DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 133 839 95 EA 009 082

AUTHOR	Doyle, Wayne
TITLE	The Birth, Nurturance and Transformation of an Educational Reform.
INSTITUTION	Northwest Regional Educational Lab., Portland, Oreg.
SPONS AGENCY	National Inst. of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	Aug 76
CONTRACT	OEC-0-71-4751
NOTE	322p.
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.83 HC-$16.73 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Community Involvement; Curriculum; *Educational Change; *Educational Innovation; Elementary Secondary Education; *Evaluation Methods; *Federal Programs; Governance; Organization; *Program Descriptions; *Program Evaluation; School Systems
IDENTIFIERS	*Experimental Schools Program

ABSTRACT

Chapter 1 of this report on the implementation and evaluation of the Experimental Schools Program (ESP) in the Jefferson School District provides a brief geographical, demographic, historical, and economic overview of the district. Chapters 2 and 3 provide data of a historical and developmental nature, as well as data on the overall purposes and intents of ESP at the national and local levels. Chapters 4 through 7 focus on district elements at which the ESP was targeted, in terms both of the rhetoric contained in the proposal and the district's implementation efforts. Data were gathered on the way district functionaries made decisions and managed the project, on relationships with the community, on curricular and instructional matters, and on the internal evaluation unit. Chapter 8 is a summary and synthesis that provides a macroscopic view of the project. The last chapter deals with general implications. The appendices are divided into sections that cover the general methodology employed in the external evaluation of the Jefferson project, list interim reports that provide more technical and indepth information on components of the project, and list the objectives of the project. (Author/IRT)

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ED133839

THE BIRTH, NURTURANCE AND TRANSFORMATION OF AN EDUCATIONAL REFORM

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Experimental Schools Evaluation Project
Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory
August 1976

EA 009 072

Published by the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, a private nonprofit corporation. The work contained herein has been developed pursuant to Contract No. OEC-0-71-4751 with the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the position of the National Institute of Education, and no official endorsement by the Institute should be inferred.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to express their gratitude not only to the host of people who contributed in many ways to this document, but also to those who provided information, guidance, support, technical assistance, understanding and patience during the time this research and evaluation team was working in the J ESP--essentially the last four years of the project.

First, the students, teachers, administrators, evaluation personnel, support personnel and parents of the Jefferson School District are to be commended for their willingness to welcome a group of external evaluators into their midst. They cooperated fully with us in every way. We scrutinized their activities on a daily basis by visiting their buildings, classrooms, offices and meeting places; they responded to our countless questions candidly and cheerfully; they filled in numerous survey instruments and gave much valuable time to interviewers. The Jefferson internal evaluation team not only shared data with us, but more importantly, provided us with support and understanding when we needed it most. We extend a vote of thanks to the entire Jefferson internal evaluation team and are especially grateful to the two directors.

We also recognize the important contributions of those full-time staff members of our team who were no longer present when this report was written. They include Robert Fite, Barbara Hawley-Winne, Fritz Mulhauser and Larry Reynolds.

Several consultants were used during the project and provided invaluable service to us; we are indeed indebted to them. The service of Edwin Bridges and W. W. Charters, Jr. were used most often, and we single them out for special mention.

Several people at the National Institute of Education were instrumental in providing support and technical assistance at different stages in the evaluation project. We extend special thanks to Robert Binswanger, David Budding, Jeff Schiller, Raymond Coward, Norman Gold and Russ Mullens for the confidence they placed in us, their willingness to support our efforts and for the guidance and technical assistance they provided.

Thanks are also extended to Larry Fish, Executive Director of NWREL, and Bob Rath, Associate Director, for their assistance and encouragement; to Rowan Stutz, Leo Myers, Tom Olson and Blaine Worthen, Division Directors at NWREL in Portland, who worked with us on this project; and to other NWREL staff in Portland for reviewing interim reports.

We appreciate the dedication and patience of our office staff who somehow always managed to meet the many work demands that came their way. Special recognition should go to Suzi Hettick, our first administrative secretary, to Jenel Virden, our second administrative secretary; and to Rena Atalig and

Debi Herbrand who did much of the typing for this final report as well as many interim reports.

The first draft of this report went to several reviewers for their reactions. Their comments were very valuable to us, and this final document reflects most of their concerns. Genuine appreciation is extended to the Jefferson Superintendent of Schools, the Director of the Jefferson internal evaluation team, Ray Coward, Norman Gold, Russ Mullens, Blaine Worthen, JoAnne Whitmore, Leo Myers, Edwin Bridges and Donald Erickson (who later wrote the Prologue to this report). Finally, we wish to acknowledge the contributions of Janet Crist-Whitzel and Vicki Spandel in editing this document.

At the same time that we recognize the many contributions of others, the authors take full responsibility for this document and for any of its shortcomings.

PROLOGUE TO THE ANATOMY OF A RUBBER DUCK

This report should be studied by every student of educational organization and administration, and particularly by anyone, in the nation's capital or elsewhere, who hopes to induce reform in school systems.

Doyle and his associates provide here a resounding addition to our pitifully sparse bookshelf (Smith and Keith's Anatomy of Educational Innovation, Wolcott's Man in the Principal's Office, and not much more) of richly elaborated, thoroughly documented descriptions of the dynamics of school systems as complex organizations. In the process the authors appear to demonstrate tha federal techniques for inducing change are still in the primitive change especially when viewed in the light of Sarason's The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change. Given the lack of reliable descriptive materials on school system functioning, despite two decades of research on innovation and change agentry, I am not surprised. Of course, the resistance of school systems to change has been documented many times over; in this respect, nothing particularly new is said. What is added is the description, the attempt to discover, not merely whether there is resistance to change, but why. And in contrast to some previous purported descriptions, little more than scattered evidence strung together with impressionistic tape, this report is based upon several years of painstaking, cross-checking documentation by a multi-disciplinary team. In terms of money and human effort, the pages that follow are extremely expensive, but as an approach to allaying our naivete about change in school systems, I think they are unusually cost-effective. Perhaps the report will soon be recognized, not only as the significant product of the entire Experimental Schools Program which it describes, but as one of the small handful of documents that notably expand our comprehension of how educational organizations operate. In contrast, I consider the bulk of studies on this topic, heavily weighted as they are toward increasingly intricate statistical manipulations to test inanely ungrounded hypotheses, a waste of the researchers' and readers' time. Our field seems to be learning, very slowly, that we cannot get far by massaging indices whose meaning we understand dimly, if at all.

I am particularly impressed by two complementary qualities in the report. On the one hand, the authors report with principled candor much information which, while important to the advancement of knowledge, will win few new friends. Some scholars would have omitted it. On the other hand, they make extensive attempts to provide an interpretation that is balanced and fair, giving local and national personnel whose work they are evaluating the benefit of every positive conclusion they can ferret out. Some authors would have been brutal, given the same evidence.

But to end on the theme with which I began, the most important aspect of this study, in my view, is not the interpretation, impressive as it is, but the exceedingly rare descriptive material. With data of this type available, scholars can develop grounded theory independently of the authors who produce the data. The evidence suggests many interpretations to me that I expect to weigh for considerable time to come. I have thought, for example, of the metaphor of the school system as a rubber duck, capable of being stretched and pulled into many reformist shapes, but rapidly reverting to its customary form whenever the pressure of federal dollars or other change agentry is reduced. I may eventually abandon my half-facetious rubber duck model, Doyle and other team members may some day change their minds about certain conclusions that have been drawn, and other scholars may find yet other meanings. But at last we are acquiring a basis more reliable than impressionistic reports, conventional wisdom, or speculation on which to erect a theoretical superstructure for scholars and a reasonably reliable technology for administrators and school reformers. I view the Doyle report as a major landmark. With a little luck, perhaps it will also be a harbinger of a much-needed methodological revolution in our research.

Donald A. Erickson

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INTRODUCTION

The major impetus behind the establishment of the Experimental Schools Program (ESP) at the federal level came from the failure of many promising educational innovations to produce significant results. Most innovations had attempted to change only one or two components within a system. The architects of ESP, along with many other educators and researchers, questioned the strategy of such a piecemeal approach, suggesting that the implementation of educational innovations might best be facilitated through a comprehensive change strategy. They hypothesized that systemic change, oriented toward a particular educational theme, would produce significant positive effects. The ESP was to serve as a bridge between basic educational research and actual school practices.

Although the ESP was not activated until December 1970, programs were to be operational in the schools by September 1971. Initial competition led to the funding of projects in three school districts, one of which was Jefferson. These three projects involved more than 11,000 students. Each attempted to combine diverse practices into a comprehensive educational program which included changes in curriculum and instruction, staffing, organization, and degree of community involvement with the schools. Each Experimental Schools site was funded for five years (initially for 30 months, followed by additional funding for the final 30 months).

A second round of competition in March 1971 led to funding of operational projects in two more districts in September 1972. These five systems were joined in September 1973 by ten rural districts and three street academies. As a result the ESP eventually involved more than 25,000 students in 18 districts.

A major concern was the documentation and evaluation of the activities of each project. This report describes the results of such activities conducted by an external evaluation team at one ESP site--the Jefferson School District (JSD). The remainder of the introduction includes a brief discussion of evaluation issues, the reporting scheme used, and the organization of this final report.

A Methodological Note

Evaluation methodology and the approach used in this setting are discussed in detail in Appendix A. In addition, a capsule of that information is presented here: first, the general role which evaluation played in the Experimental Schools Program and what that meant operationally; and second, the role of external evaluation.

Evaluation in General

ESP architects were not only critical of existing approaches to funding programs designed to promote change in schools, but also questioned the role evaluation had typically played in assessing the value of such programs. They felt evaluation should be no less comprehensive than the program of change and should serve as an analytical counterpart to that program. This meant evaluation would serve a broader function than simply assessing program impact. First of all, evaluation would provide constant feedback to facilitate informed decision making at the local level. Second, this new approach to evaluation would provide information of much value in identifying and analyzing problems encountered in implementing innovations. In addition to providing summative impact data, evaluation would generate data on all aspects of the change effort, thereby yielding some insight into problems associated with planned change. Third, evaluation would provide general information emanating from the comparisons of common programs, problems, and issues across sites. ESP architects reasoned that in fulfilling this broader role, the evaluation effort would need to assume a new character. Specifically, evaluation was to occur on three levels.

At the first level, an internal evaluation unit (Level I) was established to give the local district a formative evaluation capacity. This integral part of the change process is discussed in Chapter VII. The second level (Level II) was also site specific, but evaluation was to be conducted by an external contractor independent of the school district. The proposed cross-site evaluation (Level III) never materialized.

Level II Evaluation

The contract for the external evaluation of the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project (J ESP) was awarded to the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory (NWREL). At the beginning of the project, in the summer of 1971, the Laboratory placed an evaluation team in the district. An independent unit, the team reported to the funding agency through NWREL--not to the district. Because the external evaluation was not to influence the project, reports were not shared with the district; however, all reports will be shared with district personnel at the end of the project. The district's own evaluation capacity, represented in the Level I evaluation unit, provided information on which to base informed decisions. Over a period of five years the membership of the external evaluation team fluctuated from as few as six members to a maximum of thirteen. Since the Level II evaluation team was to document the total project effort, as well as assess outcomes, both qualitative and quantitative data were needed. Consequently, the team was staffed with individuals of varied backgrounds whose training equipped them to gather and analyze data through diverse methodologies.

In one respect, the charge of the Experimental Schools Evaluation Program (ESEP) architects was clear. Do not employ an existing evaluation methodological design;

instead, develop a new design to address not only project impact but also to document what happens as the Jefferson schools implement the project. This documentation was to serve as a basis for identifying and explaining any problems and issues encountered. On the other hand, ESP planners did not specify what evaluation design was to be used. Consequently, we were confronted with the challenging and difficult task of developing an evaluation plan which met client needs as well as our own, and satisfied the demands of the research and evaluation community for scientific rigor. In addition, while assessing impact and identifying and analyzing implementation problems and issues that the district encountered, we wanted to refrain from appraising non-events insofar as possible. We asked ourselves two questions: (1) What characteristics of traditional models caused such disenchantment with evaluation among educators and even some evaluators? and (2) What kind of model could halt the widespread criticism of evaluation and also satisfy the needs referred to above? The following paragraph questions some assumptions made in traditional evaluation designs and the utility of those models.

Historically, evaluative researchers have relied primarily on mathematical models (the traditional research models of contemporary sociology and psychology) to judge the success or failure of educational programs. Heavy emphasis has been placed on testing for outcomes (usually intended outcomes as stated in proposals and often subscribed to only by the writers of such proposals). Anticipated change in outcomes has usually been defined in terms of achievement, attitude, sentiment, and self-image and has taken the form of criterion variables with minimal attention given to treatment variables.[1] Evaluators have established a reputation for focusing on ends, as stated by program developers or derived by evaluators while all but ignoring means. This is not to say that the importance of treatment variables has not been recognized. What we are questioning is the notion that such recognition is sufficient. Having recognized the importance of treatment variables, evaluators often adopt the stance that differences within treatments are random, and thus it is perfectly legitimate and rational to proceed. Consequently, as Charters and Jones have pointed out, evaluative researchers expend much time, energy and fiscal resources testing the impact of non-events.[2] This approach to evaluation, which is too narrow in focus and has limited evaluator's ability to do more than speculate about program results, led to the state of general dissatisfaction of those being evaluated. The subsequent paragraphs cover general issues related to development of a more inclusive evaluation model.

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[1] We are not referring here to the characteristics (such as IQ) of the population targeted for change, but to process or treatment variables that occur as a result of implementation.

[2] W. W. Charters, Jr. and J. E. Jones, "On the Risk of Appraising Non-Events in Program Evaluation," Educational Researcher, 2:11, November 1973.

An evaluation design was needed that did not minimize the importance of investigating outcome variables, but elevated the importance of implementation variables in judging program merit by subjecting the latter to empirical analysis. We wanted to address the question: How well are they (the targeted populations) doing what they are doing? and not concentrate on events which were not actually occurring. We needed to discover what ESP was by addressing the following questions: How did the ESP work? Why did the ESP take the form that it did? How well did ESP work? We believed that the "how well" question could not be addressed meaningfully without addressing the companion question: How did it work? Answering the "why" question could help explain how planned change works.

The present team is composed of different personnel from those on the original team. Nevertheless, data gathered by the first evaluators, together with the observations made by new team members during the summer and fall of 1972, unquestionably indicated that the ESP was not being implemented as suggested in the formal doctrine. Consequently, the what and why questions assumed even greater importance; it was quite apparent that it was risky to assume any degree of consonance between reality and rhetoric. Unless our evaluation was congruent with the state of the innovation, we would end up with much useless data. It would be necessary, therefore, to gather several kinds of data and to combine qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Though many details are reserved for Appendix A, the kinds of data gathered and the sources of such data are noted here.

Data were gathered from central office administrators; principals and assistant principals; classroom teachers; students; officers and members of the Jefferson Education Association (JEA); Board of Education members, both past and present; secretaries; parents and other community people; officials of local universities; state education association officials; state department of education officials; and members of the intervention agency, as well as other people in USOE (U.S. Office of Education) and NIE (National Institute of Education). The data came from letters; memos; reports; fieldnotes from meetings, classrooms and follow-up interviews; fieldnotes from less obtrusive settings such as teachers' lounges and athletic events; structured and unstructured interviews; records; surveys and tests. Most student test data were collected in conjunction with Level I.

The Reporting Scheme

It should be made clear what this report is not before presenting the reporting scheme. First, we do not document and evaluate all of the activities of the members of the Jefferson School District throughout the life of the project. Such an undertaking was not feasible and perhaps unnecessary, since not all aspects of schooling in Jefferson were targeted for change or became an integral part of ESP. Consequently, it is not an all inclusive report on everything that took place during the project, and we have made no judgments about the overall success or shortcomings of schooling in Jefferson. Second, this is not a technical report of how specific innovations succeeded or did not succeed in the five-year Jefferson Experimental Schools Project. Such technical and detailed information was presented in interim reports, which were used in preparing this document. The function of such supportive reports has been to provide a microscopic view of elements within the ESP. They provide a major reference source for this report, and a list appears in Appendix B for those readers who are interested in additional information on specific aspects of the program.

The technical interim reports provided a close-up of specific ESP elements within a larger context. This document excerpts salient aspects of those magnified close-ups, and presents them as a less magnified empirical base on which a more macroscopic view of ESP can be superimposed (i. e., a way of "putting it all together"). In essence, the reporting scheme is pyramidal, with the interim reports providing a micro view, and this report providing mid-range and macro views of the program. Such a reporting scheme permits us to utilize a broad empirical base of a technical nature. This base is derived from our previous studies which have been carefully scrutinized for scientific rigor by several scholars. Information from these studies are presented in this report in a non-technical manner in order to appeal to a variety of audiences. It is hoped that this report will be read by personnel from both local and federal sites who were directly involved in the program, as well as by teachers and administrators in other systems who are potential adopters of planned change; people who study stability and change; people who teach about planned change in colleges and universities; people who measure the impact of planned change; people in agencies which fund programs of planned change; people who make broad policy; and people who appropriate funds to promote education reform.

It is neither feasible nor informative to tell the story of the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project without taking into account the role of the agency which funded and monitored the local program. Consequently, this report explains how a federal funding agency, the National Institute of Education,[3] and a local education agency, the Jefferson School District, together planned and nurtured a program of change over a period of five years. Their agreement created diverse sets of expectations among the organizational participants of both institutions. It was abundantly clear that if the Jefferson School District adopted and implemented all programs and procedures referred to in the proposal document, it would be changed drastically by the end of the intervention. On the other hand, if few were adopted and implemented, it would be basically the same at the end of the intervention.

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[3] The USOE originally funded and monitored the Experimental Schools Project through August 1972, at which time it was transferred to the National Institute of Education under supervision of the same personnel.

Organization of This Report

Chapter I, Description of the Jefferson School District, is designed to give the reader at least a minimal understanding of the general character of Jefferson prior to the Experimental Schools Project. This chapter provides a brief geographical, demographic, historical and economic overview of the district. Those aspects of the setting which help to illuminate what happened during the project are dealt with in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

The formal doctrine of the Experimental Schools Program at both the national and local levels, is the subject of Chapters II and III. More often than not, the rhetoric of planned change is one thing and the reality of planned change is quite another. However, the rhetoric must not be ignored if one is to judge the relative success of the project in view of the intent. More importantly, the genesis, contact, planning, and negotiation stages at all levels are integral parts of the project and must be examined to understand why the project took the form it did. Chapters II and III provide data of a historical and developmental nature, as well as data on the overall purposes and intents of the Experimental Schools Program at the national and local levels.

Chapters IV through VII cover the implementation stage of the project--the reality of the Experimental Schools Project in Jefferson as it unfolded over the life of the project. These chapters represent the mid-range view alluded to in the reporting scheme. These chapters focus on those elements within the district at which the ESP was targeted, in terms of both the rhetoric contained in the proposal and the district's implementation efforts. Data were gathered on the way district functionaries made decisions and managed the project (Chapter IV); on relationships with the community (Chapter V); on curricular and instructional matters, as well as classroom staffing and training (Chapter VI); and on the internal evaluation unit (Chapter VII).

Chapter VIII, the Summary and Synthesis, provides a macroscopic view of the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project. The separate but related elements are integrated into a single section, and the story of the intervention is presented in its totality. Up to that point in the report we treat the major components of the intervention as parts of a whole. Although there are many cross references in the report and various data are used freely across components to support points, at no time has there been any full scale effort to present the project in its totality by combining the component parts. Chapter VIII also attempts to explain why the project took the form it did.

The last chapter deals with general implications. The pragmatic implications of what happens when an external agency provides the funds and works cooperatively with an ongoing school system to bring educational reform to that system should be both interesting and informative to a variety of audiences.

The appendices are divided into three sections. Appendix A presents the general methodology employed in the external evaluation of the J ESP. Interim reports which provide more technical and indepth information on component parts of the project are listed in Appendix B. Those reports referred to in this work have been placed in the ERIC system. Appendix C lists objectives of the J ESP.

CHAPTER I

A DESCRIPTION OF THE JEFFERSON SCHOOL DISTRICT

I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE JEFFERSON SCHOOL DISTRICT[1]

This brief description of the Jefferson School District (JSD) setting provides a contextual background for the more detailed discussions which follow. The primary purpose of this chapter is to give a brief geographical, demographic, historical, and economic overview of the district, just prior to the implementation of the Experimental Schools Program (ESP). Later chapters will discuss the pre-ESP setting in more detail.

A. Description of the Community

1. Geographical Location and Description

The Jefferson School District is located in the southern part of a populous region in the northwest state of Pacific. It encompasses slightly over 19 square miles between Mountain View, a city of approximately 150,000 people,[2] and a rural farming, dairying, logging, and recreational region. The county in which it is located had a 1970 population of over 400,000. The neighboring county to the north had a population of over one million, centering around the large city of Seaview. The Jefferson School District is located a half-hour's drive from the state capital. It is situated near the northwest's two largest military bases, and is bordered by a major multi-lane interstate freeway.

Two small private universities enrolling about 3,000 students each are located in the Mountain View metropolitan area--one several miles from the district and the other within the western part of the Jefferson School District, only a few blocks from the district's central offices. In addition, there are two community colleges and two public technical-vocational institutions in the Mountain View metropolitan area.

The western third of the district is a residential area largely suburban in nature. Dividing the western third and the eastern two-thirds of the district is a narrow section which largely resembles a strip city along a major north-south arterial extending north to Mountain View. The eastern part of the district is less densely populated and is largely semi-rural in character from approximately one-quarter mile east of the arterial and beyond. Residential development in the district has been helter-skelter. Many homes are old and in disrepair, and it is not uncommon to see a small, poorly built house next to a large well kept home. There are a few typically suburban tracts of newer homes, mostly in the southeast section of the district. Apartment complexes and mobile home courts are concentrated along the strip city area, convenient both to the military installations and the university.

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[1] Pseudonyms are used throughout this report in text, questions, and references for the school district, the surrounding cities and the state to preserve anonymity for the district. Jefferson School District is sometimes abbreviated as JSD.

[2] Population statistics came from the 1970 census, as reported in D. F. Eixenberger, "Community Profile of the Jefferson School District," Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, (NWREL), July 13, 1973.

2. Population

According to the 1970 census, slightly over 30,000 people--7.4 percent of the county residents--resided in the Jefferson School District. The population has been predominantly white, young, and blue collar. Blacks accounted for only slightly over 1 percent of the district's population and 4.5 percent of the county's, much less than in the U.S. as a whole, which was 11 percent black.[3] In 1970, persons 19 years old and younger represented a larger proportion of the district population than of either the county or the national population.[4] Family size in both the district and county was nearly equal to the national average. However, a larger proportion of the population of the district was of elementary and secondary school age than in either the county or the nation.[5]

Blue collar workers (craftsmen, operatives, transport, non-farm laborers) represented 40 percent of the working population, a larger proportion than for the county (35 percent) and the nation (36 percent); whereas professional and managerial workers (upper white collar) accounted for less, 20 percent of the employed population in the district, compared with 24 percent for the county and 23 percent for the nation. Average total income was lower for both families and unrelated individuals in the district than in either the county or the nation.[6] The entire area encompassing the populous two-county region around Mountain View and the large city to the north suffered from a high unemployment rate in the economic recession in the early 1970's, with peak rates in 1971 of 13 percent and 11.2 percent in the two major cities, compared with 5.9 percent in the nation at that time.[7] In a survey of the Jefferson community in 1973, 10.5 percent of the respondents reported that they were employed fewer months than normal in the previous year.

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[3] Data were not available on minorities other than blacks, but school officials estimated that all racial minorities accounted for less than 4 percent of the population. 1970 census data and other data describing the population in this section are taken from D. F. Eixenberger, "Community Profile."

[4] This age group accounted for 42 percent of the district's population, compared with 38 percent for the county and 37 percent for the nation. The next highest age group, ages 20 through 44, represented a larger proportion of the population in both Jefferson School District and the county (35 percent in each) than in the U.S. (32 percent).

[5] For families with children under 18 there was an average of 2.3 children in both the district and the county, comparable to the national average of 2.5. Thirty-three percent of the district's population was of school age (elementary or secondary), compared with 30 percent in the county and 29 percent in the nation.

The school district and the county as a whole both contained a relatively transient population compared with the total U.S. In 1970 almost one-fourth of the Jefferson residents (and even more in the county) had lived outside their Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (the county in this case) five years earlier, compared with only 17 percent for the nation. The western area of the district--which includes the university and borders the military bases--had a higher transiency rate and a lower average income than the rest of the district. The military associated population and students at the university probably contributed to the high transiency rate in Jefferson School District. The university students may also have accounted for the low income for unrelated individuals; the lowest income for this category of residents was in the area surrounding the university. Within the district, the west-side schools--which were to become the initial district participants in the ESP--drew from the Jefferson population with the lowest average income and the highest transiency.

3. Community Characteristics

The Jefferson School District lacks an economic center; it has no industry or commerce of its own. The greatest concentration of businesses is along the north-south arterial dividing the district, and these are primarily convenience or service related. A community survey conducted in 1973 showed that 73 percent of employed persons living in the district worked outside the district.[8]

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[6] The mean total 1969 income of all families (excluding unrelated individuals) in Jefferson was $10,358, which was $715 less than in the county and $641 less than the U.S. as a whole. For unrelated individuals, the average total income was $2,998, $430 less than the county and $891 less than the national average.

[7] Unemployment figures were obtained from the Pacific State Unemployment Security Department, as reported in D. F. Eixenberger, "Community Profile."

[8] All information in this section was reported in D. F. Eixenberger, "Community Profile."

The major industries in the immediate metropolitan area, as listed by the Mountain View Chamber of Commerce, are metallurgical smelting and refining, manufacture of forest products, chemical and machine production, shipping, and boat building. None of these are located near the school district. The area is also affected by the large aerospace industry centered in the neighboring county; cutbacks in this industry contributed to the high unemployment rates reported earlier. The largest employers located within Jefferson are the school district and the local university. The nearby military bases also employ many district residents. Other employers within the district are the convenience-oriented businesses along the strip city area.

There is no local governmental structure other than fire districts and the school system. The major county, state, and federal agencies are located in the adjacent city, Mountain View. No organization exists to channel and integrate the diverse needs and interests of individuals and groups within the district. Residents of the area generally have not become involved in political or local issues. Other than several civic and social organizations (such as Kiwanis. American Legion, VFW, Optimists, Scouts, 4-H Clubs, and the Grange) and a number of churches, there is very little large-scale organizational activity knitting residents together. The only recent controversial public issue which mobilized residents was the creation of a sewer district encompassing a large part of the Jefferson School District and an adjacent district, which together had formed one of the most heavily populated unsewered areas in the nation.

The voting constituency of the district has been heavily Democratic and, except for the presidential election in 1972, voters in the Jefferson area have strongly supported Democratic candidates at all levels of state and national government. An examination of voting records from 1968 to 1972 on selected issues showed that Jefferson voters, as well as those from the county as a whole, were not prone to voting for social change. Measures relating to lowering the voting age to 19 and establishing sex equality failed soundly, along with one excess levy measure and a community college bond measure. Measures on real estate non-discrimination and on changes in the abortion law, although passed, barely received a majority. However, district residents consistently passed school levies (but at low levy rates) from 1966 to 1971 with an average yes vote of 73 percent, even in the face of rising property valuations and at a time when passage of levies had become increasingly difficult throughout the state.

The lack of an economic center, local governmental structure, and organizational cohesiveness, coupled with the high proportion of residents working outside the area, depict the district as a bedroom community for a predominantly working class population.

B. Description of the School District

1. History, Enrollment, and Facilities

The school district originated with the consolidation of four elementary schools into a high school district in 1949-50. Prior to the consolidation, students had attended grades 1 through 9 at these four elementary schools, then transferred to three different high schools outside the local area. From 4 elementary schools, approximately 2,500 students, and 72 certified staff in 1950, the Jefferson district steadily grew until it reached its peak enrollment in 1970 with over 8,300 elementary and secondary students. It then faced a gradual yearly decline of 1 to 3 percent, which continued during the years of the ESP.[9] In the spring of 1971, just prior to the ESP, the district had approximately 8,200 students in the nine elementary, two junior high and two senior high schools, and employed 378 certificated staff.

2. East-Side and West-Side Schools

Four elementary schools, including one of the original four, and the newest junior high and senior high schools are located in the western, more densely populated part of the district. The other five elementary schools (including three of the original four) and the initial high school and junior high school are located in the less densely populated, semi-rural eastern part of the district.[10] The thirteen schools are physically dispersed, situated at twelve separate sites: the newest (west-side) high school and junior high school share a site, although the physical facilities are separated; the original (east-side) high school and junior high school, although separated only by a freeway and linked by a bridge, effectively occupy separate sites. The central administrative offices are located at a separate site in the western part of the district. There is greater physical dispersion among the school sites in the eastern part of the district, which covers a larger area and is less densely populated. Physical dispersion within the district is accentuated by the lack of public transportation.

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[9] Statistics on student enrollment and staff size were taken from the district's annual reports to the Board of Education, 1970-71 through 1974-75. Also from internal district newsletter, October 15, 1975.

[10] The district built the first high school and two new elementary schools (one west-side, one east-side) between 1951 and 1955, the first junior high and two more elementary schools (both west-side) during the 1956-60 period, the second junior high and the last elementary schools (east-side) between 1961 and 1965, and the second high school in 1969. In each of these five-year periods, the district also made additions to at least two existing buildings. F. Mulhauser, "Report to Mr. J. Schiller," NWREL, May 9, 1973.

In May 1971, just prior to ESP, the district's enrollment report indicated the number of students per elementary building ranged from approximately 380 to 680. The two junior high schools each enrolled over 800, and the two senior high schools each had approximately 1,000 students. From district enrollment report, May 3, 1971.

3. Student Population

Because of the transient nature of the district's population, the school district has been faced with a correspondingly high transiency among its students. A student entry and withdrawal survey conducted by the district to examine how many students entered and left during the school year showed that in 1967-68 (the last year for which such figures were available) an average of nearly 33 percent of the elementary students either enrolled in or withdrew from their school during the school year (there was an average of nearly 16 percent entering and 17 percent leaving). The west-side schools had the highest percentage of students entering and leaving: 42 percent compared with 26 percent in east-side schools.[11]

Post-secondary education of Jefferson students can be illustrated by survey results of graduating seniors in 1970 and 1971. After graduation from high school in 1970, approximately 17 percent of the 460 students (all seniors in the district attended the initial high school at that time) were in four-year colleges and universities the following fall and an additional 23 percent were in two-year colleges, for a total of 40 percent attending college.[12] This percentage was considerably less than the nationwide figure of 58 percent of all high school students entering college that year.[13] Another 10 percent attended vocational institutions. In a similar follow-up, approximately 30 percent of the 242 graduates of the second (west-side) high school in 1971 were enrolled that fall in four-year colleges, with 15 percent in two-year colleges (a total of 45 percent); another 4 percent more were enrolled in vocational institutions.

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[11] The four west-side elementary schools averaged 19 percent new entries and nearly 23 percent withdrawals in 1967-68 (entries ranging from 17 percent to 27 percent and withdrawals ranging from 21 percent to 27 percent, percentages based on October 1 base enrollments), whereas the five east-side schools averaged 13 percent for both new entries and withdrawals (entries ranging from 10 percent to 17 percent and withdrawals ranging from 9 percent to 17 percent). West-side schools had a total average of entries and withdrawals of 42 percent (ranging from 37 percent to 53 percent), while the east-side schools had a total average of 26 percent (ranging from 19 percent to 34 percent). Figures were lower for secondary students. Corresponding figures over a six-year period, 1962-63 through 1967-68, showed a very consistent pattern, with the six-year averages being nearly identical to those for 1967-68. JSD, "Student Entry and Withdrawal Survey," 1968-69.

[12] Jefferson School District statistics were taken from F. Mulhauser, "Report to Mr. J. Schiller," pp. 31-32.

4. Staffing Patterns

The first two district superintendents occupied the position eight years apiece. Each had been a principal in one of the original schools before consolidation and each had been involved in local education at least 20 years at the time of consolidation. The first superintendent died in 1958, whereupon the assistant superintendent became superintendent.[14] The current superintendent, the third in the district, arrived in 1966 from a California school district where he was an assistant superintendent and director of research. In searching for a new superintendent, the school board was committed to bringing in an outsider, and the present superintendent was selected particularly for his grantsmanship, according to one board member.[15]

Like many other districts in the state, Jefferson had only a small administrative staff.[16] Therefore, personnel tended to perform multiple rather than specialized functions. Just prior to the implementation of the ESP, the central administration of the district was composed of five professional administrators (including one woman and no racial minorities) in addition to the superintendent: an assistant superintendent, with responsibilities for personnel administration, business management and various support services; an administrative assistant for business affairs; an administrative assistant for secondary education; a director of elementary education; and a director of vocational education--transportation and summer school. In addition, there was a director of special education with centralized responsibilities, and a corps of special education teachers who worked under centralized supervision, rather than under the supervision of the principals in whose buildings they taught. The central administrative office also included slightly more than a dozen technical and clerical positions (bookkeeper, payroll, purchasing and account clerks, printer, telephone operators, and secretaries).

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[13] L. Parker, "Puzzling Decline in Test Scores Being Probed." The Seaview Times, Thursday, November 20, 1975.

[14] F. Mulhauser, "Report to Mr. J. Schiller," p. 24.

[15] D. F. Eixenberger, Fieldnotes, Interview with a member of the school board, July 1972. In the Addendum to the district's January 14, 1971 letter of interest to USOE (U. S. Office of Education) concerning the ESP (five years after the superintendent came to JSD) the superintendent was listed as an author of more than a dozen federal and state projects in innovation.

[16] In 1973-74 (the third year of the ESP) central administrative staff in Jefferson comprised 3.8 percent of the certificated staff, compared with a median of 2.6 percent for all first class districts in the state, defined as districts with a population of 10,000 or more (range: 1.1 to 5.1 percent). Unit administrators accounted for 7.4 percent, compared with a median of 6.9 percent for the state (range: 4.5 to 7.6 percent). Pacific State Research Council, Monthly Report, State Capital, April 1975.

In 1970-71, the district employed 378 certificated personnel. Taking into account the ratio of non-classroom to classroom certified staff, there were 319 classroom teachers and 59 non-classroom certified personnel.[17] The adult-student ratio (including all certified personnel) was approximately 22 to 1; the approximate ratio of students per classroom teacher was 26 to 1.[18]

The district has had a homogeneous and stable staff. A survey conducted in fall 1975 by the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory (NWREL) Level II evaluation staff showed that well over half the certificated staff of the district received bachelors degrees at schools within a 50-mile radius of the district. Furthermore, over 40 percent of the staff attended high school in the county or in two nearby counties. According to the survey, 245 out of 310 teachers surveyed (approximately 77 percent of the 1970-71 teaching staff) were in the district five years earlier, the year prior to ESP. Sixty percent of these 245 teachers had taught only in Jefferson. Thus, only 40 percent had taught in more than one school district, compared with nearly 55 percent of the state teachers sampled in a state education association 1970-71 survey and nearly 52 percent of the teachers in a National Education Association (NEA) survey of a national sample of teachers the same year.[19] Nearly 53 percent of those with experience in other districts (21 percent of the 245 teachers) had taught seven or more years in Jefferson. Forty-four percent of the 245 teachers surveyed in 1975 who were in the district in 1970-71 had taught in the district seven or more years. Nearly 9 percent had been in the district since it was established in 1949-50.

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[17] The ratio of certificated non-classroom personnel to each 100 classroom teachers in 1970-71 was 18.6, which ranked Jefferson 25 among the 70 first class districts in the state, with a median ratio of 17.4 to 100. Pacific State Research Council, Monthly Report, State Capital, May 1971.

[18] The 1970-71 staffing statistics were taken from the district's annual report to the Board of Education, 1970-71.

[19] Status of the Pacific Public School Teacher, 1970-71, Research Department, Pacific Education Association, Seaview, 1971. Status of the American Public School Teacher, 1970-71, Research Division, National Education Association, 1972.

Administrators had an even higher tenure in the district. Four of the central office professional staff members had been employed in the district since the late 1940's or early 1950's. The superintendent, director of special education, and administrative assistant for business were comparatively new to the district, having come in 1966, 1969, and 1971, respectively.[20] As of the beginning of the ESP in fall 1971, all 4 secondary principals had been employed in the district since the time of consolidation in the early 1950's. Among the 9 elementary principals, 5 had been in the district since the late 1940's or early 1950's and had been principals 10 or more years; 2 had started teaching in the district in the early 1960's and had just been appointed principals; and the other 2 had been recruited as principals from other districts in the state--one in 1965 and the other at the beginning of the ESP (the latter replaced a principal who had been in the district since the late 1940's). Even considering the new administrators, the average tenure of all central office administrators and principals was over 15 years, in a district that had only been organized for 21 years.[21] Most administrators were at the top of the salary scale for their positions.

As an additional indicator of staff homogeneity, there have been many instances of relatives working within the district. For example, one central office administrator's husband was an elementary principal, and another's wife taught in the district; the wives of three other principals, the brother of a fifth principal, and the wife of the district's music director were also teachers. Other examples, included the wife of one principal leaving the district just prior to the ESP who became an administrative assistant in the district during the ESP, and two brothers who occupied key positions in the transportation department.

5. Instruction

Just prior to the ESP, instruction in the district could be characterized as a traditional, graded system, with group centered instruction; elementary schools were organized in self-contained classrooms, and secondary schools were departmentalized with five or six periods per day. The school year typically consisted of 180 regular structured days, with summer school available for selected students.[22] The west-side junior high school's mode of instruction varied from large groups to seminar groups and the school had just completed a four-year experiment (funded through USOE) with an electronic student response system in large group instruction.[23] One of the east-side elementary schools participated as a pilot school for IPI (Individually Prescribed Instruction) from 1969-72--this individualized program predated the ESP.[24] The west-side senior high school, built in 1969, opened with a new 4-1-4 plan, based on two four-month semesters and an interim month of non-credit interest courses.[25] With these three exceptions, the typical pattern of instruction was traditional.

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[20] Even though the superintendent was a relative newcomer to the district, in terms of personnel tenure, nevertheless his five-year tenure in the district was one year more than the average tenure of superintendents in the nation. By the end of the five-year ESP the district's superintendent had a tenure of 10 years, well above twice the four-year average tenure reported by Dr. Louis Zeyen, Executive Director of the National Academy of School Executives, American Association of School Administrators (personal communication with D. R. Pierce, August 2, 1974).

[21] Data on administrators were derived from the fall 1975 survey by NWREL and from the employment dates listed on a district certificated personnel listing of May 3, 1974.

6. District Funding and Finance

Revenue for the general fund was derived from a myriad of local, county, state, and federal sources. The proportion of total monies received by the district from each source changed annually, but followed a trend over the years prior to the project in which the state and county proportion had decreased (from 71.3 percent in 1967-68 to 67.4 percent in 1970-71), while the local and federal proportions had increased (from 21.6 percent and 7.1 percent in 1967-68 to 23.2 percent and 9.4 percent respectively in 1970-71). Decreases in the state proportion necessitated a heavier reliance on alternative sources if the district was to maintain the level of services annually provided. Calling upon local sources for increased operating revenue meant that the district, with one of the lowest assessed valuations in the state,[26] had to submit progressively larger special tax levies to the voters annually. The special levy approach grew more tenuous each year, as levies failed in surrounding districts with increasing frequency, and Pacific voters adamantly called for relief from increasingly heavy local tax burdens. Federal sources, on the other hand, were somewhat more inviting. With the beginning of the Great Society programs of the 1960's, opportunities for federal funding increased, and federally sponsored programs spread throughout the country and within the district as well. Thus, the federal and local revenue sources played increasingly important roles in the financial solvency of the district.

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[22] Superintendent, Letter of Interest and Addendum, submitted to USOE on January 14, 1971 in response to the OE "Call for Letters of Interest."

[23] JSD, "Progress Report #3," March 15, 1972.

[24] R. M. Toepper, "A Study of Curricular Decision Making in the Jefferson School District Experimental Schools Project," NWREL, December 1975.

[25] JSD, "Year-around Schools: 4-1-4-1," brochure, [1973].

[26] The per pupil assessed valuation for Jefferson, for taxes due in 1971, was $10,359--$4,000 below the median for all 70 first class districts in the state, ranking the district sixty-first out of seventy. Data on the district's finances were obtained from the district's annual Final Budget reports and Annual Reports of the Secretary for 1967-68 through 1970-71. Where comparisons are made with other districts, the statistics were obtained from the Research Council's Handbook, Fourth Edition, Pacific State Research Council, State Capital, 1974; and Pacific State Research Council, Monthly Report, State Capital, March 1971, May 1971, and April 1972.

The district reported a total net program cost of basic elementary and secondary programs (excluding lunchroom operations, special programs for handicapped, summer school programs, adult education, driver training, and various federal programs) of over $4,421,000 in 1967-68. It reported an annual average yearly increase of approximately $525,000 between 1967-68 and 1970-71, the year prior to ESP, when the total net program cost was nearly $5,638,000. In 1970-71, Jefferson ranked forty-sixth out of the state's seventy first class districts in reported net cost of education per pupil; the district reported a net per pupil basic program cost of $718.95, using average full-time enrollment.

Jefferson ranked twenty-first out of seventy districts in 1970-71 classroom teachers' salaries, however, with an average of $10,024 compared with the state median of $9,769. Thus, compared with other districts in the state, Jefferson ranked very low in assessed valuation, somewhat higher (but still relatively low) in cost per pupil, but relatively high in teachers' salaries, due to age and experience of staff, at the time just prior to the ESP. The district relied more heavily than other districts on state and federal sources for funding.

C. Summary

The Jefferson School District grew steadily for the first 20 years after consolidation in 1949-50; it more than tripled its enrollment and physical facilities, and increased its staff more than fivefold by 1970, when enrollment began gradually declining. At the time of ESP implementation, the district had a stable and homogeneous staff, many of whom had received most or all of their teaching experience in Jefferson. Within the small administrative component, most employees had been with the district since its inception or soon after; a notable exception was the superintendent, who had come to the district in 1966. The typical manner of instruction could be characterized as traditional, but the district had begun to implement some more innovative programs in the few years just prior to the ESP.

The district population in 1971 could be described as primarily young, white, working class, relatively transient, and experiencing a high unemployment rate.

The district's partly suburban and partly semi-rural community has sometimes been referred to as "rurban"[27]--it serves as a bedroom community for a predominantly blue collar constituency. There are few political or social organizations and no governmental structure to create any real sense of community. Having no economic center within the area and faced with low assessed property valuation, the district has relied more heavily on outside sources of funding (state and federal) than nearly all comparably sized districts in the state. Thus, the district has been in the position of actively seeking funds from these sources. In its letter of interest to the Experimental Schools Program, the district reported a five year history (since the arrival of the new superintendent) of developing innovative programs with federal and state monies.[28] Under the auspices of the U.S. Office of Education, the Experimental Schools Program, with its offer of a multi-year, multi-million dollar source of funds, promised a short-term solution to the district's financial situation, with the potential effect of establishing more long-term efficiency in its operation.

The following two chapters discuss the initiation and implementation of the ESP at the national level and the design and development of an ESP in the Jefferson School District.

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[27] D. F. Eixenberger, "Community Profile," p. 6.

[28] Superintendent, Letter of Interest and Addendum.

CHAPTER II

ESP AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

II. ESP AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

This chapter reviews the Experimental Schools Program from its conceptual origins to its implementation. The discussion traces the translation of this idea into reality from legislative deliberations, through two phases of operationalization, to the selection of sites to be funded. The chapter covers funding and selection processes at the national level and the attendant interactions between the national Experimental Schools office and Jefferson. Chapter III presents the developments of the Experimental Schools Project from the district's perspective.

A. Historical Origins

The concept of a federal program to support experimentation in education arose within the U. S. Office of Education as early as 1967; it was espoused by many, but clearly iterated by no one in particular. Under Robert Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), a review of existing literature on experimental schools was conducted early in 1969, and a task force (President's Science Advisory Committee Task Force) was appointed to survey what was being done and what should be done in the field of education by the federal government. Based upon the task force report, legislation was requested by the USOE, and authorization obtained (without funding) for fiscal year 1970. In February 1970, the Experimental Schools Program was established under an acting director, and the program became a cornerstone of the President's educational reform message of 1970.[1]

1. President's Budget Request

The President's budget request for fiscal year 1971 included a provision for funding the Experimental Schools Program within the research and training section of the HEW budget:

> For carrying out, to the extent not otherwise provided, the cooperative Research Act (except Section 4) and Section 303 of the Vocational Education Amendments of 1968, $118,329,000 of which. . . $25,000,000 shall be for

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[1] Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning, Research, and Evaluation/ Experimental Schools (DASPRE/ES), Department of Health, Education and Welfare; Memorandum to B. Martin and J. Blum, Office of Management and Budget, re: Release of Funds for the Experimental Schools Program, December 29, 1970, p. 3.

> experimental schools and remain available through June 30, 1972.[2]

Appended to the President's budget was a descriptive paragraph representing the administration's perception of the program:

> Experimental Schools--Support will be provided to test, develop, and demonstrate comprehensive new approaches to increasing the achievement of students in actual school situations. The most promising research results already available--including for example, curricular materials, different types of school organization and scheduling and new patterns of staffing--will be integrated and used in one school setting. A variety of educational approaches are under consideration, such as the community school, compensatory education, preschool programs, school and work programs, teacher career ladders, and youth-tutoring-youth.[3]

2. Legislative Deliberations

In testimony before the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, the Experimental Schools Program was depicted as having the HEW Secretary's highest priority, and as generating much enthusiasm from the President's Science Advisory Committee. The program was to provide the opportunity "...to examine closely and exhaustively viable alternatives to existing educational practices, particularly in those areas and with those children who have responded least well to existing programs."[4]

The House of Representatives cut the President's budget estimate for research and training from over $118 million to $105 million. However, in view of the emphasis placed upon the ESP by the President, Secretary of HEW, and others, the House allocated $25 million of non-earmarked funds which would allow HEW

> ...the flexibility to fund the research efforts which it consider to be the most promising, and [provide] the full

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[2] The President's budget request for FY 1971, appearing in V. E. Neimirow USOE memorandum to Mr. T. Sky, January 4, 1970, p. 2.

[3] HEW, USOE Appendix to the budget, FY 1971, p. 430.

[4] House of Representative Hearings Report #16916, March 4, 1970, p. 812.

> amount requested for the experimental schools, if they [were] judged to have the highest priority among the various projects proposed in the budget.[5]

The Senate subcommittee hearings on the appropriations bill further decreased the total allocation for research and training to slightly over $90 million, eliminating $10 million from the original $25 million ESP budget request. The Senate subcommittee felt that provisions within Title III, Elementary and Secondary Educational Act (ESEA), were sufficient to allow considerable innovative and experimental work, and thus did not, "...see the need for such a large amount for a wholly federally directed program."[6]

In subsequent deliberations, the House of Representatives subcommittee concurred with the Senate, amending the allocation for research and training to $90,077,000, with the provision that the Secretary of HEW could, "...exercise discretion as to the distribution of the total appropriation among the various activities...."[7] On August 18, 1970, Public Law 91-380 was passed, containing the provisions by which the ESP was to be financed. Using the discretionary provision allowed by Congress, Office of Education officials scheduled $12 million for the ESP during fiscal year 1971, less than one-half of the original request.

Concurrent with the lengthy legislative process, guidelines for the new experimental program were developed by the acting director's staff, while the program's conceptual framework was developed by a Policy Advisor Task Force appointed by the Acting Commissioner of Education. Both groups reported the results of their efforts to the USOE in September 1970. Late in October, the OE Commissioner Designate, Sidney Marland, appointed Robert Binswanger as ESP Director, effective upon the commissioner's own confirmation by Congress. Binswanger had served as a part-time consultant to the program until his official appointment to the OE staff on December 17, 1970, only a few days before the ESP was placed into operation.[8]

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[5] House of Representatives Report #91-996, April 9, 1970, p. 9.

[6] Senate Report #91-871, May 15, 1970, p. 14.

[7] House-Senate Conference Report #91-1306, July 15, 1970, p. 7.

[8] DASPRE/ES, Memorandum to B. Martin and J. Blum, December 29, 1970, p. 3.

B. The Conceptual Model of Comprehension

Prior educational reform efforts, rising out of the Great Society programs of the 1960's, had failed to produce significant improvements in school system operations, or in student performance, which could be documented.[9] These efforts were thought to have had little effect on the total learning environment because they were generally limited to a small segment of the total school program, representing a relatively isolated change in the educational system.[10]

In answer to the theory that piecemeal change was ineffectual and non-documentable, the ESP would

> .. serve as a bridge from research, demonstration and experimentation to actual school practice by supporting a limited number of large scale experiments of comprehensive design that have a major focus on documentation and evaluation.[11]

Comprehensiveness, used in the broader, less technical sense, was defined by the Experimental Schools' staff as ". . .accounting for or comprehending all or virtually all pertinent conditions; e.g., including at a minimum all the significant elements of a formal education program."[12] This notion reflected a view that schooling was a total program (as opposed to a set of programs) which integrated vertical and horizontal aspects of school operations, and included social, political, and cultural aspects of the community. Thus, comprehensive change came to be considered as change activities throughout all aspects of the educational system, including not only curriculum, staffing and governance, but also consideration and involvement of the community.[13]

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[9] National Institute of Education (NIE), paper titled "Description," published sometime after June 1973 (no author, no date), p. 2. Document in NIE files.

[10] Memorandum re: Release of Funds for the Experimental Schools Program, January 8, 1971, p. 3.

[11] Ibid.

[12] "Proposed Basic Program Information for Phase Two: Experimental Schools," (rough draft documentation, no author, no date), p. 6. Document in NIE files.

[13] NIE paper titled "Description," pp. 3-4.

1. Three Concepts to be Tested

The comprehensiveness model was developed as a longitudinal test of three concepts carried out in "action settings."[14] The first was the idea that a comprehensive educational change would have a synergistic effect, in that the comprehensive program's impact would be greater than the sum of each component's impact. Given compatible and mutually reinforcing components and a massive change in the total learning environment, it was believed that pupil performance would improve. To support the comprehensive change effort theory, two specific hypotheses were formulated; one anticipated an improved process resulting from changing the magnitude and possible source of resources provided for education, and the other anticipated an improved product resulting from changing the educational process.

> a) ...given the wide range of "promising practices" that now have been developed as a result of the total OE/DASPRE Research and Development effort (particularly through the [regional] Labs and R & D Centers) and by schools (particularly through Title III, ESEA), it is possible to make significant improvements in American public education by combining various of these "promising practices" in a comprehensive model.
>
> b) ...given the complex and continually developing educational needs of twentieth century Americans, significant improvements in the performance of educational institutions can only be made by a radical restructuring of the various premises on which society orders its resources for providing learning experiences for its citizens.[15]

The second concept dealt with the assumption that the model would identify and test major policy questions concerning experimental solutions within a comprehensive--as opposed to piecemeal--experiment. Major policy questions concerned cost control and the impact of professional staff quality on program outputs.

The final concept concerned the idea that the Experimental Schools model would enhance the development, refinement, and utilization of an evaluation/documentation methodology sophisticated enough to assess a comprehensive program.[16]

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[14] NIE paper titled "Description," p. 3.

[15] Memorandum re: Release of Funds for the Experimental Schools Program, January 8, 1971, p. 4. For an earlier, more general description of the comprehensive theme, see DASPRE/ES memo, December 29, 1970, pp. 1-2.

[16] Ibid., pp. 2-7.

Evaluation and documentation were to provide for the development of a theory about the process of change, grounded upward from data about the education process, and provide for the development of future recommendations regarding educational planning, programs, and policy.[17]

2. Extensive Evaluation Strategy

The impetus for evaluation and documentation of each project site was an important part of the conceptualized ESP, as evidenced by the extensive evaluation strategy proposal to document the "experiments" via a three-tiered evaluation structure.[18] First, each project's program contained a local evaluation design (Level I). Staffed by project personnel, the internal assessment was to provide "...for the basic tracking of student progress and for the collecting of vital data."[19] Tailored specifically to an individual project and its goals, the Level I evaluation unit was to provide quick feedback and enhance resident and staff participation which would aid the district in meeting objectives and improving performance.

The second tier (Level II) was an external evaluation component; i.e., a five-year evaluation carried on by an independent contractor directed towards understanding the nature of schooling and of comprehensive change. Level II was to be "...largely goal free, deriving from larger educational concerns a perspective of what to consider about the nature and performance of a given program.[20] This level was to provide formal documentation of the program, a study of the program's impact, and special studies of topics to be specified as the project progressed.

Finally, the third tier (Level III, which never materialized) was to include

> an omnibus evaluator whose activities take in all projects and all sites and whose concerns include replicability of practices and programs, assessment of the second level evaluation

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[17] NIE paper titled "Description," p. 3.

[18] The function of each evaluation level described here is iterated more specifically than may have been the case before the project was implemented at the various sites. This description of what evaluation was supposed to entail came from materials written in 1973, well after the program began. Thus, it is possible that the rhetoric presented here was developed concurrently with program implementation and not conceptualized prior to the initiation of action by ESP officials.

[19] NIE paper titled "Description," p. 6.

[20] ibid.

> activities, and the success of the Experimental Schools Program as a whole.[21]

In addition, the cross-site agency was designed to facilitate the onsite evaluation, providing feedback to assure that overall learning across projects takes place in an efficient and effective manner.

C. Operationalizing the Model: Two Phases

Placing a comprehensive change program into operation involved a compromise which produced a two-phase process.[22] For a number of reasons--none of which were reiterated in funding agency documents--members of the project staff had decided it was critical to implement local site programs by the 1971-72 school year; yet this would allow potential grantees little time for planning and preparation. Since the project director had not assumed office until December 1970, and since the selection process could take months, ESP staff stated that "...the only type of experimental school one could reasonably hope to have operational in September 1971 was one which represented a comprehensive combination of promising practice."[23] Designated Phase I, this stage of implementation was to be closely followed by a separate round of requests for proposals in Phase II, thereby allowing grantees more time for planning prior to initiating a local project.

Phase I, the implementation of operational projects in schools by September 1971, was designed to support two or three sites

> ...with emphasis on evaluation, focusing on educational reform through a comprehensive design that includes use of

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[21] David W. Budding, Director of Evaluation and Documentation, RFP 72-50, "Evaluation and Documentation of Edgewood Independent School District Project," Attachment 11, Experimental Schools Program, May 2, 1972, pp. 5-6. For more specific information, see NIE paper titled "Description," p. 6.

[22] DASPRE/ES, Memorandum to B. Martin and J. Blum, December 29, 1970, p. 3

[23] Memorandum re: Release of Funds for the Experimental Schools Program, January 8, 1971, p. 15. Though the reasons were not enunciated in official documents, one might speculate as to why there was such an interest in becoming operational as soon as possible. As noted, ESP funds were made part of the Office of Education's discretionary allocation and were thus subject to disposition to a number of programs within OE. Given the competition for these funds between programs, had the ESP not become operational soon, the monies may have been rechanneled elsewhere and the opportunity for fiscal support of this new project would have been lost altogether.

> selected promising practices and products of research in a K-12 framework.[24]

Based upon the assumption that many promising practices already existed, this phase overtly encouraged the avoidance of new research and development, and instead relied on the grantee's ability to gather the many proven products together into a comprehensive program for implementation within a period of a few months.[25] The Phase I effort was unique in terms of traditional government projects with its provision for long-term federal funding (up to five years) as well as its major focus on evaluation and documentation of program success.[26]

Phase II of the ESP involved another approach. Interested educational organizations submitted proposals for three "developmental projects"; this allowed the grantee an additional year of support to prepare for programs

> ...with emphasis on evaluation, focusing on educational reform through a comprehensive design that presents alternatives to current structures, practices, and performance....Support in Fiscal Year 1972 will be limited to planning.[27]

In addition, the Phase II approach was to fund up to five mini-grants which would provide further development of particularly promising ideas. It was expected that some of the mini-grants would lead to a developmental project and then to an operational grant.[28] Inasmuch as the Jefferson School District was a part of Phase I and not Phase II, a more detailed account of the Phase II rationale and timeline for implementation will not be presented. However, many of the references cited in the Phase I discussion will provide additional information.

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[24] P. P. Muirhead, Acting Commisioner of Education, "Closing Date for Receipt of Applications," Article for the Federal Register, HEW, Office of Education, Experimental Schools, December 28, 1970, p. 1.

[25] This assumption was apparently based more upon intuition than specific knowledge, however, since OE officials were not able to identify research results and innovations "ready" for implementation. They commissioned a group in the fall of 1971 to construct a typology of available promising practices, but instead received information useful to a funding agency judging the suitability of potential ES grant recipients, because the group felt, "...it is not really possible to define the readiness and significance of research results and innovations in the manner that the Experimental Schools Program would have liked." Refer to Syracuse University Research Corporation, "Significant Educational Research and Innovation: Their Potential Contribution to Experimental Schools Design," February 1972, submitted to the U.S. Office of Education pursuant to Contract No. OEC-0-72-0488, p. 1.

[26] J. Welch, "D.C. Perspectives: Experimental Schools," Educational Researcher, Vol. XXII, September-October 1971, p. 3.

[27] P. P. Muirhead, "Closing Date," p. 1.

D. Implementation Process

On January 1, 1971, the first phase was implemented with an announcement of the ESP in the Federal Register. Five days later, twenty-thousand "Call for Letters of Interest" notices were mailed from the Office of Education to local school districts, regional laboratories, institutions of higher education, state education agencies, and other organizations appearing on a master list of interested organizations compiled by the OE.[29] Because of its call for very limited proposals (less than 10 pages), unacompanied by any other documents, the solicitation method was considered unique.[30]

The "Call for Letters of Interest" requested potential respondents to submit a proposal by January 30, 1971 for "operational projects with a major evaluation thrust, based upon a central theme for educational reform that includes a multiple use of promising practices and the products of research in a comprehensive K-12 framework."[31]

1. Demonstrated experience with educational innovations on large scale.
2. Staff capacity and competency to manage comprehensive experimentation.
3. Development of a plan for broad participation in the design, implementation and governance of a project.
4. Identification of the targeted population for a potential project.

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[28] Memorandum re: Release of Funds for the Experimental Schools Program, January 8, 1971, p. 15.

[29] Federal Register, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 1, 1971, p. 27.

[30] J. Welch, "D.C. Perspectives," p. 1.

[31] R. B. Binswanger, "Basic Program Information, Experimental Schools Program," Call for Letters of Interest, December 28, 1970, p. 1.

5. Extent to which design fulfills objectives of the Experimental Schools Program, including:

   ...a primary target population of low-income children

   ...a student population approximately 2,000 to 5,000

   ...a longitudinal K-12 design

   ...a comprehensive approach to the learning environment, including, but not limited to, curriculum development, community participation, staff development, administration, and organization.

6. Attention to evaluation and documentation of the total project.

7. Commitment of resources for the duration of the project.

Secondly, a set of programmatic criteria was suggested for use by respondents in selecting relevant promising practices. These included--

1. Consistency of the practice with the central theme.

2. Ease of adaptability, given time and resource constraints, to the experimental schools project.

3. Importance of the practices to the purposes of the learners.

4. Cost. The cost of operating the total program in the experimental school project must be limited by the project (school systems) operating revenue so that the program can be continued after the experiment is completed (3-5 years) by the school system without any new outside resources.[32]

After submitting the "Call for Letters of Interest," Experimental Schools' officials scheduled a series of six regional meetings with prominent educational scholars and practitioners in New York City, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Paul, Portland, and Los Angeles early in 1971 to introduce the Experimental Schools Program staff, explain Phase I, discuss Phase II, invite criticism and comments, and review potential members for a National Policy Committee. The major emphasis of these meetings was on discussion of guidelines for the developmental projects.[33]

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Copy of schedule of regional meetings--list of purposes, sites, and participants, no date. Document in NIE files.

By the end of January, 486 organizations had responded to the "Call for Letters of Interest." These organizations represented large city systems, distinctly rural districts, county systems, state departments, laboratories and Research and Development centers, parochial schools, higher education institutions, private agencies, and others. Letters were screened by a committee whose function was to select planning grant recipients.[34]

1. Screening

Each letter was examined by at least two readers, one from the ESP staff and one from another Office of Education bureau. The top 38 proposals were selected for further review. Criteria for selecting the top proposals included: (a) fulfillment of guideline requirements (i.e., 2,000 to 5,000 students, longitudinal K-12 design, and primary focus on low-income students); (b) comprehensiveness of the proposal (i.e., extent of curriculum reform, extent of attention towards staffing and training, extent of attention to organization and administration of the program, and extent to which community participation was developed as part of the program); (c) clarity of central theme and degree to which it served as an organizing principle for the program; (d) potential significance of the program; (e) ability to implement the described program by September 1971; and (f) degree to which the program reflected imagination and creativity.[35]

2. Selection of Planning Grant Awards

An independent selection committee, composed of Drs. Lester Ball (University of North Carolina), Carrol Johnson (Columbia), Virginia Lewis (Superintendent, Chicago Public Schools), Lloyd Michael (Superintendent, Evanston, Illinois Public Schools), Paul Nachtigal (Ford Foundation), and Dana Swick (George Peabody College) met in Washington, D.C. on February 4 and 5, 1970. After checking the accuracy and appropriateness of the prescreening process by examining a randomly selected sample of strong and weak proposals, the selection committee further examined the 38 proposals considered strongest. Each member of the selection committee read and criticized 5 of the 38 letters of interest, using the same set of previously established criteria. All 38 letters of interest were then read by three members of the committee and rated a second time using a point system. The points given by each committee member to the letters of interest were totaled, and the 20 proposals with the lowest totals were eliminated. The remaining 18 letters of interest were again reviewed by the three committee members and reduced to 12. Finally, a fourth reading of all 12 remaining letters was undertaken by the full committee, followed by a vote to choose the final sites.[36] Eight sites were unanimously selected to receive 60-day planning grants.

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[34] "Process Summary from Evaluation Committee," Minutes of house hearing on H.R. 16916. Document in NIE files.

[35] Ibid. (See also pre-screening rating sheet, document in NIE files.

The selection committee recommended funding for as many of these projects as possible, with a serious attempt to fund more than two. The committee recommendation was based on the rationale that each of the eight proposals fulfilled the following criteria:

> 1. The proposal met all guideline requirements.
>
> 2. [The Letter of Interest] was specific in the component to be included from innovation practices and brought into the specific K-12 proposal.
>
> 3. The total impact of the proposal practices promise educational significance.
>
> 4. The past performance of the district indicates competency of carrying through the proposed proposal.
>
> 5. In our judgment, it was evident that the needed staff competency, together with necessary administrative leadership and coordination existed.
>
> 6. There was a specific theme or conceptual framework around which a discrete kind of comprehensive program could be developed.
>
> 7. Imagination and creativity were apparent in the total design.[37]

The 60-day planning grant provided $10,000 to each of the eight sites for the purpose of "completing the design of a comprehensive K-12 educational program for 2,000 to 5,000 students to be operational in September 1971 in the applicant system." Each applicant's proposed project was to be described in a final report of 75 to 100 pages (without appendices), and was minimally to include the following information:

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[36] House of Representatives, Subcommittee testimony, FY 1972 [no date], pp. 2-5.

[37] Screening selection committee, documents in NIE files: list of committee personnel, rating guide sheets, rational used for making selection, letter of rejection to unsuccessful applicants, and memoradum of approval for eight selected sites.

1. (1) Describe in detail the national educational significance of the project.

   (b) Describe the specific objectives of the applicant systems and

      (1) explain how the aims of the applicant system will be accomplished by the project, and

      (2) define the specific goals of the project and how they will have an impact on the total system.

2. The organizing principle(s) (conceptual framework or central theme) is to be described in detail with specific attention to its rationale and its relationship to educational reform.

3. Each component of the project (including, among others: (1) curriculum reform; (2) instructional patterns, methodology and training; (3) broad participation in the design, implementation and operation of the project; (4) organization and administration.) must be explicitly defined including its relationship to the other components of the project design.

   (a) Provide a clear and concise overview of the total project which will serve as a vehicle for understanding the comprehensiveness of the experimental school site.

   (b) Describe in depth the most significant element(s) of the project.

4. A specific description of the target population, including

   (a) a socio-economic profile of the community

   (b) a detailed breakdown by socio-economic characteristics of the student population

   (c) a comparison of the target population of the project with that of the total system and/or nearby systems.

5. The process of implementation planned and programmed for the experimental school site must be described in detail, including a time-line with emphasis on the first 30 months of the project.

6. A specific plan for the evaluation and documentation of the project over its five-year duration in terms of the goals and objectives of the system as well as of the project.

7. A budget for the experimental school site which estimates the total incremental cost of the program for the next five years. A detailed budget with justification is required for the first 30 months beginning in April 1971.

8. The procedure for the local administration of the project must be described in detail including the identification of

    (a) the person with the immediate responsibility for the project

    (b) the person with ultimate authority for the project

    (c) the relationship of persons (a) & (b) to the total system.[38]

In an effort to gain firsthand knowledge of the planning grant sites, Experimental Schools ' personnel visited each of the eight sites in mid-March 1971 to (1) determine site participants' general attitude towards the project, (2) assess the degree of previous implementation of planned components, and (3) gain information on fiscal projections, evaluation potential, and the target population. The site visitor also was to assist the site personnel in identifying the type of information needed for the proposal.[39]

Proposals from all eight sites were to be submitted to the USOE by April 19, 1971, when they would be given to the final selection committee along with information acquired through the site visits and regional meetings.

3. Final Selection of ESP Sites

The selection process was undertaken by a distinguished panel of educators: Carl Dolce (Dean, School of Education, North Carolina State University), August Gold (Consultant, Educational Facilities Laboratory, New York), Ruth Holloway (Director, California State Department of Education, Bureau of Compensatory Education),

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[38] J. J. Maimore, Grants Officer, "Scope of Work," Notification of Grant Award, February 11, 1971, HEW, Grant No. OEG-0-71-1214, pp. 1-2.

[39] "Questions to be Answered by Site Visit and Format to be Followed in Site Report," (no author, no date). Document in NIE files.

John Holt (Lecturer/Author), John Henry Martin (Senior Advisor to the President), Joan Mortimer (University of New Mexico Medical School, Programs for Children), Michael O'Keefe (Director, Washington Internship in Education), and Michael Scriven (Professor of Philosophy, University of California). The panel reviewed all eight proposals on April 19 and 20, finally recommending that none of the sites be funded on the basis of the proposals as submitted. However, the committee did recommend that three sites be funded contingent upon strengthening programmatic weaknesses identified by the selection committee (selection committee evaluation of the J ESP proposal appears in Chapter III, p. 59-60). Further deliberations were held between ESP officials and district representatives, and a second site visit was conducted to clarify the selection committee's request and obtain information concerning the district's alteration of program specifications.[40] Finally, awards were granted to the three sites in early May 1971.

The criteria for selecting operational grant sites from among the eight planning sites were not specified. However, it is known that during the April 14-16 meeting, two of the eight planning grant sites were eliminated from consideration by Experimental Schools staff for failure to comply with federal desegregation specifications. Later documents suggested that certain criteria existed; that is, each of the three "winning" sites was selected because it "...has developed its own unique program, has...met Experimental Schools requirements in ways which suit the particular needs of the communities involved, and...has combined a variety of promising practices into a comprehensive K-12 school design."[41]

4. Selection Process for Phase II

During the implementation of Phase I, the selection process for Phase II began, following procedures similar to those outlined for Phase I. Once the announcement was made, screening and selection committees were appointed. However, Phase II planning grant periods were longer (four months instead of two), and funds were higher ($30,000 to $40,000 instead of $10,000) than for Phase I. In addition, successful Phase II grantees were to receive appropriate developmental funds for six months prior to receiving five-year operational grants. Finally, while Phase I grantees were to collect previously existing practices, Phase II applicants were to

> ...shift their focus and look anew at what students ought to learn, how to make different use of time and space, to

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[40] Selection committee, documents from NIE files: list of committee members, committee summary for each site and letter to Superintendent notifying of reward.

[41] Budding, RFP 72-50, pp. 5-6.

> rethink staffing patterns and personnel requirements, to consider alternative ways to organize and administer the schools, and to include the community in active participation in education decisions.[42]

E. ESP Operationalized in the Jefferson School District

Up to now, this discussion of ESP implementation has focused on national ESP staff interactions with the composite set of local educational organizations, rather than with any single district. However, it must be noted that what actually took place was a series of one-to-one interactions between the ESP staff members and individual district representatives. To provide additional background, the discussion will now shift to the process as it pertained to the Jefferson School District.

1. Interactions Between ESP and JSD Before Submission of Proposal

Other than the Jefferson reply to the "Call for Letters of Interest," there were no interactions between the two groups until the eight planning grant awards had been made on February 11, 1971. Between February 11 and April 20, when the selection committee made its recommendation, several interactions occurred.

On February 17, the Jefferson superintendent sent a letter to the ESP director announcing upcoming planning activities, and requesting that a member of the ESP staff meet with district personnel sometime in March. In mid-March, site visits were made to Jefferson as well as to all other planning sites. The federal official spent two days in the district, meeting with various local officials and touring schools in order to gain a better understanding of the local planning process for the ESP.

That visitor's view of the Jefferson system can be readily reconstructed from the report to ESP officials. The Jefferson School District was perceived to have neat, clean, well behaved students, mostly from families headed by servicemen and college students--a factor said to account for the student turnover rate of "52 percent" per year (the actual figure was approximately 33 percent).[43]

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[42] Ibid., p. 7.

[43] JSD, "Experimental Schools, Jefferson: Providing Optimum Learning Environments for 4000 Students." An application to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for an operations grant under provision of the Experimental Schools Program, planning project OEG-0-71-1214, project number 18040, [Final Draft of original ESP proposal] submitted by the superintendent, May 15, 1971, p. 63. See also p. 13 and related footnote 11 in Chapter I of this report.

The district had been involved in initiating changes in schools for five years; all of the major components described in their reply to the "Call for Letters of Interest" were operations. Media coverage of ESP development activities was extensive, and strong community support for the project had been demonstrated at a charrette, a type of school-sponsored community gathering. A number of consultants had cooperated in planning the project, working separately under the direction of the superintendent. Their work was expected to result in a proposal requiring one and one-half to two million dollars per year for implementation. Major proponents of the ESP were the superintendent, school board, and community advisory committee. Major opponents were members of the teachers' association, a group which had gone on record as opposing the differentiated staffing aspect of the program. Many of the innovative structural and procedural changes originally planned were hindered by the lack of a central, unifying theme.[44]

2. Submission of Proposal and Subsequent Interactions

On April 5, copies of the district's "Project Promise" proposal were forwarded to the ESP, along with some working papers composed to guide the development of the project proposal document and a request that a decision concerning funding be made soon. Other letters, papers and copies of local publicity statements received by the district were later submitted to the ESP, along with additional requests for a prompt decision. These documents are discussed in the following chapter.

At the final selection committee meeting on April 20, the proposal submitted by Jefferson was one of three "...considered to be of sufficient merit, significance, and relevance to the purposes of the Experimental Schools Program to receive further consideration."[45] Notified by telephone of the recommendation, the Jefferson School District was requested to strengthen their proposal, using the selection committee's comments as a guide. Following the notification, a series of meetings between ESP staff members and district officials was held in Washington, D. C., and the ESP director made a site visit to the district.[46] The apparent purpose of these meetings and the subsequent visit was to resolve differences between the original proposal and the selection committee's recommendations.[47]

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[44] "On-Site Visit to the Jefferson Project," Memorandum re: Report of Site Visit [March 15-16, 1971], pp. 1-2. Document in NIE files.

[45] R. B. Binswanger, letter to Jefferson superintendent, May 10, 1971, p. 2. Document in NIE files.

[46] Ibid.

[47] The selection committee's recommendations are presented in Chapter III. See pages 59-60.

On April 30, the district forwarded a letter to ESP officials with attached case studies (a description of hypothetical students "walking through" the proposed programs). This letter amended the original proposal, and suggested a new central theme: "...to PRESCRIBE an appropriate environment for optimum learning for each student."[48] More case studies followed on May 6 and 7, along with another request that ESP officials make the final decision soon. It had already been necessary to take preliminary steps to implement the program.

3. Acceptance of Proposal

On May 10, the Jefferson School District was notified by mail that it had been designated as an ESP site, thus placing into operation at the district level a plan for an Experimental Schools Project to be funded by the federal government. As indicated by the Office of Education, the Jefferson ESP Phase I was to meet the following summary description:

> 1. To create an appropriate environment for optimum learning for each student in a relatively poor suburban community of 26,000 with a focus on equalizing educational opportunities for a highly transient student body. The project deals directly with the problems of high transiency, unemployment and low-income families, underachievement, student disenchantment and fiscal stringency.
>
> 2. Jefferson School District has 8,500 students in three elementary schools, two 7-9 junior high schools and two 10-12 senior high schools. Due to military employment in the district, the turnover rate is 25%. The percentage of minority race children is low, 4%; low-income about 20%; unemployment approximately 21% [sic--12% according to the district; see p. 45, Chapter III].
>
>   The Experimental School site included 3,840 students in four elementary schools, one junior high, and one senior high. Turnover for the target population is 45%, low-income 25%; unemployment 27%. The control group consists of the rest of the 4,463 children in the Jefferson School District.
>
> 3. Objectives for the Experimental Schools Program are listed as follows in the preliminary proposal:

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[48] Superintendent, letter to R. B. Binswanger, May 6, 1971, p. 1. Document in NIE files.

a. To close the academic deficiency gap for slow students and decrease the amount of time fast students must spend in formal education programs;

b. To develop teaching strategies which promote active student involvement in the learning process;

c. To provide vocational work experience for all students;

d. To develop new and relevant fifth day, interim, extended school day, and summer programs;

e. To provide increased opportunity for reactive, active, and interactive learning cycles;

f. To train teachers to work in ungraded programs;

g. To utilize school facilities 33% longer than at present;

h. To reduce the adult pupil ratio to 1:12;

i. To conduct the charrette as a regular activity for community involvement;

j. To develop a new performance base for accrediting public schools; and

k. To develop programs which are cost-effective and can be replicated.

4. Individualizing instruction is a key component in the Experimental Schools program and the proposal addresses itself to the problem of training teachers to be tutors as well as diagnosticians. The Experimental School sites will use such materials as IPI [Individually Prescribed Instruction], IGE [Individually Guided Education], and PIA [Patterns in Arithmetic]. Individualization is to be achieved both by extensive use of programmed instruction, various forms of media and technology and by a variety of grouping practices which permit students to pursue interest areas.

5. Another key component is the change in the school calendar. Experimental Schools will operate for a semester on a regular school schedule four days a week, with a fifth day for alternatives and options; one month in the winter and one month in the summer, between semesters, will also be used for alternative educational choices in and out of the school setting.

This flexible arrangement of the school calendar permits the development of student and/or teacher directed curriculum. Student attendance in school will vary from 128 to 200 days per year.

An example of the use of the flexible calendar in the regular school semester is an outdoor education program in which sixth graders spend one week at a nearby resident camp facility in a teacher and pupil developed environmental studies program.

Another use of the flexible calendar is an extended school day where the learning resource center is open after the regular school hours (8:00-3:30) for students working on individualized programs; some students will be able to come to school for individual project work as early as 7:00 a. m. Students will begin and end their school day at different times depending on needs, parents' work schedule and the like.

6. Another key component is the offering of vocational work experience to all children K-12. Primary students will make things in their classes for sale at the school carnival; intermediate students will carry on the making of sale objects as well as begin to work in some capacity in the schools as aides, tutors, etc. Junior high students would work on out-of-school projects for the fifth day or during the winter or summer interims. Senior high students, before graduation, must have one semester of a work/study program which combines two hours a day in school and four hours a day on a paying job. In addition, students may elect to spend half-day at a vocational-technical school and half-day at Experimental Schools [west-side] High School completing basic graduation requirements.

7. A major concern of the project is cost-effectiveness. With the various components of the project, the district is seeking more efficient combinations of staff and volunteers, various forms of constructional and self-instructional materials, and uses of time and space which allow for the genuine individualization of instruction (in terms of pacing, content, and style) within the budget constraints facing Jefferson and all of public education.

8. Of particular importance to the project (given the high turnover rate) is the capacity of the program to produce positive results for students who may be in the program for no more than three months. Some means of following

and tracking at least a portion of the transient students will be necessary.[49]

F. Summary

From early discussion within the USOE as early as 1967, a plan for a national Experimental Schools Program gradually evolved into a federally-financial project linking research and classroom instruction, through the implementation of comprehensive change at the local level and analyzing the results via a thorough onsite evaluation and documentation plan. The project was to provide the financial impetus for a local educational agency to improve pupil performance by altering the total formal learning environment. Organizations receiving grants were to change significant aspects of their system, including curriculum, staffing, governance, and relationships with the community, as well as provide the machinery for internal self-evaluation. Additional evaluation and documentation of the grantee's program was to be provided by an external independent agency, positioned onsite; cross-site assessment of all programs and evaluation activities was to be undertaken by an omnibus evaluation unit. The ESP would symbolize a new relationship between the federal government and local education agencies, with local systems defining their problems (within parameters established by very broad criteria), and the federal government providing the fiscal resources necessary to implement local solutions.

The Experimental Schools Program began operating at the national level on a less than optimal foundation considering the rather broad change it had been issued. Enthusiastically supported by an administration requesting $25 million for the first fiscal year, the project was less adamantly supported by Congress, who trimmed the request by half. Competing for non-earmarked funds with other Office of Education programs, the ESP was allocated $12 million for fiscal year 1971, under the discretionary provision granted by Congress to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

The late appointment of the director, coupled with the desire to implement programs in the schools by September 1971, led to implementation in two phases: operational and developmental. Phase I, operational projects, did not allow potential grantees an extensive planning period. Instead, it relied upon grantees' ability to combine existing innovative practices (which had not yet been identified by either the Experimental Schools Agency nor the grantees) into a comprehensive program (which was never clearly defined). This comprehensive program was to be evaluated by a process which also was not yet clearly defined (evidenced late in 1971 by the evaluation committee's request for special assistance to define evaluation more clearly[50]). On the other hand, support for Phase II, the developmental projects, would allow potential grantees a year's time for planning and preparation prior to implementing an Experimental Schools Project, while providing the national ESP staff the opportunity to define expectations adequately.

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[49] J. J. Maimore, Grants Officer, RFP 71-35, "Staff Paper Providing Project Overview: Jefferson, Attachment II," Evaluation and Documentation of Experimental Schools Project, May 17, 1971, pp. 1-3.

The potential hazard in allocating such a short lead time for planning was made explicit by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in a statement to the ESP staff when OMB released the $12 million apportionment to fund the project.

> While it appears entirely feasible and appropriate to have developed by May 1971 plans for experimental school projects that can be contracted for with FY 71 funds, it is not at all clear that good projects can be operational with students by September 1971. Projects that can be put together that quickly may be no more than an unintegrated collection of disparate practices. The crash nature of much of the present planning for the program is disturbing. The program's timetable should provide for proper development of an integrated plan for each school and of an overall evaluation scheme for the program. While serious developmental work must be in full swing by September 1971, we believe actual operating schools should only be supported if there is clear evidence that the schools will in fact be "experimental" and with carefully developed plans.[51]

Experimental Schools Program officials were optimistic, however, that the Phase I process could successfully produce comprehensive change within a local educational system. In a rebuttal to the OMB statement, ESP staff took the position that

> The select few projects can be operational and qualitatively strong and their programs will not represent "an unintegrated collection of disparate practices." On the contrary, the

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[50] G. V. Glass, M. L. Byers, and B. Worthen, "Recommendations for the Evaluation of Experimental Schools Projects of the U. S. Office of Education," submitted to the Office of Education, pursuant to Grant No. OEG-0-9-152075-3720, February 1972, p. 3.

[51] P. H. O'Neil, Chief, Human Resources Division, Office of Management and Budget, letter to C. Miller, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Budget Office of the Secretary, HEW, February 4, 1971, pp. 1-2.

> comprehensiveness of the project will be one of its greatest strengths.[52]

Project staff further stipulated that the Phase I grantees would exhibit "... a high degree of readiness that resulted from planning and programming that preceded Experimental Schools interest by as much as three years." Phase I awards were to be distinguished by the careful selection of sites manifesting these characteristics.[53]

The selection strategy was indeed elaborate in the sense that the multi-stage process presumed objectivity by attempting to award grants on the basis of each proposal's alignment with predetermined criteria, and that many distinguished educators participated in narrowing the field of aspirants to three recipients. This did not necessarily insure effectively operating programs, however, as the selection criteria themselves lacked specificity, and the distinguished educators noted a number of weaknesses in all grant recipients' final proposals.

The degree to which the Experimental Schools staff could have communicated more specific expectations to potential grant recipients, assisted in strengthening proposals and designs, and facilitated the individual sites' program implementation is unknown. The prospect of providing such definitive data was balanced against the risk of over-intervention by the governing agency--i.e., of forcing a specific government Experimental Schools Program on a local education agency. Documents suggest that these alternatives were discussed by Experimental Schools officials prior to final grant awards, but there is no written record of any decision concerning how the federal agency should participate. The following statement, though directed toward the Phase II initiation strategy, seems also to reflect the agency's position concerning Phase I projects.

> In terms of producing a range of alternative experiments, the Office of Education has to walk down a very narrow path between client initiative and Federal direction. A program determined completely by client initiative (even with the restraints represented by the program criteria) is unlikely to produce the range of experimentation required in the program. Total Federal direction not only runs the risk of excluding many of the types of experiments which ought to be tried, but also limits the amount of local commitment of energy and commitment necessary to give a fair test to any of the central themes chosen is unlikely to be generated

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[52] Experimental Schools Program Response to OMB Document, [no author, no date], p. 1. Document in NIE files.

[53] Ibid.

> by a "model" developed elsewhere and imposed on a local site by the scarcity of resources.[54]

Thus, it appears that the Experimental Schools Program was launched in an expeditious manner. It rested upon the assumption that a local education agency could design and operate a program which would alleviate a self-defined problem, through extensive alterations in existing methods of operation, without undue intervention by the funding agency. From this basis, the Jefferson School District began its Experimental Schools Project in the summer of 1971, proceeding from a series of earlier planning activities which are outlined in the next chapter.

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[54] Memorandum re: Release of Funds, January 8, 1971, pp. 15-16.

CHAPTER III

ESP AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL

III. ESP AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL

This chapter describes and analyzes how the Jefferson School District became aware of the Experimental Schools Program, how it responded to the Office of Education initiative announcing the ESP, and how, upon receiving the award of a 60-day planning grant, the funding proposal for the district's ESP was developed. These three aspects of the idea-to-funding process are recounted in chronological order. The chapter closes with a discussion of the salient aspects of the district's first 30 months funding proposal. Document analyses and retrospective interviews comprise the data base for this chapter because the events that took place prior to the implementation of the project pre-date the information of the Level II evaluation program.

A. The Decision to Respond[1]

The superintendent received the OE initiative announcing the ESP on January 14, 1971. He drafted a two-page letter of interest with a seven-page addendum the same day. (See pages 28 and 29 of Chapter II for the criteria for district replies.) The superintendent's response was warranted by a board policy authorizing him to reply to any federal or state overtures that he considered appropriate to the district. According to the superintendent, "Jefferson was nearing fiscal bankruptcy; this was one of many avenues we used to solve this problem."[2]

The reply to the OE initiative was the superintendent's prerogative. No district meetings were held to discuss the nature of this application. The superintendent did not consult with experts outside the district, or communicate with officials at the national ESP office concerning the specifics of the district's response to the initiative. The district was in the process of applying for a Title III grant from the state for a limited study of the effect of prescriptive instructional programs on students in one or two schools and had held several meetings in preparation for that application. The superintendent's familiarity with that application which contained some of the same ideas that he wrote into his letter of interest, and his general knowledge of the grant application process aided him in preparing the ESP letter of interest and its addendum.

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[1] This section is based on Fieldnotes, Interviews with the superintendent D. R. Pierce, 9/26/73, and R. M. Toepper, 10/30/75.

[2] R. M. Toepper, Fieldnotes, Interview with the superintendent, 10/30/75.

B. The Letter of Interest[3]

The superintendent's reply to the OE initiative on January 14, 1971 requested "consideration for a PLANNING GRANT to develop an experimental school under the Experimental Schools program." The letter of interest introduced the district as one that "has demonstrated successful experience with educational innovation on a large scale" including 16 federally funded projects, cooperation with the two private universities in the area, and participation in the model gifted program in the state. In addition, the superintendent explained that "through cooperation with local universities, the district maintains an evaluation and research staff, experts in school management, and specialists in media and materials, to manage comprehensive experimentation." He also stated that "for more than six years the district has maintained an education council which has provided broad participation in the design, implementation, and governing of various projects."

The superintendent proposed that the schools to be included in the Experimental Schools Project (the west side of the district) had a student population of 2,800, "approximately 40 percent being considered in the low-income category," and served kindergarten through grade 12. In addition, the superintendent classified 25 percent of the "target population" as "military dependents who are ineligible because of rank to live in on-base housing." He added that "almost 12 percent of the target population have parents who are unemployed." He labeled the target area as "a high density suburban area" with the second highest population of any area in the United States. The addendum cited the district as a "poverty area" with "the least wealth per capita of any first class district in the state."[4]

The superintendent closed his letter of interest by stating that "the district has extensive experience in developing research designs, including procedures for evaluation and documentation of project activities." An important district argument concluded the letter: "The district has a history of CONTINUING funded projects because of operational efficiencies built into project designs. The district does not develop systems of operation, which after development cannot be continued with local funds."

A seven-page addendum provided supporting data for the letter of interest. It introduced the proposed planning team, listed a set of potential project goals, and indicated how the district met the selection criteria for the program. The endeavor was tentatively titled "Project Promise, Phase II" (Programming Resources to Operate a Model Instructional System in Education).[5]

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[3] This section is based on Superintendent, Letter of Interest and Addendum, submitted to USOE on January 14, 1971, in response to the OE "Call for Letters of Interest."

[4] Figures presented in Chapter I showed the district as ranking very low (61), but not the lowest, among the 70 first class districts in the state at that time.

The section of the addendum describing the planning team was introduced in the following manner:

> The Jefferson District Board of Directors OFFERS to the United States Office of Education a unique and well qualified planning team to change the PROJECT GOALS into workable statements of needs; detailed objectives stated in both the cognitive and affective domains; a fully PERTED system of procedures including detailed budget documents; and a system of evaluation comparing the operation of the experimental program with the regular educational program.

Heading a list of six planning team participants, the superintendent described himself as "the author of more than a dozen federal and state projects in innovation." Having received the M. A. from Columbia University and the Ed. D. from Stanford University, he was described as "well trained as a systems management specialist, and fully knowledgeable of many management models in lieu of our present system." It was planned that 25 percent of the superintendent's time would be used to direct the ESP.

Other personnel described in the section on the planning team included the chairman of the education department of the private university within the district's boundaries, who was described as "presently working on a grant from the EFL (Educational Facilities Laboratory) to effect the modernization required to place this project into operation";[6] an educational psychologist from the private university on the north side of the city who would "be responsible for developing the individualized instruction model in the project"; the district's director of special education; the chairman of the district's education council;[7] and a teacher, soon to become acting principal of School G, who, according to the addendum, would "maintain liaison with a staff of almost 30[8] teachers presently using individualized instruction strategies in the district and would develop the teaching model for individualized instruction."

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[5] On page 5 of the addendum, "Project Promise, Phase I" was described in the following manner:

> PROJECT PROMISE, Phase I: (First Three Years, Title III, ESEA) is now in its fourth year and is supported ENTIRELY from local funds. Teaching systems have been built for more than 1,000 junior high students in which pre-developed large group programs are played out in a 94 student station large group classroom. Each student has a student responder, and his responses are reinforced by electrical feedback from the teacher. The large group system is backed up by seminar, small group and tutoral instruction. A closed circuit T.V. system has permitted science experiments to be carried out in the science room and carried live in the large group room.

Section II, on project goals, stated that:

> The project seeks to establish a NEW MODEL of public education with changes in the delivery of curriculum content; changes in the school day and year; changes in staffing arrangements; changes in the amount of time required under the supervision of regular teachers; a move to performance contracting in the PUBLIC SECTOR.

The section continued with a comparison of how the "proposed system" compared with the "present system."

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[6] At the time, one older elementary school building, School D, was being considered for extensive remodeling in order to facilitate open concepts of education. However, the endeavor ended when the district found out that the financing only covered the planning of the remodeling, not the remodeling itself. R.M. Toepper, Fieldnotes, Interview with principal of School D, 11/19/74.

[7] According to the Jefferson Education Council Rules of Order, policy 9000.2, this organization serves as a "Citizens Committee in coordinating and promoting matters relative to and of benefit to our schools and education system in accord with the policies and actions of the participating organization." The Education Council is discussed in Chapter V of this report.

[8] However, School G, the only district elementary school implementing individualized instruction prior to the ESP, had 14 teachers and one resource room teacher or counselor for grades K through 6 during the 1970-71 school year (the year prior to the ESP).

PROJECT GOALS

PRESENT SYSTEM	PROPOSED SYSTEM
CURRICULUM: Primarily group centered linear programs in specific academic subject areas. A graded system from K-12 mostly self-contained in K-6, mostly departmentalized in 7-12.	Both linear and branching non-graded performance based curriculum, Students would be placed in groups when they were able to work within the parameters of the group program, on individualized programs when they did not fit within these parameters.
TEACHING: Staff - 95% certificated, 4% classified occasionally volunteers are used. One "teacher" for every 25-30 students.	"One" adult for each 12 students. 5% MASTER teachers 25% REGULAR teachers 20% INTERNS 30% Paid Aides 10% Non-paid volunteers 10% Students
SCHOOL YEAR: 170-180 structured REGULAR days for ALL students on a 5 day week with the opportunity for SELECTED students to attend school in the summer.	School would operate continuously the year around EXCEPT for the month of August. FAST students would be under supervision control of the school for as few as 120 days a year. SLOW students may be in school for as many as 240 days. Basic programs would operate 4 days a week. Supplementary programs on the fifth day.
SCHOOL DAY: Usually 5 to 6 hours, from about 8:30 to 3:30. Shorter hours for primary students. Prevailing secondary pattern calls for 5 or 6 periods, with some schools operating multiples of 15 minute modules to develop variable length classes... all within the limited parameters of a 6 hour day.	Group programs would operate 4 days a week on scheduled times. Some group programs would be 4 or 5 hours in length with a teaching strategy geared to the increased functional time. Individual programs would be available ALL the time from 7:00 A.M. to 11:00 P.M. The school for these students would operate like a supermarket. MOST students would attend during the traditional hours, but lesser numbers would do their work during the early morning and late evening.

PRESENT SYSTEM	PROPOSED SYSTEM
VOCATIONAL WORK EXPERIENCE: About 10% of the students are enrolled in these programs in distributive education, community labs, and a variety of work experience programs. Most programs are limited to junior and seniors in high school with a limited amount of opportunity in the earlier high school grades.	All students would have some form of vocational work experience as a required part of the educational process. This could take the form of successful work in the community; assignment as a student aide in school work in various federal and state projects; plus traditional work experience patterns.
TEACHER PAY: Based on a history of training and experience.	Based on student performance, MASTER teachers who can manage a differentiated staff and achieve performance objectives with this staff are most highly paid. Pay is by ASSIGNMENT, and ASSIGNMENT is based on the ability of a teacher to meet certain performance objectives with students.
MANAGEMENT OF PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES: Students failing to meet teacher-made objectives are allowed to continue with a C, D, or F grade.	Students are not allowed to fail. If they do not achieve 80% success in a regular group program they are placed in a branching individualized program. Teachers may not place students in programs for which they cannot succeed.
TEACHING IN THE AFFECTIVE DOMAIN: Much talk about other values besides academic values, but nothing in performance terms. Transcripts only reflect the cognitive domain.	Geared to meet additional NEEDS of students including: 1. The opportunity for REAL RESPONSIBILITY. 2. The establishment of educator-learning relationships which promote understanding, respect and communication. 3. The building of a POSITIVE SELF-IMAGE where every student experiences success. 4. Relevant coursework and increased placement of students in the real world. 5. Greater community involvement.

PRESENT SYSTEM	PROPOSED SYSTEM
	6. Greater opportunity to plan for leisure time.
TEACHING FACILITIES: The 900 square foot room dominates the scene. New school plants have LARGE instruction areas without walls.	Large areas geared for individual study. Large areas geared for large group instruction. Areas where a student can be alone. Areas for small group seminars.

To show how the district met the selection criteria outlined in the OE initiative, the superintendent listed about 10 "large scale" educational innovations that the district had sponsored recently. Six of these programs are briefly described on pages 137 through 138 of Chapter VI. In summary, the district recounted that it had "a five year history of developing innovative programs with federal and state monies; and after the normal period of funding, gaining enough efficiency from the new procedures to continue the project on local funds."

C. The Planning Grant

On February 9, 1971, the superintendent received a telegram from the director of the Experimental Schools office in Washington, D.C., notifying him that a $10,000 planning grant had been awarded to the district.[9] That night, he reported to the district's Board of Directors and requested them formally to accept the planning grant. The board voted four to one in favor of accepting the grant.[10] On February 11, the superintendent flew to Washington, D.C. for an orientation meeting at the Office of Education. A news release from the regional commissioner of HEW's Region X announced the awarding of the ESP to Jefferson:

> They have until April 10 to submit plans for a comprehensive kindergarten through twelfth grade experimental program

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[9] Superintendent's Report to regular meeting of Board of Directors, Exhibit 71-E-77, Western Union Telegram, February 9, 1971, p. 1.

[10] Minutes of regular meeting of Board of Directors, February 9, 1971, p. 36. One director voted against the motion on the grounds that he did not agree with the "elimination of failure" concept.

> combining a variety of innovative practices which previously have been applied only on a piecemeal basis.[11]

1. Getting Underway

On February 15, 1971, the superintendent prepared a "Planning Grant Activities" paper for distribution to the 16 district administrators, 4 staff members, and 10 consultants who would participate in the preparation of the ESP proposal. In the introduction, the superintendent acknowledged that the Jefferson School District was "one of eight districts selected from more than 486 applications to receive a 60 day $10,000 planning grant to plan...an experimental school district operation." The "Planning Grant Activities" paper continued with a timeline of activities beginning on February 15 and continuing during every working day plus some weekends until either March 29 or April 7, depending on the status of revisions, when 15 copies of the formal project proposal were to be delivered to Washington, D.C. The superintendent stated:

> The purpose of the operations grant is to OPERATE, not develop, an experimental school program. True, there will be many developmental activities, but the major focus of the proposed federal grant is to place into operation project components that have already been tested on a pilot basis.

In addition, the superintendent stated that

> Because of numerous federal projects and the advanced nature of the negotiations process in the district, most of the goals have been achieved on a pilot basis and the proposed experimental schools project would place the components into operation in four of the district's thirteen schools the first year, nine the second year, and all thirteen the third year. The planning process will convert these hypothetical goals into goals the teachers, administrators, students and patrons of the district will support.[12]

The superintendent introduced the ESP during the first planning session on February 16, 1971. The superintendent foresaw two possible outcomes of the planning period:

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[11] "Federal HEW grant earned by Jefferson School District," ________ Times, 34:35 (March 10, 1971), p. 2.

[12] This paragraph is based on Superintendent, "Planning Grant Activities," paper outlining planning grant schedule and activities, February 15, 1971.

> If this district, including teachers, administrators, and the community agree with the concept of establishing an experimental school, complete cooperation from each member of this team will be necessary in order that we may submit the finest project of which we are capable. However, if cooperation cannot be achieved, we will then simply submit a project stating the limited things we can do, with the hope that it will be funded.[13]

However, according to the superintendent, "hanging heavy" over the district's efforts was the outcome of the forthcoming March 9 levy elections. The superintendent felt that the "failure of this election might negate any efforts to receive an operational grant, since federal funds must be used to supplement, not replace district funds." According to the superintendent,

> We have as good, or perhaps a better, chance of receiving this grant as any other district, and the amount of money appropriated for this area of education is difficult to believe; therefore, our success rests with this planning team, and what we are willing to put into it.[14]

The superintendent explained that Schools A, B, C, 1, and 2, on the west side of the district, were to be included in the program because of their high transiency rate,[15] and School D, also a west-side school, because of its location and connection with the private university within the district's boundary.[16] The timeline for the planning grant continued with about one and one-half weeks of meetings among the planning team members.

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[13] JSD, Summary of the first Experimental School Planning Session, February 16,1971.

[14] Ibid.

[15] "Project Promise-Phase Two," Working Paper #5, p. [1], reported that at School B, during the most recent 12-month period, 274 out of a total enrollment of 482 students (60 percent) had been in the district for less than one year. At School A, an elementary school with a total enrollment of 411, 87 students (21 percent) had entered and 74 (18 percent) had withdraw in a six-month period. The working paper continued:

> Similar statistics were available from the four other project schools. These students were simply NOT EQUAL to the more stable, long-term student in the district. They had more learning problems, more problems of identity, more needs of all types. The [project's] conceptual framework then is built around EQUALIZING the opportunities for these transient students and at the same time building a school district which will eliminate the concept of failure.

[16] Schools A, B, C, and D are elementary schools grades K-6, School 1 is the junior high (7-9), and School 2 is the senior high (10-12) on the west side of the district.

2. The Teachers' Association Reacts[17]

On February 25, the Jefferson Education Association's (JEA) Efficiency Models Committee was provided released time in order to draft a response to the proposed project. In general, the committee's response was directed toward the maintenance of the status quo. Even when expressing support for specific aspects of the project, the committee tended to dampen the intended impact of the proposed changes. The first paragraph of their position paper stated that

> Teachers must be considerably more involved in Project Planning through a direct representative basis. Each of the 5-6 schools must be represented in all planning sessions by a classroom teacher elected by the faculty to attend all meetings whenever principals meet.

The remainder of the paper was devoted to responses to the seven goals of the proposed project (see the first seven entries out of the nine Project Goals listed on pages 48 through 50 of this chapter). The committee supported the concept of the "mini-course" as an aspect of curricular change, but added that

> Changes in curriculum must take great care to preserve the "human element" in learning. The teacher-student relationship must be preserved at a personal level. Teachers must not allow themselves to be technicians but must have ample opportunity to initiate contacts with students. The interpersonal relationships between teachers and students must be emphasized (assured).

The committee feared that teachers displaced by differentiated staffing would not be absorbed into the system in a meaningful way. They predicted that "the proposed staffing arrangement provides for a ratio of students to certificated teachers of almost 40 to 1." Instead, the committee recommended that all certificated teachers be kept in their present positions and that the project be augmented by specifically selected and carefully trained intern teachers, paraprofessionals, and volunteers. The committee wanted the term "master teachers" changed to "lead teachers." According to the committee

> Such teachers must be selected after careful development of job descriptions by J.E.A. and administrative committees. Assignment to the lead teacher category should not necessarily be determined by the number of students assigned to the teacher.

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[17] This section is based on "Position Paper: J.E.A. Efficiency Models Committee, Project Promise, Phase II," February 25, 1971.

The committee also was "concerned that the Federal Government would restrict the hiring of aides to specified population groups."

The committee supported the "flexibility" by which "students' progress could be accelerated or decelerated according to individual needs." Mastery criteria based on behavioral objectives were accepted, especially where they would facilitate able students to "challenge" courses, i.e., to meet course requirements by passing a test or otherwise accomplishing the objectives without having to take the course. However, the committee stated that "summer courses and mini-courses must not compromise educational standards by reducing requirements or the number of hours required." The closest the committee came to supporting the "flexible school year" goal was in the statement: "All school facilities must be available for use during summer and mini-semesters (PE facilities, libraries, audio-visual aids, cafeterias, etc.)." Under the goal titled "flexible school day" the committee stated that

> The school day should run from 7:00 A.M. to 9:00 P.M. Curricular programs could be enriched by integrating high school students and adults in all high school and community college courses (day and night).

The committee seemed highly enthusiastic about the inception of vocational experiences for students. They listed nine possible types of experiences, along with several procedures for operationalizing the work experience component of the project. The committee also supported the no-failure concept.

3. Building Plans[18]

On February 27 and 28, the district sponsored a two-day "charrette," in this instance an administrators' retreat, during which 23 central office and west-side school project participants met to "discuss WHAT CAN BE DONE administratively to place the project into operation" and to "develop the administrative timeline and overall design for the project." At the opening of this retreat on February 27, the superintendent reiterated that "The possibility that this district will be funded is very good, and the total of the funds that COULD be involved is beyond our comprehension. However," he continued:

> it should be remembered that we would have very little chance of being funded if the programs which were responsible for

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[18] This section is based on Minutes from Project Promise, Phase Two, Retreat, Working Paper #4, February 27, 1971; Minutes from Project Promise Phase II, Planning Grant Activities, Elementary Section, Saturday, February 27, 1971; and R. M. Toepper, Fieldnotes, Interview with principals, 10/9/74, 11/8/74, 11/14/74, and 12/11/74.

> obtaining the initial grant were not continued. These are programs such as PROJECT PROMISE, the Diagnostic Center, individualized [sic] Prescribed Instruction, [IPI], the Gifted Program, the 4-1-4 plan, and Summer School. If programs such as these were expanded, perhaps by installing Project PROMISE in all schools, or by initiating IPI in all schools, we might realistically anticipate funding; however, we should think in terms of expanding from these points.

In preparation for the ESP, each west-side school had developed its own program. Each west-side principal presented his school's proposed program at the retreat. Decisions at elementary schools A, C, and D were based on the results of staff surveys at each school. The major issue at these three schools was whether or not to adopt Individually Guided Education (IGE), described on page 159. Schools A and C decided to implement IGE; School D wanted an essentially self-contained setting with the utilization of resource rooms and some movement of students to other classrooms or other teachers. By consensus, School B chose to focus on a transitional room where all entering students would be placed, regardless of grade level, for testing and diagnosis prior to assignment to a graded classroom. Remodeling plans, fifth day activities, and arts and crafts programs were supported enthusiastically at all four west-side elementary schools. After the grant was awarded, the School B staff petitioned the superintendent to allow their school to enter the IGE League also, so that they could follow IGE guidelines in implementing the ESP.[19]

Information from the west-side junior high school (School 1) indicates that involvement with ESP programs centered primarily on the activities of the principal, who worked mainly through department heads. As a result, departments with more "aggressive" department heads tended to gain more resources for their proposed activities.[20] The principal believed that people should not be forced to do anything they did not want to do, a position which one person interpreted to mean that "people shouldn't be encouraged to do anything, period."[21] Planning for the Interim[22] was left directly in the hands of the principal who was said to disperse monies in a very arbitrary fashion.[23]

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[19] R. M. Toepper, Fieldnotes, Interview with the former School B principal, 11/14/74. Early school-based ESP decision making on the elementary level is discussed in Chapter IV of R. M. Toepper, "A Study of Curricular Decision Making in the Jefferson School District Experimental Schools Project."

[20] R. B. Everhart, Fieldnotes, 10/2/73, 10/9/73.

[21] R. B. Everhart, Fieldnotes, 10/2/73.

[22] An Interim is a three-to-four week period when regular instruction is suspended and students have the opportunity to take a combination of interest enrichment, or remedial courses and/or to participate in a work experience program.

According to the superintendent, the west-side senior high school (School 2) underwent very little change and activity. He explained that since this school was completing only its first year of operation in its new building during the planning grant period, it planned to continue some of the innovations, such as Interim, work experience, and international travel, that it had already implemented when it began operations.[24]

4. The Proposal Assumes Final Form

Small group meetings continued after the retreat. In addition, visitation teams traveled to other school districts in the area to observe computer assisted instruction, differentiated staffing, learning activity projects, individually prescribed instruction on the junior high school level, and branching individualized teaching systems. By the end of February the district's staff newsletter reported that the proposed project could mean that:

> ...the many federal projects now operating in the district would be expanded into an operational districtwide set-up. The stress is not on developing a new program, but upon operating the many programs now established throught the district.... Tentative suggestions call for both a linear and a branching non-graded performance-based curriculum, differentiated staff, continuously operated school all year long, but for four days and longer hours, vocational work experience for all students, a non-failure program for students and differentiated instructional areas.[25]

After a day off for a levy election on March 10 (in which the maintenance and operations portion of the levy passed, but two capital improvement bond issues failed) the district scheduled a series of meetings with several consultants. On March 10, the JEA Board of Directors established a position opposing a differentiated staffing procedure that would increase the student-certificated staff ratio.[26]

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[23] For more information see R. B. Everhart and J. M. McGeever, "Career and Personal Development Streams in the Jefferson School District," January 1976.

[24] Superintendent's remarks to the Level II evaluation staff, May 13 and 14, 1976.

[25] Internal district newsletter, February 1971.

[26] JEA President, "Comments on JEA Involvement in Project Promise Phase II," two-page memorandum distributed to JEA membership prior to the March 25, 1971, General Assembly Meeting.

According to the superintendent's secretary, the superintendent finished a preliminary draft of the proposal by March 11. He wrote it in his office, working from a mass of materials, borrowing ideas from various resources, and consulting with various individuals whom he would call into his office to work on a section, and then send away as he turned his attention to a different section.[27]

The last several weeks were spent getting approval and endorsements for the program and preparing the final draft. Community participation during the planning grant period, which was minimal, is described in Chapter V. On March 15 and 16 a representative of the national ESP office visited the district to meet with district administrators and to tour buildings proposed as sites for the Jefferson project.[28]

Near the end of the planning grant period, the superintendent assembled just over 200 of the district's administrators and west-side certified personnel in the multiple response classroom at School 1 in two shifts for the administration of a 10-question survey assessing their reactions to the essential components of the proposal.[29] In general, 42 percent of the teachers recommended without qualification that the district should apply for the grant, while another 47 percent recommended the application "only with significant modifications."

Answers to specific questions indicated the following preferences (see the nine Project Goals on pages 48-50):

- o Sixty-six percent supported individualized instruction by a differentiated staff for students whose performance was above or below program requirements and 30 weeks of group instruction by certificated teachers for the rest of the students.

- o Eighty-three percent opposed or expressed reservations to reduction of the adult-pupil ratio to 1:12 through the implementation of differentiated staffing.

- o Seventy-five percent favored some form of year-round schooling.

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[27] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Conversation with the superintendent's secretary regarding the first charrette on March 11 to 12, 1971, 5/10/72.

[28] Memorandum, "On-site visit to the Jefferson Project," re: Report of Site Visit [March 15-16, 1971], see pages 35-36 of Chapter II.

[29] "Federal Grant for an Experimental Schools Project, Teachers Survey Form," [undated]. The raw data for the percentages reported below was handwritten on a copy of the survey form. An average of 207 people responded to the 10 items on the survey.

- Eighty-two percent were opposed or expressed reservations about a four-day week with four to five hours of group instruction and 16 hours of individualized instruction available per day.

- Eighty-five percent favored vocational work experience for all students.

- Seventy-six percent opposed or expressed reservations to the appointment of master teachers who would supervise a differentiated staff.

- Eighty-one percent supported the absence of student failure.

- Eight-eight percent favored all students having one small class per day.

- Eighty-four percent favored use of different sized class groupings ranging from large group instruction to individualization.

In order to obtain the JEA's endorsement, the superintendent and the six west-side principals made presentations on the final draft of the ESP proposal to a special meeting of all the members of the JEA on March 25. On the basis of both the survey and the official pronouncements of the JEA, the superintendent modified the differentiated staffing goal by substituting "lead teacher" for "master teacher" and stating that non-certificated personnel would be hired in addition to, not in lieu of, present staff members. In addition, he promised that the final staffing model for the project would be developed in cooperation with the JEA. As a result, about 70 percent of the members voted to endorse the ESP proposal.

5. The Proposal is Accepted

The completed proposal was mailed to Washington, D. C., on April 5.[30] On April 13, 1971, the superintendent reported to the Board of Directors that "the Project Promise grant application [was] in Washington, D. C., being reviewed and, if funded,...[would] be an important factor in keeping the district solvent."[31]

The director of the national ESP visited the district on April 28. The superintendent told his Board of Directors that the visit was

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[30] Superintendent, letter to the national ESP director, April 5, 1971.

[31] Minutes of regular meeting of Board of Directors, April 13, 1971, p. 48.

> ...one of his final actions before making a decision on the funding of the Jefferson application. Three areas of concern remain: the concern of the community regarding keeping the project going after the grant period expires; more information on the evaluation program on students who leave the district; and the attitude of JEA on differentiated staffing.[32]

In a letter dated May 10, 1971, the director of the national Experimental Schools Program informed the superintendent that:

> We are pleased to inform you that Jefferson Public Schools has been selected as an experimental school site subject to the satisfactory negotiation of a final plan with the Office of Education.[33]

The following critique was appended to the director's letter:

> **JEFFERSON**
>
> The Selection Committee determined that the proposal from the Jefferson Schools, represents an attractive and highly organized program with special efforts to tailor it to a relatively poor but super-mobile population. Some special features of particular interest and merit include the "fifth day" concept, universal vocational education, PPBES [Planned Program Budget Evaluation System] and its application, flexible time-in-school, the ratio of adults to students, the diagnostic center, pay by assignment, higher education-school district relationships, plant utilization and the staff capacity to manage a major educational experiment. A marked emphasis on the commitment to students being able to learn was favorable noted, as was the willingness to specify tangible objectives. Recognition of the need to, and ways of, changing the teacher and the instruction role was another good feature.
>
> The committee felt that the main problem was the difficulty in identifying a strong organizing principle; the proposal seemed too heavily dependent on a mix of components. Although an artificial unity would have been spurious, the lack of it here was thought to weaken transportability, evaluation and the possibility of synergy. The amount of contingency analysis was less than

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[32] Minutes of regular meeting of Board of Directors, April 27, 1971, p. 49.

[33] R. B. Binswanger, Letter to Jefferson superintendent, May 10, 1971.

> might have been suggested by the appearance of so many flow charts. (For example, exactly what is to be done in the event of various outcomes of discussions with the unions?) Some of the specific alternative components were under-specified (for example, the drug education program). Some were probably over valued (for example, the hardware). Realistically speaking, the rate of adoption, change and achievement seemed too high in view of the multiplicity of projects involved and the range of dissemination activities implied.
>
> The cost analysis is not clear with respect to real incremental costs. There is some lack of imagination in focussed areas: for example, "international education" is a worthy cause, but if so should it be restricted to such a small exchange program? Community involvement in decision-making is not specified and is in need of clarification and explication. Similarly, student input into channeling decisions concerning himself or herself is not fully conveyed by the term "assigning".
>
> In sum, the selection committee was supportive of the ideas and program conceived by the Jefferson schools in particular the concept that the school system is ready to provide an individualized program for each student. The committee recommends that a final plan be required and that in its submission it directly address the items and issues noted in the summary.

On May 11, 1971, the superintendent reported to his Board of Directors that the contract had been awarded to the district "without major revisions."[34] According to the superintendent, the project had already begun on May 1, 1971, and would continue for the next five years. The project was expected to supply approximately five million dollars over that period, "providing the district carries out the projects outlined in the proposal, discards those that prove not successful, and improves those that prove successful."[35]

Between May 12 and 25, the superintendent negotiated the specifics of the district's ESP grant with the national ESP staff at the Office of Education. The final draft of the district's ESP proposal was dated May 15, 1971.

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[34] Minutes of regular meeting of Board of Directors, May 11, 1971, [p. 52].

[35] "Superintendent's Report" to regular meeting of the Jefferson Board of Directors, Exhibit 71-E-108, May 11, 1971, p. 2.

D. What Did the Proposals Say?

1. Two Versions

The district's original ESP proposal was submitted to USOE on April 10, 1971. As a result of revisions originally suggested by the national ESP office, the general tone of which was recounted on the previous two pages, a shorter final draft was prepared by May 15, 1971.[36]

The original ESP proposal contained an abstract; a brief summary of the planning process; letters of commitment from the state Superintendent of Public Instruction, the district Board of Directors, the district's Education Council, the JEA, and the university within the district's boundaries; a description of the national educational significance of the project relating 28 project objectives to 18 district needs; a list of 13 project objectives, including 28 subordinate objectives; a statement of the district's philosophy of education; an historical review of individualized instruction; a description of 15 project components (however, they are mis-numbered as 14), including 18 pages of organizational models for the first 7 of the 9 original project goals (with the staffing model changed to meet the criticisms of the JEA); a brief description of the Jefferson community and ESP target population; a timeline for the first 30 months of the project; a description of project evaluation procedures; the budget; and a description of project administrative positions. (The national ESP's expectations for the proposed scope of work are listed on pages 32 and 33 of Chapter II.)

The final draft of the original ESP proposal opened with the addition of two new pages on the central theme of the project, followed by the statements of needs with accompanying objectives which had been presented formerly as part of the national educational significance of the project. As before, 15 objectives were associated with 7 student needs, 8 objectives were matched with 6 institutional needs, and 9 objectives were associated with 5 dissemination needs. (A copy of the three lists is provided in Appendix C.) The final draft omitted the list of project objectives and sub-objectives, the district's philosophy of education, and the historical review of individualized instruction. The final draft included the description of 15 project components with 10 (instead of 18) pages of organizational models for project components. A major addition advocated by the national ESP office, was a section which included 9 fictional case studies describing how hypothetical students would be affected by the ESP. The final draft included the community and target population descriptions from the original proposal. It concluded with the sections on administration, evaluation, and the budget.

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[36] The original ESP proposal: Superintendent and the Project Planning Team, "Project Promise: Programming Resources to Operate a Model Instruction System in Education," Jefferson School District, an application to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for an operations grant under provisions of the Experimental Schools Program, planning project OEG-0-71-1214, project number 18040, submitted April 10, 1971. The final draft of the original ESP proposal: "Experimental Schools, Jefferson: Providing Optimum Learning Environments for 4000 Students," an application to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for an operations grant under provisions of the Experimental Schools Program, planning project OEG-0-71-1212, project number 18040, submitted by the superintendent, May 15, 1971.

2. Needs, Objectives, and Basic Components

Since the original proposal was criticized by the national ESP office for lacking a strong organizing principle, the superintendent added "providing an appropriate environment for optimum learning for each student" as the "common central theme" for the two secondary and four elementary schools on the west side of the district during the first 30 months of J ESP. The following seven student needs were identified for the ESP:

- Success
- Active participation in the learning process
- Development of real responsibility
- Positive self-image
- School programs focused on student interests
- Preparation for an unknown future
- The development of idealism

Six significant institutional needs were identified:

- Teacher retraining
- Year-round utilization of buildings
- Improved staffing models
- Community involvement
- Development or adaption of an individualized curriculum which would provide "fluid" movement between the range of individualized teaching materials and group-oriented programs
- Use of a cost-effectiveness formula to operate schools which district patrons could afford

Under "significant dissemination needs for nationwide replicability" the district listed:

- Training programs for each project component
- A Planned Programmed Budget Evaluation System (PPBES)
- Quality and efficiency as import and export criteria
- Handling of project visitors without disturbing the educational process
- Evaluation for the purpose of deciding to continue, discontinue, or modify project components

Most of these needs were drawn from a statewide assessment of educational needs for students in the state,[37] with which the superintendent, as a member and chairman of the statewide Title III (ESEA) Advisory Council, was well acquainted. The district's entire list of student needs, except the last one concerning the development of idealism, was taken from the state assessment. Two subpoints under the institutional need regarding teacher training were similar to statements in the state document; the district's community involvement need was quoted verbatim from the state document. Several other ideas presented in the original proposal were similar to statements in the state document regarding individualized instruction, vocational-technical education, student involvement in educational planning, the use of cross-age tutors, student freedom of choice in the selection of courses, and the hiring of a public relations director.

The project was to be assembled from "a number of proven educational programs which [had] been piloted over the past five years...in the Jefferson district, some in adjacent or nearby districts, others in districts in other parts of the country." The basic components of the ESP were to include the following:

- Individualized education programs and non-graded arrangements on a systemwide K-12 basis
- Diagnostic teaching, whereby each student's learning capacities interests, competencies, problems, and aspirations would be analyzed in order to place him or her in an appropriate learning environment
- Student- and teacher-developed curricula

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[37] Consulting Services Corporation (Seaview, Pacific), Phase II: An Assessment of Educational Needs for Students in Pacific State, State Capital, Pacific State Title III ESEA Advisory Council, January 1970. (ED 082 311)

- Lifetime sports and activities
- Environmental education
- International education
- Extended use of all school facilities through extension of the school day, week, and year
- Expansion of vocational education to include all students in grades 1 through 12
- Drug education
- Improved use of media and technology
- Inservice training in cooperation with the two private universities in the area
- Implementation of PPBES
- Cabinet-level importance for the ESP
- Dissemination through extant channels at the local university
- Full-time evaluation to provide pre-assessment, continuous monitoring, and post-assessment of all project activities.

At the conclusion of the first 30 months of the ESP, the district reiterated that its ESP plan of operation was based upon the following assumptions and values:

- Accomplishment of truly individualized instruction in a modern school depends upon factors outside the control of individual teachers. The entire school district organization must be involved.
- The district must develop resources for diagnosis and for rapid management of diagnostic information related to individual pupils.
- Teachers must be trained to interpret diagnostic evidence and to prescribe subsequent instruction on an individual basis.
- Curriculum should be based upon a broad behavorial and conceptual base in each curriculum allowing specific topics and experiences to be prescribed as a function of individual capabilities, interests, readiness and needs.
- Schools must be organized more flexibly--allowing pupil groups to be brought together in small or large groups to deal with common problems.

- More resources must be made available to provide a wider variety of alternatives available for prescription.
- Test makers must develop diagnostic tools specific to the curriculum and suitable for academic prescription.
- The curriculum should emphasize inquiry, self-guided learning, observation and inductive processes.[38]

3. School Models

According to the proposal, the four west-side elementary schools and two west-side secondary schools were each to be organized according to models developed by their school staffs based on the 3 clusters of needs, 32 objectives, and 15 basic components of the project. Schools B and D would develop a transitional mode of operation whereby, after diagnosis using the Jefferson Learning and Attitude Profile (which was never developed), most students would be assigned to "linear graded programs" which would operate for about six weeks. Fast students would attend from 10:00 a.m. to 3:15 p.m. and slow students from 8:45 a.m. to 2:05 p.m. Students not meeting performance objectives would be assigned to Individually Guided Education (IGE) classrooms for individualized instruction by a differentiated staff. In addition, these two schools would have resource centers open from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m., fifth day programs for 36 days of the school year, and summer programs extended four days per week through June and July. After a three-year evaluation period, these schools would either move completely into the IGE school concept or return to the self-contained, largely graded program.

Schools A and C (later joined by School B) would operationalize the IGE school concept beginning in September 1971, as members of a newly formed IGE League of about 15 schools under the supervision of the University of Pacific's Bureau of School Service and Research. IGE elementary schools are organized by units composed of multi-age, non-graded student groups. Each unit is generally staffed by a unit leader (who is also a full-time teacher), several other teachers, and an instructional aide. Decisions regarding unit endeavors and the scheduling and instruction of students are the responsibility of unit teachers. Unit leaders are elected by the teachers in their respective units and represent those units in Instructional Improvement Committee (IIC) meetings with the principal. This manner of organization is intended to facilitate an environment whereby each student is educated according to his or her own style of learning, ability, and capability.

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[38] JSD, "Experimental Schools Project Final [Narrative] Report," May 1971-November 1973, p. 1.

Almost any type of curriculum can be taught in an IGE school, however, instruction is expected to be guided by behavioral objectives.[39]

The curriculum delivery system for the west-side junior high school (School 1) was intended to include diagnosis using the Jefferson Learning and Attitude Profile, followed by assignment to a combination of the regular college preparatory program; an ungraded Individually Guided Program (IGP) utilizing Individually Prescribed Instruction (IPI) and other programs; and a fifth day program including remedial, enrichment, or job experiences. The proposed program at School 1 was also to include a three-week Interim and a six-week summer program.

The curriculum delivery system for the west-side senior high school (School 2) was also planned to include diagnosis using the Jefferson Learning and Attitude Profile, followed by assignment to a combination of the regular college prep or commercial program which also included the fifth day, the Technical Interdisciplinary Program (TIP) combining academic and vocational courses, one semester of work study required of all students, or half-day assignment to one of the vocational-technical schools in the area. The proposed program at School 2 was also to include a four-week Interim and a similar four-week summer Interim.

4. Synthesis of the Plan for the J ESP

Based upon the contents of the final first 30-month proposal, especially the hypothetical case studies, one would expect the J ESP to emphasize manners of programming district schedules, buildings, and staff in order to provide alternative means of meeting the educational needs of students, especially those who came from transient families and families with minimal incomes. By operating on an 11-month schedule students would be able to spend more time in school in the attempt to close "their academic proficiency gap" or spend less time in school per day by attendance over a longer period of time per year. The schools would also operate for longer periods each day.

Thus, "slow," later called "high risk," students could attend school for more than the traditionally required 180 days and "fast" students would have the option of either spending less than 180 days a year in school or accelerating their progress. Some students would be able to attend school on a schedule compatible with their parent's schedules. Older students would be enabled to plan their school experiences around a job. One day each week in all schools (fifth day) and three- to four-week Interim sessions in the secondary schools would devote large blocks of time to lifetime sports and training for leisure time avocations.

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[39] Bureau of School Service and Research, "IGE: Questions and Answers" and "Individually Guided Education: An In-Service Training Program for Teachers." University of Pacific, Seaview, Pacific, [1971].

The foregoing innovations demanded diagnosis of the status of each student's educational development, planning of each student's educational program, and the availability of individualized or alternative group instructional programs on all levels. Students would be assigned only to objectives that they could successfully accomplish, thereby encouraging a positive self-image. Students would also participate in planning their courses and programming their own schedules. In addition, all students would be involved in extensive vocational training opportunities and would have some form of work experience at various stages in their educational careers. As stated earlier, some aspects of the educational program would be keyed to preparing students to make sensible use of their leisure time. The plan also included instructional components in environmental and drug education and international travel. Extensive use of new media and technology was planned also, such as computer assisted instruction and at-home viewing of specially prepared television courses. An extensive staff retraining program, in which the two local universities would cooperate, would be necessary in order to operationalize these innovations.

A sophisiticated budgeting system would be installed to facilitate both the selection and phase-out of programs and/or materials, based on cost and effectiveness criteria. Such a system would necessitate evaluation of affective and psycho-motor outcomes as well as the more traditional cognitive outcomes.

Buildings would have to be remodeled to facilitate many of these innovations. Following federal guidelines, the Jefferson community would be involved extensively in both the planning and the operation of the entire program. Other than the creation of several new administrative positions, however, no changes in the governance of the district were planned.[40]

5. The Budget

The negotiated budget for the first 30 months of the ESP was $2,462,718 for the operation of the project in the four elementary and two secondary schools on the west side of the district (the district estimated it would provide $8,696,230) and $2,208,980 for the second 30 months of the ESP when the number of project schools was expected to increase to include all 13 district schools (the district's estimated budget for this latter period was $19,399,323). According to the original ESP proposal,

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[40] The range of proposed innovations for the district's ESP, as well as the rationale for the national ESP effort, are strikingly similar to the Ford Foundation's $30+ million Comprehensive School Improvement Program of the 1960's. See [P. Nachtigal, et. al.,] A Foundation Goes to School: The Ford Foundation Comprehensive School Improvement Program, 1969-1970, Ford Foundation, New York, 1972.

> The statistics show that expenditures for the experimental schools will represent 22 percent of the total budget of the project during the first 30 months of the project. A greater percentage of experimental school fund expenditures go for equipment, contracted services, supplies and materials and travel, than in the regular budget, because these items represent the most unique costs required to train personnel in the project and place it into operation.

In addition, the district estimated that

> ...expenditures for the experimental schools will represent 10.22 percent of the total district budget for the second 30 months with all students in the district involved in successful experimental school programs. Because of the decreasing federal expenditures in the project schools for each year, it is expected that the total project activities can be funded with local funds at the end of the project period.

6. The Rhetoric

Six months after the project had gotten under way, the superintendent summarized what the J ESP meant from his point of view. According to the superintendent, the J ESP would result in:

> A validated curriculum with complete objectives, procedures, and curriculum guides for each component of the Experimental Schools Project. The programs would be clearly spelled out, based on the mode of instruction, the time of year it is taught, and the major content area and quality measures. Attitude measures and interest measures will be linked with cost data to develop a cost-efficiency ratio. This will allow the district with minimum resourses to select the high quality programs with little cost and those with maximum resources to export all of the high quality features of the project...
>
> When we are all finished, the student entering our schools could have a profile developed annually for his entire educational career. This could be updated each year....Depending on their capabilities, students would spend more or less time in academic pursuits with their alternative time spent:
>
> 1. In cross age tutoring or job experience.
> 2. Free from school in parent directed activities.
> 3. In a variety of environmental education programs and student exchange programs.
> 4. In international educational programs.

> I would see the elementary student spending about 90 percent of his time at the school site; the junior high school student about 75 percent of his time at the school site; and the senior high school student about 60 percent of his time at the school site. The school would be responsible for the activities of the other time periods, but would gain efficiency in student management through the wise use of student resources.[41]

E. Summary

The superintendent was, for all practical purposes, solely responsible for the conceptualization and planning of the J ESP. In retrospect, near the beginning of the fifth year of the project, he stated that he did not believe that the project could have been written by anyone else in the district. He recounted how the personnel of the district has been "supportive and professional," especially in the pursuit of outside funding for the district. He also described the writing of the first proposal as a team effort. However, he added that the rest of the district was ready to move only after they received a "road map" as to how to proceed. He concluded by saying that the project had needed a leader, but no subordinate had stepped in to lead.[42] One develops the feeling that the district was rushed in formulating the plans for its ESP, but that the hurried nature of the preparations may have been alleviated by the central conceptual role assumed by the superintendent.

In his letter of interest, the superintendent proposed a set of innovations that combined ideas he had been thinking about for a long time with some of the programs that he had initiated since his arrival in the district five years earlier. The proposed innovations--the 11-month schedule, buildings open for instruction 16 hours per day, planning of each student's educational program, differentiated staffing, and decision making about program selection and phase-out based on cost-effectiveness criteria--involved major reorientations[43] in the district's traditional manner of operation.

Considerable changes were made in the substance of the project between the initial letter of interest and the second draft of the first 30-month proposal. The personnel of the district were not willing to implement major changes affecting the times various students would attend school or the duties of the staff who would instruct them. According to the final draft of the first 30 months proposal, the schools would operate on an 11-month schedule and for longer periods of time each day. The fifth day of each week in all schools and one to two Interim sessions per year in the secondary schools would devote large blocks of time to lifetime sports and training for leisure time avocations. Diagnosis of the status of each student's educational development, tailoring of each student's educational program, provision for individualized or alternative group instructional programs on all levels, and improved use of media and technology warranted extensive staff retraining programs, in which the two local universities would cooperate. A sophisiticated budgetary system based on cost-effectiveness criteria, would be installed to facilitate both the selection and phase-out of programs and/or materials.

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[41] Superintendent, Memorandum, "Response to Questions Concerning The Experimental Schools Project," to the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, January 18, 1972, pp. 1-2.

[42] R. M. Toepper, Fieldnotes, Interview with the superintendent, 10/30/75.

[43] See R. Normann, "Organizational Innovativeness: Product Variation and Reorientation," Administration Science Quarterly, 16:2 (June 1971), pp. 203-215.

Thus, the ongoing regularities of the district caused the original innovative ideas of the superintendent as expressed in his brief response to the OE initative announcing the ESP to be changed significantly in the proposal finally accepted by the national ESP staff in Washington, D.C. Although the major student needs remained in the project, many of the efficiency models which had attracted a great deal of attention to this project during the planning phase were deleted. The resultant project, therefore, was not as innovative as it would have been had these components survived the planning process.

The following four chapters will describe and analyze the reality of governance, community participation, curriculum and instruction, and evaluation endeavors during the five years of the J ESP.

CHAPTER IV

GOVERNANCE

IV. GOVERNANCE

This chapter illuminates the development of governance under the ESP intervention. The meaning of "governance" is deceptively simple. For example, John Corson has stated,

> ...when I use the term "governance" I am talking about the processes by which decisions are arrived at, who participates in these processes, the structures that relate these individuals, and the effort that is made (or should be made) to see to it that decisions once made are carried out, and to assess the results that are achieved.[1]

Michael Cohen and James March, cautioning that the pervasive emphasis on rational decision making is misleading, suggest sources of uncertainty and complexity:

> Although organizations can often be viewed as vehicles for solving well-defined problems and as structures within which conflict is resolved through bargaining, they are also sets of procedures through which organizational participants arrive at an interpretation of what they are doing and what they have done while doing it. From this point of view, an organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work.[2]

In this report "governance" refers to the structures and the processes of decision making, without the assumptions of a linear rationality. Pragmatically, this has involved attending closely to the Program Cabinet created to direct the

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[1] John J. Corson, The Governance of Colleges and Universities (revised), McGraw-Hill, New York, 1975, p. 20n; for a brief, similar version see Governance of Higher Education: Six Priority Problems: A Report and Recommendations by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, April 1973, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1973, p. vii.

[2] Michael D. Cohen and James G. March, Leadership and Ambiguity; the American College Presidency, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1976, p. 81.

J ESP, to see what kind of choices, issues, feelings, and decisions it dealt with, and what this meant.[3] This also has involved attending at a general level to selected actors and to the structures through which they made, implemented (or avoided), and assessed systemwide decisions to see how the system was directed, coordinated and controlled. Finally, this has meant examining the J ESP's fiscal characteristics. These foci have included, but have not been limited to, ESP-specific structures and processes of decision making.

First, we describe the pre-ESP setting, including the organizational and fiscal structures and the administrative complement which existed immediately before the intervention. The J ESP rhetoric is then examined for implications regarding governance. Subsequently, we examine project governance during the first J ESP year, along with the early USOE/ESP concerns which culminated in direct intervention in the school district's governance. The processes and implicit agendas of the resulting Program Cabinet are discussed. Focus then shifts beyond the Program Cabinet, examining in turn administrative structure, fiscal structure, personnel administration, management of support services, and environmental transactions.

A. The Setting

Though general properties of the intervention setting were described in the first section of this report, those properties considered particularly relevant to governance development are further reviewed here.

1. Organizational Structure

The internal differentiation within the school system was minimal and simple before the ESP intervention. The four secondary school principals, administrative assistant-secondary education, vocational education-transportation-summer school director, and director of maintenance and plant operations all reported directly to the assistant superintendent. The assistant superintendent, in turn, plus the nine elementary principals, director of elementary education, director of special education, administrative assistant-business, and supervisor of operations all reported directly to the superintendent. The superintendent reported to the Board of Directors.[4]

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[3] This approach is consonant with a recent model of organizational choice; see Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," Adminstrative Science Quarterly, 17:1, pp. 1-26, March 1972.

Policies enacted by the Board of Directors, as well as position descriptions and administrative regulations, governed administrative activities. Administrative practices also were subject to standards promulgated by the state Superintendent of Instruction, and to provisions negotiated with the teachers' association and unions representing other employees. Regular administrative meetings facilitated interaction among the administrators.[5] Sufficient regularity of activity and structural differentiation was established to facilitate the smooth functioning of the school system.

2. Fiscal Structure

The district's pre-ESP annual budget of about $6 million was administered through a simple accounting system with minimal accountability provisions. The acquisition and allocation of school district financial resources were controlled through three major funding accounts: the building fund, bond redemption fund, and general fund. The building fund and bond redemption funds were "earmarked" accounts, used solely for the purposes indicated by their titles; i.e., expansion, construction and improvement of the physical plant facilities, and payment on the principal and interest of school bonds. The general fund, largest and most complex of the three, was the account through which monies were channeled for the annual maintenance and operation of the school system.[6] It was this fund which directly supported the system's ongoing operation, and through which ESP monies would be directed towards comprehensively changing that operation.

Expenditures from the general fund were dispensed through a set of line item categories based on the function for which monies were spent, such as administration, instruction, and transportation. These categories in turn were broken down by the object of expenditures within each function, such as certified salaries, supplies and materials, and capital equipment. Expenditures were displayed apart from revenues, and attempts were not made to report expenses in a manner illuminating the sources of revenue from which they were derived. There were no charts of accounts to facilitate locating and tying together specific program costs and outcomes relative to the source of revenue; i.e., a specific instructional program could be operated on funds from many sources, without reference to the proportion of the program's cost attributable to a particular revenue source.[7]

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[4] JSD, Regulation 2310. 7, 1970-71 (approved July 14, 1970) (organization chart).

The Board of Dirctors was not instrumentally involved in J ESP decision making, hence is not discussed in this chapter; however, it is discussed in terms of community relationships in Chapter 5.

[5] JSD, "Schedule of Administrative and Principals' Meetings, 1970-71," Procedure AP 70-10, issued September 1, 1970.

[6] JSD, Final Budget, 1973-74, pp. 6, 20 and 26.

3. Administrators: The Human Variables

The administrators personified the stability and homogeneity of the school system. Only one, an elementary principal, was less than thirty years of age when the ESP began; about 12 would be eligible for retirement by the time the five-year project was completed, or shortly after. About two-thirds of the administrators had earned one or more degrees at the church-related university located within the boundaries of the school district.

In the five years since the "outsider" superintendent had been selected, they had accommodated a position between the prevailing emphases upon basic education and traditional schooling and the superintendent's emphases upon imported and externally funded innovations. The accommodation had avoided conflict by permitting variation in curricular-instructional practices among the schools, and by leaving unaffected centralized managerial functions such as personnel administration. The superintendent had relied mainly on building authority through the influence of his ideas and the lure of new funding, rather than challenging the established spheres of authority and informal power of the long tenured administrative staff. The administrators were accustomed to smooth administrative operations free of conflict over objectives, processes, and authority.[8]

B. The J ESP Rhetoric: Implications for Governance

The major thrust of the J ESP rhetoric was to modify the school system's curricular and instructional practices. These modifications added outcomes in the affective domain, in leisure activities, in vocational competencies, and in environmental, international, and drug education. They also entailed changes in the teaching-learning technology toward individualized and non-graded programs, diagnostic teaching, and improved use of media and technology. Teacher training was to be provided to facilitate implementation of these changes. Efficiency criteria were to be applied to facilitate decisions on program development and retention.

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[7] A. Anderson & Co., "Jefferson ESP Study", independent accounting firm report, June 27, 1972, p. 13.

[8] F. Mulhauser, "Report to Mr. J. Schiller," NWREL, May 9, 1973, particularly pp. 16-40.

A secondary thrust of the J ESP rhetoric was to modify the school system's relationship with certain elements of its environment. Local community involvement was to be increased. Further, the school system was to disseminate information about its progress to the interested professional community nationwide.

Governance modifications were not detailed in the rhetoric. Beyond releasing a fraction of the superintendent's time for project direction, proposed administrative position additions were minimal (vice principal level positions for the secondary schools and a director for the new evaluation unit). The rhetoric did not advocate modifications in existing administrative positions or in their interrelationships.

However, the fiscal provisions did imply substantial change in decision making practices and provisions for organizational control. In addition to regular district revenues, nearly 2.5 million dollars of federal funds were incorporated within the Jefferson general fund to support experimentation in one-half of the district's schools (four elementary, one junior high, and one high school) entering the project during the first 30 months. According to the proposal, the other half of the district would not receive federal monies under the ESP and would continue operating as it had previously.[9] At the beginning of the second 30 months, more than 2 million dollars would be needed to import programs which had been successfully implemented in the "project" schools into the "non-project" schools, as all district schools would become project sites.[10]

The funds also were to support the district's effort to change the financial reporting and control system from a line item account system, which lacked the ability to provide program expense data, to a Planned Programmed Budget Evaluation System (PPBES)[11] through which monetary inputs could be attributed to individual program expenses, and could be related to student outcomes resulting from the operation of the ESP-proposed instructional system.[12] Cost Efficiency Ratios (CER's) would be elicited for the instructional program components undergoing trial runs as a result of the project (e.g., environmental education, individualized education) and would serve as a basis for deciding whether to maintain, eliminate, or alter those programs.[13] The district planned to implement the PPBES for ESP activities the first project year, expand the accounting system to all financial transactions of the project schools the second year, and further expand the system throughout the organization by the end of the third year.[14]

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[9] JSD, "Experimental Schools, Jefferson: Providing Optimum Learning Environments for 4000 Students," an application to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for an operations grant under provisions of the Experimental Schools Program, planning project OEC-0-81-1214, project number 18040, submitted by the superintendent [final draft of the first 30 months proposal], May 15, 1971, p. 63.

[10] Superintendent and the Project Planning Team, "Project Promise: Programming Resources to Operate a Model Instruction System in Education," Jefferson School District, an application to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for an operations grant under provisions of the Experimental Schools Program, planning project OEG-0-71-1214, project number 18040, [original draft of first 30 months proposal], submitted April 10, 1971, pp. 18 and 75.

[11] Also referred to as PPB system.

The district's financial accounting structure would need to undergo substantial change. Budget documents would need to be characterized by explicit statements of desired outcomes and organized around major instructional programs (a format with program activities clustered around objectives). Procedures for recording expenditures would need to be developed to reflect program characteristics. Multi-year projections of new program resource demands would need to be made for each instructional program, and fiscal and programmatic data would need to be organized in a manner which would enhance resource allocation decisions.[15]

The district would be required to integrate the financial accounting system with the instructional program system, such that budgets could be displayed and expenditures accounted for on a program-by-program basis. Institutional and client outcome data and instructional expense data would be required, and periodic cost benefit analyses would be made to support decisions reached about the optimally valuable programs. The PPBE System would require extensive coordination among various administrative personnel in establishing a budget which could effectively serve as a planning document, as comprehensive instructional programs would mean cross-grade level and/or cross-site implementation. In addition, centralized control of spending would be necessary to contain building level discretionary spending within specific program budgetary parameters.

Further governance implications were substantial. Foremost, the emphasis on diagnosis and individualization would increase the interdependence among components within individual schools. The principals would share increased coordination functions with students, teachers, and counselors directly involved in the teacher-learning technology. The lengthened school day and the school year would also require increased managerial coordination. Obtaining materials, equipment and transportation services would further increase the managerial workload.

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[12] Ibid., p. 22

[13] Superintendent and Project Planning Team, "Project Promise," [original draft of first 30 months proposal], p. 18.

[14] JSD, "Experimental Schools, Jefferson", [final draft of first 30 months proposal].

[15] S. J. Knesivick, Program Budgeting (PPBE) McCutchan, Berkeley, 1973, p. 2.

There were also implications for systemwide managerial coordination and control and for negotiations with elements of the school system's environment. The J ESP design called for program articulation across school levels, including the systemwide distribution of multi-media materials and equipment, as well as transportation services. Retraining programs would require additional coordination among schools. Data collection, analysis and feedback functions of the new evaluation component would create a need for collective deliberations and decisions, in addition to coordination of activities within and among schools and between schools and the evaluation component. Further, the school system would need to negotiate acceptance of the added outcomes with the local community and with regulatory agencies. Finally, the dissemination functions, including the management of onsite visitors, would require orientation to educators beyond the Jefferson boundaries.

In summary, the governance workload would be greatly increased. The demand would fall heavily upon principals as their schooling programs became more responsive to individualization. Increased need for flexibility would encourage managerial decentralization, as well as interschool articulation. This articulation, in turn, would reinforce a return to centralized coordination, control, and negotiation. Changes in managerial style also would be needed, emphasizing the strong analytic orientation of the PPBES approach.

While the rhetoric pertinent to governance did not resolve the meaning of "comprehensive change," it suggested that implementation decisions would require consideration of performance and costs throughout the system. Clearly there was the implication for some system of centralized decision, coordination, and control, paralleling the broad involvement in implementing an individualized education program.

C. The Developmental History Of Governance

The developmental history of governance began with centralized initiative and structuring, evidenced in securing the ESP grant and setting the project parameters. As the project school principals and their staffs set about implementing programs and expending ESP funds, decentralized exercise of administrative discretion also became apparent. These parallel centralization and decentralization forces would soon be reflected in an issue whether the "comprehensive change" project theme required common objectives and common means for their attainment, permitted varied objectives and varied means among the several project schools, or some variation.

1. The Early ESP Governance Structure and Practices

During the first year of the ESP (1971-72) 25 percent of the superintendent's time was funded for project leadership, and he remained highly involved with J ESP developments. Staff support for ESP managerial tasks was provided by a senior level administrative assistant and a secretary. As shown in the next section, the superintendent and the administrative assistant performed primary linkage functions between the district and USOE/ESP.

The superintendent was the articulate spokesman for the project, making numerous media-assisted presentations to outside groups. Within the district the superintendent also continued to promote the ESP and the possible curricular-instructional innovations it could facilitate.

The superintendent and the J ESP administrative assistant were instrumental in budgeting the ESP funds. In the absence of input by the project school principals, the superintendent secured support from his cabinet to allocate ESP funds according to the number of students enrolled in the six project schools. He also advocated the development of a system to track all personnel and other expenses.[16]

Beyond structuring the fiscal allocations, centralized coordination and control were minimal. Perhaps the minimal coordination was unintentional. Regardless, it appears consonant with the decision mode as perceived by a central office administrator who told a NWREL evaluator:

> Well, we never make very clear decisions. You work around people...let biases die... and you play games.... We make little decisions, not any big ones. I know there's a model of getting clear your objectives, gathering information, looking at alternatives, etc., but we just don't go by that model. We avoid big decisions.[17]

In the first month the J ESP governance agenda shifted from the designing and selling phase to getting the project implemented. Correspondingly, the center of governance activity shifted from the superintendent's arena to the principals' turf.

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[16] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Superintendent's cabinet meeting, 2/28/72.

[17] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with central office administrator, 1/17/72. The reality perceived by the administrator probably was closer to the model described by Charles E. Lindlom in "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" Public Administration Review, 19:1, pp. 79-88, winter 1959, or by Cohen, March, and Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model."

Fieldnotes of interviews with several principals during the first months of the project produced a list of varied curricular-instructional programs being considered or implemented at their schools (see Chapter VI for a discussion of curricular and instructional developments). It was general practice for the individual building principal and those teachers directly involved in a program to procure the necessary materials, arrange for necessary staff training, and handle the many details of program implementation.[18] Principals performed those tasks with minimal systemwide coordination. In addition, they labored under uncertainty about the extent to which they would be held accountable for J ESP objectives, and about whether they would be given enough monies to implement their programs.[19]

The pace of activity quickened then, but without the magnitude of changes suggested by the J ESP rhetoric. As assessed by the assistant superintendent, "The project allows us to continue things we had begun...it allows us to do things we were thinking of doing. It sort of speeds things up."[20]

Thus, governance developments of the first year, which set the tone for project implementation, occurred in an atmosphere of "getting the show on the road," without staffing provisions which would have freed time for deliberations about the implications and means of implementing the J ESP. The decision which emerged was for school-by-school implementation, thereby avoiding the delay and conflict which likely would have occurred had those questions been confronted.

In retrospect, the superintendent saw the project's first six months as the project's time of greatest change. He saw the lack of planning time as a virtue, contributing to rapid change. After the initial six months, as he saw it, USOE/ESP imposed a planning approach on the district. Repeating for emphasis, he concluded: "Long-term planning results in no change."[21]

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[18] Organizational and managerial developments associated with the adoption and administration of the Individually Guided Education (IGE) program by three of the four ESP elementary schools are detailed in F. Mulhauser, "Report to Mr. J. Schiller," pp. 64-89.

[19] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with elementary principal, 12/2/71.

[20] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with assistant superintendent, 1/14/72.

[21] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Superintendent-NWREL staff meeting, 5/13/76

2. The Precariousness of the "Comprehensive Change" Theme

"Comprehensive change," as shown earlier, constituted the unifying theme for the initial announcement of the ESP. Subsequent documents and pronouncements maintained the theme, but did not specify USOE interpretations of the theme or to elaborate upon its implications.

In December 1971, seven months following award of the grant, the USOE/ESP director of evaluation, the project officer for Jefferson, and a consultant came to the district. Their assessment was reflected in the evaluation director's expressed conviction that "this project sure needs some prodding from USOE."[22] The consultant, a veteran evaluator with qualification in economics and statistics, concurred, commenting upon the lack of varied inputs or evidence of any experimentation.[23] The project officer's memorandum report of the visit, quoted in part below, detailed the concerns.

> The main thrust of the Jefferson project, as expressed by the final plan and the project staff, is providing education based on the individual learning pace of each student. This can only be fully realized if all of the educational services provided by the project to the students are designed and operationalized in an articulated, comprehensive way.... Achieving the goal... depends heavily on the degree to which the various parts of the plan are mutually supportive and reinforcing. This is true not only for the various curricular components, but for all of the project.
>
> Parts of the Jefferson project are beginning to move.... However, at the present time, there is no real vertical articulation of programs from elementary through high school; nor is there a great deal of substantive coordination among the four elementary schools.
>
> Given that this first year must be considered a developmental year to some extent, the staff is less concerned that there is no obvious articulation now, than by the fact that we don't see the issue of articulation being perceived as a priority for the project.... I believe that the fragmentation which now exists is due, in large part, to the manner in which the project components were developed and the way in which the project is administered. It appears that there are really two processes at work: (1) Each

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[22] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Telephone interview with USOE/ESP evaluation director, 12/10/71.

[23] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Telephone interview with USOE/ESP consultant, 12/9/71.

> building principal has a great deal of autonomy in deciding what kinds of programs to implement, how those programs are defined operationally, and the extent to which teachers are involved in planning and decision making.... (2) At the same time the superintendent, who is also the project director, brings a different perspective....His major concern...is the cost/quality efficiency of program components. Therefore, his perspective of the Experimental Schools project has less to do with the specific content of individual components than with questions of how components can be imported, modified in terms of cost and requisite materials, and implemented in order to facilitate the goal of running a system which has an adult/pupil ratio of 1/12 on a 1/30 budget....it is highly probable, if not changed, that the issue of articulation might end in no one's [sic] domain as roles and responsibilities are currently perceived and thus the project will not even have a fair chance to carry out its objectives.[24]

Subsequently, USOE/ESP took advantage of the superintendent's February 1972 trip to a meeting of the American Association of School Administrators in Atlantic City, bringing him to Washington. Those conversations were to be followed by a return visit by USOE/ESP staff to Jefferson to deal further with the articulation-comprehensiveness issue. But while those conversations at least made the superintendent aware of federal level concerns, they did not result in his full understanding of those concerns and expectations, as indicated by his comments to a NWREL staff member:

> I'm still in great confusion on this articulation. I thought it meant having a program linked together from kindergarten through high school in some way that made sense year after year. But I'm afraid I never understood what they were talking about in our meetings in Washington. I think they were saying something about the effective assembly of the innovations we promised to install. And I got a real barrage on the high school. But I still don't really know what they want, or understand their talk.[25]

A USOE/ESP staff member described the Washington conversations hopefully: "We got through; we think he heard us, and understood what we were saying and saw the lack of connection between what's happening and the ultimate program goals."[26] Yet the lack of effective communication between the district and USOE/ESP which characterized the [illegible]cation/initiation phase of the project persisted during this critical period of early development and implementation.

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[24] B. Rose, "Report on December Visit to Jefferson Experimental Schools Project," USOE/ESP internal memorandum, January 13, 1972. Document in NIE files.

[25] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 2/22/72.

Subsequently, a new project officer assumed responsibility, visiting the site in March 1972. In a site visit report following his return to Washington, he stated the vulnerability of the comprehensiveness theme:

> The Experimental Schools project in Jefferson is in danger of losing its identity as a K-12 educational experiment. The principal factor accounting for the present situation is the administrative structure that by tradition has allowed the building principal to exercise almost complete control over his school, resulting in a district-wide coordination and management on issues critical to the operation of an experimental school project.
>
> The experimental schools project instead of being a continuous articulated educational experiment, appears to be a series of component schools operating a series of component parts, some of which were in operation prior to the experimental schools project designation.[27]

His diagnosis was not new, but his proposed remedy was; rather than suggesting another report or meeting, he advocated direct responsibility and control by the superintendent:

> The director of the experimental schools program in this case the Superintendent, must take physical and mental control of the project schools and be perceived as having [taken] such [control] by the building principals.
>
> This could be a difficult task, since tradition, a very strong element in the Jefferson School District which has a very small teacher turnover and up from the ranks long-term principals, has dictated that the principal is the controlling factor in the educational movement of the district....

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[26] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Telephone conversation with USOE/ESP project officer, 2/23/72.

[27] R. Mullens, "Jefferson Trip Report," USOE/ESP internal memorandum, April 3, 1972. Document in NIE files.

> The major share of the responsibility would have to come from the superintendent who could serve as a coordinating force by (a) requiring his approval of proposed plans and subsequent modifications prior to operation, and (b) exercising control of experimental school budgets in component form.[28]

Within a few days following the filing of the site report, the superintendent was back in Washington, D.C. for several days of talks. When he returned to J he brought a letter refusing authorization to expand the project to more schools during 1972-73, and citing the adverse effects of such a proposal upon efforts to unify the project. Further, he brought word of a compromise. The superintendent was not to exercise more control over the ESP as proposed by the project officer, nor as had been considered by the USOE/ESP staff was an outsider to be brought to the ESP as director. Rather, USOE/ESP staff members were to come to Jefferson in May to assess the situation directly.[29] A retreat was charted for that period to determine the future course of the ESP's management. This summit, subsequently referred to by the superintendent as "Yalta I," was the origin of the ESP Cabinet, which was to be the structure for governance in the J ESP.

After six months of growing concern, USOE/ESP program staff found themselves meeting face to face in a retreat with the district administration of Jefferson in early May 1972. The sessions lasted one and one-half days for the whole group, and another day for the district staff alone.[30]

The retreat opened with some large-group sessions at which the director of the Experimental Schools Program tried to convey a sense of the national objectives of the effort at all of the sites. His remarks stressed the need for comprehensive thinking across all the schools and the relation of every piece to some unified whole. He cited a nationally-known school system (not an ESP site) as an example of what was not desired. According to his perceptions, the separate buildings in this nationally-recognized system went their own way under the guidance of powerful individual principals.

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Memorandum to J superintendent from NIE/ESP director, subject: "Revised Summary of Meeting, April 4, with J superintendent and Experimental Schools staff," April 10, 1972.

[30] No observer from the NWREL Level II was permitted to attend the sessions. Consequently, this section is based upon secondary data as recalled and volunteered by participants at the sessions.

The superintendent reported later that he recognized this message:

> We discussed comprehensiveness, and for the first time I began to get an idea of what they meant by it. I never had much idea before, except it might mean K-12 curriculum guides. But they made it very clear that wasn't what they meant. They told us not to be another [renowned district with pronounced sub-unit autonomy]. They want a kind of subdistrict in which everyone would think as though the six buildings were one school. The schools would be run as a team, and nothing would happen without all the teachers and staff knowing about it. We were to come up with alternative ways of managing along these lines.[31]

The USOE/ESP director separated the central office groups and met for some time with the principals alone, establishing rapport and drawing out concerns and frustrations from the first project year. Concerns centered on pressures from the superintendent and on a review process in which the evaluator looked at new curricula before purchase. A USOE/ESP staff member later told a NWREL evaluator that they just raised problems and listened without proposing solutions.[32]

The full Jefferson group stayed an extra day at the retreat site and worked on plans for management. Two proposals outlining models of a cabinet structure were sent to Washington on May 11, 1972, with some text prepared by the superintendent and some by the six project principals. The first model created a new Experimental Schools Cabinet of six principals which in effect would serve as an advisory committee to a full-time director. The director would report to the superintendent. The second model created the same cabinet, but placed it directly under the superintendent; in addition, a project coordinator was to provide staff support, reporting directly to the cabinet. In both alternatives, according to the organization charts, the superintendent and the assistant superintendent maintained direct lines of authority over the principals, independent of the cabinet structure. The key conceptual distinction between cabinet business and other business was touched on only briefly in the superintendent's text. On the one hand, that text stated that "curriculum strategies, new programs, export proposals, will be routed through the cabinet and approved prior to institution in any school. Before adoption, the cabinet will insure that the programs have a comprehensive plan....[33] However, if any decision affected more than one school, the cabinet would not be autonomous: "When changes in curriculum will affect other district schools, the curriculum change must be approved by the districtwide curriculum advisory committee."[34]

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[31] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 5/15/72.

[32] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with USOE/ESP project officer, 6/22/72.

[33] Superintendent, Letter with enclosures, to USOE/ESP director May 11, 1972.

The six project principals added a memo to these proposals, approving the first alternative. They emphasized their "belief that present personnel have sufficient strengths to move the ESP project in the direction of meeting proposed objectives."[35] They also expressed their desire that the project director be responsive to ESP cabinet decisions and that the superintendent act as the project consultant.

Two weeks after the proposal was sent, the USOE/ESP project officer suggested to the superintendent that the principals themselves direct the project, and that they elect one of their number to serve as leader and chairman. A district administrator could serve the group, but on their terms; he would be viewed as a staff member, not as a head or authority.[36] This arrangement was accepted by the superintendent, who told his cabinet on June 5, "All this is unusual and innovative, but I don't think it really changes things."[37] The next day he reported to the principals that Washington's plan would go into effect.

> They have requested that no one report to two people. In other words, that an administrator report to the Cabinet and work with your chairman, not reporting to me. The line authority is through the chairman. I'm nervous about this, but that's the way it will be.[38]

For almost a year no changes had occurred in the project governance structure of the district, but now the USOE/ESP had intervened to modify the prevailing structure. The principals, acting as a Program Cabinet, were to take charge of the J ESP implementation. This change was meant to reduce the fragmentation which Washington officials believed to exist, and to bring about a sense of comprehensiveness within the J ESP.

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[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] USOE/ESP project officer MAILGRAM to superintendent, May 25, 1972.

[37] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Superintendent's cabinet meeting, 6/5/72.

[38] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Principals' meeting, 6/6/72.

3. The Functioning of the J ESP Cabinet

This discussion focuses on the J ESP Cabinet's structure and processes, and the four main agendas with which the cabinet dealt during the remaining four ESP years. (The J ESP Cabinet is referred to simply as the cabinet, thereby distinguishing it from the superintendent's cabinet previously discussed.)

a. The Cabinet's Structure and Processes. In accordance with plans made in May and June 1972, the principals of the six ESP schools organized themselves into a cabinet in June 1972. The senior high school principal was elected chairman for an initial six-month term. He was succeeded for a second six-month term by an elementary principal. (At this time, principals of three non-ESP schools were added to the cabinet as representatives of the seven east-side schools.) In late spring 1973, another elementary principal was elected to the third chairmanship, which was lengthened to one year as plans progressed for incorporating the seven non-ESP schools into the ESP and expanding the cabinet to include all 13 principals. Another elementary principal was elected chairman in the 1974-75 followed by a junior high school principal elected for 1975-76, the final J ESP year.

The administrative assistant, who in the prior year had assisted the superintendent with project responsibilities, provided staff support during the cabinet's first year. However, the superintendent viewed this administrative assistant's performance of the coordinator role as excessively directive, and subsequently the function was divided between a secretary and a former journalism teacher.[39] Project-specific fiscal transactions, including submission of quarterly fiscal reports plus purchase order and budget transfer approval requests to NIE/ESP, were handled by the secretary (who was titled secretary-ESP fiscal/administrative assistant).[40] Quarterly program progress reports to NIE/ESP, plus preparation of cabinet agendas and minutes, were handled by the ESP disseminator (a title assigned to the former journalism teacher).

The cabinet met twice monthly during its first three years (the project's second through fourth years), and monthly during its final year. Meetings began at 8:30 a.m. in the board room of the central administrative building, seldom terminated before 10:30 a.m. and often extended into the noon hour. The member principals were in regular attendance, as was the ESP disseminator.

The superintendent attended at least part of most sessions, but the assistant superintendent (subsequently retitled deputy superintendent) rarely attended.

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[39] D. R. Pierce, "Project Governance: A Three-Year Review," NWREL, August 1974, particularly pp. 56-58.

[40] The responsibility for the Experimental Schools Programs was transferred to the newly established National Institute of Education in August 1972.

Several other administrators attended, some with regularity and others only occasionally, either to make presentations or to observe the proceedings. The cabinet constituted the district's largest regular assembly of administrators.

Operating somewhat in a fishbowl, cabinet members developed formal procedures. As early as September 1972 they adopted bylaws and a formal decision making model which stated priorities among various categories of action and included provisions for assigning items for staff work. The bylaws stated

> ...All workshops, in-service training programs, curriculum development, curriculum adoptions, budgets, or other considerations with ESP involvement are to be presented to the cabinet for approval before implementation becomes a fact.... The cabinet is responsible for directing the ESP program....[41]

One year later (in September 1973), the third chairman added time allocations for each agenda item, and attempted heightened structuring of cabinet activities. The emphasis upon formalization continued; early in the fourth ESP year, the cabinet adopted a job description which could permit its continuation beyond the ESP duration with responsibility for all categorical projects.[42]

Yet the actual practices of the cabinet belied the formal structure and procedures. Rather, the structural looseness typical of school organizations characterized the cabinet.[43] Numerous matters were addressed, commonly without clear demarcation among topics or definitive closure. The cabinet's practices seldom included control of time or common use of staff or subgroups to clarify issues, obtain information, and develop action recommendations. Such managerial actions as setting deadlines and planning for feedback or follow-up were uncommon.[44] Rather, cabinet actions commonly appeared to be self-executing; for example, approval of funding requests entailed the implicated party as completing the transaction independently (e.g., installing a music curriculum, holding a training workshop). Such processes appeared legitimate under project objectives in which performance assessment was the responsibility of the evaluation unit (which did not report to the cabinet).

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[41] J ESP Cabinet, "Bylaws: Experimental Schools Project Cabinet of the Jefferson School District #402," mimeographed, approved September 12, 1972 by the cabinet; also "A Model for ESP Cabinet Decision Making," mimeographed, approved September 12, 1972 by the cabinet.

[42] J ESP Cabinet, "Job Description: Cabinet," adopted October 8, 1974 by the cabinet; this development is discussed in D. R. Pierce, "Project Governance: Fourth Year Review," NWREL, March 1976.

[43] C. E. Bidwell, "The School as a Formal Organization," Chapter 23 in J. G. March (ed.), Handbook of Organizations, Rand McNally and Co., Chicago, 1965, pp. 972-1022.

[44] The absence of exercise of managerial control by elementary principals participating in simulation research is reported in J. K. Hemphill, D. E. Griffiths N. Frederiksen, Administrative Performance and Personality, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1962, pp. 345-346.

The cabinet rarely sought or received extensive and precise information. Further, materials which were brought to the cabinet for consideration were customarily distributed as discussion began, not in advance. In numerous instances the cabinet acted in the absence of, or without inspecting, pertinent information.[45]

On items with multiple parts the prevailing practice was to proceed in serial fashion. For example, principals' requests for unallocated ESP funds were invariably approved in the serial order in which the requests were arranged by the secretary-ESP fiscal/administrative assistant, and often with little or no discussion.

The cabinet tended not to scrutinize its own processes. Yet the members were rather candid in referring to some of their activities as "playing the game," "making end runs," and "beating the system." Such activites included providing required cabinet approvals after the fact and extended to the occasional searing criticism of persons in potentially threatening but precarious roles including the evaluation director and his staff.

In sum, there was much looseness in cabinet practices. Such ambiguity was functional and therefore valued, as discussed in Chapter VIII.

b. The Cabinet Agenda. The cabinet attended to numerous and varied matters during the four years from its inception to the time of this report. As we examined what was dealt with and how, we found the cabinet to be attending to four implicit agendas. The first agenda involved protecting the turf of the individual principals. Other agendas included challenging district components based outside the school, buffering the schools against environmental pressures, and satisfying requirements of NIE/ESP.

1) Protecting school autonomy. A pervasive, implicit agenda of protecting school autonomy accounted for the preponderance of cabinet activity. Although there were important exceptions, the pursuit of that agenda was largely indirect, marked by indecisive or inconsequential activities. In spring 1975 a typical

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[45] In an interview, the superintendent commented upon the absence of an analytic orientation (particularly, the analysis of relevant information) among the principals, attributing to it lack of a tradition, lack of experience in analytic work, and lack of planning time. D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, November 21, 1973.

response by a principal to the question, what do you see as the function of the cabinet? was: "Well, really the cabinet doesn't do much [of] anything, they don't make any important decisions--if there are important decisions, they are made in the individual schools."[46] Principals also said that the cabinet "... [was used] as a source of support [for individual school interests and objectives], just as the superintendent uses the cabinet"; that the cabinet "... [was] becoming more an informational thing... [about activities which were going on in the individual schools]."[47]

In items of curriculum and instruction, school autonomy was protected by inaction. The development and coordination of systemwide curricular and instructional programs were not dealt with, with rare exception, in the cabinet setting. Those functions were respected as the individual schools' domain, with limited facilitation provided by coordinators of elementary and secondary education. This had not changed even by the final ESP year, as illustrated when six elementary principals assigned by the superintendent to coordinate main elementary curriculur programs (in lieu of restaffing the elementary coordinator role vacated by retirement), entertained their peers in the cabinet for about five minutes with their progress reports. They made it quite clear, although in a joking manner, that their performance in the added roles would not disrupt the status quo.[48]

Six months later, the cabinet heard the superintendent express satisfaction with the arrangement whereby various principals were responsible for districtwide curricular coordination, saying, "If the cabinet continues to handle the curriculum process without bringing in a certified employee, then you're talking about $20,000. I think it gives a validity to the cabinet operation on a long-term basis--fine, then we won't have any central office person, we'll just have a clerk. I really think the cabinet is more efficient."[49]

In terms of financial allocations, the cabinet acted directly to protect school autonomy. This was evidenced at the final session of the cabinet's second year when the principals adopted criteria for reallocating undesignated carry-over funds.[50] In essence, they reserved the funds to conform with the individual school ESP budgets.

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[46] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with principal, 5/14/75.

[47] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with principals, 5/28/75 and 5/14/75.

[48] This incident, its antecedents and meaning is discussed in D. R. Pierce, "Project Governance: A Five-Year Review," NWREL, July 1976.

[49] Ibid.

Early in the third year, the cabinet recommended approval of specific reallocation requests totaling $52,780, reaffirming its support of budgetary autonomy and noninterference in the developmental choices of budget administrators.[51] Nominal approval action followed, in subsequent sessions of the cabinet, on all requests for reallocation.

In addition to their ESP budgets, the principals received an unrestricted allocation from the general fund of the district. The amount was calculated on the number of students enrolled, with the dollar amount formally recommended by the cabinet (in the fourth ESP year, the cabinet ratified a decision on the amount made in another setting).[52]

By supporting egalitarian formula-based allocation practices, the cabinet protected individual school autonomy against centralized direction and control. The cabinet also resisted possible encroachment upon the principals' domain by other components of the school system and by external environmental elements.

2) Challenging non-school-based components. The cabinet tended not to exhibit confrontational or challenging behavior during the first two years of the cabinet's existence. There were exceptions, but they appeared minor when compared with happenings of the cabinet' third year. Whether due to the success of those confrontations or to other developments, the cabinet's fourth year (and the final ESP year) saw a return to general absence of confrontation and conflict.

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[50] Pierce, "Project Governance: A Three-Year Review," pp. 57-58, 62-63. The carryover account had been established by NIE/ESP to handle the district's problem arising from having underspent the 1973-74 budget in the amount of $124,530. NIE/ESP retained approval authority over expenditures from this account. Extended discussion of this account if presented in T. L. Donicht, "Jefferson Experimental Schools Project: A Fiscal Orientation," NWREL, July 1976.

[51] Pierce, "Project Governance: A Fourth-Year Review," pp. 5-13.

[52] Ibid.

The internal evaluation component was the prime subject of criticism throughout the 1974-75 year.[53] Before the end of the fourth ESP year, the impending dissolution of the evaluation component became apparent, and the evaluation director announced his intention to leave the district at the project's end. The development and legitimation of a post-ESP viable domain for evaluation was inhibited by those interactions and actions. A top administrator explained, "Since education isn't a market economy, there's no pay-off for cost-efficiency.... When money gets tight, evaluation is the first thing to go."[54] Further, across school comparison could undermine egalitarian allocation practices and lead to loss of school autonomy.

The cabinet also provided an arena for a series of confrontations between the special education director and the superintendent, joined by the principals. Antecedents of the diagnostic and individualized instructional thrusts of the J ESP design had found some of their multiple roots in the district's special education division, and were reflected in the listing of the director on the planning team for the ESP proposal. The special education director had sought to maintain substantial autonomy in controlling the diagnostic and instructional activities of his staff, penetrating the territories of the 13 principals. However, declining state categorical funding, accompanied by a decline in state non-categorical funding, jeopardized his claim to autonomy based on fiscal independence (the state categorical funding declined from 78.7 percent of the $531,297 special education budget of 1971-72 to 57.5 percent of the $731,452 special education budget of 1974-75, with the district's local obligation increasing to over $300,000.)[55]

There were many challenges to his autonomy, beginning with a stand-up confrontation in which the director rejected the superintendent's order to release technical and clinical information about special education students to counselors and principals in the schools, claiming that to do so would violate legal restrictions.[56] Seven months later (following other public disagreements) the superintendent used the cabinet forum to announce that he and the deputy superintendent would assert their authority to attain equity in special education staffing among the district's schools.[57] His declaration signaled the special education director's loss of independent control over his staff, and evidenced the maintenance of authority over personnel assignments independent of the cabinet. Four months later at an administrative retreat the superintendent proposed that the special education director be added to the cabinet, a recommendation rejected by the principals.[58] Later in that fourth ESP year, the superintendent denied the special education director's prerogative to communicate directly with special education staff in the state education office, and removed his authority over special education staff assignments and performance evaluations. Confronted with reassignment and demotion, the special education director resigned in summer 1975. Subsequently, limited management of the special education program was added to the assignment of the director of secondary education, with control over the professional and technical staff largely distributed among the schools in which they performed diagnostic and instruction activities.

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[53] Chapter VII provides a comprehensive summary of the development of the district's internal evaluation component. Further, an extended analysis of the 1974-75 evaluation component-cabinet interactions is presented in Pierce, "Project Governance: Fourth Year Review."

[54] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with central office administrator, 5/28/75.

[55] Pierce, "Project Governance: A Three-Year Review," p. 68.

[56] Ibid., p. 65.

The cabinet's challenge of non-school-based components was most evident in regard to precarious components. Evaluation, for example, promoted precarious values which were not part of the main stream of school operations. Special education lacked a potent constituency and was vulnerable through declining fiscal independence. However, institutionalized and secure parts of the system, including the personnel, maintenance and transportation operations under the deputy superintendent, effectively rebuffed the few rather weak challenges which were risked by the cabinet.

3) Buffering environmental pressures. Few environmental pressures sufficiently penetrated the school system's boundaries to impact the principals directly. However, for those which did reach their attention, the principals used the cabinet as a buffer, protecting their schools against disruption.

The superintendent was the prime conduit of environmental pressures to the principals. His performance of this linkage role was examplified in the initiation of the J ESP. Among the numerous and varied other matters which he introduced to the principals were a managerial training workshop (offered by a local consultant), an employee ranking technique used by a major industrial firm, a year-round schooling approach implemented by a financially-pressed neighboring school district, and a planned program budgeting technique responsive to environmental pressures for efficiency and accountability. The cabinet tended to "cool" such pressures through minimal consideration and inaction.

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[57] Ibid., p. 67.

[58] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Administrative retreat, 10/11/74; a principal explained the rejection as due to the special education director's tendency to "move in on you." D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with principal, 5/28/75.

The teachers' association and other employee organizations were potential sources of environmental pressure upon the principals. Early in the third ESP year the teachers' association sought opportunity for direct involvement in J ESP development, through participation in the cabinet. The principals rejected the request, deprecating the association's proferred contribution. Following the superintendent's intervention to permit teachers' association officials to observe cabinet meetings, citing "open meeting" requirements, teachers' association members were appointed to special committees of the cabinet during the fourth ESP year.[59] However, an early cabinet decision of the final year was to discontinue the committee structure initiated the prior year, reversing its decision of three months earlier to continue broad involvement in consideration of issues. The expressed rationale for the reversal was to protect managerial prerogatives by limiting the access of the teachers' association to management information and management planning.[60] Typically, the principals' response to questions about the extent to which the teachers' association impacted their buildings was, "I don't feel any impact at [school]," and "It's all at the central office, there isn't any at the local school."[61] Their agenda regarding the teachers' association thwarted development of direct impact upon the individual schools.

The ESP funding agency was another source of environmental pressure. A common cabinet tactic for buffering such pressures entailed attending to them in somewhat ritualistic fashion. Such was the fate of some NIE/ESP expectations to which we now proceed.

4) Complying with NIE/ESP expectations. The cabinet's final implicit agenda was to satisfy NIE/ESP officials, at least enough to forestall adverse fiscal or contractual repercussions. This agenda was particularly salient through the second 30 months' refunding negotiations; subsequently the impetus subsided, reflecting a shift in NIE/ESP priorities.

Earlier USOE/ESP concerns, which had led to formation of the cabinet, again surfaced as the time for the second 30 months' refunding grew near. In March 1973, the NIE/ESP director, the project officer for the J ESP, a finance officer, and an evaluation specialist visited the site.[62] In a series of meetings, they challenged the principals to cope with the issue of the central theme in preparing the J ESP plan for the second 30 months' refunding. Following a day of discussions, the site visit team drafted a table of contents for the second 30 months' refunding plan. A chapter was included in which each principal was to write a program description and plan for his school, employing a streams concept.[63] They complied, with sections by each principal, though most of the plan, including the budget, was drafted by the superintendent.

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[59] Pierce, "Jefferson Education Association--Jefferson School District Relationships: Impacts of the Teachers' Association upon Governance," NWREL, July 1975.

[60] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 9/9/75.

[61] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interviews with principals, 5/14/75 and 5/28/75.

[62] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, District administrators' meetings with NIE/ESP officials, 3/16-17/73.

The resulting plan at least satisfied the NIE/ESP officials' desire to instill in the principals a sense of project ownership. However, NIE/ESP concerns with the project's fragmentation remained; after attempting to obtain satisfactory revisions, NIE/ESP ultimately, under severe time pressures, accepted a revision which retained the bases for fragmentation.

A year after refunding the NIE/ESP J project officer challenged the cabinet to confront phase-out issues. The cabinet complied, ritualistically going through a phase-out planning process. Early in the fourth ESP year, the cabinet created a phase-out committee (subsequently retitled the phase-in committee) to study problems and develop recommendations pertinent to the termination of the J ESP.[64] Several principals volunteered to serve on the committee, and others appointed included the superintendent, deputy superintendent, training director, evaluation director, and teachers nominated by the president of the teachers' association.

Uncertain of its role and lacking ready access to management information and to staff support, the committee met half a dozen times during the year. Phase-out issues involving the individual schools were rejected as inappropriate; rather, ESP-subsidized activities such as evaluation and field trip transportation were subjected to phase-out deliberations. Performing an intended "end run" around the evaluation component, for example, the committee conducted an unstructured survey of teacher attitudes toward ESP courses and activities (members struggled for an hour with summaries of the responses before putting them aside, not to be referred to again). Later the committee attended to the evaluation director's presentation of the evaluation committee's final report, and eventually recommended to the cabinet that the evaluation component be directed to develop a prototype analysis of program effectiveness (labeled "program sourcebook") for the cabinet's consideration. Finally, the committee instigated the formation of a cabinet subcommittee to develop recommendations pertinent to reductions in the field trip transportation budget for 1975-76. The committee was commended for its work by the cabinet, with an indication that it should continue during 1975-76, focusing on possible cost differences between ESP and non-ESP courses and activities. That decision was reversed four months later.

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[63] Ibid. The streams concept was defined in the NIE/ESP proposed format as "...all of those major elements that assist the project in meeting its goals as applied to a particular emphasis. Major elements would normally encompass curriculum, time and space, staffing, administration, training," "Experimental Schools Project--Format," handed to cabinet by NIE/ESP site visit team, March 17, 1972. The program streams that were organized incorporated similar curricular offerings under one title. For example, algebra, trigonometry, geometry, calculus, and general math would fall within the mathematics stream. The six program streams under the J ESP are listed and discussed in Chapter VI.

[64] The phase-out committee's history is chronicled in Pierce, "Project Governance: Fourth Year Review."

During that fourth year the NIE/ESP director returned for a final site visit, once more urging the cabinet to define the J ESP central theme and to consolidate the gains, but by then the members only listened politely.

By the final year, cabinet compliance with NIE/ESP expectations was largely pro forma. This was illustrated in the cabinet's handling of a proposal to seek J ESP carry-over funds for an assistant principal's full salary. Although not mentioned in the cabinet discussion, the signed request document already had been received by NIE/ESP in Washington. The cabinet endorsed the proposal, which was approved by NIE/ESP.[65]

By December, the cabinet could question whether any NIE/ESP expectations remained for compliance, as reflected in the secretary-ESP fiscal/administrative assistant's instructions to the cabinet members: "I notice that some of you are not spending your money--[you] want to spend it all before June 30. I notice that [NIE/ESP project officer] is approving anything and everything--contracts and grants is still looking at a few things."[66] The chairman added, "For the benefit of the former chairman and you others, communications with Washington have been practically nil; we have had no communications since September."[67]

In the project's final month the cabinet addressed its future. Following a recommendation developed in an elementary principals' retreat, the cabinet approved a motion that the cabinet continue to function. Its subsequent purpose would be "...to approve the entry and exit of all categorical funds used in the district."[68] The membership would be expanded by adding the five central office administrators.

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[65] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 9/9/75.

[66] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 12/16/75.

[67] Ibid.

[68] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 6/1/76.

The assistant superintendent was elected as chairman for 1976-77, with an understanding that the chairmanship be rotated among representatives of the central office, elementary principals, and secondary principals.[69]

Beyond those main agendas (protecting the autonomy of individual schools, challenging non-school-based components, buffering environmental pressures, and complying to a minimal degree with NIE/ESP expectations) members refrained from involving the cabinet in such internal affairs of the schools as curricular and instructional development, or in such central office affairs as the procurement of revenue. The negotiations with employee organizations which established constraints within which project implementation could occur, proceeded without reference to the cabinet. Similarly, personnel adminstration, management of pupil transportation, and management of physical plant and facilities maintenance, all of which impacted project implementation, did not come under the cabinet's oversight. In turn, the cabinet attended to matters not directly allied with the ESP, as the principals legitimated through formal cabinet action an increase in the lump sum budgetary allocation to their schools from the district's general fund. Similarly, the superintendent found the cabinet a useful setting for confronting the special education director and for presenting the district's annual budget to the principals.

4. Governance Structures and Processes Beyond the Cabinet

The distinction between ESP and non-ESP governance remained loosely-drawn throughout the project. Perhaps this looseness found some of its bases in the system's opposing forces toward centralization and decentralization and toward stability and change. Regardless of the setting in which such forces met, their resolution would affect the J ESP fate. Hence we turn attention to governance structures and processes beyond the cabinet, examining in turn administrative structure, fiscal structure, personnel adminstration, management of support services, and environmental transactions.

a. Administrative Structure. The small pre-ESP administrative complement continued throughout the project's duration, with few changes in responsibilities, managerial practices, or personnel. The influence of the few administrative functions added under ESP auspices (project direction, fiscal management, and dissemination) upon pre-existing responsibilities was minimal. Though subsequent staff reductions entailed some reallocation of assignments, most managerial practices remained largely unaffected.

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[69] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 9/26/73.

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1) Centralized administrative structure. A review of the administrative complement helps clarify the managerial practices which prevailed. The two main actors were the superintendent and the deputy superintendent. Supporting roles were performed by the assistant superintendent-business; two administrative assistants who wore multiple hats, one mostly grantsman and the other mostly secondary education curriculum coordinator; and the elementary education-training director. In addition, the special education program was headed by a director, as was the ESP instigated evaluation component. (An administrative assistant-ESP disseminator and a secretary-ESP fiscal/administrative assistant were appointed to provide ESP-related staff support.)

Beyond component budget administrators (the special education and evaluation directors and the 13 principals) and the cabinet structure, there were six professional level administrators to perform systemwide managerial coordination and control functions, including transactions with external environmental elements. The system operated with an annual budget which ranged over the project from about 7.5 to 10.5 million dollars, with about 500 employees. However, it was not subject to large fluctuations in the number and type of students served, in fiscal resources, or in employee turnover. Further, managerial procedures, schedules and routines had been evolved over the year by the district's long-tenured administrators, facilitating management of the total operation with available personnel.

In essence, the resulting administrative structure was rather simple. The superintendent oversaw the total operation, and the system's relationships with external environmental elements. He exercised his forte in securing money from non-regular sources, while avoiding stringent constraints on its use. He sought to instigate change by generating discretionary funding and proposing specific innovations, not with expectation of their implementation as proposed, but as a lever to generate alternatives developed and implemented by the principals.[70] Low-profile staff support for obtaining categorical funding was provided by an administrative assistant. The superintendent also performed a primary role in maintaining peace with employee organizations.

The deputy superintendent exercised substantial independence in controlling personnel selection and assignment to components and in oversight of such support services as maintenance, transportation, and food services. The assistant superintendent-business provided support particularly in classified personnel administration and oversight of financial transactions (effectively managed by the supervisor of accounting services).

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[70] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 9/26/73.

As discussed in Chapter VI, the elementary and secondary education curriculum coordinators lacked line authority. Yet they operated rather autonomously in attempting to influence and facilitate curricular and instructional developments in the several schools.

The superintendent periodically assembled these administrators, including the special education and evaluation directors and the cabinet chairman, as the superintendent's cabinet. Written agendas were not regularly distributed, nor were minutes routine. This forum and other informal interactions facilitated exchange of information and discussion of issues extending across the managerial sectors.

2) Decentralized administrative structure. Under the superintendent's advocacy of decentralization, evidenced in "lump sum" and other formula-based allocations, the 13 principals enjoyed discretionary choices regarding curricular, instructional and pupil control practices. During the ESP they prospered in the historical pattern aptly characterized by one principal: "We operate on our own."[71] Such independence was particularly applicable for the elementary principals who worked as "loners," contrasted with the situation of the secondary principals supported by vice principals, department heads, counselors, and secretaries.[72] Their independence is illustrated by an elementary principal's response to inquiry about how his school's music program would be determined: "In making the decision, I'm not going to make it..." (he added that he would not go along with the district-wide program recommended by the district's music coordinator).[73]

The principals' managerial practices were rather simple. For example, one principal explained, "Most of the preliminary discussion occurs around the lunch table, then at faculty meetings we make the formal decisions."[74] However, not all decisions were shared with the faculty. For example, a principal described how he had recently asked teachers to turn in lists of supplies needed for the next year. He commented that there was no need for any teacher to be aware of lists submitted by others; if one teacher requested $400 worth of supplies and another requested only $20 worth, he would not question the difference but would fill the orders.[75] Management coordination, information, and control systems were not elaborate.

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[71] Pierce, "Project Governance: Fourth-Year Review," p. 11.

[72] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with principal, 4/18/75. Another principal added that the central office administrators were oriented to the secondary level and not committed to insuring that the elementary principals received equitable treatment: D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with principal, 5/12/75.

[73] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with principal, 4/21/75.

[74] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with principal, 5/28/75.

The district's evaluation component was not highly successful in developing the capacity to deliver either school-based or systemwide management information. The prevailing administrative structure and practices did not pose strong demands for management information support.

Further, an analysis showed that district employees shared common perceptions of the system's domain.[76] This would imply that ordering action in some directions and not in others would not be likely to generate strong friction or to require highly visible and directive authority. The district's rather simple administrative structure thus satisfied the system's need. In contrast, the fiscal structure to which we now turn, was somewhat more complex.

b. Fiscal Structure.[77] The financial system, evolving apart from the cabinet was somewhat different from the original rhetoric, and can best be described as a dual fiscal control system. Budgets were set and allocations were made at the central office level by the superintendent who, after establishing budget amounts for districtwide budgetary components such as evaluation, training, administration of instruction, dissemination, and pro rata services, allocated remaining ESP funds to project schools on a per pupil enrollment basis. Control of spending in the districtwide accounts remained at the central office, largely with the superintendency, while control of spending at project sites was left to individual building principals. Responsibility for instructional program spending lay with the individual principals, and efforts to establish programs which extended beyond individual building sites were almost non-existent. Cabinet ventures into fiscal matters were generally limited to the disposal of year end surplus funds (undesignated funds), as described later.

Accounting for expenditures eventually became the responsibility of a secretary-ESP fiscal/administrative assistant, who, as the district progressed through the project years, became the only centralized source of continuous feedback concerning the amount of money spent and the amount remaining in all district accounts. She would report to individual principals, component directors, and to the Program Cabinet, informing them how much money they had spent and how much was left in their respective accounts. However, the secretary-ESP fiscal/administrative assistant could not directly authorize spending in any account and merely served as an alarm system, warning individual budget administrators that specific categories were running dangerously low on funds and submitting requests to the funding agency for permission to transfer funds remaining in other accounts to the overexpended accounts. Budget transfer requests, numbering between 60 and 100 per year, were seldom denied by the funding agency, as the brief (and at time absent) rationale supplied by the district was generally considered sufficient to substantiate the requests. The prolific use of this tool may have discouraged the maintenance of spending within initial budget parameters. Though the practice enhanced the administrators' flexibility, it correspondingly inhibited the effectiveness of the budget being used as a planning and control mechanism.

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[75] Ibid.

[76] The "system's domain" refers to claims staked by the administrators and teachers about what the schools will do: the outcomes they will produce, the populations or clientele they will serve, and the services they will render. See D. R. Pierce, "Perceptions of Institutional Character," NWREL, December 1974.

[77] Information concerning the fiscal characteristics of the ESP is taken from T. L. Donicht, "Jefferson Experimental Schools Project: A Fiscal Orientation," July 1976.

The planned programmed budget system never really got off the ground. Provisions in the original budget document at least partially precluded the district's ability to implement the new fiscal accounting procedure. Fiscal allocations were budgeted on a building-by-building basis rather than on an instructional program basis, and specific instructional objectives were never tied to individual building program budgets. Further incorporation of an account coded IGE in the budget was in reality a misnomer, designed to pay teacher salaries with federal money and thereby free comparable district funds for remodeling project sites. Though the IGE account was incorporated into the budget with the full knowledge of funding agency officials, the ramifications of establishing this "in lieu of" account for the planned budget system would be serious, since it inhibited the district's ability to identify expenditures of project funds according to their real purpose, and thus clouds the meaningfulness of any potentially derived cost-efficiency rates (CER s). Finally, initial efforts to account for expenditures on an instructional program basis dissolved midway through the first year and the practice was discontinued. The proposed PPBE system was formally dropped by the superintendent at that time, and a "tracking system for Cost Efficiency Ratios" was proposed in its place. As of the final project year (1975-76), the cost effectiveness technique, based upon program streams and combining ESP and district general fund inputs, had still not been fully implemented, though the district planned to do so in the post-ESP era through another federal grant and an extension of ESP funds for the evaluation component.

1) Spending within the ESP fiscal structure--first 30 months. Results of the financial system which evolved were revealed through an examination of expenditures accrued over the two funding periods. For the first 30 months, ESP money was expended in four major classifications within the district: pro rata services (15.4 percent), direct support service programs (22.8 percent), IGE program (7.8 percent), and instructional programs (54.0 percent).

The first classification, pro rata services, represented the ESP's proportion of district overhead and was budgeted and dispersed through the central office. Expenditures charged to pro rate service included costs incurred for plant maintenance and operation, transportation, student health services, and general districtwide administration. Generally, monies expended within these accounts had little direct relationship to specific ESP-developed program objectives, but rather enhanced the district's ability to maintain its total educational effort without experiencing undue fiscal constraint.

Secondly, the ESP provided funds for direct support services, districtwide activities in dissemination, training, evaluation, and administration of instruction. Costs incurred through many of these direct support services programs were not directly attributable to specific instructional programs. For example, costs of evaluation and dissemination were part of the ESP's proposed effort to provide feedback regarding all instructional programs, as well as information to external audiences regarding the progress of the ESP. These components consumed substantial funds and changed in salience over the first 30 months, as spending for evaluation doubled original estimates, largely at the expense of dissemination, which was cut by two-thirds.

The Individually Guided Education (IGE) account paid the first 20 months salaries of lead teachers within those schools which had restructured their instructional organization, though it was actually designed to free equivalent sums of district money for remodeling purposes in all project schools. Remodeling funds had been excluded in the district's final proposal, possibly because ratification of such funds by the Grants and Contracts division of HEW would require more time than was available before the project was to commence, and thus, this account was set up to provide for remodeling in an indirect manner. Monies spent for IGE salaries were charged off to the elementary school accounts, but the actual benefit and purpose of these funds was to provide remodeling necessary to facilitate program implementation in all the project schools. Projects supported through this arrangement ranged from renovating the junior high school principal's office to establishing resource centers in some project schools.

The instructional programs (Interim, individualized education, etc.), the final group of ESP supported efforts, received slightly more than half of the total first 30 months outlay ($1,327,923), though the district had expressed a desire that most of the money would be expended for programs involving students directly.[78]

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[78] JSD, "Experimental Schools Project: To Provide an Appropriate Education Environment for Each Individual Student in the Jefferson Schools," an application to the National Institute for [sic] Education for an extension of funding for Jefferson School District No. 402, [original draft of second 30 months plan], submitted by the Board of Education and Superintendent, no date.

With unsuccessful attempts to implement the PPBES, financial outlays to cover the cost of instructional programs were allocated to individual building sites on a per pupil basis, subsequent to the approtionment of pro rata, direct support service, and IGE program monies. Expenses incurred for specific instructional program components such as occupational versatility and fifth day activities were not tracked separately after the first few months of the project and thus would not be available for analysis under a PPBE system.

2) Instructional program funds at school sites. Principals were responsible for the disposition of instructional program funds within their own school sites and expended the money in a variety of ways, both in their own schools and in non-project schools under a sister school concept.[79] School sites, rather than specific instructional programs, were the unit of program analysis, with each site financing different facets of the proposed ESP, and no site financing them all. Resulting expenditures within all school level programs did not resemble budgeted amounts, and some program components within schools ceased to exist as separately identifiable entities without apparently affecting the school's budget. Some principals spent funds hastily, without duly considering the contribution of materials purchased to ESP goals and objectives, while others were more judicious in their use of ESP funds.[80] Few, however, were able to contain spending within budgetary parameters.

In short, first 30 months expenditures of ESP funds for instructional components within school level programs, direct support programs, pro rata services, and IGE (remodeling) services were diffused throughout the district and thus could not be related to specific instructional program operations. Application of centralized authority towards coordinating ESP expenditures (and hence the method and substance of programs implemented) among individual project school building sites, between district components such as training and evaluation, or between building sites and district components during the first 30 months was not characteristic of the JSD. Principals independently controlled their respective programs, as each selected the project goals and objectives applicable to his unit.

3) Spending within the ESP fiscal structure--second 30 months. Spending ESP funds during the second 30 months did not differ significantly from the first 30

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[79] The sister school concept was one in which each project school in the district had at least one non-project school associated with it for the purpose of facilitating the implementation of innovations and, in this case, sharing funds. Monies allocated for instructional programs were dispensed to project schools on the basis of the number of students enrolled in the project school and sister school combined.

[80] Superintendent, JSD, Critique of Level II Final Report, May 13, 1976, p. 4.

months, even though the district had much longer to plan for the latter phase. Though changes were made in the formal structure of ESP accounts (e.g., IGE account dropped and remodeled funds provided in the maintenance of plant account, pro rata accounts name changed to indirect support service accounts, and 13 schools supporting programs instead of 6), and tighter conditions were imposed by the funding agency to reduce district fiscal flexibility, little changed except that more schools were independently spending project funds, and longer delays were experienced for approval of budget transfer and large purchase requests.

The superintendent again allocated funds to individual components, as the cabinet did not initiate a determination of ESP fund distribution, and individual component expenditures were still controlled by individual budget administrators. The purposes for which funds were spent by each school remained more different than alike, as each individual site expended different proportions of their funds for personnel, supplies and materials, and equipment.

No school implemented all the proposed ESP programs, and no two schools adopted a combination of instructional programs that were alike. Schools new to the project spent ESP funds for some of the instructional programs which had been piloted by the "veteran" project schools, while others adopted completely new systems. Some schools put the majority of their resources into certified and classified personnel services, while others relied heavily upon equipment and supplies. Some schools maintained specific instructional programs for the entire funding period, while others dropped similar programs after only a single year's implementation. All schools, however, attempted to purchase and implement new programs as a part of their ESP.

Throughout the project period, the Program Cabinet was not an effective authority for the control and coordination of fiscal (and hence programmatic) concerns, and never questioned the spending patterns of individual members. Instead, each of the 13 buildings financed its own indigenous ESP, with the major commonality among sites being source of revenue, as opposed to commonality of expenditures.

4) District spending--non-ESP fiscal characterisitics. During the ESP, the district's systemwide level of services offered prior to the project's implementation were not maintained. A comparison of the district's pre-project spending patterns with those established during the first three project years, exclusive of ESP expenditures, revealed that during the project period the district did not increase its general fund expenditures at a rate comparable to that established in pre-project periods. Inflation, declining enrollment, and a reluctance to continue the expansion of its local financial support base resulted in overall spending patterns that failed to maintain services which consistently increased in value.[81] In fact, during the first year of the project, the district decreased

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[81] "Value" refers to the actual purchasing power of money expended over a multi-year period in an inflationary economy. In this situation, value signifies the 1967 dollar equivalence of post 1967 expenditures.

the level of expenditures required to maintain the value of services previously offered. Out of nine general fund categories through which ESP monies had been channeled, the value of the district expenditures exclusive of these monies increased in two categories, the superintendent's office and plant maintenance. The value of district expenditures declined in four categories (i.e., transportation, health services, textbooks, and administration of instruction), while spending in three other categories (i.e., principals, teaching, and plant operation), failed to increase at a rate equivalent to that established during a three-year pre-project period.

When district expenditures were analyzed by the object of expended funds, the results indicated that district outlays for travel, certified and classified personnel salaries, and capital equipment purchases declined in value during the project's first three years, while expenditures for contractual services failed to increase at a rate comparable to the pre-ESP period. District non-ESP spending patterns for supplies and materials and employee benefits, however, were maintained or increased compared to pre-project spending levels.

Amounting to almost a million dollars per year, the federal monies did have an effect on the district. In a state characterized by an inadequate financial foundation program, where school district voters have regularly defeated levy overrides in recent years, the influx of ESP money into J allowed the district to maintain its programs and operating style without increasingly relying upon its traditional sources of revenue. Services were maintained for a number of functional areas such as administration of instruction, textbooks, student health, and transportation by the fiscal support provided by the ESP. Without ESP funds, a much heavier reliance on other funds would have been necessary to maintain the previously established, increasingly high cost of providing normal educational services. The district was able, through the ESP, to retain the services of certified and classified personnel who otherwise would have been dropped from the district due to decreasing enrollments, as well as to make considerable inprovements in the physical plant.

Nevertheless, the ESP had a supplemental effect also, as the district did attempt to broaden its offerings by providing new instructional experiences. The district maintained its pattern of fiscal effort in some areas such as the superintendent's office and plant maintenance, which were both supported by district funds to an extent that was consistent with pre-project trends. The value of district resources expended for supplies and materials and employee benefits was as great or greater during the project than it had been prior to the ESP inception, as an effort was made to enhance the effect of the ESP influx of funds with continuing import of regular district funds.

The fiscal impact of the ESP was best summarized by the superintendent:

> Jefferson School District through the augmented ESP funds was able to find ways to decrease its general funding expenditures without decreasing the quality of its educational delivery

> system to its students. During the project period, districts next to Jefferson lost their levies, cut back their programs, while Jefferson was able to pass its levies and maintain the programs through augmented ESP support. Despite the additional funds from ESP, and despite the highest voted levy in the state, Jefferson was never able to accumulate enough resources to reach per-pupil expenditures equal to the average of the first-class districts.[82]

We will now examine the Jefferson personnel system, which accounted for a major protion of the district's expenditures.

c. Personnel Administation. Personnel salaries and benefits accounted for about 70 percent of the district's annual budget. The district employed about 375 certificated teachers, administrators and other professionals, in addition to about 125 classified secretaries, clerks, custodians, bus drivers and other technical personnel. The district had elaborated provisions for their selection and assignment, and for negotiating the conditions of employment with their associations.

1) Centralized personnel practices. In the main, those personnel practices entailed centralized management.[83] The deputy superintendent established and maintained the candidate pool from which teachers were selected and exercised veto power over specific selections. Internal transfers also required his approval. Guarding his centralized authority, he had directly refused a request by the chairman to discuss personnel administration with the cabinet, saying, "This isn't any of your business, it's 'personnel.'"[84] Similarly, when, at their own initiative, the principals recommended that specified members of the cabinet be appointed to the committee to seek and screen candidates for the position of evaluation director vacated in the third ESP year, no representatives of the cabinet were appointed by the deputy superintendent.[85]

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[82] JSD Superintendent, "Critique of Level II Final Report," May 13, 1974, p. 4.

[83] The distribution of the incentives most important to teachers, however, remain beyond centralized control; these involve psychic rewards associated with classroom events, responsive to interactions with students. See D. Lortie, School Teacher, A Sociological Study. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975, particularly pp. 101-106.

[84] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with principal, 4/4/75.

[85] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 10/8/73.

Though teacher selection and assignment were subject to the deputy superintendent's authority, principals generally were involved in decisions involving assignment of personnel to their schools. Their involvement ranged from rare discretion to recruit beyond the deputy superintendent's pre-screened file of applicants to the exercise of veto over particular assignments (although two principals did report receiving teachers without prior consultation). Principals reported they would be unable to effect an involuntary transfer of a teacher from their building or to block a transfer requested by a teacher.[86] Further, there was variation in the time at which the individual principals received their teacher allocations. This was seen by some as discriminatory. Early allocation permitted a principal to be more selective. Late allocation was seen by principals as favoring centralized control, as their favored candidates accepted other jobs. Principals also were sensitive to inequities in the number of position allocations which they received. The positions were allocated on the basis of projected enrollments, which did not correspond perfectly with actual enrollments. This resulted in over-allocation to some principals and under-allocation to others. Resulting differences among school levels of staffing were pointed out by the superintendent, who attributed them to variation among principals' political acumen.[87]

2) Staffing practices within schools. Within their schools the principals determined the structure of teacher assignments. As stated by the superintendent "The use of a staff member is at your [principal's] discretion; the determination of funding [of positions] is at the district's and the state's discretion. . . ."[88] He made explicit that principals were to run their schools with the teachers assigned to them. For some principals, this posed difficult ethical and managerial issues as they found themselves with more "Title I" teachers than could reasonably be used for their "Title I" student populations, but with fewer "general fund" teachers than would permit maintaining the negotiated staffing ratio.[89]

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[86] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interviews with principals, 4/14/75, 4/18/75, 4/24/75, 5/14/75, 5/21/75, and 5/22/75.

[87] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 10/17/73. As evidence of staffing variation, he pointed to differences in general fund expenditures by the several schools, ranging from a low of $476.63 per pupil to a high of $721.55 per pupil, referring to "Budgeted Expenditures by School Location, Jefferson School District #402, 1973-74," (mimeographed, no date).

[88] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Elementary principals meeting, 10/29/75.

[89] Ibid.

Further, those staffing ratios and other conditions of employment were determined through negotiations in which the principals were at best only indirectly and marginally involved. Rather, relationships with the teachers' association remained with the superintendent and the Board of Directors.[90] We will discuss those relationships under "Environmental Transactions" following discussion of support services.

d. Support Services: Maintenance and Transportation. The conduct of teaching-learning activities, particularly those dependent upon modification or repair of the schools' physical facilities, was contingent upon centralized scheduling and management of maintenance and renovation services. Similarly, the timing of teaching-learning activities, particularly those conducted away from the school buildings, was contingent upon the centralized pupil transportation services. Both services were under the deputy superintendent's jurisdiction.

Neither service was criticized for inefficiency in either public meetings or private interviews. However, the maintenance service was criticized as unpredictable and non-responsive to the principals' priorities. In contrast, the pupil transportation service was criticized as rigid and non-responsive to the principals' awareness of their own local situations. On two occassions, principals attempted without success to bring the management of maintenance services under cabinet oversight. On another occasion, a cabinet committee vainly struggled to obtain sufficient accurate information about the field trip portion of pupil transportation to prepare a recommendation for expenditure reduction.[91]

Inequities in the distribution of maintenance services, the processes for establishing maintenance priorities and schedules, and the lack of communication with principals regarding these matters were discussed at an administrative retreat early in the fourth ESP year.[92] Later in that year, an administrator suggested that the close, centralized control of maintenance and other services, which differentially affected various principals (as did the centralized personnel management), enabled the deputy superintendent to exercise decisive control over internal operations.[93] The administrator projected increased militancy by the principals against such practices. Supporting his projection, he pointed to increased solidarity among principals resulting from their cabinet interaction, to gains in lump sum budgeting allocations at the expense of the deputy superintendent's sphere of control, and to increased inclination to confront the deputy superintendent.[94] Similarly, in a discussion of specific pupil transportation problems, centralized authority over transportation was cited as inconsistent with central office talk about the principals' responsibility to solve their problems at the local level.[95]

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[90] An extended analysis of those relationships is available in D. R. Pierce, "Jefferson Education Association."

[91] Attempts to deal with the non-responsiveness of both services are detailed in D. R. Pierce, "Project Governance: Fourth Year Review."

[92] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Administrative retreat, 10/14/74.

[93] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with central office administrator, 4/14/75.

Such instances surfaced the usually latent conflict over the distribution of authority. In essence, the bifurcated governance structure, the existence of both decentralized and centralized authority, probably motivated the principals to challenge centralized features of the organizational structure. Through specific actions or decisions, the principals tested the limits to which decentralized of authority would be permitted to encroach upon centralized power bases.

e. Environmental Transactions. In the main, transactions across the school system's boundaries were subjected to centralized, low-profile management (with the exception of the non-centralized local community-school relationships discussed in the following chapter). Criteria in such management appeared related to exacting support or resources from external agencies, and avoiding or minimizing the potential for conflict.

1) Relationships with the teachers' association. Teachers' association-school district relationships have maintained low visibility. Perhaps this reflects the stability of the relationship and the limited scope of concerns. The same employee organization has continuously represented the teachers in negotiations with the school district since the creation of such a relationship in the mid-fifties. The focus of concerns had tended to be of limited comprehensiveness, leaving a variety of schooling activities and interactions unaffected. The teachers' association has been active primarily in protecting and promoting teacher welfare, and secondarily in promoting the institutional welfare of the school system and promoting some activity involving professional practices. For example, the teachers' association acted to endorse the district's first 30 months' ESP proposal only after it had succeeded in "turning around the intended ESP objectives of a full differentiated staffing to guarantee [the] present [level of] staffing plus added aides."[96] Subsequently, the teachers' association did not exhibit particular concern with the development and implementation of the J ESP, beyond seeking non-voting representation on the Program Cabinet in the third year of the ESP, apparently to establish its presence rather than to exert influence in the determination of specific issues (after its right of presence was established, the right was not long exercised).

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[94] Ibid.

[95] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Elementary principals' meeting, 9/9/75.

[96] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 4/14/75.

Despite the low profile of the relationship with the teachers' association, and despite the principals' tendency to deny feeling constrained in their operations by the teachers' association, the management of those relationships tended to be seen by the administrators as highly important. In observing that the teachers' association was very strong but fortunately not militant, a principal quickly added that unless properly handled, "...it could happen overnight."[97] A central office administrator corroborated this assessment, commenting that the association could be decisive whenever it chose; the superintendent's skill in avoiding an impasse situation was therefore critical.[98] Finally, the principals preferred to avoid the risks of potential conflict with their teachers, as illustrated at an administrative retreat where they made clear their inclination not to be directly involved, but also for the superintendent and deputy superintendent to develop plans for dealing with the teachers' association in the event of a strike.[99]

The pervasive, low-profile impact of the teachers' association has been more significant than casually apparent. Such impact has occurred through the advance obligation of the major portion of the district's financial resources, coupled with agreements constraining mangerial prerogatives regarding utilization of personnel resources. Acceptance of major "givens" about proper utilization of personnel resources protected and promoted by the teachers' association has limited the school system's innovative capacity. Under the emphasis upon maintaining peace, the teachers' welfare has prospered and the school system has enjoyed stability.

2) Relationships with the local universities. The superintendent was credited as chiefly instrumental in securing local university endorsement of the proposal, in the process generating expectations of substantial mutual benefits.[100] However, these expectations were not met. The school district and the university were each perceived as attempting to exploit the other. Interactions became few and infrequent, and contrasting action styles, values, and perceptions of institutional missions were not examined.[101] One university official, comparing this deteriorated relationship with extensive interactions common before the ESP, bitterly commented that when project funds were exhausted the district would "rediscover" the local universities.[102]

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[97] Pierce, Fieldnotes, Administrative retreat, 10/14/74.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with local university official, 6/17/74.

[101] F. Mulhauser, (with editorial revision by D. R. Pierce and W. Doyle), "School-University Relations in the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project: A Two-Year Review," NWREL, March 1974.

[102] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with local university official, 6/17/74.

3) Transactions with the funding agency. District-NIE/ESP (earlier, USOE/ESP) relationships involved various Jefferson administrators and funding agency personnel over the project's duration. There was change during the project in the rate and locus of interaction and in the distribution of power and exercise of authority.

During the project design and initiation phase, the prime district linkage with the funding agency was the superintendent. During the first two years of the implementation phase, the administrative assistant detailed for ESP staff support also was much involved in direct communications with USOE/ESP staff. At NIE/ESP's instigation, the primary linkage shifted to the cabinet chairman with the formation of the cabinet. At the refunding phase it shifted back to the superintendent. The extent of interaction was subsequently reduced, attributed to restrictions on NIE's travel funds and NIE/ESP staff's uncertainty about the proper function of the monitoring task, particularly about what impact, if any, NIE/ESP could expect to exert during the phase-out.[103]

Though there appeared to be consonance between the J ESP design and the USOE/ESP "comprehensive change" theme (both suggesting projectwide implementation of an integrated set of changes), early developments showed that appearance to be largely an illusion. As the several principals expended ESP monies to support different programs, the lack of districtwide programmatic and fiscal coordination and control disturbed USOE/ESP officials. As chronicled earlier, the USOE/ESP concerns led to the creation of the cabinet, which the principals developed into a tool for promoting their autonomy. The first 30 months grant funds had been centrally allocated before that intervention, and were basicaly unaffected by the cabinet's establishment. Control over spending remained both at the central office level (pro rata services and direct support services) and at the individual school level.

The funding agency attempted to impose tighter fiscal control at the time of negotiating the second 30 months funding period. First, an audit of J ESP expenditures was ordered to determine how much money had been spent and where. Secondly, the superintendent was directed to submit a "reprogrammed" budget for the first funding period, i.e., one which would minimize the large discrepancies between budget and actual expenditures which had resulted from the loosely controlled spending. Thirdly, the budget document accompanying the second 30 months proposal was to be much more specific, explaining in detail the expenditures planned for each school and districtwide activity based upon expenditures accrued over the first funding period. Finally, refunding was to be awarded under contract rather than grant provisions, to retain some federal management clout over district fiscal matters after the second 30 months operation got underway.[104] When the superintendent attempted to delay compliance with these mandates, the funding agency briefly froze spending in all non-instructional accounts except training, and later threatened to withhold program refunding entirely.[105]

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[103] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with NIE/ESP project officer, 2/27/75.

Further, during the first year following that negotiation, NIE/ESP officials attempted to use new mechanisms to maintain fiscal control. Contract provisions were enforced requiring the district to request approval of budget transfers among accounts, capital equipment purchases, and large supplies and materials purchases. The federal officials also established and administered an undesignated fund account to control the allocation of the district's fiscal year-end surplus or carry-over funds. However, by the final project year federal interventions had ceased with the exception of largely pro forma approval of the district fiscal requests.

The ultimately negotiated second 30 months plan more nearly reflected the reality of the varied approaches among the 13 schools. However, the basic fiscal allocations still reserved about 42 percent of the ESP monies for centralized administration. Throughout the five-year project the district maintained that dual system, retaining basic allocation decisions in the central office along with administrative control over more than 42 percent of the ESP monies, paralleled by individual project school principals' control of the remaining ESP monies.

District communications with NIE/ESP officials were not tightly controlled. The absence of managerial oversight of communications with the funding agency was evidenced by an exception to the typically positive quarterly progress reports filed with NIE/ESP by the administrative assistant-ESP disseminator. This exception, a rather critical report, elicited immediate telephone calls by NIE/ESP staff to the superintendent and to the present and former cabinet chairmen.[106] In response to those inquiries, NIE/ESP staff ascertained that no one had read the report (corroborating comments by several local administrators that their work was rarely reviewed within the district). In lieu of the special report then stipulated by the NIE/ESP project officer, the superintendent filed an addendum minimizing problems cited in the adverse report, stating that "it [the addendum] represents the views of the school principals to the operation of the district cabinet."[107] The report, its repercussions, and the superintendent's response were never discussed or acted on by the cabinet. Following the filing of the addendum there was no further communication from NIE/ESP pertinent to this matter. Further, district staff members continued to exercise autonomy. For example, the following fall (1974) the secretary-ESP fiscal/administrative assistant informed the cabinet that, without NIE/ESP authorization, she had released a batch of purchase orders, recognizing there was some risk in her action. She added that the purchase orders had been awaiting NIE/ESP approval for three months. Cabinet members quietly accepted her report.[108]

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[104] P. Wavro, "Site Visit Report to Jefferson on 11/30/72," December 11, 1972, pp. 1-3; and P. Wavro, "Memo to Robert Binswanger," December 1, 1972. Documents in NIE files.

[105] R. Mullens, "Additional Instruction: Jefferson Budget," attachment to memorandum to Jefferson superintendent, March 23, 1973.

[106] In part, the report stated: "... the ESP Project may be foundering [sic] due to a lack of leadership.... some schools exhibit occasional lapses or simple refusal to implement new programs designed to meet ESP objectives, and no authority exists to direct the school toward meeting these responsibilities.... the cabinet founders [sic] in a sea of confusion, indecisiveness [sic] and inaction...." JSD, "Progress Report #3," April 1, 1974, p. 2.

Potential managerial issues associated with dissemination of information about the J ESP tended to be avoided. For example, the administrative assistant-ESP disseminator commented during the fourth year, "All the time I've been in this job, NIE has never talked with me about dissemination, and neither has the cabinet."[109] Citing an instance in a recent cabinet session, at which the visiting NIE/ESP project officer had recommended that the cabinet decline to respond to a request by another (non-ESP) NIE office for information about activities and outcomes which could be disseminated (giving as rationale that it was yet too early, with not enough information for conclusive statements), the ESP disseminator reflected on NIE/ESP, discouraging dissemination while the superintendent"... wants to tell the whole nation. . . ."[110] Meanwhile, the principals did not want the administrative assistant-ESP disseminator to handle dissemination of their school programs. Instead, they retained their traditional control of access through their school boundaries, with some of them handling many visitors.[111]

Site visits by funding agency staff presented the district with problem solving or impression management opportunities. Site visits declined in frequency from the quarterly basis established during the initial project year. Even during the period of greatest frequency, visitors were susceptible to the agenda of district staff, who tended to expose visitors to successes, avoiding problem areas. A classic instance occurred in the fourth ESP year, in anticipation of a site visit by the NIE/ESP director. With the aid of the principals in the cabinet, the superintendent designed a schedule to expose the NIE/ESP director to successes and to avoid problem areas and failures, and to lead up to a possible proposal for supplemental funding to disseminate the successes.[112]

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[107] Superintendent, Letter to NIE/ESP project officer, May 7, 1974.

[108] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 10/8/75.

[109] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interview with ESP disseminator, 5/9/75.

[110] Ibid.

[111] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Interviews with principals, 4/14/75, 4/18/75.

While initially USOE/ESP possessed power relative to JSD, through its ability to satisfy the district's revenue needs, once the award was made JSD gained in power. The district gained the capacity to satisfy (or withhold satisfaction of) the funding agency's need for successful performance. However, through the first 30 months, the funding agency maintained an active presence in the district, with its authority supported by the possibility (if not the probability) of withholding refunding. When the project passed the midpoint, the funding agency largely withdrew from efforts to exercise authority. While the district generally complied with funding agency requirements throughout the project, that compliance was largely symbolic.

D. Summary

The governance structure of the school system remained simple and stable, as the J ESP was adapted to conform to the prevailing distribution of power. Zoning was employed to coordinate and control school system operation. The superintendent and his central office staff enjoyed hegemony over revenue sources and allocations, personnel administration, support services, and the management of transactions across the system's boundaries. The principals enjoyed hegemony over curricular, instructional, and pupil custodial activities within their individual schools.

The cabinet, created under the USOE/ESP impetus to overcome fragmentation and to promote a sense of comprehensiveness, was adapted to other ends. The principals developed the cabinet into a tool for protecting and promoting their individual autonomy and group solidarity. As more resources became subject to discretionary use, the cabinet became a "garbage can"[113] for the expression of problems, feelings, ideas, and decisions, generating a strong countervailing force against governance centralization.

The fiscal resource allocation and control system remained basically unchanged, as the proposed implementation of fiscal accountability techniques (PPBES and CER) were either dropped or postponed to post-project periods. Funds were dispersed and consumed within the previously existing allocation structure, generally bypassing the cabinet, and in part relieving the district's reliance upon traditional sources of revenue. The J ESP financial structure evolved into an unarticulated spending program, characterized by a low level of specificity in planning for expenditures, few attempts to follow the spending plans made, and almost no realization of the degree to which expenditures had fulfilled project objectives. However, the five million dollars did allow the district to make changes, some of which will continue beyond the end of the project, and most of which would not have occurred otherwise.

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[112] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 10/29/74.

[113] See Cohen, March and Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model."

The rhetoric and resources of the J ESP were absorbed into the prevailing system. The district's compliance with the funding agency requirements was largely symbolic. The federal intervention in Jefferson governance did not generate commitment among the administrators to institutional transformation, nor did it yield strong systemwide coordination and control. As the temporary ESP intrusion approached an end, there was little promise of a residue of increased governance capacity for dealing with complex and dynamic interdependence. However, the structures and processes for decision making were adequate, enabling the system to function smoothly.[114]

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[114] NWREL evaluators found the administrators consistently willing to invest time in helping to illuminate events as they were occurring and open to the risks of exposing developing programs. The administrators evidenced a high level of consideration, much beyond what could be attributed to any expectations of direct returns from the evaluative research, and beyond conventional cautiousness against unessential risks.

CHAPTER V

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

V. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Community participation has frequently assumed an idealized stance as a cultural given in federal educational programs. As Sherry R. Arnstein states, "The idea ....is a little like eating spinich: no one is against it in principle because it is good for you."[1] This chapter focuses on community participation in the Jefferson ESP. As will be noted later, the issue of community participation was a major concern, both on the part of the U. S. Office of Education in mounting the ESP and in the district's plan to implement its version of it.[2] This chapter will deal with the nature of that concern and its translation into actual district operations. The role of the community in the development and maintenance of the Jefferson ESP will be discussed, focusing specifically on parents whose children attended district schools and their formal participation with the district during the project.

The format for this focus is a historical unfolding of the intent and actuality of that formal participation throughout the ESP. Both the substance and extent of participation will be examined. Interwoven throughout, the role of salient actors (both within and outside the school district) in determining that participation will be described. Other information, such as the nature of the Jefferson community itself and of the instructional and organizational components of the project, is included as it relates to the development of parental participation. The chapter begins with an overview of the pre-ESP setting as it pertained to parental participation, followed by a discussion of community participation in terms of three phases:

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[1] S. R. Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," American Institute of Planners Journal, 35:4, July 1959, p. 216.

[2] In recent years large scale federally funded educational innovations, as represented by the ESP, have emphasized the importance of community participation. Such emphasis stems from those democratic traditions and ideals that public institutions should be responsive and open to the public. In reference to educational institutions, Mario Fantini points out

> The concept of the public is particularly pertinent because it reveals what should be the basic nature of our major educational institutions--openness and responsiveness to the citizenry. Under a public system of education, laymen determine the goals of education and the policies calculated to achieve them. Professional educators are the specialists to whom responsibility for implementation of these policies is delegated by laymen.

M. Fantini, quoted in M. E. Stanwick, Patterns of Participation, Institute for Responsive Education, Boston, Massachusetts, 1975, p. 1.

1. Phase I, 1971-1972, when the project centered on district level participation.

2. Phase II, 1972-1973, a transitional phase, when the focus began to shift from district to individual school level participation.

3. Phase III, 1973-1976, when the project focus stabilized at individual school level participation.

A. The Setting

As described in Chapter I of this report, the area encompassed by the Jefferson School District bears little resemblance to a community; rather, it is an area arbitrarily demarcated by the school district. Lacking an economic center, governmental identity and organizational cohesiveness, it can best be depicted as a bedroom community for a predominantly working class population. The school system is the only structure which exists to articulate and integrate the needs and interests of individuals and groups within the district and to provide opportunity for community participation.

1. Formal District Entry Points

The potential entry points available to community members and parents for participating in school district affairs had a distinctly traditional cast prior to the ESP. The most general opportunity, of course, was the chance to vote on the special levy proposal for maintenance and operation funds submitted yearly by the district, as well as on other occasional tax levies--such as building improvement bonds. Each year the citizenry could, in a sense, express some general approval or disapproval of district policies and operations via the ballot box.

The district's organizational structure was typically bureaucratic as described by Saxe.[3] Briefly, this structure, which has continued to exist throughout the ESP, is a hierarchical arrangement in which a non-partisan Board of Education, selected by the public, has broad policy responsibilities. These policies, administered by the district superintendent and deputy superintendent, are ultimately implemented at the local school level by the principals and teachers. In Jefferson, an additional forum called the Education Council links the school board and the community. Each member is appointed by an individual school board member, and the council serves as a citizens committee, ostensibly facilitating communication between the school board and the community.[4]

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[3] R. W. Saxe, School-Community Interaction, McCutchan Publishing Corporation, Berkeley, California, 1975, p. 22.

At the school building level, each of the district's elementary schools had a Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) prior to the ESP. The junior and senior high schools did not have PTA's, although one junior high school did have a "Booster Club," which concerned itself with support of various social functions at the school.

2. Nature of Pre-ESP Participation

The role of the community in school affairs prior to the ESP appears to have been generally stable and supportive. A barometer of this is the district's history of special excess levy elections. Between 1966 and 1971, voter approval of the annual maintenance and operations levy requests ranged from 65 to 84 percent[5] (with a 60 percent majority required by state law for levy approval). This apparent indicator of strong community support for the district educational programs appears even more remarkable, given the increasing frequency of levy failures throughout the state.

More direct community participation occurred at the school level PTA's and at the district level Board of Education and Education Council. Because of the lack of recorded minutes, little can be reconstructed concerning the nature of participation at the PTA's prior to the ESP; however, observations of PTA activities during the ESP suggest that participation there was and continued to be largely social and supportive (e.g., implementing social functions for children, such as the yearly carnival at the school or raising funds for playground equipment, and library books).

Minutes from the board and the council meetings during the year immediately prior to the ESP (1970-1971) suggest a low profile for community participation. During this period, the Education Council focused almost exclusively on formation of excess levy proposals and planning the levy campaign. Such deliberations were highly structured by the district administration and apparently focused more on the feasibility of the amount to be raised than the specific educational aspects to be affected. Though initial planning for the ESP occurred in the spring and summer of 1971, the only reference to this planning in council minutes was a decision to support the planning phase of the project, which ultimately was to take place through a public forum known as the charrette. According to the minutes, these proceedings took place at council meetings attended only by district administrators and the five council members themselves.[6]

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[4] D. F. Eixenberger, "Formal Community Involvement at the Board of Education and the Education Council Since the Development of the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project," NWREL, July 1974.

[5] D. F. Eixenberger, "Community Profile."

The main opportunity for community members to participate at Board of Education meetings was in decisions relating to policy formation (e.g., relating to those decisions which alter district goals, task definitions, procedures, priorities, rules and regulations). During the 1970-1971 school year, the board made 44 such decisions, of which some community members participated in 13. In few instances the Education Council issued recommendations on the amount of the special levy request and litigations concerning voter validation requirements to approve such levies. Other decisions in which community members participated concerned the use of school buildings by the community for social activities, dress code policies, and school attendance by married students. Community members also participated in two policy formation decisions relating to educational programs. In one case, the Education Council recommended support of the application for the ESP grant. In the second, a controversial speaker policy was created, based on input made from a public meeting sponsored by the district and attended by over 100 citizens, most of whom apparently were parents. This meeting was held in response to an outburst of negative opinion concerning the language used by militant guest speakers invited to make presentations as part of the junior high school social studies program.[7]

3. Summary of Pre-ESP Participation

Community participation appears to have been constant only in terms of the Education Council and then only in relation to business and finance. The council's functions can be seen as an expediency in response to the state's legal prescription against school districts becoming directly involved in levy politicking. Other participation appears to have been peripheral to the central educational functions of the district (e.g., social use of school facilities) and supportive of ongoing operations (e.g., the annual levy campaign). The remaining focus of participation appears to have been regulatory (e.g., the dress code and the controversial speakers policy), and the district response was apparently satisfactory to community members.

Examination of these settings yields no evidence of any major dissatisfaction on the part of the community with the basic educational programs offered by the district or the quality of instruction within those programs. The controversial speakers issue was a minor exception, but it (and the dress code issue) suggests that wide community participation was on an ad hoc basis, occurring only when community members felt that some important value boundary had been transgressed by the district. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the community was dissatisfied with the role available to it at these settings; there was no visible movement by the community to redefine or expand its role in school affairs.

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[6] D. F. Eixenberger, "Formal Community Involvement," pp. 30-31.

[7] Ibid.

It is difficult to identify the degree of power exerted by the participants at these settings using archival data. Members of the board and Education Council appeared to occupy a "partnership" role in decision making.[8] However, the alternatives offered for such decision making appear nearly always to have been set by school administrators, and there is no evidence of the board and council running contrary to administrative recommendations. Participation by community members at large appears to have been sporadic and was characteristically at the token level (i.e., informing, consulting and placating). While members of the community did participate in such policy decisions relating to the dress code, social use of school buildings, and the controversial speakers issue, such participation was only at the consultation or placation levels; their role, while perhaps influential, did not entail decision making.

In deciding to embark upon the ESP, the district may have considered the needs and values of the community. Nevertheless, that consideration was made initially in the absence of any formally stated call from the community for large scale educational change or systematic effort by the district to elicit community views regarding educational needs.

The discussion will now turn to community participation during the development of ESP and will focus on the three phases outlined earlier.

B. Phase I (1971-1972): Community Participation at the District Level

Phase I concerns the early life of the J ESP, when the focus was on community participation at the district level.

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[8] Arnstein offers a typology called "Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Participation," based on the degrees of power available to the participant in determinig end products. The rungs range from non-participation at the lower end (including "therapy" and "manipulation") to tokenism in the middle ("informing," "consultation," and "placation") to actual decision making power at the top ("partnership," "delegated power," and "citizen control"). Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen participation," pp. 218-224.

1. Intentions

The issue of community participation figured prominently at the very beginning of the ESP. In inviting letters of interest, the USOE stipulated a variety of general criteria for selecting potential planning sites, including "development of a plan for broad participation in the design, implementation and governance of a project," and "extent to which design fulfills objectives of the Experimental Schools Program including: ... a comprehensive approach to the learning environment, community participation, staff development, administration, and organization."[9] Community participation figured again in the criteria provided to the selection committee for reviewing the submitted letters of interest:

> Extent to which community participation is developed as part of program. To what degree is decision making shared? Is there any evidence that the community has been given any authority to make any decisions in the design, implementation and operation? To what degree is the involvement of community essential to the operation of the program?[10]

The Jefferson proposal identified a local need "to promote greater community involvement, so that channels of communication are open and adequate, the community is involved in the development of policies and goals, and so that community resources are used both inside and outside of the school for educational purposes." To meet this need, the proposal stated the following objective: "To establish the charrette as a regular procedure for converting community desires into real programs."[11]

A consultant to the district in the spring of 1971 suggested the charrette as a useful tool in the planning of the ESP.[12] The idea was borrowed from the marathon

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[9] R. B. Binswanger, "Basic Program Information," Experimental Schools, U.S. Office of Education, Call for letters of interest, December 28, 1970. Also see Chapter II of this report.

[10] "Process Summary from Evaluation Committee: Criteria for Selection," (U.S. Office of Education), Experimental Schools, NWREL, [undated].

[11] JSD, "Experimental Schools, Jefferson: Providing Optimum Learning Environments for 4000 Students," an application to the HEW for an operations grant under provisions of the Experimental Schools Program, planning project OEG-0-71-1214, project number 18040, [final draft of first 30 months proposal], submitted by the superintendent, May 15, 1971.

[12] The following discussions of the charrettes and follow-ups to the charrettes are documented in F. Mulhauser, "Charrette Report," NWREL, September 8, 1972.

designing sessions of architectural planning teams and was a method whereby large groups of clients and professionals could work together intensively to develop basic concepts for guiding the design of specific facilities. The consultant saw the charrette as an open community forum from which leadership might emerge to mobilize the community toward identifying and solving problems which, in turn, would guide ESP developments. Apparently, the district's development of the charrette was meant to mobilize and involve large and diverse segments of the community in project planning in order to produce a plan responsive to community needs.

2. The Reality

The discussion now turns to a history of the charrettes during the planning and implementation of the J ESP.

a. Early Charrettes. Two early charrettes were held in the district: one on March 11-12, 1971, during the 60-day planning period prior to the district's receipt of the final ESP grant; and a second in the fall of 1972.[13] The first charrette was attended by some 60 people, including 10 parents and 7 students; the second charrette had an attendance of approximately 100, including 24 parents and 18 students. The majority of those attending both charrettes were district administrators and teachers.

The major purpose of both events appears to have been to introduce the ESP to parents and review its developments. As one observer remarked, "The parents were there, but really didn't have a role." At the first charrette, the project proposal was already in draft form, so the group was being informed about the shape of the project, but not directly involved in its initiation. The second charrette involved a review of the many new ESP programs. At both meetings, parents were presented with nearly crystallized plans and ideas within a school context, rather than with the broad canvass of problems experienced by the whole community and a search for solutions and resources. Even though plans were reviewed, the audience apparently had no decision making powers. Parents were informed of established directions rather than called upon to participate in the charting of future directions.

b. Third Charrette. The third charrette was held in March 1972, toward the end of the first ESP year. Planning for this charrette occurred over several administrative meetings with the principals, beginning in January 1972. Discussions at these meetings centered on the techniques for disseminating information about the ESP to participants, gathering feedback from current participants in the project, and soliciting reactions to proposed programs and ideas for potential programs.

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[13] Other internal district planning sessions were called charrettes, but they were not public meetings designed to include the community.

The Dean of Education at a local university and the district's Level I evaluator, participating in the planning, urged that, rather than relying upon the traditional nucleus of PTA parents, special efforts be made to recruit the "unseen majority" of parents if decisions were to be made or policies developed. This issue was especially pertinent, as the plan at this time was to expand the ESP to all 13 schools. However, the decision making aspect of the charrette was not emphasized; neither was there a clear identification of what policy areas would be opened. Accordingly, it was difficult for the participants in the planning meetings to decide who would be invited to the charrette, what their roles would be, or what information would be provided. Much attention was given to scheduling various events within the charrette, but there was little focus on substance other than eliciting feedback from the community about the goals of education, and their attitudes toward such current programs as interim, IPI, and IGE. Interesting for its direct relevance to charrette planning was the ranking by the principals of current and future amounts of effort to be given to various ESP activities. "Involving the community in the project" was ranked eighth out of twelve goals in both current and future lists.

Uncertainty reigned prior to the charrette. Specific data-gathering questions had not been presented at planning meetings. Arrangements of times and spaces were in flux. Principals were unsure what to present; many had not completed their plans for the coming year. Many tasks had been left to the director of Level I evaluation, and these were made ambiguous by the lack of detailed substantive planning. The superintendent suggested that principals be guided by an extensive list of planning questions that he had prepared as the agenda for the third day of the charrette. These were posed as potential alternatives for the ESP, such as the implementation of a year-round school. However, since the shape and substance of these alternatives were not fully clear to the principals themselves, they could hardly be made clear to parents who were asked to respond to questions.

In summary, although adequate time had been allocated for planning, most preparation for the charrette was done at the last moment. Many important issues were raised during the planning, but, in the settings observed by NWREL staff, few were straightforwardly resolved. It appears that the need to have some data on "community reaction" to the project, required by USOE, and not yet gathered through any other means, overcame the other possible focuses of the charrette. The community's role--beyond that of some ill-defined "sounding board"--was never discussed.

The third charrette consisted of four sessions held over a three-day period, March 16 to 18, 1972. The first of these, an introduction to the ESP, was held on a Thursday evening and consisted of some 20 different simultaneous presentations of various aspects of the ESP. The presentations were given twice, allowing a parent to attend, at most, two full presentations. Half the audience left after seeing only one. Of the more than 200 persons attending, about 83 were parents, many of whom were well educated (50 percent had attended at least some college). Seventy percent had been specifically invited by school personnel, and 85 percent had not been to any previous charrette.

A second session, Friday afternoon, was held for discussion and feedback. It was attended by 42 parents, almost all female, most of whom were specifically recruited by principals. The third session, Friday evening, was held to give parents, students, and their respective school principals a chance to discuss specific building plans for the next year. The number of parents attending fell sharply, to only 15 or 20. The fourth session, on Saturday, was intended as a time of synthesis and action. School administrators, teachers and parent spokesmen from the Friday discussion groups would review information gathered over the previous three days and attempt to draw everything together in order to make decisions for the coming year.

Observations of the various sessions disclosed a variety of problems. First, it was apparent that the parents found the charrette frustrating. Programs were presented and discussed in acronyms perhaps familiar to educators but confusing to the uninitiated. The sheer number of programs reviewed presented an informational overload. Parent leaders who were to serve as information sources for the discussion groups had been recruited at the last minute, and their comments revealed that they too felt confused about many of the various programs. It was quickly discovered that no one could clarify the precise meaning of such things as "greater opportunity for individualization of instruction," "staggered vacations," "flexible programs," or "broader experience for academically gifted students."

A variety of parental concerns did emerge. One leader questioned the school administrators present about "what bearing this group has on anything?" Concern was raised throughout the groups over the ambiguous roles they were playing. Others wondered if they or anyone else would hear the results of their efforts. Specific concerns centered on such things as the costs of the various programs and their fiscal maintenance after ESP, the articulation of the programs between elementary and junior high schools, making results of the programs known, and the meaning of individualized instruction.

The Saturday session was hurried and inconclusive. The mass of data gained through the "feedback" questionnaire was laboriously tabulated by the Level I evaluation staff Friday evening and distributed at the Saturday meeting. However, it was treated only briefly; many questions were raised but then lost under the pressure to "move on." All interpreting and synthesizing was done by the superintendent; few others attempted to draw conclusions from the data or suggest interpretations. Answers with negative connotations, such as parents' negative response to the adequacy of their voice in determining school policy, were not discussed. Other aspects of parental roles in the project were also left undefined.

One USOE observer concluded that there was a need for more serious involvement by parents and for better explanation to them of ESP innovations.

c. Follow-Up to the Charrette. At a principals' meeting following the charrette, it was recognized that the group's goal of using feedback to revise plans and set priorities had not been met. The suggestions made by principals for future plans were not very new but were things principals have "always wanted to do." The cabinet did not discuss the charrette further.

A follow-up questionnaire was sent by the district disseminator to 100 charrette participants, 20 of whom were parents, and of these, 11 responded.

Further principals' and superintendent's meetings held through the spring of 1972 showed no consideration of either the organization of the charrette or the information elicited from the three prior charrettes. In fact, in the fall of 1972, the decision was made to abandon the charrette as a vehicle for community participation. (This decision is further discussed under Phase II.)

d. Other Settings. The charrette was the forum intended for community participation in the ESP. However, other forums were also available--such as the PTA's at the building level, and the Board of Education and Education Council at the district level.

Unfortunately, there is little evidence of participation through the PTA's. However, observations of several "Back to School Nights," the major yearly community involvement activity of the school PTA's, indicate that ESP did figure prominently in the proceedings. These proceedings were mainly extensive overviews of ESP components, often districtwide in scope and already implemented in the ESP schools, as well as those projected for the future. In no case did the proceedings involve deliberations by parents about alternate directions the ESP might take; nor were there any systematic attempts to record parental reactions to these programs for use in district decision making bodies. Their major emphasis appeared to be on public relations, with the purpose of convincing the audience of the benefits of the various ESP components.[14]

The proceedings and participation at the Board of Education and the Education Council showed even less change when compared with the year prior to the ESP. Of 41 policy forming decisions made by the board, the community was involved in 7. Once again, participation of community members was largely peripheral to the educational programs of the district (e.g., the social use of school facilities by the community) or related to the amount of the special levy to be requested, with little consideration of the specific educational substance to be purchased with such funds. Extension of the school calendar year to accommodate the interim programs was the only ESP feature to be dealt with directly by the board.[15]

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[14] D. F. Eixenberger, Fieldnotes, PTA "Back to School Nights," 10/12/72, 10/31/72, 3/20/73, 3/22/73, and 9/27/73.

The Education Council dealt mainly with development of the annual special levy campaign. At the superintendent's request it granted approval of the third charrette, at a meeting attended by central office administrators, the five regular council members, and one Board of Education member. Lacking in the proceedings was any consideration of organizing the community for the charrette or any attempt to define the community's role in it beyond generally informing the community and generating some undefined input from it.

Throughout this period, community attendance at the Board of Education meeting and Education Council was minimal. Most noticeably absent were representatives or individuals from the community approaching either setting in an attempt to change the existing educational programs of the district or to participate in charting future directions.

3. Summary of Phase I

Community participation was to have been a major feature in OE/NIE's notion of comprehensive change. However, as part of the federal staff's purposeful non-directive stance in relation to the individual ESP settings, the form of community participation was left undefined.

What OE might have meant by participation was indicated by the criteria given to the ESP selection site committee, such as the "extent to which communtiy participation is developed as part of the program" and "to what degree is decision making shared?"[16] However, this concern was not substantively addressed in the district's final plan, nor did it emerge as a high priority in interactions between the district and OE. Community participation was cited by OE as one of several issues needing discussion, but one which required more reflection.[17] As shown elsewhere in this report, OE devoted most of its energy to the problem of articulation and the allied issue of project governance.

As a result, the district had virtual carte blanche regarding community participation. There was little definition or push from OE; there was no demand from the community or from the local school building. Whatever impetus existed emanated from the central office administration--specifically from the superintendent and the district ESP disseminator. Since the ESP proposal itself was virtually the isolated expression of the superintendent,[18] the development of community participation also bore his stamp and perspectives. That development centered on the charrette which was largely district level in focus, with only minimal attention given to specific school level issues. Its planning and development was carried on almost solely by the central office, with no participation by community members and virtually after-the-fact participation by school building administrators and personnel. Coordination was lacking throughout.

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[15] The activities of the Board of Education and Education Council are discussed more fully in Eixenberger, "Formal Community Involvement."

[16] "Process Summary From Evaluation Committee."

[17] B. Rose, OE/ESP project officer, Memorandum to R. B. Binswanger concerning J site visit, January 12, 1972.

The charrettes themselves were cyclical in nature; one did not build upon the other, in either participation or program. They failed, therefore, to build a stable cohesive group of parents who might have become sufficiently knowledgeable about the ESP to interact meaningfully with the district and from which parental leadership might have emerged. Originally planned as a two-way planning process, the charrette became, operationally, an information gathering mechanism with little accommodation to parental perspectives (e.g., the global ESP approach, the heavy use of educational terminology) or clarification of parental role. The fait accompli nature of many presentations in both existing and planned programs and the absence of alternative proposals ran counter to possible community participation in the development of the project, leaving parents with only a yes or no function, with little structure or substance to help them perform even that role. Most of the programs considered were already in some stage of development in the ESP schools.

Left almost to chance evolution, participation in the charrettes assumed the form Arnstein describes as "tokenism";[19] attempts were made to inform the participants about the ESP but in a manner which many found unsatisfactory. Even district administrators themselves admitted that attempts to receive feedback from the participants had failed. Commenting on the third charrette, the superintendent stated, "Our aim was to approve the priorities for this coming summer work, and it just didn't happen. So I wrote up some things after the meeting and here they are."[20] Thus, participation remained largely at the initiative of the superintendent.

C. Phase II (1972-73): The Transition

Phase II, the second year of the ESP, was largely dominated by the district's efforts to formulate plans for the second 30 month phase of the project. It was also marked by a change in the organization of the contractor: ESP was transferred from the USOE to the newly created National Institute of Education (NIE). Problems of project governance raised in the prior year had, largely at OE initiative, led to the creation of a new system of management--the ESP Cabinet. In design, this portended a radical departure for managing the affairs of the project schools and potentially for the development of community participation.

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[18] The role of the superintendent is discussed in Chapter III of this report.

[19] See footnote 8 (p. 119) of this chapter.

[20] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Superintendent's cabinet meeting, March 20, 1972.

Creation of the cabinet was intended by OE to mobilize the principals towards unified governance of the project and to reverse its fragmented development. However, as shown in Chapter III, its creation actually strengthened the autonomy of individual schools and the continuance of fragmented development--including developments in community participation.

1. The Charrette

The newly formed ESP Cabinet considered the issue of the charrette at two meetings in September of 1972.[21] A charrette was tentatively scheduled for the latter part of October. It was to be held at a local university simultaneously with a USOE display of national educational innovations brought to the area through the sponsorship of the district.

The superintendent broached the issue by citing what he perceived to be the problems of the previous charrette, namely that people had felt used, did not have a chance to express themselves, and that methods of selecting the participants did not provide an adequate representation of the community. He and the district disseminator provided the cabinet with a plan to remedy such problems. Included in the plan was the formation of parent advisory committees at each school, to be composed of those parents selected for the charrette; they were to meet twice prior to the charrette to discuss and formulate issues.

Several principals openly opposed the plan. Concerns were expressed that to select participants randomly would result in attendance by parents who didn't have children affected by ESP programs. Others felt that the districtwide charrette was of little help to principals who had to sell the ESP to parents at their school and that the work required to hold the charrette took energies for an activity of questionable value that could be devoted to other project efforts. A poll of the principals indicated that all felt the USOE exhibit should be held, but that they were against having a districtwide charrette, opting instead to have advisory committee meetings at each individual school in the spring. The superintendent defended the charrette plan in that it "...was trying to remedy the disappointment that we all felt that the previous charrettes have not met our needs." But he stated that he would accede to their position as long as each principal would develop feedback mechanisms. "Be creative about getting this feedback," he urged. "I'll remind you of the purpose of the charrette: to reach solutions on where to go next." The cabinet formally decided to have the exhibit that fall, but not the districtwide charrette.

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[21] The following discussion is taken from F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, ESP Cabinet meetings, 9/5/72 and 9/12/72.

Throughout these meetings, purposes for community participation were discussed but never resolved--including informing parents about the ESP, attempting to sell the project, seeking solutions to problems, and gaining feedback from parents. Overriding was the overt surfacing of the conflict between districtwide and local building needs and purposes.

2. Second 30 Months Planning

Planning for the second 30 months of the project began during the 1972-73 school year. Major problems were apparent. The issues of defining comprehensiveness and establishing a unified theme for the project were not resolved; project governance was entering an uncharted era; the ESP itself was now being extended to the remaining district schools.

This planning period involved frequent interaction with NIE, which pressed for more community participation in all phases of the project. How this participation was to be defined remained ambiguous. At a meeting with the district administrators and principals, the project officer commented, "Surveys and charrettes aren't originally what you had in mind as a total package, or what we have in mind...I don't see much further exploration of what constitutes community involvement." The principals' discussion focused on forming parent advisory councils, and the difficulty of getting parents involved in them. When asked to participate on such councils, parents responded, "We pay you [principals] to do that." Other comments described parents as being overwhelmed by school personnel and were ill prepared for such involvement; one principal stated, "We have to bring them [parents] up to the level we are. We have to orient them and get them to learn just as we are doing... this all takes time." Another implied that involvement between the parent and his child's teacher on a one-to-one basis was more appropriate.[22]

The issue of community participation was raised again at a district retreat. The superintendent pointed out the comparative weakness of the district's effort and stated that NIE "...seems to think that it's important for schools to have a systematic process for input to the principals."[23] Throughout the two-day retreat, however, there was no focused discussion on the issue beyond mention by a few principals of their intent to formalize Parent Advisory Councils at their schools. Again, any mention of a charrette or district level involvement was noticeably absent. Yet, this was apparently very much on the mind of the NIE director of ESP as indicated by his comments regarding such involvement:

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[22] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Meeting of the NIE/ESP project officer and district administrators, 12/1/71.

[23] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, ESP retreat, 1/23/73.

> This is essential on a districtwide basis and in each school. (In all three ESP communities, parents have not understood what was going on.) Community involvement necessitates a slowdown in the process, but it is critical to comprehensive change. It is a long-term process.[24]

Planning for the second 30 months continued in the district. An initial document on community involvement--largely the conception of the superintendent--was produced in March. At a meeting between the district and NIE to review the plan, principals expressed surprise at seeing the charrette was still included as a component for district level involvement. One stated that the cabinet had disapproved the charrette, "...yet it reappears." No further discussion of the charrette or community involvement occurred throughout this two-day session.[25]

NIE was critical of the plan in that it, "did not inspire confidence that the concerns of the community will be represented adequately with immediacy or representationally at anything but the individual school level."[26]

Yet, throughout this period, NIE declined to clarify or resolve the issue, especially with reference to the charrette. According to the project officer, this was an intentional posture. Community amorphousness made development of districtwide participation difficult; and other issues, especially project governance, were of greater priority from NIE's standpoint. The project officer felt that, by allowing the ESP cabinet's opposition to the charrette to prevail, its strength as a governing body might be enhanced.[27]

The final 30 month plan was approved by NIE in the summer of 1973. It presented, prima facie, an anomaly regarding community participation. Despite the ESP cabinet's position, the charrette still appeared as a potential forum for participation. In addition, fully functioning parent advisory councils were projected for each school. It was suggested that participants in these councils be randomly selected. Among the suggested guidelines for parental participation in the councils were involvement in the planning, development, operation and evaluation of the ESP programs. It was also suggested that parents be involved in "recommending a general plan for the allocation of ESP funds," and "participating in the development of proposals... adapted to bridging the gap between the needs of the pupils and the curriculum of the school."[28]

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[24] JSD, "Report--Experimental Schools Project Meeting," District memorandum re: meeting in Washington, D.C. between district representatives and NIE, February 9-10, 1973.

[25] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, NIE-district meeting, 3/16/73 and 3/17/73.

[26] NIE, "Critique of Plan Submitted by the Jefferson School District," May 7, 1973.

[27] D. Eixenberger, Fieldnotes, Interview with project officer, 2/27/75.

These proposed guidelines were apparently the sole creation of the superintendent. There is no evidence that they were ever considered at ESP cabinet meetings or other administrative meetings. The role described for the participants, while more specifically laid out than in the first 30 month proposal, still remained unclear. Community decision making powers were not precluded in that a districtwide council was to augment the ESP cabinet; however, neither were there specific provisions that participants would formally be granted decision making powers. Informing and consulting roles, emerged most clearly.

The district entered the third year of the ESP with a complex set of plans. Yet, the general absence of negative expression by the community continued to provide a defensible reason for not seriously operationalizing those plans and for continuing the low profile stance with regard to community participation. This absence was perceived by the district as evidence of community support. In part, this perception was borne out by a random sample survey of Jefferson parents made in March 1973 by the NWREL Level II evaluation team in conjunction with the district. Parents with children in the ESP schools rated school practices more favorably than parents with children in the non-ESP schools. While the district perceptions of a generally favorable and supportive stance with regard to educational practice were supported to an extent by this study, possible problems regarding parents' personal contacts with school personnel were indicated. Though parents who were more frequently involved tended to perceive themselves as having some influence on the way their children were being educated, 37 percent of the parents felt themselves to have no influence and 50 percent stated they would like to have more influence. Of these 50 percent, 30 percent stated they knew of no way to have an influence, and 27 percent stated they had been unsuccessful in trying to have an influence. Apparently, potential for developing a more influential role was stymied through lack of knowledge or lack of response by the school system.[29]

3. Summary of Phase II

The planning process through Phase II appeared chaotic with regard to community involvement. What emerged was a conflict between the superintendent and the principals over the issue of the charrette and district level involvement. The superintendent held to the inclusion of district level involvement right through to the final proposal. However, through the development of the cabinet, the principals formalized their resistance and opted for involvement at the school building level. The widely held consensus was that the charrette was a failure. The posture of NIE regarding the charrette significantly strengthened the principals' position. The entire period was characterized by the absence of any conclusive discussion of community involvement at either the district or school building level. As shown in discussions of other project components, the autonomy of the building principals worked against resolution of the issue. Each school appeared as its own community, and the superintendent's districtwide scope was perceived by the principals as disruptive and alien. In a sense, the charrette was a transplant which did not hook up adequately with the circulatory system of the district. There was no overt demand from the community for such districtwide involvement; there were no intermediate structures upon which to coordinate and sustain such districtwide involvement; and there were no ostensible rewards for principals to generate such involvement or create such structures.

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[28] JSD, "Experimental Schools Project," [final draft of second 30 months plan]. [April 1973], pp. 30 and 278-279.

[29] D. Eixenberger, B. Hawley and B. Fite, "Impact of the Experimental Schools Project on Parents of the Jefferson School District," NWREL, April 1974, pp. 22-23.

The final 30 month plan created a rhetorical ambiguity that, on the one hand, left open the possibility of a charrette, but on the other, called for coordination of the building PAC's with the existing district education council. The issue of the charrette was moot from the principals' standpoint: it was never discussed again during the ESP. Of crucial importance was the fact that throughout this planning period, the community was never formally involved except in the final phases. This involvement was in the form of the school board's approval of the second 30 month ESP plan. In addition to the central office staff and representatives of the teachers' association, this board meeting was attended by five community members. Their input was somewhat critical. They expressed misgivings about supporting the project components after federal funds had elapsed and objected to what they perceived as the "frills" of the program and a general neglect of the "basics." However, little of the plan was specifically discussed. Nor for that matter, did the plan--a 115-page document which no community member had seen before the meeting--invite discussion, particularly given the nature of the setting. Conventional business meetings of the board are ill suited for such informational exchanges. Nevertheless, the plan was unanimously approved by the board.[30]

D. Phase III (1973-76): The Parent Advisory Council Era

In Phase III, community participation in the Jefferson ESP became stabilized at the individual school level.

The plan for the final 30 months of the ESP called for Parent Advisory Councils (PAC's) at each of the district's 13 schools. These were to be coordinated through some form of representation at meetings of the Education Council. Guidelines for formation of these councils and their activities were also stipulated in the plan, emanating once again from the superintendent, who did not consult with the principals concerning their development. The establishment of such councils, definition of their nature and functions, the role parents were to plan in their proceedings, or how PAC's were to figure in district decision making were not considered at any district level setting. It appeared that the development of the PAC's was to be totally at the discretion of the building principals.[31]

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[30] D. Eixenberger, "Formal Community Involvement," pp. 28-29.

This development posed some difficulties for the Level II task of community analyses. In effect, formal community participation in the ESP was to be dispersed throughout each of the district's 13 schools.

1. The Parent Advisory Councils[32]

Most principals had some form of PAC in operation during the final two years of the project (1974-1976) with parental membership varying from five to fifteen. These members were generally selected by principal and/or teacher nomination and often appeared to be those parents previously active in the PTA. Exceptions occurred in 1974-75 in four schools which had developed PAC's with both an ESP and a Title I focus. Title I programs were developed to provide remedial education in mathematics or English to those students two years or more behind in grade level achievement. Title I required that PAC's approve such programs and that PAC membership be composed of a majority of parents with children actually in the Title I programs. As a result, parents with no previous involvement in the school had an opportunity for PAC membership. Another exception to PAC membership being comprised of parents who were formerly active in PTA's occurred at one junior high school. With the cooperation of school personnel, a cadre of 10 to 15 parents, alarmed at the quality of education in the school, especially conditions of discipline, formed their own PAC to deal with these problems. This group actively solicited memberships from all parents. It was the only PAC which attempted to serve as a formal liaison between the school and the community. The initial cadre developed special committees to meet with school personnel to deal with specific issues such as discipline and curriculum. These committees met several times a year with all interested parents to report and to chart future directions (in 1974-75, 100 to 150 parents attended these open meetings). Parents involved with the PAC's were largely female (84 percent). When compared to a random sample of 556 parents participating in a Level II survey made in the spring of 1975, PAC participants also tended to be more highly educated. For example, 48.6 percent of parents surveyed had some education beyond a high school diploma; 61.3 percent of PAC parents surveyed were in that category. For the most part, the parental role at PAC meetings tended toward tokenism--that is: "informing" and "consultation."[33] The majority of parental interactions at the PAC meetings consisted of either being informed about school practices (64 percent of all interactions) or providing information to school personnel (26 percent). Decision making was universal, accounting for less than 1 percent of all interactions (six instances of 715 interactions). All but one of these decisions were made in the four Title I PAC's when parents were asked to vote approval of Title I programs. Nine percent of all interactions were instances of policy formation, with parents questioning existing practices or presenting possible alternatives or solutions to problems. This type of interaction occurred largely in two of the nine PAC's examined.

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[31] This, of course, is excepting those PAC's which were later established according to Title I criteria.

[32] D. Eixenberger, "Report on Formal Relationships Between School and Community Schools Project," April 1976.

The predominance of token participation can be attributed to a variety of factors. In four PAC's, for example, parents were formally limited to providing advice and assistance by a constitution established by the principal. Agenda formation was largely under the control of the principal in all but two PAC's. Parents were provided reviews of programs already in operation. Seldom, if ever, were they presented with projected developments at the school. The absence of presentations of educational plans and alternatives thus precluded the opportunity for parental roles beyond exchanging information.

2. District Level Involvement

Parental involvement remained focused at the individual school level through the remainder of the project. An attempt was made to provide formal liaison between the PAC's and district level decision making. Title I PAC's had representation on a districtwide Title I PAC, but proceedings there were limited to Title I issues. Parental involvement at the district level remained at the Board of Education and the Education Council. Such involvement remained typical of that described during the first phase of the ESP--that is, ad hoc involvement by parents with some special issue or problem. An example of this was an effort by a group of parents to change the composition of the athletic league the district participated in. Another involved the effort to institute soccer as a major sport in the schools. Both issues were still being resolved at this writing. A third example consisted of a group of approximately 10 parents protesting the nature of the district's Man: A Course of Study (MACOS) program, a fifth grade social studies program which has been controversial nationally. These parents felt the program was an example of "secular humanism," detrimental to their conception of traditional morality, and asked that the program be removed from the curriculum. Their opposition was seen by the district as being forceful, but representative of only a minority of parents. Various school committees were assigned to study the issue. Resolution was reached at a board meeting at which members of various PAC's were asked to provide their opinions of MACOS (five PAC members attended). These opinions were highly favorable to the program, and the board decided to continue the MACOS program subject to a review in one year.[34] The district continued operations through the final year of the ESP with the feeling that the community was supportive of its activities. Major evidence of this was the successful passage of a maintenance and operation levy in the spring of 1976 with a 73.1 percent majority. A second survey of parents in the district in the spring of 1975 provides some evidence of support. Parents as a group felt the quality of education in their children's schools was positive, however, major discrepancies existed between what parents would like to see emphasized in their children's education and what they felt the schools were actually emphasizing. While parents generally felt the schools should place greater emphasis on such traditional areas as discipline and the basic academics, they also felt greater emphasis should be placed on many aspects of individualization which were major ESP goals.[35]

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[33] Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," p. 216.

While overt expressions of such discrepancies did not occur in the schools or at the central office level, such expression, in our observations, was not formally solicited by the district.

E. Summary

This chapter began from the perspective that openness and responsiveness to the public by educational systems has traditionally been an American ideal--an ideal which in recent years has found reflection in an emphasis on community participation in many federally funded educational change efforts. This was followed by an overview of the history of a school district whose stated intent was to attain some measure of that ideal. In the main, the results have been ambiguous but, as has been shown, that is a reflection of the ambiguity of the intent itself. Parents were to be involved in the development of the project in some way, but the place of that involvement (district level and/or school level) was never satisfactorily resolved. Even more important, parents' expected roles in the development of the project were never collectively determined but only finally determined by individual principals in the latter half of the project. As discussed earlier, that parental involvement was characterized by the token form of participation.[36]

Throughout most of the PAC's, some parents did indeed have the opportunity to hear about the ESP and, in many, to be heard. But there was no provision to insure that their views would be heeded by the district unless parents themselves created that provision, as described in the partnership form of the PAC. But that partnership provided evidence that a capacity for participation existed in the community; and that when school personnel and parents openly approached school affairs from a problem orientation, sustained and broad participation was possible. But the partnership PAC was to be an exception. Overall, parents were allowed little scope for participation other than to support ongoing activities. Participation in the ESP bore a marked resemblance to that existing prior to ESP. Parents participating in the PAC's did obtain more systematic reviews of school practice, but this was hardly the reorientation envisioned by project planners.

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[34] D. F. Eixenberger, Fieldnotes, School board meetings, March 9, 1976.

[35] D. F. Eixenberger, and J. Crist-Whitzel, "Parents and Schools: An Examination of Consensus, Perceptions of Quality and Involvement," NWREL, January 1976.

[36] Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," pp. 216-224; see footnote 8 (p. 119) of this chapter.

CHAPTER VI

CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION

CHAPTER VI. CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION

This chapter concerns curricular and instructional endeavors of the Jefferson ESP. During the course of the ESP, individualization of instruction became the primary curricular emphasis. Individualization was implemented mainly on the elementary (K-6) level, especially in the mathematics and communications streams, and particularly in grades 3 through 6. The secondary (7-12) level applied its energies primarily to developing and implementing programs in the personal development and career education streams.[1]

Due to the nature of the district's approach to curriculum and instruction, this chapter is organized according to a topical outline rather than the chronological approach of Chapters II and III or the developmental approach of Chapters IV, V, and VII. A brief introduction to the teaching and administrative staff of the district and to the instructional emphases of the J ESP is followed by an analysis of the status of curriculum supervision and inservice training in the district during the ESP. A description of the character of program implementation sets the scene for an analysis of individualized instruction, the two district-developed instructional management systems, and activities in the career education and personal development streams. This chapter concludes with a review of student outcome studies conducted by NWREL during the ESP. This chapter is based on observations of district meetings, observations of classroom instruction, extensive interviews and surveys of district personnel, and results of student outcome studies, and document analyses.

A. The Setting

The Jefferson School District had a stable and homogeneous teaching and administrative population (see Chapter I). There is no indication that teachers or principals were dissatisfied with existing educational conditions in Jefferson or that any of them had advocated any major changes in the patterns of curriculum and instruction in the district prior to the ESP. Although, as reported in Chapter V, there were some isolated incidents of community discontentment with the district prior to 1971, there is no indication that the community was generally dissatisfied with the curricular or instructional practices of the district prior to the ESP. In fact, as recounted in Chapters I and V, the district's electorate has been very supportive of district levy requests, even though it has one of the lowest property valuations of any first-class school district in the state.

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[1] The district defined a program stream as a grouping of courses or program activities which have similar goals, objectives, and curriculum delivery procedures. The six program streams during the J ESP were mathematics, communications, social studies, scientific, career education, and personal development. According to the district, personal development involved those program activities which prepare a student to make use of a greater amount of leisure time and included sports, hobbies, arts and crafts, and fine arts. Career education was defined as those program activities which are designed to help prepare a student to take his or her place in "the work day society which now exists." JSD, "Experimental Schools Project," [final draft of second 30 months plan], [April 1973], pp. 41, 55, and 58.

As the original appointees to such positions, the two central office administrators responsible for the supervison of curriculum and instruction had developed their own operating procedures over the 12 to 15 years prior to the ESP. The director of elementary education usually had appointed a committee representative of each elementary school in the district to listen to the the sales representatives of various publishers and to recommend the districtwide curricular adoption that came due in each major subject area every five years. When she resigned at the close of the fourth year of the ESP, after 27 years of service to the district, her position was not filled. Instead, during the fifth year of the ESP each elementary principal was made responsible for the coordination of a curricular subject or program stream on the elementary level. The director of secondary education had been divested of all budgetary discretion about five years before the ESP, soon after the present superintendent was appointed. His five secondary subject-matter curriculum coordinators were returned to the classroom on a full-time basis in order to facilitate a greater level of building autonomy on the secondary level (in this case, the removal from each building of the influence of "outside" personnel). Since then he has had virtually no control of funds and has worked solely in separate monthly meetings with the leaders of the various departments of each secondary school.

The major new thrust in the district in the area of curriculum and instruction prior to the ESP was the awarding of funds for six projects, generally state-administered federal title programs. The impetus for these grants was provided by the superintendent whose grantsmanship experience had been a significant factor in his appointment (see Chapter I). In the proposal writing and implementation stages, the superintendent worked directly with the building principals responsible for these programs. The curriculum supervisors generally were not involved in planning or administering these grants.

These programs included the following:

- Project Promise, a Title III program implemented at the west-side junior high school in 1967, which provided for use of a 90-student electronic response system in science, mathematics, health, and geography studies.

- Differentiated Staffing, a Title V program begun in four JSD schools in 1969, designed to recruit non-education majors and train them for work on a differentiated teaching staff

- Project Skill, a Title III program begun in 1969 and designed to provide large group, individualized mathematics instruction at one east-side elementary school through the use of the IPI (Individually Prescribed Instruction) program

- Project Diagnostic Teaching Systems, a Title VI program implemented in 1970 at the east-side junior high school and designed to integrate academically-deficient students into regular classrooms and make the resource room teacher available to all students

- Interdisciplinary Vocational Education Program, a Title III program inplemented at the east-side senior high school in 1970 and designed to integrate the instruction of vocational students and provide learning activity packages through which each student could progress at his or her own rate

- International Education Program, a state gifted program, funnelled through the west-side senior high school, which provided travel-study experience for students to Italy (1970) and Mexico (1971).

Two of these programs, Projects Promise and Skill, are exemplary of all six as precursors to aspects of the ESP. (See Chapter III for a review of the various components of the J ESP.) Project Promise (Programming Resources to Operate Model Instructional Systems in Education) had several main thrusts that seemed to foreshadow the ESP; in fact, the ESP was originally referred to as "Project Promise: Phase Two." Those thrusts were:

- Students were to be regrouped every six weeks according to their progress

- Instructional time was to be divided so that one-half of the time would be spent in large group instruction, one-fourth in small groups, and one-fourth in independent study

- Student evaluation was to be done through electronic data analysis and small group feedback

- Teacher and program evaluation was to feature the use of video-taping, followed by analysis involving a team comprised of the teacher, the principal, and a learning theorist.

- Two periods a day were to be given to curriculum development, making use of an ad hoc staff and a micro-teaching process.[2]

Project Skill (Skill Development through Individual Learning Levels) had five main objectives:

- Individualized mathematics teaching using Individually Prescribed Instruction (IPI) materials in a resource center was to replace self-contained programs.
- Student achievement and attitudes were to be improved.
- Scheduling efficiencies involving the use of a differentiated staff were to increase teacher time in small group situations.
- Teacher attitudes toward mathematics teaching were to be improved.
- Better mathematics teaching materials with predictable outcomes were to be provided at current costs or less.[3]

As established in Chapter III, the ESP was conceptualized and planned primarily by the superintendent. His five-year tenure at the beginning of the project was not short when compared to national statistics. As an outside appointee, however, and with less tenure than other district administrators, he tended to be perceived as a newcomer.[4]

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[2] Intermediate District No. XI, "Project Promise: Programming Resources to Operate Model Instructional Systems in Education," Title III, 89-10 Application, January 15, 1967.

[3] Jefferson School District, "Project Skill: Skill Development in Intermediate Education through Individual Learning Levels," Title III, 89-10 Application, January 15, 1969.

[4] The superintendent fits almost all of Carlson's characteristics of a "career-bound superintendent" except the reception of a mandate for change from the J Board of Directors when he was appointed. According to Carlson, career-bound superintendents are chosen from outside the school district, tend to alter what exists, at least to some degree, and are likely to sponsor the adoption of educational innovations. R. O. Carlson, *School Superintendents: Careers and Performance*, Merrill, Columbus, Ohio, 1972.

The ESP became the bonanza in a series of successful grant applications motivated by the new superintendent. This approach helped alleviate the financial stress under which the district was forced to operate. However, as a result, the district became reliant on this type of funding in order to maintain its services.

B. ESP Instructional Emphases

The first 30 month ESP proposal was vague with respect to curriculum and instruction.[5] The central theme was expressed in general terms and, as a virtual appendix to the final draft of the original proposal, was not articulated in such a way as to unite the various components into an integrated whole. Only general curricular or instructional operations were mandated by the stated student needs of success, active participation in the learning process, development of real responsibility, positive self-image, school programs focused on student interests, preparation for an unknown future, and development of idealism. Success was defined as being at grade level or completing academic requirements early. Active participation in the learning process meant assignment to at least one small class per day and the development of individualized and independent study programs. Real responsibility would be developed through work experience at all grade levels. A positive self-image, defined as a sense of dignity, pride, identity, and self-confidence and a willingness to meet challenging situations, would be facilitated by competition with one's self and one-to-one pupil-teacher relationships. Fifth day, Interim, summer month curricula, and interdisciplinary technical programs were the school programs that would focus on student interests. Preparation for an unknown future meant preparation for shorter, high performance work weeks, constructive use of leisure time, and learning relevant thinking skills. And the development of idealism meant intra-school activities and a realistic approach to non-materialistic values.[6]

Buildings were allowed wide latitude in their interpretation of the ESP objectives. In addition, each building was given virtually unlimited discretion as to which programs it would select in order to reach its interpretation of the project's goals. Money doled out according to an equity formula based on full-time equivalent enrollment, rather than on building needs or potential for goal accomplishment.[7]

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[5] See Chapter III for a full discussion of the proposal.

[6] JSD, "Experimental Schools, Jefferson," [final draft of the first 30 month proposal], pp. 3-5. See also Appendix C.

[7] The fiscal nature of the J ESP is discussed in Chapter IV.

Although the district's revised ESP proposal was accepted in Washington, D.C., it provided few specific ideas regarding how it would be operationalized in the district. In retrospect, it seems that neither OE/NIE nor the district expected agreement upon how the goals would be interpreted.[8]

In brief, over the course of the five years of the J ESP, the following emphases were discernible in the area of curriculum and instruction:

- The program of activities was more widely implemented across elementary schools (K-6) than across secondary schools (7-12).
- Individualization of instruction, especially in the mathematics and communications streams, was the primary ESP thrust on the elementary level.
- New programs were implemented across schools on the elementary level in the social studies and scientific streams.
- Programs were also implemented in the personal development stream on the elementary level.
- The primary ESP thrusts on the secondary level involved implementation of programs in the career education and personal development streams, the Interim being used primarily as a vehicle for the latter, some of which involved individualization of instruction.
- The secondary level implemented some individualization of mathematics instruction and also a small amount of individualization in the communications and scientific streams.
- In general, the selection of programs and their degree of use were decided independently by each building.

The remainder of this chapter will describe and analyze the entries on this list.

Similar to some of the current literature on educational innovation, this list indicates that the district was implementing a set of innovations that were occurring simultaneously across the country. Havelock conducted a nationwide survey of a sample of the school district superintendents to determine the feasibility of obtaining periodic information on existing dissemination and utilization networks for educational innovations. Havelock found that "individualized instruction and team teaching" was the type of innovation cited most frequently as the "most significant" district innovation ("showcase innovation") during the school year prior to the beginning of the J ESP (1970-71), especially by school districts of less than 80,000 students. The two phenomena (individualized instruction and team teaching) were generally reported as integral aspects of a single innovation and were often part of a broader innovative effort that ranged from individualized instruction in one course in one grade to more comprehensive innovations involving the implementation of an open-space classroom or school or the introduction of multi-age, ungraded, or continuous-progress concepts. Individualized instruction and team teaching innovations were almost always directed at the elementary grades and, when reported as being applied to specific curriculum areas, reading and mathematics were the most commonly mentioned. Career-oriented curriculum areas were also well represented.[9]

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[8] Developmental Associates described a similar situation in an evaluation of exemplary vocational projects performed between February and May 1974. "Executive Summary" of the Final Report on the evaluation of exemplary vocational projects, part D, Vocational Education Act Amendments of 1968, Contract No. OEC-0-73-6663, Development Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C., March 1975, p. 6.

Havelock also found the elementary level to be more active than the secondary level in the implementation of showcase innovations.[10] In another exploratory analysis of a survey of a nationwide sample of 293 change agent projects funded by four federal education programs, the Rand Corporation found that elementary school projects were more effectively implemented than junior or senior high school projects and were more likely to produce teacher change.[11] Such differentiated rates of adoption between the elementary and secondary levels have been observed at other ESP sites also.[12] In an analysis of a 1969 questionnaire administered under the supervision of Robert Havighurst to 670 secondary school principals in cities with a population of over 300,000, Nelson and Sieber reported that continuous progress (students within the course work at their own pace through predesigned units of study including various materials) was rated by a panel of nine secondary education experts as the most educationally worthy of 14 innovations with high consensus, but they found that it was being implemented in only 19 percent of the approximately 550 schools responding to the questionnaire.[13]

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[9] R. G. Havelock, et al., Educational Innovation in the United States, Volume I: The National Survey: The Substance and the Process, submitted to the National Institute of Education pursuant to Contract No. OEG-0-70-4296 (508), Center for Research on Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 1973, pp. 11, 13, 15, 27, 29, 30, 50, and 69. (ED 091 865)

[10] Ibid., pp. 15 and 69.

[11] P. Berman and E. W. Pauly, Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Volume II: Factors Affecting Change Agent Projects, submitted to the United States Office of Education pursuant to Contract No. HEW-OS-73-216, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, April 1975, p. 65.

[12] R. T. Coward, R. A. Mullens, and R. J. Winters, "Rates of Innovation Adoption: A Cultural Perspective on Secondary Schools," paper presented at the fifth annual conference of the Rocky Mountain Educational Research Association, Albuquerque, New Mexico, October 30 through November 1, 1974.

C. Curriculum Supervision

The ESP provided no explicit mandate for the two curriculum supervisors of the district to change the modes of operation by which they had worked during the 12 to 15 years prior to the ESP. Thus, both supervisors tended to conduct their affairs in the manner that past practice and the various intervening district events and policies had determined. Lacking communication between the two supervisors, emphasis on K-12 articulation was lacking also. However, the ESP made more money available than ever before to expend on either more quantity or higher quality of curricular or instructional materials.

Without the assistance of subject-matter curriculum coordinators, the director of program development and secondary curriculum delegated responsibilities for curriculum development, concomitant training, and the resultant instruction to interested secondary departments or teachers. The stated rationale for this approach on the secondary level was:

> The C.D.P. [Curriculum Development Project] will be developed by the teacher-team as the most appropriate and useful resource for this purpose.... The teachers represent expertise: (1) they are subject matter specialists; (2) they know available text and supplemental materials; (3) they will be using in the classroom firing-line the curriculum they have developed.[14]

The director of training and elementary curriculum relied on several consultants, the sales representatives of the various publishers with whom she had come into contact, and the curriculum committees chosen to represent each of the nine elementary schools in the district. The director of training and elementary curriculum also spearheaded the development of management systems for mathematics and communications instruction on the elementary level, although this had not been an original objective of the ESP. A later section of this chapter will discuss the development and utilization of these two district-developed management systems.

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[13] M. Nelson and S. D. Sieber, "Innovations in Urban Secondary Schools," School Review, 84:2 (February 1976), pp. 213-231.

[14] "ESP Proposal--1973-74," Social Studies Department, School 4, [1974].

As the superintendent had circumvented the roles of the curriculum supervisors prior to the ESP by going directly to principals for the administration of innovative projects, he made each building responsible for its own program during the ESP. The building principals responded with idiosyncratic programs that mixed an implicit set of perceived building needs and goals with the rather general, idealistic needs and goals of the ESP proposal. To bring some order to this process during the preparation of the second 30 month plan, the ESP disseminator was assigned to match building programs with specific project objectives.[15] Shunning responsibility for any endeavor that involved districtwide policy implications, each principal worked mainly to protect the autonomy of his own building's operations (see Chapter IV).

D. Inservice Training, Including Curriculum Development

The inservice training sponsored by the district during the ESP involved scheduling publishers' representatives to give presentations, providing specific training to facilitate use of the instructional materials purchased or developed with ESP funds, and publicizing specialized courses offered under the sponsorship of area colleges or universities that teachers could elect to take. The district had sponsored such activities before the ESP. Much training also was provided within individual elementary schools and secondary departments in preparation for implementing specific instructional programs. For example, between May of 1971 and November of 1973 (the first 30 months of the ESP) the district listed 54 training activities that had been conducted.[16] Thirty-six (67 percent) of these activities involved workshops for specific programs or subjects; 30 of the 36 activities were conducted for elementary level personnel.

The district gave little attention to orientation or training sessions that assisted district personnel to identify what was legitimately encompassed by the project or to facilitate their use of the ESP's potential. On only a few occasions was ESP training directed to the more comprehensive instructional goals of the project such as diagnostic teaching procedures, the process of curriculum development, or the development, scheduling, and management of alternative programs. District documents and NWREL observations record no training emphases on the psychological inputs for and expected outcomes of the promotion of student success, real responsibility, positive self-image, or idealism or on the definition of the type of individualization or programmatic alternatives that would satisfy district needs and goals. Cooperation with the two local universities in training was not operationalized as stated in the ESP proposal.[17]

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[15] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Conversation with ESP disseminator, 2/19/73.

[16] JSD, "Experimental Schools Project Final [Narrative] Report," May 1971-November 1973, pp. 18-21.

Instead, the training activities sponsored by the ESP generally focused on short-term, sometimes cursory introductions to the hard- and software purchased with ESP funds. Some training activities involved multiple sessions and rigorous instruction. Some inservice courses, under the sponsorship of local colleges or universities, involved some district teachers in the study of topics related to the needs and goal statements of the ESP proposal.

If the district had approached its ESP from the viewpoint of problem solving (as discussed in Chapter IV), the nature of the problem to be solved and the necessary changes to be made probably would have determined the nature and scope of ESP training. Lacking the delineation of such a problem or issue in the central theme of the project, the training "program" was an accumulation of discrete endeavors aimed primarily at introducing users to curricular programs or instructional materials purchased with ESP funds. The district did not have a coordinated effort to operationalize the ideas that the superintendent had written into the ESP proposal. The training program on the secondary level was muted by the allocation of money from the training budget primarily to individuals or groups of teachers for the development of course syllabi, especially for Interim offerings.

On the elementary level, where most of the training efforts occurred, the director of training and elementary curriculum once remarked that the principals preferred to buy hardware and remodeling for their buildings rather than invest much money in staff training.[18] She also considered the principals' lack of "sophisiticated skills" for training their teachers as one of the district's "biggest gaps and needs."[19] Following earlier statements on the issue,[20] a principal of one elementary school reported:

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[17] F. Mulhauser, with D. R. Pierce and W. Doyle, "School-University Relations in the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project: A Two-Year Review," NWREL, March 1974.

[18] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Conversation with director of training and elementary curriculum, 11/20/72.

[19] R. M. Toepper, Fieldnotes, Interview with the director of training and elementary curriculum on the Jefferson Communications Goals System, (JCGS), 1/25/75.

[20] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Secondary and elementary principals' meeting, 2/29/72.

> In my opinion the most exceptional deterrent to success in the program at our [IGE] school has been the lack of training in the methods being used, and lack of personnel to set up the programs and furnish leadership in them. I feel the staff should have had more training in communications skills before starting this program in the Fall of 1971. Also one person should have been freed from regular duties to spend at least a half day with [each] new discipline being introduced.[21]

According to a critique of the district's second 30 month proposal (which also included a site visit), the district's training program was considered

> ...an amalgam of uncoordinated efforts lacking integration accompanied by budgets designed primarily to consume an estimated sum alloted for training rather than to meet the needs of the actual training programs themselves. It is obvious that a careful analysis of training needs was not carried out.[22]

Another critique also cited the need for coordination of the district's training program.[23]

The following rationale can be reconstructed to explain the evolution of the district's approach to training. Although the district originally intended to rely up on the personnel of the two local universities for staff retraining for all project components, during the course of the ESP it began to consider its own personnel as the best sources of expertise in the areas of curriculum development and training. It reasoned that building personnel were best qualified to decide what instructional strategies were appropriate for their own students. Then they would either purchase or develop a program to fit those needs. If a program was purchased, they would rely on the company representatives to provide the training that was necessary and carry on from there. If district personnel developed the program, the developers would train their colleagues in its use. In either case, consultants were used sparingly. It was too easy for consultants to miss the point or to concentrate on too narrow a focus.

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[21] JSD, "Progress Report No. 5," November 1972.

[22] A. M. Gallegos, "Critique of the Jefferson School District Continuation Proposal," received by National Institute of Education, April 30, 1973, p. 10.

[23] P. C. Kennedy, "Experimental Schools Project, Jefferson School District, Critique of Program," April 27, 1973, p. 3.

For example, in a statement to the ESP Cabinet at the end of the third year of the ESP, the director of program development and secondary curriculum summarized secondary curriculum development "activities to date":

> With the implementation of the ESP the Secondary staff was dismayed with the paucity or complete absence of programmed materials on the market. This was in contrast to the Elementary Curriculum for which some excellent materials were available, i.e., MACOS, IPI, Criterion Read [sic], etc., although the programs were not limitless.
>
> In consequence the staff was forced to look to themselves to create those programs (excepting OV [Occupational Versatility]) appropriate to the dimensions of ESP. This has now proved to be a blessing rather than a curse. Many of the secondary teachers, along with the respective administrators, are extremely capable of producing and implementing programs that meet student needs.
>
> ESP fostered from the beginning the emphasis of a quality teacher, and then a quality program. If you would see a good ESP project in the secondary today, you would see also a classy teacher.
>
> We have continued meeting in secondary sessions to utilize the skills of department heads to meet ESP. (It is ironic that now good-expensive secondary programs are becoming commercially accessible, and no money is available).[24]

By the middle of the fourth year of the ESP, the director of training and elementary curriculum was making similar statements. An entry in the district newsletter to employees, summarizing one statement made by her during a Program Cabinet meeting with a two-man visitation team from NIE, stated that:

> We learned the lesson that there are few places (other than some commercial publishers and an occasional national project) where teachers can turn for curriculum help. We have learned that we must look to ourselves for curriculum development.[25]

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[24] Director of Program Development and Secondary Curriculum, "Progress Report, Secondary," attached to Program Cabinet, minutes of June 11, 1974 meeting, [pp. 3-4].

[25] Internal district newsletter, February 14, 1975, [p. 1].

A summary of the discussion of that meeting circulated by the district disseminator added that the director of training and elementary curriculum said: "It was a bit of a shock, but it was good for us."[26]

The scholars who have studied teaching and educational innovation advocate a different approach. Although they place teachers at the center of instructional innovations, they do not expect teachers to operationalize distinctively new patterns of instruction by themselves. Rather, they feel that instructional innovations demand intensive training programs.

According to Jackson in Life In Classrooms, elementary teachers tend to shun elaborate ideas. Rarely, if ever, do they turn to evidence beyond their own personal experiences to justify their professional preferences. In addition, Jackson found that they tend to accept the status quo regarding educational conditions. Their interest in educational change is usually mild and typically restricted to ideas about physical room arrangements or regrouping of students.[27] According to Brickell, "Teachers are not change-agents for innovations of major scope. Even when free to guide their own activities, teachers seldom suggest distinctively new types of working patterns for themselves."[28] Thus, teachers, on their own, are not prone to advocate highly creative or demanding innovations.[29]

But according to House, teachers are key personnel in educational innovations involving classroom instruction, "household" innovations, as he called them:

> The burden of innovation must inevitable fall on the teacher. The teacher must implement the innovation and learn the new skills that are required. Depending on how different the innovation is, the burden can be costly indeed, and benefits seldom approach costs....In any case, innovation can be

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[26] "Special Cabinet Meeting February 12, 1975, Visit of NIE Review Team, A Summary of Questions and Discussions," [p. 1].

[27] P. W. Jackson, Life in Classrooms, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York, 1968, pp. 144-148.

[28] H. M. Brickell, "State Organization for Educational Change: A Case Study and a Proposal," in M. B. Miles (ed.), Innovations in Education, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1964, p. 503.

[29] See D. C. Lortie, Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975, pp. 181-184.

> realized only through the changing work skills of the teaching work force, or it cannot be realized at all.[30]

However, certain obstacles have been identified that hinder the operationalization of educational innovations. For instance, Gross, Giacquinta, and Bernstein report that teachers' lack of clarity about the new role model implied by an innovation and their lack of skills and knowledge required to carry out an innovation were two barriers that may be encountered by members of organizations in their efforts to carry out innovations.[31] Havelock states that confusion and lack of information about innovation, unwillingness to change or listen to new ideas, frustration or difficulty in trying to adapt, and lack of communication among staff are barriers during the "showcase innovation" process.[32]

Thus, according to the scholars, innovations in teaching demand intensive teacher-training programs. Brickell states that

> the most successful innovations were those which were accompanied by the most elaborate help to teachers as they began to provide the new instruction. Whereas initial faculty reaction to the proposed change was not critical in determining its success, the amount of help provided was critical.[33]

Because changes of fundamental order demand understanding and support, Nachtigal advocates that staff, students, parents, and community must be part of a long-range process that prepares the way for serious rethinking about school functions. According to Nachtigal, innovations are more likely to be implemented if their overall significance is conceptualized and conveyed to the individuals who will be responsible for implementing them.[34] Summarizing the experience of the Ford Foundation's Comprehensive School Improvement Program, Nachtigal states that

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[30] E. R. House, The Politics of Education Innovation, McCutchan, Berkely, California, 1974, p. 171.

[31] N. Gross, J. B. Giacquinta, and M. Bernstein, Implementing Organizational Innovations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change, Basic Books, New York, 1971, pp. 122-135 and 196-197.

[32] Havelock, The National Survey, p. 178.

[33] Ibid., Brickell, "State Organization for Educational Change."

[34] Nachtigal, A Foundation Goes to School, pp. 25-39.

> Without systematic teacher preparation,...usage [of new curricula and equipment] tends to be superficial, sporadic, and ephemeral, ignoring the potential for significant improvement in the teaching-learning process.[35]

Havelock emphasizes that "the involvement of various individuals and groups in the innovation process is viewed [by superintendents in his national survey] as the most significant procedure to employ in securing the success of an innovation." Havelock also reports that training of school personnel was highly rated by all districts as a key factor in the innovation process.[36] Lortie, on the other hand, states that "'In-service training' in American public schools rarely rises above a superficial level...."[37]

Despite what the scholars say, "innovative" school districts seem to operate in much the same manner as the J ESP. In a Rand Corporation report synthesizing the findings from 29 exploratory case studies of federally funded change agent programs, performed in parallel with a nationwide survey of 293 such projects that were in their last or next to last year of funding during the 1973-74 school year, Greenwood, Mann, and McLaughlin report that

> In general, the more training of whatever form...the better. However, we found that the benefits of training were conditioned by the content of the training program and by the characteristics of the training staff. In all of the projects where training was important--teachers strongly preferred very concrete, "how-to-do-it" work shops...given by local personnel. The most smoothly implemented projects were fortunate to have in their project director...or in district resource personnel...people who knew what they were doing, understood what potential problems might arise, and had the experience to make specific suggestions to help teachers improve their performance. Conversely, participants felt that outside consultants performing a similar technical assistance role were almost always ineffective and disappointing....On the whole, personnel in the projects we

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[35] Ibid., p. 25.

[36] Havelock, The National Survey, pp. 169 and 178.

[37] Lortie, Schoolteacher, pp. 233-234.

> visited believed that outside experts could not understand their particular problems and were unable to give practical advice.[38]

In the area of curriculum development, Greenwood, Mann, and McLaughlin found that

> Local staff helped to develop project materials in many projects we visited; this activity appeared to make an important contribution to the effective implementation of change agent projects. This was particularly evident in the classroom organization projects, which were highly complex, inherently difficult to implement, and based on no prior, well-specified model of project treatment, however, even in less complex projects, the benefit of teacher participation in materials development was apparent. Development activities ranged from a careful assessment to existing products or technologies, which were then repackaged into a form which reflected local interests and needs, to activities which, beginning from scratch, produced a wide range of project materials.[39]

In an analysis of the Ford Foundation's $30+ million Comprehensive School Improvement Program (CSIP) of the 1960's, Nachtigal states that

> Many new curricula did find permanent homes in CSIP schools....However, the new curricula that require a significant outlay of funds or basic changes in teacher behavior... are less likely to be continued.
>
> But despite the packaged curriculum movements, widespread commitment to develop curriculum within each project required a heavy investment of teacher time. Under the rationale of local uniqueness, project teachers almost universally felt the need to create their own materials....It...is not known precisely whether teachers were simply unaware of recent curriculum units that were readily available or whether they were conditioned to resist the so-called "teacher proof" units regardless of their quality and availability.

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[38] P. W. Greenwood, D. Mann, and M. W. McLaughlin, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Volume III: The Process of Change*, Santa Monica, California, The Rand Corporation, submitted to the United States Office of Education pursuant to Contract No. HEW-OS-73-216, April 1975, p. 33.

[39] Ibid., p. 34.

> In many instances, the overproduction of inadequate curriculum units at the local level was not the fault of the individual projects. Rather, the projects were doing what they had been funded to do. The Foundation itself had underestimated the difficulties in producing new curriculum units. As we now know, partly from that experience, any significant process for curriculum development must meet a number of demands: scholarly input to assure intellectual rigor; expertise in learning theory and child development to support methodologies; extensive testing, evaluation, and revision; programs for teacher-training; and procedures for dissemination. Within CSIP, few curriculum development activites attempted to move to the cutting edge of the discipline or to experiment on learning theory and child development. Materials were put into use too quickly to allow for adequate testing and revision; and most materials generally were not used by anyone other than the teachers who created them.... New materials can provide greater variety, but, without strong scholarly grounding, they do not necessarily foster new learning. Without broad dissemination, impact is minimal in terms of time and money invested. In terms of both cost and student-teacher learning, the adoption of professionally developed curricula produced a more substantive change than in-house curriculum development.[40]

E. Program Implementation

1. The ESP in General

Although some unique programs were developed by the district, the primary means chosen for the implementation of ESP objectives in the area of curriculum and instruction was use of programs that had "been piloted over the past five years [prior to the ESP]...in the Jefferson district, some in adjacent or nearby districts, others in districts in other parts of the country."[41] While some of these materials were used across schools, the common pattern was individual school adoption of materials for use in that school.

Building autonomy is very important in understanding the form the project assumed in the area of curriculum and instruction. The best description of building autonomy is found in the district's original draft in its second 30 month ESP plan, titled "A Simplistic Design":

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[40] Nachtigal, A Foundation Goes to School, p. 21.

[41] JSD, "Experimental Schools, Jefferson," [final draft of the original ESP proposal], p. 11.

> Jefferson District is a poor district when measured by the amount spent per student, but because of the lack of an intervening bureaucracy, most of the funding goes directly to the classrooms instead of through the funneling process of the central office. Features of this design include:
>
> The allowing of each principal to be his own purchasing agent, to write his own purchase orders, to determine his own programs subject to approval of the CONSOLAP [short for Consolidated Application and for all practical purposes: an east-side cabinet] or the Experimental Schools Cabinet, which is made up of his own peers...
>
> The deciding of what materials, what equipment, what contractual services, should be bought is left to the school principal, not to a central office administrator or school board member. Because of their freedom to choose and establish priorities, most Jefferson Schools are significantly better equipped than typical districts [sic] of their size and wealth.[42]

Capitalizing on the funds that could be allocated, each building developed a program based on its staff's perceptions of local needs, taking care to couch those needs in terms that approximated the district objectives prescribed for the ESP.[43] According to an NIE-commissioned review panelist's critique of the district's second 30 month funding plan cited earlier,

> ...As in the first 30 months, the district is requesting funds to allow the superintendent, principals, and curriculum coordinators to "buy" whatever sounds interesting and exciting to them. Unfortunately, the total package is a composite of individual desires rather than a coordinated district-wide program based on commonality of needs and purposes.[44]

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[42] JSD, "Experimental Schools Project: To Provide an Appropriate Education Environment for Each Individual Student in the Jefferson Schools." An application to the National Institute for [sic] Education for an extension of funding for Jefferson School District , [original draft of second 30 months plan], submitted by the Board of Education and superintendent, [no date].

[43] R. M. Toepper, "A Study of Curricular Decision Making in the Jefferson School District Experimental Schools Project," NWREL, December 1975.

[44] Gallegos, "Critique of the Jefferson School District Continuation Proposal," p. 3.

The superintendent facilitated the growth of building autonomy in the district. Prior to the ESP, the tight budget of the district limited the discretionary powers of each building. However, the ESP greatly enhanced the autonomy of each of the 13 district schools, especially in matters pertaining to curriculum and instruction. While such autonomy was granted to the secondary schools soon after the superintendent's appointment in the district, the ESP was a primary force in facilitating the growth of greater discretionary powers in the elementary buildings.

In a description of curriculum and instruction, the district stated that "the heart of ESP is the individual school. Each principal and his staff builds its own approach, its own way of reaching each child."[45] Therefore, "it is not to be assumed that the same programs are offered in each school in the district. On the contrary, each school has the freedom to select those programs it decides will allow it to best accomplish the objectives."[46] Even the description of individualized instruction, which came to be the central curricular focus of the J ESP, was couched in terms of building autonomy:

> Perhaps the most obvious, and the most frequent, series of alternatives is found in individualized instruction. Here a wide choice of methods, processes, materials and equipment provides many different ways for a teacher to help a child learn....For example, each school attempts to provide a number of different programs in each subject area. These programs provide a variety of software, equipment such as tape recorders or language masters, and provisions for a child to work by himself or as part of a group.[47]

However, the combination of building autonomy and the adventitious character of administrative and training components resulted in coordination problems. The district's fourth quarterly progress report for the first 30 months of the ESP stated that

> Throughout the first year of the project, there has been difficulty coordinating efforts by the individual project schools toward the development of a clear, articulated program district-wide....Also needed is a model program

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[45] JSD, "Experimental Schools Project," 1972-73, p. 3.

[46] JSD, "Experimental Schools Project," [fall 1973], p. 3.

[47] Ibid., p. 4.

> for the individualization of instruction. Much of it is now being done piecemeal by individual schools.[48]

Two years later, the district's third quarterly progress report for the second 30 months of the ESP stated that

> There is developing an indication within the District that the ESP Project may be foundering somewhat due to a lack of leadership. While it is true that no "project director" exists in this District, but that a unique organization known as the Program Cabinet apparently has the authority of a "project director," there still remains no single source of authority for providing direction, leadership and control of the Experimental Schools Project. That lack may result in something less than the best results. Various components, including both buildings and support, appear to be conducting their own separate projects without the coordination necessary for the successful completion of the overall ESP project.[49]

However, 10 months later, an entry in the district newsletter to employees summarizing statements made by principals during a Program Cabinet meeting with a two-man visitation team from NIE, in an apparent contradiction to this outlook, stated that

> The success of ESP perhaps can be laid to the fact that each school made its own decisions about what it would do toward meeting the goals of the project. Though only a short planning time was available, no specific authority dictated what the schools and their teachers would do.[50]

The practical consequences of this manner of operation of the ESP did not surface until the fifth year of the project, when several curriculum committees began to discuss the lack of coordination of instruction in the curricular streams for which they were responsible. During the first semester of the fifth year of the ESP, the articulation of instruction from grade to grade and level to level and also between elementary schools was discussed in several meetings. However, the construction of a sixth grade mathematics exit examination was the only concrete outcome of these discussions. While this movement was motivated by the consequences of the manner by which the ESP operated, it was not the direct result of any specific ESP programmatic emphasis.

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[48] Superintendent and [ESP] Excutive Director, "Accomplishments and Problems: Jefferson Experimental School Program, April 1, 1972 to June 30, 1972," Progress Report No. 4, p. 15.

[49] Superintendent, Cabinet Chairman, and Staff Assistant, "Progress Report No. 3," April 1, 1974, p. 2. This report was somewhat controversial in the central office in that it was submitted to NIE before the superintendent had read it.

[50] Internal district newsletter, February 14, 1975, p. 1.

2. Elementary (K-6) Programs Funded by the ESP

a. Non-Individualized Programs. A myriad of instruction endeavors were carried on with ESP funds on the elementary level. A list of the more comprehensively adopted programs, excluding individualized materials, includes:

- Interim, a one-hour per day arts and crafts session for three consecutive weeks at one school and a half-day program of lifetime sports and arts and crafts sessions for two consecutive weeks at another school.
- Fifth day, which evolved from a full day per week program focused on the individual academic and interest needs of students into a one- to two-hour per week whole-class arts and crafts session in five schools.
- Arts and crafts, involving one or two hours of instruction per week, was put into operation in three schools.
- The Grace Nash music program, and expressive arts program emphasizing music for the total growth of every child and usable in the regular classroom, was implemented in all elementary schools by the music specialists during the fifth year of the ESP after two years of more limited use.
- The Pullman Physical Education Program, an integrated physical education program which provides each student with the apparatus necessary to participate in whole class learning activities at the same time, was implemented to various degrees in six schools.
- Elementary Science Study (ESS), a K through 9 science program consisting of 56 inductively oriented units of study which provide classroom resources of printed materials, films, equipment, and specimens aimed to encourage student inquiry, which district elementary teachers could order through a central storage and retrieval station located at one of the schools.

- Databank System, a supplementary K through 6 social studies program using a multi-media approach to facilitate student inquiry, was ordered for selected grade levels in four buildings.

- Map and Globe Skills Program, another supplementary elementary social studies program providing cassette lessons, raised relief maps and globes, and other teaching materials, was purchased by seven schools.

- Concepts and Values, a comprehensive K through 8 interdisciplinary social studies program in textbook format, classified in the district's social studies curriculum guide as the basic social studies curriculum in grades K through 4 and also in grade 6, was not widely implemented during the ESP.

- Man: A Course of Study (MACOS), the nationally controversial upper elementary social studies curriculum uses film as the primary source of data in the course to examine the concepts of life cycle, adaption, territoriality, parenthood, agression, natural selection, social behavior, and the character of humaness. MACOS was the basic fifth grade social studies curriculum implemented in virtually all fifth-grade classrooms during the course of the ESP.

- People and Technology (PAT), an intermediate grade social studies curriculum which integrates manipulative activities, case studies, and community exploration in the study of technology, was classified as an alternate basic sixth grade social studies curriculum in the district, but was used sporadically by the district's sixth grade teachers.

The latter five curricula are described and observations of instruction using four of them are analyzed in detail in a NWREL report on curriculum and instruction in the mathematics, communications, and social studies streams during the third year of the J ESP.[51] A sample of 45 elementary teachers was observed teaching social studies during four or five consecutive lessons each. In general, the 204 observed social studies lessons were taught in whole class groupings (66 percent of the time) using teacher-initiated interaction patterns (49 percent of the time) with knowledge as the primary cognitive outcome (in 73 percent of four discrete categories of lesson segments). Though the Concepts and Values, MACOS, and PAT curricula utilized whole class groupings and teacher-initiated interaction patterns to approximately the same degree as all social studies instruction,

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[51] R. B. Everhart, B. J. Hawley, J. M. McGeever, and R. M. Toepper, "Curriculum and Instruction in the Mathematics, Communications, and Social Studies Streams in the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project," NWREL, September 1974.

MACOS and PAT de-emphasized knowledge outcomes (56 percent of lesson segments) to allow the cognitive levels of comprehension and analysis to receive more emphasis. In very general terms, elementary social studies was observed to be taught in such a manner that students in a given class tended to use the same materials at the same time moving toward the same objectives at approximately the same rates.

In addition, our observations during the third year of the ESP indicated that 73 percent of the teachers in the mathematics stream sample, 67 percent of the teachers in the secondary communications stream sample, and 14 percent of the teachers in the elementary communications stream sample were using non-individualized instructional strategies. In general, our observations of the instruction of 162 teachers in 747 mathematics, communications, and social studies lessons in the JSD during the third year of the ESP showed that the basically self-contained classrooms that used essentially non-individualized instructional materials tended to be taught in whole class groupings (41 percent of the time) using teacher-initiated interaction patterns (50 percent of the time) with knowledge as the primary cognitive outcome (in 71 percent of the lesson segments). These findings tend to conform to the conventional wisdom and empirical research that says teacher talk of various forms tends to dominate the classroom,[52] generally meaning whole class groupings,[53] and the knowledge dimension tends to dominate the cognitive level of verbal interaction in the classroom.[54]

b. Individualized Programs. Individualization of instruction was the most pervasive ESP curricular and instructional emphasis implemented across district schools, especially the elementary schools. The following individualized instructional programs[55] were implemented on the elementary level during the course of the ESP:

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[52] For example, see R. Dreeben, "The School as a Workplace," in R. M. W. Travers (ed.), Second Handbook of Research on Teaching, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1973, pp. 464-466; J. I. Goodlad, M. F. Klein, et al., Looking Behind the Classroom Door, Charles A. Jones, Worthington, Ohio, 1974, p. 51; R. S. Adams and B. J. Biddle, Realities of Teaching: Exploring with Video Tape, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1970, p. 38; and N. A. Flanders, Teacher Influence, Pupil Attitudes, and Achievement, Cooperative Research Monograph No. 12, Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D. C., 1965.

[53] See Dreeben, "The School as a Work Place," p. 465; H. Perkins, "A Procedure for Assessing the Classroom Behavior of Students and Teachers," American Educational Research Journal, 1:4 (November 1964), pp. 249-260; and Adams and Biddle, Realities of Teaching, p. 37.

[54] For example, see Goddland and Klein, Looking Behind the Classroom Door, p. 53, and R. N. Bush, "Curriculum-Proof Teachers: Who Does What to Whom," in L. J. Rubin (ed.), Improving In-Service Education: Proposals and Procedures for Change, Allyn and Bacon Inc., Boston, 1971, p. 48.

- Individually Guided Education (IGE). IGE is a strategy of organizing elementary schools into units of multi-age, non-graded student groupings staffed by a unit leader, several other teachers, and an instructional aide. It is designed to facilitate an environment whereby each student is educated according to his or her own style of learning, ability, and capability.[56] Three west-side elementary schools adopted this form of organization at the beginning of the project. Although all maintained aspects of the approach throughout the five years of the ESP, all three returned to aspects of their former, more traditional operations, especially during the fourth and fifth years of the ESP.

- Individually Prescribed Instruction (IPI). IPI Mathematics was implemented in one elementary school of the district through Project Skill, a Title III program begun in 1969 (two years prior to the ESP). In IPI, a student progresses from one skill to the next over a period of several years, using consumable materials. He or she first takes a comprehensive placement test and then repeats the cycle of pre-tests, skill sheets, and post-tests for each of the behavioral objectives on the IPI continuum. Teachers prescribe new lessons, while instructional assistants correct the work already completed. IPI generally includes grades 3 through 6. In the JSD, the east-side school that had piloted IPI Mathematics two years before the ESP also implemented IPI Reading and IPI Science during the course of the ESP; two west-side schools adopted IPI Mathematics and two west-side schools and one other east-side school implemented IPI Reading.

- The Jefferson Mathematics Management and Support System (JMMSS). The JMMSS is a correlation system aimed originally to facilitate inidividualization of instruction developed by district personnel that matches elementary mathematics instructional materials available in the district with a comprehensive list of objectives. The JMMSS also includes a set of pre- and post-tests. During the fourth year of the ESP, 46 percent of the elementary teachers of the district professed to be using the JMMSS, although only 24 percent professed to be using the JMMSS to individualize instruction.[57] (The JMMSS is further described in section C of this chapter.)

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[55] All of the following programs are described and/or analyzed in either Chapters IV and V of Everhart, et al., "Curriculum and Instruction in the J ESP" or in Chapter IV and VI of Toepper, "Curriculum Decision Making."

[56] The IGE mode of organization is described briefly in Chapter IV, pp. 96-97.

- Jefferson Communications Goals System (JCGS). The JCGS is also a correlation system developed by district personnel that matches elementary instructional materials available in the district with a comprehensive list of objectives aimed originally to facilitate individualization of instruction in the communications stream. The JCGS also includes a set of pre- and post-tests. During the fourth year of the ESP, 35 percent of the district's elementary teachers professed to be using the JCGS, but only 3 percent were judged to be using it to individualize instruction.[58] (The JCGS is further described in section G of this chapter.)

- Criterion Reading. Criterion Reading is a multi-level, K through 12 assessment and learning management system consisting of approximately 450 skills identified as necessary for reading and language competence, performance objectives for each of these skills, and diagnostic assessments designed to determine the individual student's level of mastery of each skill. Criterion Reading was purchased by four schools; however, it was implemented as a basic curricula in one west-side school in the intermediate grades and in one east-side school in the primary grades.

- Wisconsin Design for Reading Skill Development. Wisconsin Design is a K through 6 language arts and reading program featuring individualized diagnosis through testing for mastery and subsequent assignment to homogeneous skill groups for instruction. It was used extensively as the basic communications curriculum in one west-side IGE school and was also used in one east-side building in grades 5 and 6.

- The Hawaii English Program (HEP). HEP is a K through 6 language arts management system that utilizes a variety of materials through which each student progresses at his or her own rate. HEP was piloted at one east-side elementary school with ESP funds during the third year of the ESP and then funded for implementation at that school during the last two years of the ESP with ESP funds and federal Title III monies.

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[57] Toepper, "Curricular Decision Making," pp. 83-90.

[58] Ibid.

In addition, the ESP funded the purchase of various other materials to facilitate the individualization of mathematics and communications instruction. Among the more publicized materials were Continuous Progress in Spelling; Distar Reading and Mathematics; Holt, Rinehart and Winston's individualized mathematics curriculum; Science Research Associates' Reading Laboratory Series; Sullivan Reading; the Xerox Reading Laboratory; the Systems 80 mathematics and reading programs; and the Hoffman reading program, the latter two of which use teaching machines in the course of individualization of instruction. Section F of this chapter includes a description and analysis of the character and pervasiveness of the implementation of individualized instruction in the JSD during the course of the ESP.

3. Secondary (7-12) Programs Funded by the ESP

In terms of adopting policies or programs congruent with ESP objectives, the secondary level focused primarily on personal development and career education. Almost all the secondary schools either developed new programs or continued the implementation of earlier programs in the career education stream with ESP funds. Based on the experience of the west-side senior high school, which had implemented an Interim session when it opened the year prior to the ESP, and Interim experience was incorporated as part of the ESP. All four secondary schools implemented a two- to three-week Interim session either in January or May of each year. In addition, three elementary schools also implemented Interim programs, although only two retained the Interim until the end of the project. (Section H of this chapter deals more specifically with the career education and personal development streams.)

In general, interested secondary departments or individual teachers volunteered for extended contracts during the summers in order to engage in curriculum development activities. Most activities were carried on by individuals or small groups working to improve their course syllabi. Such activities were often carried on in preparation for the Interims.[59] The mathematics departments at all four secondary schools developed laboratories for individualized instruction. The west-side junior high school developed a program that involved about two-thirds of the students; the other three departments focused their math laboratories on remediation activities. District literature reported individualization in various secondary science courses. Three of the secondary schools implemented reading laboratories focused primarily on the Craig Individualized Reading Program. This program utilizes a workbook and a series of slides which are read on the variable-speed Craig Reading Machine. The English department at the east-side senior high school worked on a sophomore humanities program utilizing individualized instruction. The social studies departments of all four schools worked on general department goals and scope and sequence documents.

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[59] Superintendent and [ESP] Acting Executive Director, "Summer Curriculum Development," Procedures Paper A, June 2, 1971, pp. 3-5.

4. Drug, Environmental, and International Education

This report says very little about three of the original components of the J ESP: drug, environmental, and international education. Each of these components was deleted from the second 30 month plan at the insistence of the national ESP office. After several exchanges of correspondence, a letter from the national ESP project officer to the superintendent explained the government's rationale for discounting the funding of these three components during the second 30 months of the project:

> ...Please delete all monies from your proposed budget for these three areas.
>
> Drug Education: has expended $4039.43. The supporting document, "An Interim Proposal for Drug Education" makes no argument or rationale for expenditures of Experimental Schools funds. It is evident that this program suffered from a lack of leadership and planning. Based on the lack of progress to date and the lack of a plan for systematic development of a program, it is our position that any further focus on drug education by the project of federal funds is unwise. It is of course, a district decision as to whether drug education should be a focus of the district.
>
> Environmental Education: has expended $39,199.26. While there were a great many activities detailed, mostly in non-project schools, the development and implementation of a basic environmental program has not taken place. It appears as if the use of environmental programs or environmental materials has happened both randomly and infrequently. If the district wishes to pursue environmental education that is its choice. However, Experimental Schools funds can not be allowed for specific Environmental Education programs or for an environmental education thrust in the district.
>
> International Education: the information sent in support of this component give no rationale for continued funding by Experimental Schools. There is no rationale for the specific goals and objectives nor a consideration of alternative methods of reaching those goals. There is no evaluation data that indicates that the Hawaiian model is one that should be continued or as to why those specific sites should be used. It appears clear that these programs are operated in isolation to the rest of the school program and that leaders have minimum goals and evaluation beyond a travel experience that could not be accomplished through alternative methods. Consequently, while Experimental Schools commends the district for attempting a travel program, a monetary com-

> mitment must come from the district and not from Experimental Schools money.[60]

5. Recapitulation

Decisions regarding which curricular and instructional programs would be implemented with ESP funds were generally made on the building level. In most cases the decisions were of the variety: "Do we implement Program X or do we not?" rather than proposing a careful search for alternative solutions followed by a choice of the most viable approach. In addition, several purchases made on the elementary level were expected to be implemented by all nine elementary schools. Among the latter purchases were: the Elementary Science Study (ESS) program, which was financed by the four west-side elementary schools and stored at and distributed from one east-side school, and three social studies curricula: Man: A Course of Study (MACOS), People and Technology (PAT), and Concepts and Values. Of these only MACOS was widely used by the teachers for whose grade level it was appropriate.

In general, the lack of inter-unit coordination during the ESP and the concomitant emphasis on building autonomy tended to foster the variety of curricular implementations recounted above. The practical consequences of this manner of operating the ESP did not surface until the fifth year of the project when several teachers' committees began to discuss the articulation of instruction in the curricular streams for which they were responsible.

6. Implications for Program Evaluation

This manner of project governance also made difficult the task of organizing an evaluation program appropriate to the way in which the project was implemented. New treatments tended to be confounded either with pre-existing approaches or with other new programs purchased with ESP funds. Thus, the implementation of the project did not provide opportunities for so-called experimental treatments and their resultant outcomes to be studied in comparison with previous, other, or control treatments. The J ESP was not unique in this respect, however. According to a 1975 site review report sponsored by NIE which included visits to about half of the ESP school districts (not including the J ESP):

> We are generally in agreement that ESP is not in any sense experimental.... The program was not characterized in the first instance by a rigorous experimental design, nor is it characterized in the immediate as an example of implementation of an experimental design.[61]

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[60] NIE Project Officer, Letter to the superintendent, April 4, 1973.

[61] Doyle, "Final Report of the ESP Review Committee," NWREL, p. 14.

In addition, without the careful selection and analysis of experimental and control treatments or some delineation of the differences between ESP implementations in comparison with other programs, district decision makers lacked the empirical data upon which to determine if the programs should be phased out of the ESP or implemented more widely. Without such a clear delineation of treatment conditions, it became impossible to organize the budget evaluation or cost effectiveness systems that were rigorously emphasized in the district's ESP proposals (see Chapters III and IV).

The next three sections analyze three major aspects of ESP program implementation: individualized instruction, the two district-developed management systems, and the career education and personal development streams.

F. Individualization of Instruction

Although individualization of instruction was implemented at one elementary site two years prior to the ESP, individualization was not an operational goal of the district prior to the ESP.[62] Implementation of individualized instruction on a districtwide basis was stimulated by the ESP. In the first draft of its original ESP proposal, the district stated that it was

> committed to the traditional goal of achieving [illegible] individualized teaching in the context of modern mass education. The district believes that modern and curriculum technology coupled with [the] "will to realize this commitment," makes possible the reorganization of the school system and curricula...to accomplish this goal in a relatively short time span. This effort, applied as planned to an entire school district, represents the ultimate step that must be taken if it is to accomplish these goals. Thus, the plan described herein is exemplary and promises to provide a model for other districts in the future, a logical and feasible fulfillment of the promise afforded by the new technologies to accomplish an individualized program on a district-wide basis.[63]

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[62] Individualization of instruction is not mentioned in the district philosophy revision adopted by the J Board of Directors on July 8, 1970 (Policy 6120), approximately one year before the ESP began. Instead, the philosophy statement speaks of "tolerance for individuals and their ideas."

[63] [Original draft of the first 30 months proposal], pp. 31-32.

The district planned to individualize instruction "at all levels in at least reading and mathematics."[64] In its original ESP proposal, the district defined the concept of individualized education as embodying "diagnosis of learning problems on an individual basis, planning educational programs for individual students and non-graded arrangements on a systemwide K-12 basis."[65] At the beginning of the third year of the ESP, the district reported that "most individualization occurs in the basic skill subjects, such as reading and mathematics, but some exists in such subjects as science and shop."[66] By the end of the project, individualization had been most rigorously implemented in reading and mathematics on the intermediate (grades 3 or 4 through 6) level.

By emphasizing the implementation of individualized instructional programs, especially in the mathematics and communications streams and especially on the elementary level, the J ESP became part of a national trend. As introduced earlier, Havelock found that "individualized instruction and team teaching" was the type of innovation cited most frequently by school districts of less than 80,000 students, as the "most significant" district innovation ("showcase innovation") during the 1970-71 school year. According to Havelock, "Individualized instruction is probably one of the most complex and difficult innovation assignments educators have ever put to themselves. Nevertheless, this was the most popular innovation area in 1970-71." Havelock found that the individualized instruction and team teaching combination represented more mixed (positive and negative) consequences and encountered more barriers than any other innovation. Superintendents also were most guarded in recommending innovations of this type for adoption by other districts.[67]

The individualized programs developed or purchased by the JSD generally involved variation of the rate of student progress rather than variation of the means or materials to be used or variation in the goals expected to be accomplished by each student. As defined here, variation of rate means that the student can work through his or her assignments at his or her own speed and, in addition, may omit certain assignments by achieving a mastery level on related diagnostic tests. Thus, throughout this section, individualized instruction is defined as an instructional program whereby, after pre-testing, each student works at his or her own rate on objectives appropriate to accomplish his or her learning goals or to remedy his or her deficiencies, using materials correlated to those objectives; subsequently each student is post-tested and either goes on to the next objective or is recycled through a review of areas in which he or she is weak. With this style of individualization, each pupil tends to move through the same set of materials toward a common set of goals, but at different rates of accomplishment.

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[64] "Jefferson District now has 13 schools in I. I. Project," The Individualized Learning Letter, 2:18 (June 22, 1973), p. 3.

[65] [Final draft of the original ESP proposal], p. 12.

[66] JSD, "Experimental Schools Project," [fall 1973], p. 4.

[67] Havelock, et al., The National Survey, pp. 15, 23, 27, 30, and 178.

Variation of rate, rather than the more advanced levels of individualization of means and/or goals,[68] seems to define the present "state of art" of construction of individualized learning programs. The developers of IPI specifically decided to limit the program to "differentiation of rates" rather than "differences in interests and in other personal qualities."[69] According to Drumheller, "most attempts at individualized instruction using behavioral objectives thus far have focused upon giving each student the same program but letting each work at his own pace."[70]

Tucker, on the other hand, criticizes most of the commercially-prepared "individualized" programs for being "individually paced" rather than truly individualized.[71]

In our monitoring report documenting the general nature of curriculum and instruction in the district during the third year of the ESP, we found that individualized instruction had not been widely implemented, even in mathematics and communications instruction, and that the two district-developed management systems were not being used by the 36 elementary teachers on our random sample.[72] Our survey of 136 elementary teachers (99 percent) during the fourth year of the ESP found that 24 percent of the respondents reported that they used the mathematics management system to individualize mathematics instruction while only 3 percent responded that they used the communications management system to individualize communications instruction. However, approximately one quarter of the teachers reported that they used other individualized programs[73] for mathematics and/or communications instruction.

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[68] See L. M. Smith and P. M. Keith, *Anatomy of Educational Innovation: An Organizational Analysis of an Elementary School*, Wiley, New York, 1971, pp. 330-331, for a discussion of these terms.

[69] C. M. Lindvall (ed.), *Defining Educational Objectives*, report of the Regional Commission on Educational Coordination and the Learning Research and Development Center, Pittsburgh, Pa., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964, p. 4, in A. Oettinger and S. Marks, "Educational Technology: New Myths and Old Realities," *Harvard Educational Review*, 38:4 (fall 1968), 697-717.

[70] S. J. Drumheller, "Behavioral Objectives as Learning Inhibitors: A Dilemma and a Solution," *Educational Technology*, 14:10 (October, 1974), p. 18.

[71] B. T. Tucker, "A Vivisection of Individualization," *School and Community*, 59:5 (January 1973), p. 38.

[72] Everhart, et al., "Curriculum and Instruction in the J ESP."

[73] Toepper, "Curricular Decision Making in the J ESP," pp. 83-90.

Our fifth-year survey of 131 elementary classroom teachers (100 percent)[74] showed that the four west-side elementary schools had tended to implement increasing levels of individualization by rate during the first half of the project, but tended to return to a status similar to the first year of the ESP by the end of the project. The five east-side elementary schools had tended to implement increasing levels of individualization by rate during the third and fourth years of the ESP, but regressed slightly during the final year of the project. In general, the intermediate level (grades 3 or 4 through 6) was more active than the primary level (grades K through 2 or 3) in the implementation of individualization by rate.

The six schools that implemented either IPI Mathematics or IPI Reading consistently achieved the highest levels of individualization during the ESP: individualization by rate supplemented with whole class instruction. School E reached comparable levels of individualization by rate on both the primary and intermediate levels through implementation of the JMMSS and the Hawaii English Program. School B achieved similar status on the intermediate level through the implementation of the Holt, Rinehart, and Winston individualized mathematics program. The Criterion Reading program was used by intermediate teachers at School A to achieve individualization by rate. At School C, the Wisconsin Design program was used by intermediate teachers to achieve individualization by rate also.

Thus, five district elementary schools used ESP funds to implement individualized mathematics programs while all nine elementary schools purchased at least one management system for the individualization of communications instruction. However, individualization was implemented mainly on the intermediate level. Generally after initial attempts to install relatively pure forms of individualization by rate in mathematics and communications instruction, it was found that district teachers began to substitute small group, or even whole class, instruction for aspects of individualization. This indicates a partial return to the stylized, traditional lock-step approach whereby students essentially use the same materials at the same time moving toward the same objectives at approximately the same rates.

One possible explanation of this movement away from variation of rate is that it is a result of the practical necessity of adjusting the individualized approach so that students who are having trouble internalizing certain procedures or conceptualizations may benefit both from group interactions as well as from the teachers' monitoring of the specific tasks that these students are expected to accomplish. Thus, where the district's original proposal said that individualized programs would be operated especially for "high risk" (low-ability) students, the implementation experience seemed to show that such students do not have the basic academic skills, motivation, or ability to concentrate for the sustained periods of time necessary to allow them to benefit from the type of programs purchased by the schools. In addition, declining funding, especially for the salaries of aides and other paraprofessionals, forced teachers to fall back to more traditional instructional approaches and student groupings because they lacked the assistance necessary to the continued operation of the individualized programs. A third explanation involves the advantages of teacher-flexibility in the self-contained classrooms and the ease of teacher information-processing inherent in the more traditional approaches to teaching. According to Oettinger and Marks:

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[74] See R. M. Toepper and J. M. McGeever, "The Status of Individualized Instructional Stategies on the Elementary Level (K-6) in the Jefferson School District during its Five-Year Experimental Schools Project," NWREL, April, 1976.

> One reason why the lockstep system has persisted for so long may be that it minimizes the teacher's information-processing problems. Students progress in unison; they are given identical assignments and they take tests simultaneously. In the continuous progress plan school, on the other hand, at any one time each student may be working at a point in the curriculum different from every other.[75]

G. District-Developed Management Systems

Although not an original objective of the ESP, the development of management systems for mathematics and communications instruction became a primary activity on the elementary level. The Jefferson Mathematics Management and Support System (JMMSS) and the Jefferson Communications Goals System (JCGS) were developed to coordinate the myriad of programs and materials purchased by the nine elementary schools for instruction, especially individualized instruction, in these two curricular streams. The director of training and elementary curriculum expected the JMMSS and JCGS to facilitate individualization of instruction by providing the elementary teachers of the district with printed guides that correlated the various materials available in the district with a list of sequentially-ordered (continuous progress) behaviorally-stated objectives. During the process of development, the JMMSS was requested for possible publication by several publishing firms[76] and the JCGS was highly praised by the state superintendent of public instruction's supervisor of language arts education as "one of the best [elementary language arts programs] I've seen."[77]

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[75] A. Oettinger and S. Marks, "Educational Technology: New Myths and Old Realities," Harvard Educational Review, 38:4 (fall 1968), p. 702.

[76] In the fall of 1975 (the fourth year of the ESP), two of the former consultants to the district for the JMMSS independently published what they called "The Design for Math Skill Development."

[77] Letter to director of training and elementary curriculum, March 5, 1975.

The two management systems are similar in format. Both include a guide for teacher and student use, a set of pre- and post-tests, and a student recording and reporting system. Accompanying each objective in the guide is a statement of the concept toward which the objective is aimed and correlations to available instructional materials in the district. Page numbers are given for materials that offer instruction in each objective with appropriate exercises for the student to study and complete. Three basal texts and an assortment of supplementary materials are correlated in the JMMSS. Based originally on the Portland Language Arts Course Goals Collection,[78] which was developed during the summer of 1971 (the summer the J ESP began), the JCGS correlates IPI Reading, Wisconsin Design, and Criterion Reading materials and a variety of other language arts curricula to an extensive list of behavioral objectives. The list of objectives serves as a statement of the minimum proficiency levels for elementary students of the Jefferson School District.

The management systems were developed in a similar manner. Development of the JMMSS began early in the first year of the ESP by a consultant. Several revisions were made by the director of training and elementary curriculum and the mathematics cadre (the elementary mathematics committee of the district) through extended summer contracts. The JMMSS was compled by the mathematics cadre at the beginning of the fifth year of the ESP. Work on the JCGS followed the same pattern, each stage occurring three to nine months after the corresponding stage in the development of the JMMSS. The director of training and elementary curriculum had first perceived the need for such tools, initial work was performed by consultants, with the committees responsible for revisions and refinements, based primarily on group consensus concerning what was needed or what they thought would work. The committees that developed the systems received no training in writing behaviorally-stated objectives. Neither the thinking of scholars in the fields of mathematics and communications nor the literature on criterion-referenced instruction and testing were seriously considered. The essential ingredients of these products were the aggregate classroom experiences of the personnel who participated in the endeavors and the quality of the instructional materials from which the contents were borrowed.

Both management systems experienced implementation problems. During the second year of the ESP, unsuccessful attempts were made to mobilize the elementary principals in support of the JMMSS. Both principals and teachers were too involved with the implementation of a myriad of other programs and activities spawned by the ESP to single this one out for special treatment. Unlike the JMMSS, the JCGS was not distributed to all elementary teachers. Instead, selected teachers were given the first version, and a later revision was distributed to those who requested it. Extensive modifications of the JCGS began during the fourth summer of the ESP and continued, as committee members worked on extended contracts, during the fourth school year and final summer of the ESP. During the fourth year of the ESP, the JCGS was distributed to all teachers who requested it.

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[78] Course Goals in Language Arts, Grades K-12, (A Critique Draft), local and intermediate education school district of Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washinton Counties of Oregon, 1972.

During the third year of the ESP, a random sample of observations of the instruction of 36 elementary teachers disclosed that none of them were utilizing either system.[79] Near the end of the third year of the ESP, math cadre members were queried by the director of training and elementary curriculum about the use of the system in their schools. Four members indicated that it was being used to some degree in a few classrooms in their buildings; however, members from the other five schools responded that their schools first planned to begin using the program the following year.[80]

Near the end of the third year of the ESP, school representatives reported to the JCGS consultant on the degree of implementation of the communications system in their buildings. Implementation was generally reported to be very low. In a memorandum to the director of training and elementary curriculum and the Communications Goals Committee summarizing the teachers' comments, the consultant reported that "interest in the [language arts] objectives has not been widespread in the district." Whereas about 36 copies of the JCGS had been distributed selectively among the teachers of the nine elementary schools of the district, he indicated that only eleven teachers reported having used them.[81]

To continue data collection on the implementation of the two systems, an open-ended survey was administered to 136 of the 138 elementary classroom teachers and resource room teachers (counselors) working in the district during the fourth year of the ESP. Eighty-eight percent of the respondents replied that they were familiar with the JMMSS and 46 percent reported that they used it. Of those who reported they used it, 52 percent (24 percent of the 136 respondents) reported they used the JMMSS to individualize mathematics instruction. Twenty-three percent used it to facilitate more traditional, teacher-centered, lock-step approaches to instruction. An additional 5 percent reported they used the JMMSS to supplement another management system for individualized instruction and 19 percent said they did not use the JMMSS because they gave precedence to another management system for individualized instruction. The survey also found 79 percent of the 136 respondents were familiar with the JCGS and 35 percent reported that they used it. However, only 3 percent (four respondents) reported they used the JCGS to individualize communications instruction. An additional 11 percent reported they used the JCGS to supplement another management system for individualized instruction and 15 percent answered that they did not use the JCGS because they gave precedent to another management system for individualized instruction.[82]

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[79] Everhart, et al., "Curriculum and Instruction in the J ESP," pp. 213-214.

[80] Director of Training and Elementary Curriculum, "Summary of Math Meeting," memorandum to math cadre members, May 13, 1974; and B. J. Hawley-Winne, Fieldnotes, Math Cadre Meeting, May 13, 1974.

[81] C. Forsythe, Consultant, "Evaluation of the Use of the Language Arts Objectives and Recommendations for the Future," memorandum to the Communications Goals Committee Members and the Director of Training, May 7, 1974.

The development of the two management systems fit both the letter and the spirit of the ESP in that the endeavors offered the potential of comprehensive K-12 articulation of the individualization of mathematics and communications instruction. In addition to intending to expand the JMMSS and JCGS to include the secondary as well as the elementary level, the district also planned to develop curriculum guides for grades K through 12 for the social studies, science, personal development, and career education streams.[83] None of these endeavors was ever carried out, although curriculum guides were developed for elementary social studies, focusing on the Concepts and Values and Man: A Course of Study curricula, and for the Elementary Science Study program.

Other than a few endeavors by secondary-level departments to develop outlines of general objectives and scope and sequence documents, the secondary level sponsored no thrusts similar in nature to the JMMSS or JCGS. Nor did the secondary level follow up on the development of the JMMSS or JCGS. However, the two senior high school math departments collaborated on the development of a mathematics survival skills test which went into use during the fourth year of the ESP and the two junior high school mathematics department chairmen and selected intermediate-grade teachers developed a sixth grade exit examination in mathematics during the fifth year of the ESP.

Several reasons explain the low level of usage of two district-developed management systems: First, individual buildings, especially on the west-side of the district, made their own programmatic decisions during the course of the ESP and thus were committed to such nationally field-tested management systems as IPI Mathematics or Reading, Criterion Reading, or Wisconsin Design before the management systems were available in even their rough, early versions. Second, with each building making many independent curricular choices, the sheer magnitude of unique implementations tended to make rigorous and comprehensive implementation of any one program highly unlikely. Third, the various versions of the two management systems were generally distributed to teachers several months into the school year. This occurred because the committee work of each summer was prepared for printing by only one typist, and finished copy was sent to the district printing office just as that office was being deluged with other responsibilities in preparation for the opening of the new school year. Fourth, because of their long tenure, some teachers were resistant to changes in teaching repertoire they had developed through many years of experience; adjusting to new instructional strategies without adequate planning time, while the school year is in progress, is an added burden for any teacher. In addition, the teachers' estimation of the quality of the products also affected how they used them.

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[82] Toepper, "Curricular Decision Making," pp. 100-109.

[83] JSD, "Addendum" [to final draft of the second 30 month plan, 1973, Appendix Nine, pp. 2-4].

H. The Career Education and Personal Development Streams

Programs in career and personal development constituted a highly visible aspect of the district's instructional activities. Generally speaking, these programs included: fifth day activities at the elementary level and Interims at both the secondary and elementary level; and work experience and Occupational Versatility (OV) at the secondary level. These programs received the most publicity in district literature and were touted as some of the most successful programs funded by the ESP.[84]

There is little doubt that personal development activities (fifth day and the Interim) were the most popular among students. Level I evaluations of student attitudes showed consistently higher ratings for these activities in relation to regular subject matter.[85] Though some parents initially objected that many personal development courses were too much "fun and games," the community as a whole seems to have received the personal development activities favorably.

Over the duration of the project, however, district commitment to personal development activities, on the whole, seemed to have diminished. Secondary interim offerings took on an increasingly academic nature. And despite the fact that the elementary bowling program has continued undiminished and the skiing program has been increased, the overall elementary program in personal development has decreased. For example, one elementary school began the project with one full day per week devoted to these activities; by the end of the project it was devoting only two hours per week to them. Another elementary school had two Interims of three weeks duration, two hours per day, during the second year of the project; by the end of the project, it had only one Interim session.

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[84] This section is based on R. B. Everhart and J. M. McGeever, "Career and Personal Development Streams in the Jefferson School District," NWREL, January 1976. The career and personal development streams are defined at the beginning of this chapter.

[85] JSD, Evaluation Report No. 25, January 1974 Interim, November 1974.

Still another elementary school began the project with an Interim all day for three weeks; by the last year, it had completely dropped the Interim concept. Still other elementary schools drastically scaled down their personal development activities to include fewer students (for example, only grades 3-6), less time (usually two hours a week), or else they incorporated those activities into the regular school curriculum. At the secondary level, the Interim program remained structurally intact, but gravitated toward fewer off-campus activities and more "academic enrichment" offerings on school grounds.

The reasons for this decline are varied. It appears that teachers had difficulty developing and updating courses for personal development activities while having concurrent responsibility for ongoing classes during the "regular" school year. Although initial enthusiasm was high for these two activities, it seemed to wane over time.

In addition, individual teachers apparently scheduled Interim and fifth day activities within their buildings at their own discretion. This was especially true at the elementary level, where the practice of staggered scheduling at two schools permitted personal development activities to be incorporated into the regular schedule. The fact that other fifth day activities seemed to occur at the classroom level with no integrated school schedule reinforced this trend.

Cost is another important factor. Although most schools wishing to maintain a personal development program say they can do so without ESP funds; the degree to which they will be successful remains dubious. Key administrator salaries at the secondary level must be absorbed and students must assume an increasing share of the cost if these programs are to remain viable. The case may not be as clear at the elementary level, yet competition for scarce resources will continue, as in the past, to determine the level of personal development activities. We might safely predict a continuation of the slow absorption of personal development activities into the regular curriculum, resulting in a somewhat idiosyncratic pattern of adoption.

Career education and work experience activities were provided primarily at the secondary level. The Occupational Versatility program was an individualized shop program offered at the secondary level. Students learned wood working, metal working and automotive skills, for example, but they proceeded (through learning activity packets) individually at their own rates. The ESP program provided the funding to expand the secondary level work experience program into a year-round program. Over the years of ESP a wide variety of work experience options was added to the program, and all district students were required to complete two units (120 daytime hours) of work experience in order to graduate from high school. On the elementary level, only one school provided career education experiences. This school organized a career awareness center where students were taught how to use basic tools in household repair. It also provided regular outside speakers who explained their own careers to students.

Unlike the personal development activites which diminished and became more a part of the regular instruction over the years, the career education and work experience programs were rountinized into the regular course of studies. Moreover, the career education and work experience program increased rather than diminished over the course of the ESP.

I. Student Outcomes

The thrust of the ESP, as has been shown, was different depending upon grade levels and school. At the high school level, the Interim, work experience, and mathematics laboratories prevailed as major ESP elements, with isolated instances of smaller efforts such as sophomore humanities at the east-side senior high school. The junior high school level operationalized ESP through Interims, Occupational Versatility, and the effort at individualized instruction in the mathematics laboratory program at the west-side junior high. Finally, as described previously, the elementary schools utilized a large variety of curricular programs and fifth day activities, some of which could be described as following one of several individualized approaches, and some which did not. Types of programs and the degree to which any single program was implemented varied according to individual classrooms, with intraschool differences often as disparate as interschool or interlevel differences.

Faced with such a proliferated set of treatments, some of which appeared in all schools, a decision was made in 1973 by the NWREL Level II evaluation program to concentrate on monitoring the progress of large student groups across time; it was felt that such a strategy would illustrate the cumulative effect of the myriad of instructional treatments. Near the end of the project it became possible to identify students with some of the predominant instructional treatments in the J ESP; thus, two studies were conducted in an attempt to tie student outcomes to specific treatments, which was not possible with the large scale monitoring studies.

1. Large-Scale, Longitudinal Monitoring Studies

The longitudinal "monitoring" studies were limited to dependent variables in the student congitive domain, namely, student ability and achievement. Student affective characteristics also were thought to be important outcome variables, but were not monitored over multi-year periods because changes by the district in test forms, sampling methods, and testing intervals, along with occasional clerical errors, were considered to have weakened the significance of test result interpretation.

The final large-scale monitoring report to consider student achievement patterns in Jefferson School District illustrated the change in student achievement over the first four project years for three separate student populations; students progressing from grade 2 in 1971 through grade 6 in 1975 (Group 1), students progressing from grade 5 in 1971 through grade 9 in 1975 (Group 2), and students progressing from grade 7 in 1971 through grade 11 in 1975 (Group 3).[86] Final year data (1976) were not utilized in this study, since such data were not available at the time this work was initiated.[87] The study was concerned with determining whether, once pre-achievement and IQ were statistically controlled, student achievement patterns differed according to; (a) student membership in a west-side school (in the ESP all four years), or an east-side school (in the ESP the last two years of the study period), and (b) a student's sex.

The general overall finding of the study depicted students as declining in achievement gains over the four year period when their progress was compared to corresponding increases in the 1968 national norm. This "declining" trend was consistent with prior monitoring report results, and was evident for both west-side schools and east-side schools, and males and females, across all subtest areas.

Most literature depicts the "declining" trend in student achievement as nationwide, and to date has been unable to formulate a positive rationale to account for the tendency. Explanations for the decline range from assertions that it might be attributed to a larger number of minority student test takers, potential drop outs staying in, a younger population taking tests, lack of test relevancy, inadequate basic skills instruction, or finally that there is no real problem, but merely a very slight decline (or leveling off) of achievement after considerable gains over the four decades prior to the mid-sixties.[88] In any case, this monitoring report did not attempt to generalize the achievement growth decline of Jefferson students to the nation's school age populace, but merely attempted to determine whether certain characteristics of the Jefferson situation (school of attendance and student sex) were related to the [illegible] achievement scores in this district.

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[86] Donicht, "Summary Report: Changes in Jefferson Student Achievement, 1971-1976," NWREL, July 1976.

[87] As of this document's final draft, data covering the fifth project year were available. In 1976, Jefferson students had been given a newly developed and renormed CTBS battery (Form S), and in general performed well on it. 1976 results for grades 2 through 10 showed that average student scores on the total battery ranged from two months to one year above the new norms, depending upon the student's grade level. Converting the total battery averages to the previously used CTBS Test (Form Q), which was based on 1968 norms, resulted in student achievement averages ranging from three months below the 1968 norm to four months above the norm depending upon the student's grade level. The rather striking difference in depicting student performance which results from administering the different CTBS instruments illustrates that care should be taken in interpreting scores of one form relative to scores on another and relative to different norms. The district evaluation unit acknowledged the problem of comparing results of two different CTBS forms in 1974, when administering CTBS Form R showed students' achievement to drop significantly when compared to previous Form Q achievement results. The same caveat has been issued by the district's evaluation unit concerning the 1976 Form S data. See JSD, "Evaluation Report #34, The Effect of the Experimental Schools Project in Reducing the Proportions of High Risk Students in the Jefferson School District," June 1976, p. 29.

The four year trends in Jefferson student achievement suggest that the ESP did have an effect on the nature of this growth decline. Prior to the project, students in Groups 1 and 2 generally achieved at similar levels in the three subtest areas and on the total battery, regardless of whether they attended west-side or east-side elementary schools. Group 3 west-side school students generally performed at higher levels on all subtests and on the total battery, than east-side school students. For all three groups, as students' schools entered the project between 1971 and 1973 (west-side schools), student achievement progress was inhibited compared to student achievement at schools not in the project (east-side schools). Between 1973 and 1975, when the previously "non-project" schools entered the project (east-side schools), student achievement generally did not increase as much as students whose schools had been in the project previously. Though the four year gains in achievement made by east-side students were higher than four year gains by west-side students, the difference was not significant since the west-side group gains over the last two years had at least partially offset east-side student achievement advantages the first two years.

Male and female achievement did not consistently reflect this pattern, as one sex did not always outperform the other between any two testing periods. In general, both male and female achievement increased at a comparable pace, though often their initial achievement levels differed significantly. An exception to this occurred at the junior and senior high levels, where females began the ESP with higher language scores than males, and continued to out perform males throughout the project, and at the high school level where males started the project with arithmetic scores similar to females, but significantly outperformed the females during the project period. These "exceptions" are not particularly unique inasmuch as similar results have been found often in previous studies. Girls seem to be more accomplished than boys in the language arts, and boys tend to do better than girls in arithmetic,[89] especially at the secondary school level.

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[88] Education Daily, 8:174, September 8, 1975, p. 4-6. See also, Roger Farr, Jaap Tuinman and Michael Rowls, Reading Achievement in the United States: Then and Now, Indiana University, Bloomington, August 1974, pp. 134-140; and Richard L. Ferguson, "ACT Test Scores--What's Behind the Decline?" NASSP Bulletin, 60:400, May 1976, pp. 71-77.

[89] W. W. Clark, "Boys and Girls--Are There Significant Ability and Achievement Differences?" Phi Delta Kappan, November 1959, p. 74; and F. T. Tyler, "Individual Achievement and Sex Differences," in Chester W. Harris and Marie R. Liba (eds.), Encyclopedia of Educational Research, third edition, Macmillan and Company, New York, 1960, p. 685.

A possible explanation of the west-side--east-side student achievement differences is not as straightforward and is, at best, speculative. Nevertheless, the trends do seem to support a hypothesis posited in an earlier Level II evaluation study which might be termed a "disruptive" influence hypothesis.[90] It may be that initial implementation of a change in teacher instructional activities produces a temporary lessening of effectiveness of those activities due to the newness of the situation, increased demands on time, etc. After a period of time, teachers stabilize the intervention, and effectiveness of activity increases. In Jefferson, the effects of a disruption may have been reflected in west-side student achievement gains during the first two project years being lower than east-side student gains. If one can assume that instructional techniques and activities became stabilized by the project's second two years, or if teachers discontinued the interventions and returned to original activities, then west-side student achievement would gradually overtake east-side student achievement since the latter group was entering the "disruptive" phase at that time.

On the other hand, it is just as possible that there was no real achievement difference resulting from the ESP, and that different groups outperforming one another in different time periods is simply a statistical anomaly or a function of natural regression. If so, it can be said that there was no overall ESP effect, positive or negative, on student congitive outcomes.

2. A Longitudinal Study of Achievement in Mathematics and Communications Instructional Treatments

An additional study was conducted in an attempt to follow, longitudinally, elementary students throughout the district during the first four years of the ESP (those in second grade in 1971, prior to implementation of ESP, who were sixth graders in 1975, the fourth year[91]--the same group of students as in Group 1 in the study reported.) This study was designed to compare achievement outcomes according to whether students received predominately individualized or non-individualized instruction in mathematics and communications during this period. Only achievement outcomes were included in this longitudinal study, due to the problems already delineated concerning affective data. It became possible to identify relative degrees of implementation of individualized instructions within specific classes and for specific students each year by conducting interviews with the district's elementary teachers in the fifth year of the ESP.

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[90] L. J. Reynolds and T. L. Donicht, "Monitoring Report I: Changes in Student Achievement in Jefferson During the First Two Years of the Experimental Schools Project," NWREL, October 1973, pp. 17-18.

[91] J. L. Crist-Whitzel, R. M. Toepper, T. L. Donicht, and J. M. McGeever, "A Longitudinal Study of Achievement in Jefferson Mathematics and Communications Instructional Treatments," NWREL, July 1976.

Students were classified in each subject area according to one of four instructional treatment conditions to represent the trend of their instruction over the ESP by their 1973 treatments (when the west-side schools had been in the ESP for two years--and the year prior to the east-side schools entering) and their 1975 treatments (after the east-side schools had been in the ESP for two years and the west-side schools for four years). For each of these years, students were classified as receiving either a predominantly individualized or predominately non-individualized treatment. The four treatment conditions derived were: (1) consistently individualized (I-I) across these years; (2) consistently non-individualized (N-N); (3) a shift from non-individualized in 1973 to individualized in 1975 (N-I); and (4) a shift from individualized in 1973 to non-individualized in 1975 (I-N). The last condition (4) was found to exist in mathematics, but not in communication.

Students in the four mathematics treatments were compared on the arithmetic total score on the CTBS. The three communications treatments were compared on the reading and language tests.

a. Mathematics. From 1971 to 1973, students in the consistently non-individualized group had significantly higher achievement gains than the other three groups, with students' 1971 achievement level accounted for. Over the first four years of the ESP (1971-75), students in the consistently non-individualized group and the groups shifting from non-individualized to individualized and vice versa achieved at about the same rate regardless of initial achievement level. However, there was a difference in 1975 achievement for the consistently individualized group compared with the other groups, depending on initial (1971) achievement level. Students beginning with high achievement performed significantly less well in the consistently individualized group than in the other three, whereas low initial achieving students had higher 1975 achievement in that group than in the other three.

In addition, when examining achievement patterns from 1973 (just prior to the east-side schools' entrance into the ESP) to 1975, instructional treatment interacted with 1973 achievement level in producing 1975 achievement, resulting from the effect of the group switching from individualized instruction in 1973 to non-individualized in 1975. In this case, that switch appeared to be detrimental for students who were lower achievers in 1973; their 1975 achievement was significantly lower than for comparable students in the other three groups. The difference among groups was not as great for students who were high achievers in 1973, although students at this level performed slightly better in the group switching from individualized to non-individualized instruction than in the other three groups.

These results seem to indicate that efforts to individualize instruction in mathematics provided some benefit for low achieving students, but not for average and above average achievers. High achievers tended to attain the best achievement when they were in more traditional non-individualized instruction.

b. Communications. An examination of achievement patterns from 1971 to 1975 for reading showed no difference among communications treatments, from 1971 to 1973 or from 1973 to 1975. However, when 1975 achievement was controlled for initial (1971) achievement, a difference emerged based on original achievement level. In this case, low initial achieving students had higher 1975 reading achievement in the group with consistently non-individualized instruction than in the other two groups, a result opposite to that for arithmetic achievement, while students with higher initial achievement did somewhat worse in that treatment than in the others.

In the period from 1971 to 1973, the consistently individualized group had significantly lower 1973 language achievement adjusted for 1971 language achievement. This result held for all levels of 1971 achievement. There were no differences among the three groups on their 1975 achievement with either 1973 or 1971 achievement controlled. Thus, while there was evidence of some short term differences in language achievement to the disadvantage of individualized communications instruction (perhaps due to the "disruption" hypothesis mentioned earlier), by the end of the four year period studied, even though the consistently individualized group still had lower overall achievement gains, it had caught up with the pace of gain of the other two groups from 1973 to 1975 so that the differences were no longer statistically significant.

3. A One-Year Intensive Study of Specified Mathematics and Reading Instructional Treatments

A more narrowly focused study (in the fourth year of the ESP) was designed to identify different methods of instruction at the sixth grade level and to examine both cognitive and affective outcomes in relation to various student characteristics in these different treatments.[92] The specific treatment studies were: (1) IPI Mathematics and Reading, considered to be two of the most comprehensively implemented individualized curricular programs in the district; (2) the JMMSS, utilizing primarily a combination of individual and small-group instruction; and (3) basal text whole-class instruction in mathematics in self-contained classrooms and teacher-determined variety of individualized instructional materials within self-contained reading classrooms (a basal text, whole-class approach was not found in sixth grade reading instruction in the fourth year of the project).

It was decided to conduct a study focused on a few classrooms over a one-year period in order to allow an intensive examination of a variety of student input and outcome variables in relation to specific instructional programs. Mathematics and reading were chosen as foci of the study, since major ESP efforts were in these two streams and the district administered annual achievement testing in these areas. Observations of mathematics and communications instruction by a 25 percent stratified random sample of Jefferson elementary teachers in 1973-74[93] provided initial identification of treatments. Through follow-up interviews with principals and teachers in 1975, intact classrooms were selected for inclusion in this study. Posttest (spring 1975) data were collected for as many students in these classes as possible. It was deemed infeasible to collect data from prior years of the ESP due to irregularities in the district's administration of affective measures (tests administered only to samples of students in the early years, then to all elementary students; changes made in the instruments at different administrations), as well as missing data on achievement measures (due to yearly attrition) which would reduce the already small sample; thus, it was not possible to monitor the students longitudinally over more than one year. An intensively focused study, covering the equivalent of ten classrooms (approximately 300 students) also allowed the Level II staff to collect data for monitoring and describing the actual treatments, as well as to collect additional data on student characteristics not measured by the district evaluation unit (Level I).

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[92] J. L. Crist-Whitzel, "A Study of Student Characteristics, Instructional Outcomes, and Classroom Environment in Different Instructional Approaches in Sixth Grade Mathematics and Reading," NWREL, July 1976.

a. Mathematics Treatments. In mathematics, results showed that students at higher pretest achievement levels achieved more on arithmetic total and the computation subtests of CTBS in traditional math than in IPI and that students with lower pretest achievement performed better in IPI. Field independence, or analytic ability, and SES also interacted with treatment to account for differential computation and total achievement. There were no significant differences among the three treatments on achievement growth on the concepts or applications subtest, when controlling for prior achievement and other student variables, but there were some interactions of prior attitude and treatment. Thus, at least in some areas of math achievement, there was evidence that traditional math was associated with higher performance for students with a history of high achievement, and IPI was linked to higher performance for low prior achieving students.

With posttest attitude toward mathematics controlled for prior attitude toward math and prior math achievement, as well as personality variables and general attitude toward school work, there were no significant overall differences among the three treatments, but there was an interaction between prior math attitude and treatment. For students whose initial math attitude was below average, end-of-year attitude was significantly better in IPI or JMMSS (math management) then in traditional math. The difference among treatments for those with high initial attitude toward math was less than for low attitude students, but such students in traditional math showed slightly higher attitudes than those in the other two treatments. On general attitude toward school work, traditional math was superior to the other two treatments when posttest attitudes was adjusted for prior year attitude, achievement, personality variables, and attitude toward mathematics, but again there were some aptitude (or trait)--treatment interactions (ATI's) accounting for differential attitudes.

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[93] See Everhart, et al., "Curriculum and Instruction in the J ESP."

With prior self-concept and other measured personality and attitude variables, as well as prior math achievement, all controlled, there was a significant difference among the three math treatments on posttest (1975) total self-concept and self-concept ability, and evidence of such difference on social self-concept. The difference was in favor of IPI over the other two treatments.

b. Reading Treatments. In reading, there were no significant differences between the two treatments (IPI and teacher-determined individualized curricula) on any of the CTBS achievement outcomes (vocabulary, comprehension, and total reading). There was one ATI: attitude toward school was positively related to vocabulary achievement in the teacher-determined treatment but negatively related in IPI.

On students' attitude toward reading in 1975, controlling for their previous year's attitude toward reading, reading achievement, and the other variables, there was a statistically significant difference in favor of the teacher-determined individualized curricula over IPI reading. Whereas the former group had an increase in favorableness to reading, the latter had a slight decline over the year's period. There were also ATI's for SES and prior achievement in relation to posttest attitude toward reading. On end-of-year attitude toward school work, the students in the teacher-determined curricular also evidenced a significantly more positive attitude when that measure was adjusted for prior attitude toward school work and the other variables. Neither reading treatment was superior to the other when examining end-of-year self-concept, controlling for prior self-concept, achievement, and the other personality and attitude variables, but there were significant interactions, the most consistent one being the interactions of internal-external locus of control with treatment.

The final two studies reported do indicate that individualized instruction in mathematics contributed to higher achievement and better attitudes for low prior achieving students, while traditional math was superior for both outcomes among high prior achievers. It may be that low achieving students are unable to keep up with the pace of instruction in a traditional classroom but are able to gain greater mastery of material when working at their own pace. On the other hand, high achieving students may thrive on the greater degree of competition with their classmates in traditional instruction. It appeared that IPI may have enhanced students' self-concept (at least in the mathematics sample), one of the goals of the ESP. Results were not so clear for communications treatments; this may have been due to the fact that different treatments in communications (language arts, reading) were not as distinct as treatments in mathematics.

J. Summary

This chapter has described the reality of curricular and instructional endeavors during the J ESP. Rather than transforming the practices associated with curriculum and instruction within the district, the ESP itself was diluted by the pre-existing regularities of the district. The major emphases of the ESP--the 11-month schedule, planning of the educational program of each student, an extensive staff retraining program, and decision making about program selection and/or phase-out based on cost-effectiveness criteria were not implemented as rigorously as originally proposed. The components comprising the reality of the J ESP which were implemented widely included individualized instruction, especially on the elementary level and particularly in the mathematics and communications streams; the Interim program, especially on the secondary level; career education, also on the secondary level; the purchase of new instructional materials on both levels in virtually all program streams; and building remodeling to facilitate the implementation of purchased or locally-developed programs.

In general, the selection of programs and their degree of use were decided independently by each building, although, on the elementary level, several programs (MACOS is the best example) were expected to be implemented by all nine elementary schools. On the secondary level, teachers devoted their efforts primarily to the development of course syllabi, especially for the Interims. The Occupational Versatility program on the junior high school level and the work experience program on the senior high school level constituted major efforts in the career education stream. The mathematics departments at all four secondary schools developed laboratories for individualized instruction and participated in the development of sixth and twelfth grade exit examinations emphasizing basic skills.

Individualization of mathematics and communications instruction was the most pervasive curricular and instructional implementation across district elementary schools. In general, the type of individualization implemented by the district is best described as variation by rate. The four west-side elementary schools tended to implement increasing levels of individualization by rate during the first half of the project, but ended to return to a status similar to the first year of the ESP by the end of the project. The five east-side elementary schools tended to implement increasing levels of individualization by rate during the third and fourth years of the ESP, but regressed slightly during the final year of the project. In general, the intermediate level (grades 3 or 4 through 6) was more active than the primary level (grades K through 2 or 3) in the implementation of individualization by rate.

Individually Guided Education (IGE) was implemented in three elementary schools. Individually Prescribed Instruction (IPI) for mathematics and/or communications instruction was installed in grades 3 or 4 through 6 in six schools. School E, an east-side school, installed the Jefferson Mathematics Management and Support System (JMMSS) and the Hawaii English Program (HEP) on both the primary and intermediate levels. School B, on the west side, implemented the Holt, Rinehart, and Winston individualized mathematics program on the elementary level. School A, on the west side, implemented the Criterion Reading program and School C, another west-side building, installed the Wisconsin Design reading program on the intermediate level. In addition, a variety of other instructional hard- and software were purchased for use in each elementary building.

The ESP training program was an accumulation of discrete endeavors, often sponsored by individual buildings, aimed primarily at introducing users to curricular programs or instructional materials purchased with ESP funds. It was not a coordinated effort of the district to offer retraining programs for each of the 15 project components. Most of the training occurred on the elementary level.

Project impact on students was mixed. On the one hand, districtwide studies showed that though cognitive achievement declined (when compared to the 1968 national norms) during the ESP, and that the disruptive influence of the innovation may have been related to that decline, there were few significant long term (4 year) differences between initial entrants and later entrants to the project. On the other hand, certain instructional approaches emphasized during the ESP (e. g., IPI and other individualized instruction) contributed to improved cognitive and/or affective outcomes for select subgroups, particularly for low prior achieving students in mathematics. These students had higher mathematics achievement in individualized instruction and higher attitude toward mathematics in IPI. Students in IPI, in general, had greater gains in self-concept when compared to those in JMMSS and traditional math. High prior achieving students had better achievement and attitude toward math when they received traditional math instruction. Results were not so clear for reading instruction, where treatments were not as distinct as those in mathematics. Unfortunately, much of the ESP impetus was in areas such as career education, personal development, social studies, etc., for which definitive student impact information was not available. The effect of many project programs will therefore remain unknown. However, as measured by standardized achievement tests, ESP-instituted programs did not have any overall negative effects on student cognitive outcomes and, in some particular cases, a positive effect.

In no way do we mean to castigate the day-to-day operation of the district. The JSD operates a relatively efficient traditional educational program, especially in view of available financial resources. Instead, we wish to emphasize that the district was not able to operationalize the comprehensive experiment originally proposed by the superintendent for the ESP. The J ESP lacked both central coordination and subunit loyalty to project goals. The presence of either characteristic probably would have kept the project much closer to its original goals. A myriad of curricular activities were carried on under the rubric of the ESP; however, specific implementation differed from school to school and did not fit the proposal rhetoric closely.

The J ESP was not unique, however, in producing confounded or insignificant effects. The report of the 1975 NIE-sponsored comprehensive review of the national Experimental Schools Program, which included visits to about half of the ESP sites (not including the J ESP), stated that

> the reviewers agreed that all projects were characterized by seriousness of purpose and a determination to improve the education of the children served. At the same time, the reviewers were nearly unanimous in the view that, in a fundamental sense, the various projects had not turned out as planned. The reviewers agreed that ESP has proposed one thing and produced another....[94]

What the J ESP produced was similar to Havelock's summary description of "the 1971 showcase innovation":

> The broad picture which emerges shows that while the school systems are being innovative they are not being radical or daring. Although very large districts find it more necessary to improve their complex administrative operations, all districts place emphasis in the instructional areas on improving the basic skills of the students. When the regular curriculum fails to give an adequate level of basic skills to the young child or to hold the interest of the high school student, special instructional programs are initiated to fill the gap. In the elementary years the thrust is towards improving reading and math skills through individualized or remedial instruction. At the senior high level the English curriculum is made more appealing through the introduction of unit courses, mini-courses and electives, and there is also provision made for occupational preparation and vocational training for those students not headed for college. With this emphasis on basic skills of the youngest and oldest students, programs for the gifted students and students in the middle school years are rarely given much attention.[95]

At the conclusion of the project, the district could highlight the following accomplishments:

- Three west-side elementary schools had officially espoused the IGE model of school organization; one east-side elementary school had also moved away from lock-step self-contained classroom organization in mathematics and communications instruction.

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[94] Doyle, "Final Report of the ESP Review Committee," p. 8.

[95] Havelock, et al., The National Survey, p. 70.

- All elementary schools had installed at least one individualized instructional program in either the mathematics or communication stream; five had installed one in each stream.

- All schools had installed arts and crafts, "fifth day," and/or Interim programs emphasizing lifetime sports and training for leisure time activities, thus taking time away from the usual school subjects.

- Work experience and demonstrated facility with basic mathematical operations were made twelfth-grade graduation requirements.

- All schools had purchased or developed instructional hard- and software in virtually all curricular areas and had renovated aspects of their physical plants to facilitate the implementation of new programs.

- Curricular decision-making had been transferred from the central office to the individual buildings.

This had all been accomplished without unusual declines in student achievement in the basic skill areas and while neighboring school districts had suffered fiscal and programmatic retrenchment.[96]

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[96] Based on the superintendent's remarks to the Level II evaluation staff, May 13 and 14, 1976, and ESP disseminator, "An Experiment in Learning," Compass, (Pacific State School Directors' Association publication), 4:2, March 1976, pp. 3-5.

CHAPTER VII

INTERNAL (LEVEL I) EVALUATION

VII. INTERNAL (LEVEL I) EVALUATION

This chapter presents an overview of the role of internal evaluation in the J ESP,[1] marked by three major phases:

- The formative phase, the early ESP context in which initial efforts to develop and define evaluative functions were made. This phase extended through the summer of 1973.
- The transitional phase, during which Level I acquired added resources and hardware in an attempt to cope with the growing diffusion of the ESP and underwent major changes in personnel. This phase extended roughly through the 1973-74 school year.
- The final phase, during which pressures were applied on Level I for added evaluative and non-evaluative services and performance, with mounting questions as to its legitimacy as a unit. Processes developed pointed towards a major curtailment.

Throughout each phase, the roles of salient actors both within and outside Level I will be examined for their influence on the development of the evaluation effort and its effect on the development of the ESP. Other factors, such as those stemming from the context of the school system and those emanating from the thrust of the ESP itself, will also be discussed in relation to Level I evaluation.

A. The Setting

In responding to the OE's call for letters of interest, the superintendent stated that "through cooperation with local universities, the district maintains an evaluation and research staff."[2] The scope of evaluation, however, appears to have been narrow. No onsite evaluation unit had day-to-day involvement in district operations. What formal evaluation did exist apparently performed no systematic role in decision making at either the building or district level. As the district's first Level I director later noted,

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[1] The role of internal evaluation is described more completely in D. F. Eixenberger, "Internal Evaluation: The Sea of Heterogeneity," NWREL, June 1976.

[2] JSD Superintendent, Letter of interest, submitted to USOE in response to the OE "Call for Letters of Interest," January 14, 1971.

> Probably it was not clearly understood from the ESP beginning that Evaluation, with a recognizable philosophy, department, and resource, was non-existent in the district. True, the various federal title in operation had complied with regulations demanding summary evaluations. These evaluations were at the skill of the various director's, generally ad hoc, without common standards, purposeful application to decision makers, and not adaptable to dissemination, internally and externally.[3]

B. Rhetoric

1. OE Intentions

Evaluation and documentation of each Experimental Schools site was a major concern of the USOE and subsequently NIE from the initial development of the program. As described in the Introduction, projects were sought "with a major evaluative thrust" which was conceived on three levels.[4] Level I, the focus of this chapter, was to be "an evaluative system to compare the output of the project with other outputs of the system in terms of that system's goals and objectives[5] and "this component was to provide timely and specific information for the local decision making process."[6] (Later, Level I was also conceived of as a "functional and integral part of the comprehensive educational program.")[7] Of all program funds targeted nationally for ESP at this point, 26 percent was to be expended for evaluation and documentation. However, the roles and responsibilities among the three levels were not clearly articulated. In large part, this was due to an intentional posture held by the OE/ESP. As one of their staff described the national program, "We've never attempted the task of setting out a single point of this program... we await a welling up from the grass roots. It's wrong for us to pick ideas and tell people in the field to put them into practice."[8] However, at the same time, the national director had concerns about the ability of local districts to provide useful evaluation. He stated that "so far as evaluation, we wanted it to be good and onsite, but we felt the districts couldn't handle it."[9] On that basis, OE apparently decided that both internal and external evaluations were needed, but they remained firm in not spelling out their goals.[10]

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[3] Superintendent, ESP Executive Director, and Director, "Evaluation," J ESP, OEG-0-71-3464, project number 10179, January 1972.

[4] Chapter II, pp. 25-26.

[5] R. B. Binswanger, "Basic Program Information," Experimental Schools Program, Call for Letters of Interest, December 28, 1970, p. 2.

[6] Ibid.

[7] D. Budding, "Guidance for the Development of Level I Evaluation in Greenville," Memorandum to F. Gardequa, January 28, 1972.

2. The Jefferson ESP Proposal

The evaluation section of the district's first 30 month proposal was written by a state Title III evaluation specialist (who was later to become the director of Level I) and a member of the education department of a local university (who was to become a consultant to the Level I effort and later its second director). This plan was only a general projection of future work.[11] Upon funding the project, Level I intended to develop a more specific document. A series of evaluation needs were cited: to view the project in its large perspective in terms of both process and product, so as to allow comparison with a large norm group; to obtain information about the effectiveness of its process and its effect upon staff and students in order to realistically manage the district; to monitor student progress; and systematically to gather, analyze and disseminate data regarding the school objectives and student progress toward these objectives.

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[8] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Estes Park Conference, 12/16/71, p. 3.

[9] Ibid.

[10] This decision could be due in part to the political climate at the time. To quote the director of ESP: "We will need data at appropriations time. This is a research program and we need to prove our results. We operate in a political climate...." (Ibid., p. 2). At the time of inception of the ESP, evaluation was becoming a very popular notion across the country and certainly in Washington. This is supported by Ernest R. House who wrote in 1972 that evaluations in general "were never intended to produce relevant information. Rather, they were meant to protect the Office of Education from hostile forces in the Congress and the Bureau of the Budget." E. R. House, "The Conscience of Educational Evaluation," in E. R. House (ed.), School Evaluation, McCutchan: Berkeley, California, 1973, p. 129.

[11] The following summary of the initial Level I plan is taken from JSD, "Experimental Schools, Jefferson: Providing Optimum Learning Environments for 4000 Students," an application to the Department of HEW for an operations grant under provisions of the Experimental Schools Program, [final draft of first 30 months proposal], May 15, 1971, pp. 75-78.

Procedures cited to meet these needs included an overall standardized testing program; the gathering of aptitude, interest and attitude data; standardized diagnostic examination for aid in pupil placement and prescription; individual instructional program evaluation; community inventories; and management check instruments based upon major objectives and decision points across time. These data were to be combined with the cost accounting of all programs in terms of performance objectives and developed into a PPBES format for district operations and decision making.[12] (This format was later termed a Cost-Effectiveness Ratio [CER] and will be so termed throughout this chapter.)

Although vague, the Level I plan allows certain inferences. Evaluation was to be an onsite unit with evaluative responsibilities at both the district and school building levels. The extent of data gathering activities projected suggested that there would be a major impact upon a school system which apparently had little prior experience with such intrusion. The range of potential objectives to be measured, as evidenced by the main body of the proposal itself, suggested a rigorous, systematic examination of processes and outcomes--a capacity for which the district had little experience. Major evaluation activities were projected for a school system which had virtually no experience in evaluation and had expressed no need for it.

C. Formative Phase: 1971-73

The formative years included initial efforts to develop and define the Level I evaluation functions.

1. Early Efforts

The funding of the ESP enabled the creation of the Level I unit in the district in the summer of 1971. The state Title III evaluator who had written the initial Level I plan was hired as the director. Two other employees were added in the fall of 1971: a full-time professional evaluator, new to the district; and a district special education teacher who was hired half-time. In addition, a part-time consultant was retained from a local university.

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[12] [Final draft of first 30 months proposal], pp. 75-78. A discussion of the Planned Program Budget Effectiveness Program and the later focus on CER is included in Chapter IV of this report.

Early activities were extensive. The multiplicity of project goals apparently led the director to attempt to anticipate a variety of potential data needs. Extensive student achievement and IQ tests, as well as general student and teacher attitude inventories were administered, in many cases across both project and non-project schools (the latter in anticipation of their eventual inclusion into the ESP). Specific measures were also taken of student and teacher attitudes towards district programs, such as the Interim and Occupational Versatility. Efforts were made to assess the congruence of various programs being implemented in the schools with project objectives.[13] The extent of these activities reflect the director's view of the eventual role evaluation would play in the district. As stated in a more specific plan for Level I operations developed during the first year of the ESP, the information to be gathered would be like a

> continium rather than a conclusion, and susceptible to judgment and needs of the institution, the superintendent, students, parents, and the greater community. Useful and meaningful data will be provided in every educational endeavor, from subject matter—accountability--staffing--to the 1/8500 member of the student body.[14]

The scope of these activities, both existing and planned, represented a major intrusion into a school system which had no prior input into the kinds of information being gathered, little experience with the physical demands of such activities, and no sense of their educational use. The director was sensitive to these issues and sought to legitimate Level I intrusions in terms of meeting the needs of a variety of clients. First, he stated that such data collection was required by OE "for now we need to feed information to Uncle Sam." It was also justified on the need to create an information system (especially the CER) for district decision making. It was also justified by promises to the local schools: "after we get this system functioning, we'll come into your buildings and help teachers assess their individual programs."[15] Development of these efforts, however, was beset by a host of problems.

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[13] These activities are discussed in Eixenberger, "Internal Evaluation," pp. 7-9.

[14] Superintendent, ESP Executive Director, and Director of Evaluation, "Evaluation," p. 4.

[15] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Elementary principals meeting, 10/12/71.

2. A Sea of Heterogeneity

The district's ESP proposal presented a diverse array of goals, but offered little specificity as to how those goals would be reached. The Level I director was initially tolerant of this ambiguity, stating that he would "put up with confusion now, as it is a precursor to fundamental change.... The main thing is to get the setting set up so people will have to change."[16] This notion was reflected in Level I activities throughout the first two years of the project--with the director playing a major role in staff training activities and searching for management by objective systems to be used in the district. He also assumed other roles, such as reviewing and validating major programs purchased by the district, and assisting in the development of the charrette.

However, the district's ESP was assuming hydralike dimensions: developments within each school became disparate from those in other schools; many bore little relationship to those objectives envisioned in the proposal. This created a continuing dilemma for Level I. On the one hand, Level I was committed to evaluating the ESP as defined in the proposal, in which the central issue was the projected development of the CER system; on the other hand, Level I was committed to providing evaluative services pertinent to program developments at the local building level. Both commitments assumed some common movement by the schools towards project goals--an assumption which was to prove unwarranted.

Various aspects of the proposal were being marginally implemented, including elementary prevocational education, environmental education, and drug education. The themes of interactive, reactive, and active learning environments were discovered by Level I to have a variety of definitions within each school with little meaningful relationship with what anyone was doing.[17] Level I efforts to track what was being done for gifted students, another ESP target group, disclosed that not only were there no identifiable programs, but also the term gifted had not been defined (ultimately Level I itself defined gifted as being two years above grade level in achievement). Presentation of this problem to the ESP Cabinet elicited the response from a principal: "I still ask, just because there's something in the project, does it mean there has to be a gifted program in each building?"[18] Later interviews with Level I staff disclosed that this was a persistent problem and was thought to be a source of resistance to Level I efforts. "These principals don't know what the objectives are and get upset when we try to refer to them....We try to tell them that we didn't write them, we just measure them."[19] The difficulty was that the data system was Level I's, based on the superintendent's objectives which had little relationship to the intent of what was happening in the buildings.

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[16] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Conversation with Level I director, 3/7/72.

[17] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Elementary teachers meeting, 7/13/72.

[18] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, ESP Cabinet meeting, 10/10/72.

Throughout this period, the director continued to exhort greater discipline in program development. He became overtly critical in warning teachers against "going shopping when you don't know what you're after, by looking at materials without clear sets of objectives in mind."[20] Much of this arose from the director's concern that purchased programs be susceptible to evaluation by Level I. One such program, for example, the Criterion Reading Program, had been stalled for some time because of the requirements that it be evaluated. This had apparently aroused the anger of both principals and the director of elementary education. While it was eventually approved, Level I's stance ran against that of the elementary education director whose position was, "Let's buy everything now while we can; we'll never have a chance again to afford all these materials."[21] The problem became critical for Level I as the idiosyncratic development of programs in the schools threatened the relevancy of Level I's standardized testing program.

3. Scarcity of Resources

The magnitude of the Level I task apparently was beyond the resources available for its fulfillment. The director initially had asked for a budget of approximately $240,000 for the first 30 months. But USOE cut this back to $120,000 on the ground that the external (Level II) evaluation would be doing many of the things envisioned by Level I. According to the director, this cut was made without any substantive considerations by OE as to what the respective tasks of the two levels of evaluation would be. He left the scope of Level I work intact in the final proposal and operated on the basis that as the project developed, this scope of work could be justified and more money would be possible.[22]

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[19] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with Level I staff member, 5/31/73.

[20] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Secondary teachers meeting, 2/23/72.

[21] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Elementary teachers meeting, 4/25/72.

[22] D. Eixenberger, Fieldnotes, Conversation with first Level I director, 1/13/76.

In the meantime, the director attempted to deal with this problem through a variety of tactics: school counselors were asked at times to administer the various tests; arrangements for cooperative data collection and sharing were sought with Level II; and analyses and reporting of much data was postponed. The success of these tactics was mixed. Use of counselors met with resistance, but was achieved with the support of the superintendent; Level II had not developed a plan acceptable to OE during the first year, making cooperation there uncertain. OE, itself, was unclear as to what stances the two Levels should take. Efforts to resolve this issue at a meeting of OE, Level I and II representatives from the three national ESP sites, and a panel of evaluation specialists failed to resolve the ambiguity. Postponement of the reporting schedule, while permitting the continued collection of data, risked providing untimely and, hence, less useful information to the district.[23]

Ultimately Level I pushed for a larger evaluation budget. OE acknowledged that Level I was underfunded, but stated that an increase could only be made through transfer of monies from some component within the ESP budget. In the spring of 1972, Level I's first 30 month budget was increased from $120,000 to $258,702 by transferring funds from the district's dissemination budget. With this increase, Level I added two evaluation staff members and purchased unit record equipment to provide some internal data processing capability.[24]

3. Client Related Issues

Level I attempted to legitimate its activities on the basis of client needs. Large scale data gathering efforts and their intrusions into district operations were justified in part, on the basis of USOE's need for information on the progress of the project. However, this rationale was undercut by the USOE itself, which denied any informational demands from Level I and stated that the director need not worry about incessant reporting, since USOE had never asked for that.[25]

Level I activities were also justified on the basis of the value of resultant information for each school building. But, given the resource problems, many Level I reports, such as those on CTBS (Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills, the district-administered achievement tests) were initially reported to the schools as tabular results. Detailed interpretive reports relating to ESP development were made a year or more after their administration. Questions also rose about the appropriateness of the CTBS in measuring student achievement in the IPI program. Teachers in other programs questioned the usefulness of information provided by the CTBS and complained that they still didn't know what skills students brought with them into the classroom. Some principals had strong reservations about the student affective questionnaires used by Level I, because of what they perceived as the "negativism" of various questions.[26] Other reports appeared of low utility, presenting prolific numbers of tables with little interpretation. Still other reports presented information by school with no breakdown by grade or classroom. Many reports simply were not read.

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with Level I Director, 10/12/72.

Central administrative relationships were less distressed. The superintendent supported the director's effort to develop the CER system. The two worked in close liaison. The director took on many project developmental and administrative tasks (such as the charrette). The director also made himself readily available for handling ad hoc requests by the superintendent for information, which often called for nonscheduled data gathering activities.[27]

However, relationships between the director and other central office administrators were somewhat strained. Level I's disclosure that project developments were not meeting the letter or the spirit of the proposal made principals and the curriculum directors of elementary and secondary education potentially vulnerable. Program validation activities also created ostensible conflict with the elementary director in particular. Efforts by Level I to develop the CER system led to close scrutiny of the district's accounting system, potentially threatening the image of the business department. Indeed, an external review of the district accounting system revealed gross inadequacies for existing needs, let alone the development of a CER system.[28]

During the 1972-73 school year, relationships between the director and the superintendent also showed strain. Both verbally and in reports, the director continued to emphasize the lack of progress on a number of objectives. CE itself was becoming increasingly critical of the project's lack of comprehensive development. Yet the creation of the ESP Cabinet had solidified the autonomy of the principals. The director again raised the issue to the superintendent's cabinet: "How can I evaluate and compare the effects of programs in the schools if they are not working toward the same objectives?" The director of secondary education implied that there were too many cooks in the broth for such issues to get straightened out by him. The director of elementary education replied that systems would just have to be developed to include all the objectives of the various schools. In considering overall project development, the superintendent commented

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Eixenberger, "Internal Evaluation," pp. 19-20.

[28] See Chapter IV; also T. L. Donicht, "Jefferson Experimental Schools Project: A Fiscal Orientation," July 1976.

> We just want to test a big hypothesis that we can reduce the number of students who are two years below grade level and maintain the rest at grade level while shortening the school year to spend time on fifth day Interim subjects.

He further stated that Level I would just have to gather more complex data on some schools to add to the standardized test information.[29]

The dilemma had crystallized: Level I could define a complex of treatments at each school and evaluate them uniquely, or ignore the uncommonality of objectives and treatments to test the "big hypothesis."

D. The Transitional Phase: 1973-74

The second 30 months of the district's ESP called for the expansion of the project to all 13 schools. This expansion would create greater demands on the Level I effort, the fulfillment of which posed even greater complications for the unresolved problems encountered in the first two years. Existing personnel and hardware apparently were insufficient to complete many tasks already begun, let alone those projected.

According to the director, these problems were caused by a variety of factors: (1) the lack of systematic and centralized record keeping; (2) lack of central information processing system, resulting in pools of data (including program cost data) which were difficult to access, blend and correlate; and (3) the data needs of Level I which often required unique collection efforts resulting in duplication of information.[30]

To deal with these problems and to enable Level I to provide both projectwide and individual programmatic evaluation, the director proposed creation of a massive unified data collection, management, and evaluation system. This would not only provide evaluative services, but would also include most of the business office functions, personnel record keeping, and an extensive student information system. Such a system, he felt, also would have the potential to provide evaluative and data processing services to clients outside the district. To create such a system, he proposed the acquisition of a computer and an increase in Level I personnel, allowing for a "building facilitator" at each school. These facilitators would be responsible for documenting program developments and insuring the systematic flow of data to and from the schools.

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[29] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Superintendent's cabinet. 11/1/72.

[30] Director of Evaluation, "Upgrading of Evaluation Data Processing Equipment," Memorandum to NIE/ESP project officer, September 28, 1973.

Support for this proposal was mixed. The director felt the superintendent was in favor of it, because it would aid in the development of the CER; the superintendent had also expressed commitment to spending $100,000 a year of district funds after ESP to keep the effort alive. Support elsewhere was less certain: there was fear that the business office would see such a system as an infringement; the assistant superintendent expressed concern over the costs it would impose upon the district after the ESP; building principals were concerned over who would control the building facilitators; and several principals felt strongly that reducing the student/teacher ratio was more important than spending money for evaluation.[31]

Following negotiations with the newly formed NIE the idea of building facilitators was rejected on the basis that their tasks were unclear and that such an addition of personnel might pose problems after the project was over.[32] The computer was approved by the district along with the addition to the Level I staff of two programmers, three data processing clerks, and one evaluation specialist. NIE allowed ESP monies to pay for 100 percent of computer leasing costs through June 1974, 75 percent through June 1975, and 50 percent through June 1976, the final year of the project. The superintendent agreed to this arrangement with the stipulation that the computer would be used also for non-evaluative services proportional to the district's share of the costs.

Final negotiations for the remaining 30 months of the ESP resulted in a Level I budget of $536,000--over twice the first 30 months budget. The chairman of the ESP Cabinet, when reviewing this budget, was to remark, "[Level I director] is the only smart guy here. He can get one budget rejected [that for the building representatives] and then rework it and get more money."[33] This comment was perhaps elicited by the fact that expansion of the ESP to all 13 district schools had resulted in cutbacks in other areas of the ESP, including the amount allotted to each school.

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[31] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, ESP Cabinet meeting, 5/8/73.

[32] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, District administrative meeting, 5/7/73.

[33] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, District administrative meeting, 5/22/73.

However, at this stage, another fundamental change occurred in the composition of Level I: the director resigned in order to take a field position with NIE. The university based consultant to Level I was then hired as the new director in the winter of 1974.

E. Final Phase: 1974-76

The task commitments of Level I for the final two and one-half years of the ESP were extensive, and most of these were dependent on computer operations. Four major areas of work were seen by the new director: student accounting systems, personnel accounting systems, financial administration systems, and evaluation systems.

Development of these systems posed a major expenditure of effort by Level I. The new computer had only been on board for two months when the new director assumed the position, and much debugging remained to be done. Internal staff training and orientation was still necessary. Existing evaluation staff had little or no experience with computerized data processing requirements, and new programmers had no prior experience in an educational evaluation context.

Data collected over the first two and one-half years of the project were yet to be processed into a form appropriate for transfer to the computer; continuing data collection and processing would have to be geared and coordinated to the development of the systems envisioned and the vagaries of computer developments. These tasks required not only appropriate research, evaluation and system analysis skills, but also a high level of administrative capability. Although the new director had amply demonstrated research and evaluation skills, neither he nor the programmers were trained computer system analysts, nor had the director had much administrative or public school experience.

When the new director assumed the position, the plan was to have the previous director maintain part-time involvement with the Level I effort. It was the new director's understanding that the previous director would be responsible for the development of the CER system. However, the NIE project officer disclaimed this and, within a few months, removed the previous evaluation director from all formal Level I involvement.[34]

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[34] D. Eixenberger, Fieldnotes, Conversation with second Level I Director, 1/15/76.

External problems encountered by Level I still persisted. Diffuse development of the project continued. During refunding, NIE endeavored to create greater programmatic identification and integrity. The result was the creation of the "stream" approach; but this again was a rhetorical overlay supplied by the superintendent and had no practical impact on the idiosyncratic programmatic developments in the schools. The dilemma of identifying clients and specified services to be provided those clients remained unresolved. Yet, Level I was to make even greater data gathering demands upon a system which was not convinced of the utility of evaluation. Complicating the issue was the continued delay in reporting the data already collected by Level I.

1. Early Activities: 1974

Through the spring and summer of 1974, most Level I energies were directed toward developing data processing capabilities. Yet few reports requiring computer processing were made. Setting up the various files for the information system encountered some early problems. Schools were using different formats for recording data. Changes discovered in the format and content instruments used by Level I complicated efforts at longitudinal analyses. Inexperienced personnel were having continuing difficulties "debugging" the computer and setting up programs. The problem, in part, involved a major overcommitment of effort--well over 50 different jobs were in some stage of development.[35]

Throughout 1974, the new director was aware that tolerance for evaluation was declining throughout the district and he admitted that, with the acquisitions of the computer, expectations for rapid delivery of services had escalated markedly, but evaluation had "repeatedly fallen short in meeting deadlines for products from the computer."[36]

To deal with this shortcoming, the new director instituted an internal management system for computer operations and attempted to prioritize staff workload. Externally, an evaluation committee was formed at the director's initiative to work with the ESP Cabinet in clarifying evaluation's role and exploring the problem of making evaluation useful at the school level (see Chapter IV). Efforts were also made to secure outside contracts to ease the potential financial burden of evaluation after ESP.

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[35] Eixenberger, "Internal Evaluation," pp. 26-28.

[36] Superintendent, Cabinet Chairman, and ESP Disseminator, "Experimental Schools Project, Quarterly Report #5," October 1, 1974.

2. Overt Criticism

Criticism of Level I and general skepticism about evaluation increased. ESP cabinet members felt evaluation was costing too much and was being subsidized by the district, and could not see how evaluation was helping them. Yet, few were willing to define how evaluation might be made useful, stating only that it should be programmatic. At an administrative retreat in the fall of 1974, the feeling was that Level I had a research orientation which was not compatible with the schools. The superintendent, citing the need for "instant turn-around" of Level I tasks, suggested that the idea of tracking students should be abandoned "as too detailed and complex to be obtainable," and that school staff judgments and perceptions should be relied on in developing a cost-effectiveness measure. During the retreat, the principals and one central office administrator prioritized the degree to which each of 13 areas of district operations should be cut back fiscally in the 1975-76 and 1976-77 school years. For 1975-76, the group rated evaluation as a "proportionate" cutback. For 1976-77, when ESP funds would not be available, evaluation was rated midway between a "major" and "total" cutback. Commitment to evaluation beyond the ESP was virtually non-existent, and Level I was left with virtually no guidance for specific action.[37]

3. Attempts to Recoup

Strenuous efforts were made to counter the growing skepticism. Despite shaky beginnings, the evaluation committee, composed of the Level I director, the special education director, four principals, and three teachers (none of whom were among those most vocally critical of Level I) was established to review Level I's effort. At the director's initiative, with review by the evaluation committee, two major lines of activity were pursued by Level I: (1) the development of an instructional profile instrument, which was an attempt to define the instructional characteristics of the various programs throughout the district and to gauge the degree of ESP impact upon those programs, both based on teachers' perceptions of the program and (2) the development of a needs assessment process for evaluative services in the district. The instructional characteristics profile was an attempt to create a substantive core upon which to base the CER system (initiated at the suggestion of the superintendent); the needs assessment was to provide a guide for the recommendations to the cabinet for future evaluative activities. However, neither instrument was to be administered until the spring of 1975.

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[37] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, Administrative retreat, 10/7/74.

Meanwhile, Level I attempted to respond to the call for more specific services at the building level. A student progress tracking system for the mathematics segment of the IPI program was created for two district elementary schools. A movement toward evaluating student performance began in the district's mathematics and communications management systems. However, efforts of this nature were to be abandoned.[38]

4. Continuing Pressure

Level I internal problems continued during the 1974-75 school year. Because of staff turnover, the director was the only person remaining who had been employed by the district during the entire ESP life span. The workload severely stretched resources, and staff morale was apparently low. While some computer programs were in operation, control of the quality of some data going into those programs was poor. For example, some changes in various measurement instruments had not been accounted for in subsequent analyses. Due to such problems reprogramming and reruns of analyses were frequently required.

External pressure continued in two veins: the increasing demands on Level I by various ESP Cabinet members to stipulate the specific costs to the district of its various services; and to decrease the turnaround time of those services. The director stated he was unable to ascertain specific costs, maintaining that the complex intertwining of the various phases of Level I operations prevented delineation of specific program costs such as operation of the student information system. Despite efforts to solve the turnaround problem, Level I was still unable to provide timely reports on many data gathering activities.

Relationships between the director and the superintendent had also reached a low ebb. Whereas the previous director and the superintendent generally had been in close liaison, with the former making himself available for a variety of ad hoc services, the second director had a more distant relationship. While this may have been due in part to the outgoing developmental role taken by the first director, in marked contrast to the more neutral, research oriented role of the second director, another reason loomed larger. With the apparent failure of Level I to meet district expectations, however vaguely expressed, evaluation had increasingly become a liability to the superintendent. Doubts concerning its eventual feasibility were now widespread, especially with the district paying half the costs of the computer. Skepticism concerning the competencies of the evaluation staff was openly expressed by various principals. The assistant superintendent for business felt that intermixing evaluative services with business operations had resulted in so much confusion as to preclude the development of a

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[38] Eixenberger, "Internal Evaluation," pp. 31-33.

CER system. District counselors were reputed to be dissatisfied with the use of the CTBS for their needs and wished to go back to the multiple tests used prior to the ESP.[39] Major criticism came from the superintendent himself in November of 1974. Responding to the lack of information available to the phase-out committee, which Level I was to provide, he stated, "It may be meaningless, but we expected to have it."[40]

5. Final Effort

To an extent, the director hinged the future of Level I on the needs assessment for evaluation conducted in the spring of 1975, on the recommendations by the evaluation committee for Level I activities in 1975-76, and on the proposed development of a system of regional computer systems being sponsored by the state superintendent of public instruction's office.

The needs assessment was designed to pinpoint evaluative services found useful by the recipients and to gauge whether those services warranted fiscal support by the district after the ESP. Results of this survey, while indicating that some Level I services were found useful, disclosed widespread dissatisfaction with the failure to produce timely deliveries of those services and noted that turnaround time was often so long that the results were relatively useless when received. Even where services were thought to be useful, willingness to support such services with district funds was considerably lower.

The potential development of a regional educational computer center by the state office of public instruction posed an opportunity for external funding for maintenance of the district's computer and evaluation after the ESP. Through Level I initiative, a feasibility study of the district's capacity was conducted by an external agency in the spring of 1975. Their final report had crucial implications for Level I. Management and control of data processing functions were found to be weak, with no formal or informal standards for systems design, programming, acceptance testing, or documentation. District demands for computer services were minimal and would diminish once the evaluative requirements of the ESP were met. It was concluded that the district would achieve substantial savings by eliminating the computer as soon as possible.[41]

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[39] Pierce, "Fourth Year Governance Report."

[40] D. R. Pierce, Fieldnotes, ESP, Cabinet meeting, 11/12/74.

[41] Compass Management Group, "Jefferson School District, Study of Data Processing," August 1975.

6. Withdrawal of Support

In the face of these events, support for Level I all but vanished during the 1974-75 school year. Based on the needs assessment, recommendations for evaluation activities for 1975-76 were made by the evaluation committee to the ESP Cabinet. The cabinet rejected, out-of-hand, recommendations to expand the student tracking system, Level I involvement in the various management by objective systems, and student attitude assessment.[42]

Based on the feasibility study, the decision was made to eliminate the computer. This decision, made essentially by the superintendent, altered dramatically the functions of the Level I unit as envisioned by the initial director. Level I would retain the computer only as long as it took to do the data processing necessary to make some kind of CER statement for the ESP and to unload the data needed by the district. Through the fall of 1975 the director and necessary staff would concentrate their energies to accomplish this. The computer itself would be returned to the company in January 1976.

The unit record keeping equipment would be moved to the central office administration. CTBS testing and the evaluation of categorically funded programs would no longer be the direct responsibility of Level I. During the 1975-76 school year, and presumably after ESP, these functions would be the responsibility of a coordinator of testing and evaluation, a new position located in the district office. The coordinator would be directly responsible to the central office administration. This position was filled by a Level I staff member who had just completed an administrative internship in the district concurrent with his Level I duties. He was to continue providing some assistance to Level I in the development of the CER system through 1975-76. Consequently, half his salary was to be paid from ESP funds, and half from other district sources. In essence, then, Level I activities would be curtailed during the final year of the ESP.

7. The Final Year

Internal evaluation in the district underwent organizational changes during the final year of the ESP. As planned, there now was a Coordinator of Testing and Evaluation, organizationally and physically separate from the Level I unit and directly responsible to the district superintendent. During 1975-76, he administered the CTBS achievement test and carried out the evaluation of the district's Title I programs. Both of these activities involved some consultation and coordination with the Level I director.

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[42] Pierce, "Fourth Year Governance Report," pp. 36-38.

The Level I unit underwent changes in personnel in the last year of the project. Two evaluators left for other positions; with the removal of the computer, two other technicians left. Level I then was reduced to the director, a three-quarter time consultant, two technical assistants and three clerical assistants. To replace the computer, a smaller desk computer was purchased.

A variety of evaluative efforts were made. These consisted of analyzing and reporting results of 1974-75 data such as elementary affective testing, assessment of the district's "Innovative Science" program, student attitudes towards the district music program, and attitudes towards the Interim. Conversions were also made of the 1974 CTBS form R scores, necessitated by the lack of equivalence between Q and R forms (form Q had been administered by the district in other years). Scoring and analyses were also completed for the district's "comprehensive survival skills" test in mathematics. Additional efforts included assessing the effect of the ESP on reducing the proportions of high risk students (those two years or more behind in grade level)[43] and on transient students' achievement.

Major work continued on the development of a CER statement. This had been renamed a "Source Book" and was to include: (1) a brief description of each course; (2) an instructional characteristics profile (based on data gathered in the spring of 1975, to be updated annually); (3) student outcome data based on achievement gains and affective data; and (4) costs.

Through the latter half of 1975-76, a variety of preliminary reports formed the nucleus of the Source Book. These were based on the 1974-75 instructional characteristics profile for elementary, junior high and senior high courses in terms of programmatic streams of instruction (i.e., social studies, math, science, communications, personal development and career development). Measures of ESP impact were derived on the basis of whether teachers perceived their courses as revised or added through ESP support and whether or not they perceived those revisions as improving the quality of those courses in terms of course content, teaching methods, and student outcomes. The extent of ESP impact was defined as the percentage of all courses revised or added through ESP support. The quality of this impact was measured by comparing teacher judgments of improvement for those courses revised or added with those continued unaltered during the project. The reports generally concluded that ESP had relatively greater impact at the elementary school level than at the secondary level.

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[43] JSD, "Evaluation Report #34, The Effect of the Experimental Schools Project in Reducing the Proportions of High Risk Students in the Jefferson School District," June 1976. This report concluded that the population of high risk students had not been reduced during the ESP. Transient student achievement had not been reported at this writing.

Thus, considerable movement had been made in the fifth year of the ESP in a variety of areas. The results of these efforts were received favorably by the district; the superintendent was particularly impressed with the report of ESP impact on the elementary schools.[44]

In many respects, Level I had resolved some of its earlier difficulties. With the removal of the computer and the reduction of activities from development of a central information and service center, Level I was able to concentrate its energies more directly on specific evaluative tasks. Turnaround time on reports was shorter; the reports themselves provided more detail in presentation and discussion of data than they had in the past (in terms of school, grade level, and stream). Some specific programmatic evaluation was made, such as math, science and music programs; there was also movement toward evaluating achievement of high risk and transient students. But despite this movement, there is no evidence that the information provided played a part in district decision making.

Time was now running short for the development of the Source Book. The refocusing of effort had resulted in an underexpenditure of the Level I budget. The district negotiated with NIE and was granted an extension of the Level I contract for six months to use unexpended monies. During this extension, the Source Book and the final summary Level I report were to be completed.

8. The Future

At this writing, Level I planned to complete the Source Book and its final summary report during the six-month extension period. After that, there is no evidence that the district plans to continue the position of a Level I director. The coordinator of testing and evaluation is to continue with the achievement testing and categorical program evaluation. The Level I director is to serve as a consultant to the district's Title IVC project. During this project, attempts will be made to develop a management information system to facilitate improved learning performance of students with learning disabilities and to test the effectiveness of three evaluation models. The effort apparently will be a further development of current work on the Source Book but with a focus on a targeted student population (i.e., disadvantaged learners).[45]

On the basis of these developments, the future of evaluation in the district remains unclear. At a minimum, it appears that the focus will be similar to that prior to the ESP: achievement testing and activities required by categorical funding.

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[44] Memorandum, Minutes of May 18, 1976 cabinet meeting, May 19, 1976.

[45] Letter of interest, SEEA, Title III proposal, Jefferson School District, November 14, 1975.

Beyond this, the future depends on the successful development of the Source Book which could provide district decision makers with additional evaluative information. However, at this time, there is no clear commitment on the part of the district to make the activities envisioned by the Source Book an integral, ongoing part of its evaluative effort. What overt commitment exists is represented by the Title IVC project.

F. Summary

This chapter covers events and issues pertinent to the district's efforts to develop a capacity for the internal evaluation of the ESP and to establish such an internal evaluation unit as an ongoing integral part of the "comprehensive change" effort promised by the ESP. During the ESP, it is apparent that the district failed at both. While a few specific programmatic changes were made through Level I activities, the overall direction of the project was virtually unaffected by Level I efforts. Continued evaluation as part of the "comprehensive change" effort remains unclear at this time. The focus as envisioned by the initial director was altered dramatically by the end of the project. And while developments may occur during the six months extension period which will affect the role of evaluation, the present indication is that evaluation beyond ESP will consist of achievement testing and categorical program evaluation necessary to qualify for governmental funds, both activities remarkably similar to pre-ESP activities.

The final two chapters of this report will provide a review and synthesis of the various elements and issues of the Jefferson ESP and derive implications of this change effort which may apply to other attempts of planned change in educational settings.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS

VIII. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS

This chapter has two main purposes as well as a subsidiary purpose. First, it recapitulates the events describing the ESP effort in Jefferson. A review of material from previous chapters will highlight salient issues within both the district and the NIE/ESP as they related to the inchoate stages of the ESP.

The second main purpose of this chapter is to determine what purposes the Jefferson ESP served. Preceding chapters suggest that those purposes were channeled by certain ongoing regularities within the district, and thus, were more influential in changing the ESP than the ESP was in changing the Jefferson School District. Though not manifestly intended, the project came to serve much the same purpose as the system of federal revenue sharing, in which federal funds are used for wide ranging, generally undesignated purposes.

This chapter also speculates why events turned out as they did and whether the course of events could have been different. Events at the district and the federal level are examined simultaneously. The concept of ESP as a form of educational policy is also addressed. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the conservative nature of educational innovation.

A. Recapitulation of Preceding Material

1. ESP at the National Level: A Program in Search of Clarification

The Experimental Schools Program began with great hopes and expectations, both nationally and locally. In October 1972, one year after the project began in the Jefferson School District, an article appeared in Saturday Review, touting the expected changes being attempted in Berkeley public school system under the auspices of ESP.[1] While attention was given mainly to the Berkeley site, the article mentioned Minneapolis and Jefferson, the two other sites funded at the same time. Perhaps with some degree of accuracy, the article said of the Jefferson site:

> By contrast, consider the experimental school project in Jefferson in which everything is neat, controlled, and predictable. Jefferson isn't going to make any mistakes, and Berkeley is making them all the time. But Jefferson isn't asking any of the big questions either and isn't likely to make a major change.

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[1] D. Divoky, "Berkeley Experimental Schools," Saturday Review, LV, October 1971, p. 50.

That the Jefferson ESP was thought to be a truly viable alternative to the standard public school system was evidenced by Ronald Corwin, who stated that alternatives within the public school system itself could serve as a challenge for other modes of public instruction to become "more responsive and accountable to a wider range of publics." Speaking of the ESP in the Jefferson schools, Corwin noted:

> In Jefferson, the schools operate on highly flexible scheduling. A child might go to school four days a week, or five mornings or afternoons. Depending on a computer assisted diagnosis of the instruction he needs, the student will be in school as little as 180 days or as much as 240 days in a year.[2]

The overall hopes for the Experimental Schools Program, as well as the specific project in Jefferson, were based upon the notion of "comprehensive change." As noted in Chapter II, the theme of comprehensive change was defined as "accounting for or comprehending virtually all pertinent conditions; e.g., including at a minimum all the significant elements of a formal educational program." In this respect, comprehensive change came to be considered as change activities which were to occur through all aspects of the school system and were meant to include not only curriculum, but also staffing, governance procedures, and community participation.

Why comprehensive change? Early literature from USOE indicated that one problem with American education (and particularly innovation in American education) was that too many activities occurred in a "piecemeal manner," that is as separate and unrelated efforts. The basis of comprehensive change was tied to the notion of "synergistic effort," and represented the first major objective of the ESP. Quite simply, the concept was that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and that changing one aspect of the educational environment without making simultaneous changes in other segments of that environment would continue to produce disappointing results.

A second goal of the ESP was to "identify and test the major policy questions which lend themselves to experimental solutions within the context of comprehensive as opposed to piecemeal experimentation."[3] Though some illustrative policy issues were raised (such as determining the degree of proper parental and/or student participation), in general, the subject of which other specific policy issues were to be tested remained open. Yet it was clear that the ESP was to be at least (1) a test of the notion of comprehensive change and (2) an opportunity to test various policy issues, however defined. As we shall see later, the ESP was a test of some critical educational policies, although not those originally conceived by the ESP staff.[4]

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[2] R. G. Corwin, Education in Crisis, (New York: Wiley, 1974), p. 280; Corwin based his statement on extant literature and never visited Jefferson himself.

[3] "Summary: Release of Funds for Experimental Schools Program," Memorandum, Experimental Schools Project, January 8, 1971, attached to above Memorandum re Release of funds.

Though the notion of comprehensive change earmarked the "distinctiveness" of ESP in its earliest days, another and perhaps more subtle characteristic was also evident. Heretofore, most federal programs in education had been contract-specific, as evidenced in Title I and III, awarding monies to school districts in order to solve certain definable problems; e.g., to assist children who could not read, to fund specific science projects, or to support specific mathematics techniques. The ESP, however, was to be a more "comprehensive change." Little was said about what types of programs would constitute comprehensive change, or what the criteria for comprehensiveness would be, only that the proposed program must be comprehensive, must have a central theme, and must facilitate extensive research and documentation.

The role of USOE vis-a-vis the recipient was different than in most federally supported educational programs. Rather than funding a project aimed at solving specific problems, USOE was funding an approach to change, and the OE staff saw the need to "walk down a very narrow path between client initiative and federal direction." A USOE memorandum stated the policy of federal direction and involvement:

> Total federal direction not only runs the risk of excluding many of the types of experiments which ought to be tried but also limits the amount of local commitment to a particular experiment. One must assume that the degree of energy and commitment necessary to give a fair test to any of the central themes chosen is unlikely to be generated by a "model" developed elsewhere and imposed on a local site....[5]

Following this approach, USOE gave considerable autonomy to local ESP sites for the development and eventual operationalization of the ESP. Great reliance was placed on the capacity of each local site to develop and implement its plan; in fact, the potentiality for self-direction was a criterion in the original choice of sites. While not explicitly stated, such an approach (consciously raised throughout the first two years of the project) was commensurate with the growing ideology in Washington, D.C. that the federal government was already too big and too heavy handed and that local decision makers knew best their own problems and how to handle them. In this respect, the ESP was not only a test of comprehensive change, but also of a new relationship between the federal government and local schools wherein the government assumed a low profile, granting to the local schools maximum discretion for designing and implementing the plan.[6] The issues of comprehensiveness and the relationship between the the USOE (later NIE) and the Jefferson School District were raised repeatedly, in one form or another, over the duration of the project.

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[4] The ideological roots of "comprehensiveness," as well as the partnership between NIE and local districts, will be discussed later in this chapter.

[5] "Summary, Release of Funds," p. 16.

2. ESP in Jefferson: A Project in Search of Clarification

Four associated issues, present in the early stages of the ESP, contributed ultimately to making the ESP a project in search of clarification, and set the stage for the ESP over the next five years: (a) the time allotted for planning and implementation (at both the federal and local level), (b) the notion of "past practices," (c) the problem of identifying a central theme, and (d) the nature of responses by Jefferson to the ESP proposal.

a. Time for Planning. As reviewed in Chapter II, the timeline between the appointment of a national ESP director and project implementation at ESP sites was extremely short, considering the five year commitment of over five million dollars. The ESP director was appointed in December 1970, and at that time the decision was made that an ESP characterized by a combination of promising practices would have to be implemented by the beginning of the next school year.[7] Almost 500 organizations responded to the call for letters of interest. The three sites to be included in Phase I were selected by early May 1971. Yet site selection took only four months.

More important, however, was the sharp compression on time on site. Within two weeks after receiving the original call for letters of interest, the district drafted a reply and sent it to OE (two weeks before the deadline). The draft was written by mainly the superintendent acting for the district; his actions were to have long-term ramifications. Regular meetings over the contents of the response involved from nine to twelve district personnel. In early February, after Jefferson received the notice of the planning grant of $10,000, the district had approximately two months to turn in a final proposal. Frequent meetings were scheduled within the district from mid-February to late March. Many participants later referred to the two months as a "blur," characterized by an urgency to get things done, with little indepth discussion of what was to be done. One principal criticized the entire planning process:

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[6] It is useful to note here that this low profile stance was not consistent or clear. For example, there was early mention of the need for "consistent monitoring by NIE/ESP itself." NIE, "Description," paper published sometime after June 1973, document in NIE files, p. 4. This "hands off--hands on" position vacillated over the first half of the project and was most visible in the establishment of the program cabinet. Thus, vacillation may be accounted for by the increasing political pressures NIE was facing and the demand by external critics for greater "accountability" from the agency. Whatever the reasons for the inconsistency in Washington, the ripples were felt in Jefferson.

[7] This probably occurred because the money had been appropriated and had to be allocated by the end of the fiscal year, or funds would revert to the Treasury Department.

> I think the whole problem with it is they went too fast. There wasn't enough time to look at things, to look around at what you wanted to do and choose the best way to go. Everybody rushed into things.[8]

The next year the superintendent said of the planning process, "We just had to do everything so fast that we couldn't be sure of every objective and every program. We've paid the price of that over and over this year."[9] Toward the end of the project, however, he looked back at the available time as adequate considering that much of the groundwork had been laid in previous district proposals.[10]

The time problem was equally recognized by the Office of Management and Budget, which criticized ESP by stating that "it is not at all clear that good projects can be operational with students by September 1971"; warned against the "unintegrated collection of disparate projects;" and called attention to the disturbing aspects of this "crash" program.[11] Despite these warnings, the ESP became operational in September 1971.

b. ESP as "Past Practices." A second factor endemic from the earliest days, and one having an immense influence on the direction of the J ESP, lay in the very nature of the ESP as a "combination of past and promising practices." As noted in chapter III, the Jefferson proposal was largely a compilation of programs which had either been ongoing within Jefferson and other school districts before the ESP proposal or which the superintendent and others had discussed favorably. The district's proposal emphasized the operation, not the development of an experimental schools program. Thus, the district was proposing that Jefferson combine a number of ongoing projects with some new ones previously discussed under the rubric of the ESP.[12] It was not proposing any radical departure from its past curricular practices, although it did propose to alter the school calendar somewhat through an extended school day/year, and alter staffing through a differentiated staffing program. The district newsletter of February 1971 stressed that the project was not based upon "developing a new program, but upon operating the many programs now established throughout the district."[13] One district administrator said, in reference to receiving the ESP grant, "The project allows us to do things we had begun."[14]

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[8] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with Principal, 1/12/71, p. 3.

[9] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with Superintendent, 7/10/72.

[10] Retrospective comments on planning time were made in a discussion with the NWREL staff on May 14, 1976.

[11] P. H. O'Neil, Chief, Human Resources Division, OMB, Letter to C. Miller, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Budget Office of the Secretary HEW, February 4, 1971.

Such a stance, apparently, was considered legitimate by USOE, in that it was part of Phase I. Some criteria to be met in applications for ESP funds included "demonstrated experience with educational innovations on a large scale," and "ease of adaptability, given time and resource constraints, to the experimental schools project,"[15] Understanding the time constraints in submitting proposals, and given the explicit tie of the legitimacy of past practice to experimentation, it should come as no surprise that many ongoing practices within Jefferson were conveniently subsumed under the ESP rhetoric.

c. The Central Theme. Third, the issue of the central theme reveals much about the earliest stages of the project. This issue was never resolved, and lack of resolution influenced the shape of the project for its duration. One of the stated criteria for an Experimental Schools site was that it had to be organized around a "central theme" which would "represent the range of alternatives"; "determine the components or dimensions of the experiment"; and "determine the value of the experiment."[16] The three sites eventually selected for funding were chosen subject to revision of the proposals. In the case of Jefferson, the proposal was felt to lack a "strong organizing principle" and to have only a "mix of components." In response, the district invented the slogan, "providing an appropriate environment for optimum learning for each student," a statement added to the proposal after funding had been assumed.

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[12] Decisions on what was included in the proposal were made rather haphazardly. As one administrator said:

> You have to consider what we did when we wrote this. Lifetime sports was put in there because a guy who assisted in writing the project was a nut on it. He made sure it got in. Environmental Education was very big so we put that in. Groups around here in the community were concerned with drugs, so we put in Drug Education. Everybody says kids aren't involved, so we put in Student-Teacher-Developed Curriculum. Then to wind it up we put in Individualized Education.

F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with administrator, 11/30/72.

[13] District internal newsletter, February 1971, p.3.

[14] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with administrator, 1/14/72.

[15] Letter from HEW/USOE. Basic Program Information, December 28, 1970, pp. 3-4.

[16] Memorandum re Release of Funds for Experimental Schools Program, January 8, 1971.

In retrospect, the addition of this theme seemed to do little more than meet the technical requirement of a central theme for ESP proposals. Despite OE's admission that the addition of a central theme after the fact would provide an "artificial unity (that) would have been spurious,"[17] the theme was added. Its superimposition on the proposal could in no way determine the dimensions or value of the experiment.

The central theme and its inclusion, especially the manner in which it was included, pointed out the fact that the proposal itself, while including some very enticing dimensions, really represented little more than the "mix of components" noted by OE. It addressed the issue of "comprehensive change" only through a number of inferences about how one dimension related to another. With the late addition of a central theme, one might question what specific problem(s) was to be solved through the ESP. Though a number of student, institutional, and dissemination needs were mentioned, these did not reflect problems to be solved as a result of the ESP. As funded, the project seemed to lack a definable purpose, other than to combine a series of past practices under the rubric of "providing an appropriate learning environment for each student."

d. The Dynamics of the District Response. The ESP as a program in search of clarification becomes even more evident when critical factors within the Jefferson district during the writing of the proposal are examined. Schools were not bound to implement all aspects of the ESP proposal, but could pick and choose among a variety of programs and approaches.

Accordingly, each school acted autonomously in deciding how the ESP proposal, written largely by the superintendent, was to be actualized.

The range of discretion was demonstrated when three of the four west-side elementary schools decided to implement an IGE model, while one other school remained with the standard self-contained classroom. The principal of the school which did not opt for IGE stated, "I couldn't see my staff doing it and I was not interested in doing it myself."[18] That particular school decided against "openness" and the theory of ungraded classes, preferring instead to keep students within the self-contained classroom, although some of the individualized programs evidenced in the IGE school were present in the non-IGE school as well. It is interesting that this principal proposed his plan with some reservations, being unsure that it would fit the notion of the ESP outlined in the preliminary proposals or that it would be accepted by the superintendent. In retrospect, though, he said, "If you are clear about what you want to do, the superintendent will allow you to do it."[19]

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[17] Selection Committee, documents from NIE files no date or author, p. 1.

[18] R. M. Toepper, "A Study of Curricular Decision Making in the J ESP," December 15, 1975, p. 57.

While each school made decisions about which programs to propose and adopt somewhat independently of each other, there is little record of these proposals being coordinated effectively in the district central office before the start of the actual project, as there was little challenge from either the director of elementary or secondary education as to a program's appropriateness whether more appropriate programs existed (there was some attempt at coordination after the program began, as noted in Chapter VI). Thus, whatever the notion of comprehensive change was, it did not appear to motivate the choice of program in each school.[20]

A second factor related to the purposes and mission of the ESP was the underlying issue of district finance. The fiscal base of the district was described in some detail in Chapter 1. As described in Chapter IV, the trend before the ESP was a steady increase in the use of local funds (which could only be obtained by local levies) in order to meet the accompanying decrease in state funds.

In general, the school district personnel had little reason to hope that state support would increase; they also knew that monies derived from local funds were increaseingly hard to get, especially since districts only had two chances each year to pass a budget. Jefferson was reminded constantly of the precariousness of local funding by the history of the immediately adjacent district, which passed local levies with decreasing frequency. No wonder then, that the superintendent, upon sending the final draft of the proposal to Washington, D. C., told the board that the proposal "if funded, (would) be an important factor in keeping the district solvent."[21]

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[19] Ibid., p. 58.

[20] Whether the autonomy in the planning process was by design or default is difficult to say with certainty. We suspect that it was a combination of both. First, it fit into the basic trend within the district of allowing principals to make more choices relative to the operation of their schools. Yet, the district did not have the resources, capability, or tradition to bring about large scale instructional coordination of the type suggested by the ESP proposal. Nevertheless, the implication is clear in preliminary proposals, that each school had proposed activities in the 10 major instructional components for all students, an assertion which was dramatically overstated. See Superintendent and the Project Planning Team, "Project Promise: Programming Resources to Operate a Model Instruction System in Education," J SD, an application to the Department of HEW for an operations grant under provisions of the Experimental Schools Program, planning project OEG-0-71-1214, project number 18049, [original draft of first 30 month proposal], submitted April 10, 1971.

A final problem, which was to have an important effect on the project's future, was the reaction by teachers and the teachers' association to crucial elements of the proposal. Two key factors centered around the proposal for differentiated staffing and the extended school day/year. These two items provided the potential flexibility in teaching assignments and learning activities needed to operationalize the notion of "an appropriate learning environment for each child." (Chapter III documents the cautious response by the Jefferson Education Association to the concepts of differentiated staffing and extended school day and year). Basically, the association rejected the propcsed model of differentiated staffing, fearing it would eventually lead to a reduction in the number of certified positions within the district. The notion of an extended school day/year was supported, but only with significant reservations.

e. Discussion. The Jefferson ESP, considered in relation to the ESP as a national program, suffered from serious deficiencies even before it began. The project became operational in what seemed to be a very short period of time, offering little opportunity for the deliberation of mission and purpose. Jefferson was given only 60 days to make a final proposal, certainly a short time considering the significance of a five-year project. The main purpose of the project, "comprehensive change," was only vaguely articulated at the national level, and the planning process within Jefferson with the "school by school" approach demonstrated little understanding of "comprehensive change." The seemingly contradictory notions of an "experiment" utilizing successful "past practices" seemed to belie the fact that the project would ever become much more than a melange of previously existing programs gathered under one rubric (a fact which was admitted repeatedly by district officials). More comprehensive programs or practices (such as differentiated staffing or radically altered school calendars) were seriously questioned by the teachers' association. Underlying all these concerns was the fact that the school district was suffering from declining state revenues and anticipating even harder times. From the district officials' point of view, the enticingly large amount of money the ESP would bring to the district compensated for the ambiguities and contradictions of the program and its cautious receptivity by teachers. Yet, the ambiguity about what the ESP was came to affect the very operation of the district, as our review of governance illustrates.

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[21] J SD, Minutes of the regular meeting of the Jefferson Board of Directors, April 18, 1971, p. 48.

3. Governance

The original proposal contained little more than passing reference to how the project would be governed. Essentially, all that was anticipated was that the superintendent would serve as project director, with an executive director to take care of day-to-day operations.[22] In this sense, the project was envisioned to run much the same as the district had operated before, administered by the superintendent and his designated subordinate, with the schools running their own programs. The organizational chart in the final first 30 month proposal even described ESP governance essentially as an appendage to ongoing school district operations, with the superintendent 57 days per year to administer the contract.

This pattern of some functions being centralized while others were decentralized, typified early years of governance, and in fact mirrored the very planning of the ESP. As discussed in Chapter III, the ESP letter of interest was written almost totally by the superintendent. Yet, the planning of the project at the school level was done independently by building principals, with relatively little concern for any comprehensive, articulated, districtwide plan--a fact acknowledged by USOE staff in a December 1971 site visit report: "The perspective that each principal and school staff has of the Experimental Schools Program is defined by program components and money available to and implemented in a given school."[22] The first year of governance, with schools administering their own programs under the direction of the superintendent and the executive director, thus continued the relatively autonomous operation conceived by the superintendent.

However, after about six months, USOE/ESP felt that the project's progress was not satisfactory. Part of the problem lay in the resurrection of the notion of "comprehensive change" or what was sometimes synonomously referred to as "articulation." During the spring of 1972, the superintendent traveled to Washington, D.C. to discuss the issue of project governance. Upon his return, he noted, "for the first time I began to get an idea of what they meant by it; I had never had any idea before [underlining added], except that it might mean K-12 curriculum guides. But they were very clear that wasn't what they meant in Washington..."[24] Later, the OE project officer related to a NWREL staff member that the focus in the district was unclear, that secondary teachers met in departments and elementary teachers met in grade level or subject interest groups. In keeping with the non-directed approach, USOE staff didn't feel it was their place to tell the superintendent what he should do in order to bring about collective conscience. In fact, they realized that as an "outsider" the superintendent would have trouble taking too direct control over the project. Recognizing the power of district principals, the USOE official noted, "He [the superintendent] has to go the way he sees best, particularly when he is dealing with this informal power structure."[25]

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[22] The superintendent mentioned that he once envisioned appointing a project consultant as project director, but that the idea never went beyond the possibility stage.

[23] B. Rose, "Report on December Visit to Jefferson Experimental Schools Project," internal USOE/ESP memorandum, January 13, 1972, Document in NIE files.

[24] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 5/15/72, p. 2.

a. Program Cabinet. The idea of the program cabinet for providing the project with comprehensive direction emerged during "Yalta I." After formation of the cabinet, OE officials were optimistic about its function as a useful forum through which to bring about comprehensive districtwide planning and raise the level of consciousness of district administrators about the project as a districtwide effort and part of a national project. One OE official said,

> We hope the members themselves will continue the enthusiasm they showed in the retreat. We hope they will bring up issues that concern them, and confront each other on matters of school program rather than just letting each person have his own way. Their fear of invasion of their own school autonomy will have to be overcome if they are going to work together.[26]

The development of the cabinet over five years indicates that the forum was only minimally successful in bringing about a unified direction to the project. It is true that the cabinet did serve to bring principals from the various schools together and that it facilitated their interaction about various aspects of the projects development. In the same sense, cabinet meetings also permitted greater sharing of information about activities in the various schools--information that may have been disseminated had the cabinet not existed. On the other hand, if a purpose of the cabinet was to force members to confront each other on matters of the district program rather than to let each person do things his own way, then the information in Chapter IV indicates that such did not occur.

There are a number of reasons for this, one of which pertains to the processes within the cabinet itself. First, the cabinet's procedures were oriented towards individuals, with items being discussed among the relevant parties rather than among the body as a whole. For example, discussions about the addition or continuation of programs were held among the affected parties, with the other cabinet members remaining marginally involved. Secondly, items were discussed in a chronological fashion with little prioritizing in order of importance. Finally, the cabinet rarely evaluated its own processes but instead relied on getting the job done in the most expeditious fashion. These processes, coupled with the fact that the cabinet usually acted on information provided at the meetings rather than in advance, made its existence more reactive than proactive. In terms of process alone, then, the cabinet did not act with project criteria guiding its actions, but rather on a case by case basis with the merits of each case deciding the outcomes.

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[25] F. Mulhauser, Interview with project officer, 6/22/72, p. 2.

[26] Ibid., p. 8.

Programmatic assessment was avoided in another fashion as illustrated by the relationship between cabinet members (representing the 13 schools) and non-school based components. The district's evaluation component was one of those non-school based agencies that received considerable cabinet scrutiny, especially during the fourth year of the project. This scrutiny in part, resulted from the perceived non-utility of evaluation functions as well as the potential challenges of school-by-school comparisons to individual building programs. Another agency receiving particularly strong criticism from the cabinet and superintendent was the district's special education component--an agency whose independence from the ongoing district procedures was being threatened by diminishing fiscal support from the state. The cabinet attempted to bring these agencies into the general purview of regular district operations; however, considerable open conflict developed over these issues and ultimately both agencies scheduled for phase out with their functions being absorbed into existing district offices.

The difference between the rhetoric as a forum to control and coordinate the ESP across the district and its acutal role wherein individual schools were afforded considerable discretion again was portrayed when the refunding proposal was submitted to NIE. As noted earlier, NIE desired that the building principals qua cabinet have maximal authority and accountability for the project. To implement the desired accountability, NIE asked the superintendent to have each principal write his section of the refunding proposal as it applied to his particular school, rather than being responsible for the entire proposal himself, as occurred in the first round. This involved incorporating the "stream" concept into the organization of each of the 13 sections pertaining to each school.

This move was designed to provide the cabinet with greater unity, direction, and accountability for the districtwide operation of the ESP, yet, many principals saw writing a plan for their individual schools as a burden they did not wish to assume. One principal commented that this exercise was a waste of time and added, "I just want to know when I can order my paper for next year."[27] Another commented, "We're not trained for that (writing proposals); we're trained to be administrators."[28] In most instances, then, the principals did not view writing the refunding document as an act to broaden their power base, but rather as an activity not in their area of expertise--one that they would rather have the superintendent perform.

The operation of the "phase-out committee" also illustrates the propensity for district administrators to deal with those ESP funded activities shared across the district and to leave untouched those within the purview of individual buildings. This committee, appointed by the cabinet, supported a proposal by the superintendent to the cabinet that each school be given authority to decide which program would be continued or dropped, based on the needs of that school. This would be accomplished by increasing the lump sum budget allocation to each school by $20 per pupil, thus providing principals with the fiscal resources to determine program continuance. Accordingly, districtwide programmatic concerns did not have to enter the deliberations, but schools could act independently with minimal outside constraints.

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[27] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 5/15/73.

[28] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 3/20/73.

b. Non-Cabinet Activities. Governance beyond the cabinet was rather simple and straightforward. The superintendent and deputy superintendent were the two key administrators, each with relatively separate domains which they controlled rather tightly. The superintendent had responsibility for the whole system, but spent considerable time dealing with external agencies and generating external funds. The deputy superintendent controlled personnel and support services. While these functions were centralized, others were more decentralized. Individual principals enjoyed considerable autonomy over curricular, instructional, and pupil control practices. The existence and increases in lump sum budgets over the duration of the ESP provided principals with more autonomy as increased discretionary funds led to more independence from the districtwide constraints.

Yet, principals were powerless over personnel and support services, as the deputy superintendent could consult or not consult them in allocating staff and material to the school. Individual principals often tested their powers to make decisions at the school level against the centralized powers of the deputy superintendent to control maintenance services. This subtle push-pull gave even more meaningful importance to the discretionary funds that the principals did control.

The autonomy of the individual principal was perhaps most dramatically reflected in the ESP budget. While the cabinet was given the responsibility of directing the project, spending patterns indicated that substantial money was allocated to and expended by individual schools with little regard for districtwide objectives— most of which were not understood in the first place. Fiscal matters were rarely discussed in the cabinet, except for discussion of non-school based programs (evaluation) or for allocation of undesignated funds. School accounts were left alone and never came under the scrutiny of the cabinet as a body.

c. Discussion. Governance in the ESP was diffuse and only peripherally related to a districtwide project. The cabinet itself was not directly involved in a large number of ESP decisions, since such items as budgetary allocations and interactions with NIE were out of its zone of control. In addition, the area of staffing, which had great potential effect on the ESP, was controlled by the deputy superintendent and not the principals. Those areas where there was a potential for cabinet control (such as a collective prioritizing of programs across the district rather than by each school) were relegated to the building level. Thus, conflict was minimized because no standard existed by which programs could be prioritized. In this manner the program cabinet existed more to protect individual domains than to challenge them.

There are a number of reasons why project governance served to perpetuate separate school domains. First, broad based incentives for change were lacking. The superintendent was the architect of the ESP, and the issues that he outlines for the ESP to cope with were his issues and not necessarily those of the other administrators. Principals saw the system being changed in minor not major ways, and thus they established maintenance-oriented rather than change-oriented governance procedures. Such an arrangement seemed sufficient for their intentions to be filled. In this sense the ambiguity and uncertainty in the governance process could be tolerated because the demands were low for systemwide control and coordination.

A second reason for lack of a change in governance processes was the anticipation of the ESP's termination. Comments were made by numerous administrators about changing back "when the project was over," and many administrators did not wish to make long-term commitments that would obligate them beyond the end of the project. For this reason, in part, financial obligations were made for as few new personnel as possible; instead, money was spent on equipment and supplies or to supplement (or substitute for) the income of personnel already on staff. The deptuy superintendent was perhaps most vocal about not instituting long-term commitments that would disrupt the stable patterns developed in the past, this reason possibly accounting for his almost total non-involvement in the project.

Given the predisposition of the main actors not to change governance processes, the minimal involvement by USOE/NIE facilitated the continuance of 13 somewhat discrete project schools. Initially, USOE/NIE had not obtained highly specific or enforceable commitments from the district, and those commitments that were made (such as linkages with local universities) seldom were enforced. Through the development of the project, the theme of comprehensiveness remained nebulous, and NIE permitted (by default) the district to reinterpret its commitments into an evolving set of objectives and means from which individual schools could choose to demonstrate "comprehensiveness"--a fragmented approach which the ESP ostensibly was devised to overcome. Even though district officials complained loudly at refunding time that NIE was placing strict limits on their flexibility, these limits were small in scope and concerned the mechanics of budgeting, not the substance of the program. The fact that contact with NIE and the district was infrequent the last two years of the project and absent the last year seems indicative of the minimal restrictions placed on the district by the funding agency.

Finally, the allocation of ESP funds seemed to guarantee a lack of need for program coordination. With the absence of understood objectives and the low perceived impetus for change, the channeling of money to individual schools on a formula basis only exacerbated the creation of fiefdoms and the pattern of protecting those domains via cabinet operations. The receipt of new funds through the ESP and the lack of direction for application of those funds to clearly articulated purposes minimized the need for governance processes to be coordinated, compelling, or structural toward common ends.

4. Community

Chapters I and V outlined some salient aspects of the Jefferson community, noting in particular that the community, as such, was an artifact of political boundaries, the school district being the largest. There was no town only a strip of fast food shops, small businesses, and service stations running along the main thoroughfare which extended south from the major incorporated city nearby. Jefferson was a residential community, consisting largely of small one-story ranch homes and older frame houses on small lots of acreage in the eastern section of the district.

Jefferson citizens had traditionally been concerned with bread and butter issues, and had, in the past, supported local school levies. Schools had been supported sufficiently to provide a basic education; the district had provided such basic education for a number of years prior to the ESP. Since fewer students than the national average went on to post-secondary schools following graduation, college preparation was not a burning issue for the majority of the constituents.

In the original ESP proposal, the form community involvement would take was not specified. Understanding that in order to be funded, it was necessary to specify the community's role, Jefferson later stated that a charrette would be formed to translate community desires into actual activities; nothing was mentioned as to how this would be done.

a. The Charrettes. The charrette, which was meant to involve community members in planning the ESP proposal, was minimally effective. Attendance was selective and composed mostly of school personnel rather than parents. By the time this forum was organized, the ESP proposal was well formulated. Outsiders were informed about plans already made, rather than being given a voice in what should be done. A second charrette was held soon after the project began, and again over half in attendance were educators or outside consultants. A third charrette was held in the late winter of the first project year and, though attendance was initially around 200 at the first of three sessions, it dwindled greatly by the second session. Only about 40 parents attended--and most of these had been personally recruited by building principals.

Generally speaking, overall community support for the charrette was minimal. The principals saw little use for this forum and usually provided formal speeches about all of the activities going on in their school (a practice which led one administrator, after one of the sessions, to say that there was "too much selling and too much back patting" going on).[29] Indeed, principals generally resisted the notion of any further charrettes for fear of having community people "take over." Principals saw the charrettes as a waste of time and did not wish to carry them on, a decision which, through the newly founded ESP cabinet (with NIE support), they were finally able to implement.

b. PAC's at the School Level. No forum immediately emerged to replace the charrettes. The lack of a forum became crucial because refunding proposals were being considered in early 1973, and the district was being criticized by NIE for its failure to establish a dialogue with the community. In an early draft of the refunding proposal, the superintendent proposed a huge council of parents, teachers, and students to meet six times a year with the cabinet, a plan rejected by NIE as being unwieldy.

The final draft of the refunding proposal marked the creation of Parent Advisory Councils (PAC's), school level organizations formed to advice principals on local needs. In all respects, these councils were to be organized by principals, and the information collected from these groups was to remain at the building level. No forum existed to coordinate the information these groups provided, and principals used their discretion to call meetings when they wanted and to include whom they wished.

The remainder of the project's experiences with community participation were minimal and ritualistic in nature. PAC's met with erratic regularity, depending on the school involved. In most cases, principals complained about the difficulty of getting people involved in PAC's and thus resorted to calling school "boosters" to attend the 2 to 3 meetings a year, wherein information was disseminated about local programs.

As noted in Chapter V, other forums did exist (e.g., the school board and the educational council) but these tended to legitimate decisions already made by the administration. There was no doubt that Jefferson was not an organic community, amenable to easy community organization; thus, the issue of community involvement was difficult. But, in many respects, the absence of organized community interest groups made the district's policies easier to implement, since there was no localized media to mobilize patrons on any one issue. Whatever community input occurred at the school board level tended to be issue oriented (e.g., requests by parental groups for a better music program, a fence around an elementary school playground, a more extensive program for the gifted, and for the retention of the special education program which was drastically reduced during the fourth year of the project). In most cases district officials were able to use the absence of an organized community to stifle incursions by these interest groups, and through delay, referrals, and avoidance, most of the requests were unmet and finally died from lack of attention. After late 1973, when the funding for the last half of the project had been approved, this issue of community participation was never again raised by the program cabinet nor NIE. By the end of the project, PAC's had provided the opportunity for a large number of parents to be informed about school programs, but did not have significant effect of involving parents in the making of school policy.

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[29] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Meeting of charrette, 10/1/71.

c. Discussion. A variety of factors may be brought to bear to explain this apparent maintenance of the status quo.

First, the organization of the district was not amenable to other forms of participation. "Involvement in the development of policies and goals" suggests, at a minimum, their presentation to the community for their reaction; at the other end of the continuum it suggests some form of decision sharing with the community. But as suggested by Saxe, "The citizen does not meet the professional at the building level to discuss objectives. These are determined at the top of the organization chart"[30] (i.e., the central office administration). The charrette attempted to bridge this gap, but its focus on the totality of the ESP was the unique orientation of the district superintendent set against the local perspective of the building principals and parents. The district simply did not provide appropriate settings for a reorientation to the districtwide aspects of the project.

In addition to the decentralized nature of the district's operation, the continuing fragmentation of the project made the global districtwide approach of the charrette and district level participation even less feasible.

The source of impetus for community participation is a second important aspect. At the beginning of the project NIE stressed participation that was to be decisionary in nature. But NIE never clarified its position to the district except to say what did not constitute participation. By Phase III, it had retreated from the issue, apparently to attend to other priorities.

Throughout Phases I and II, the superintendent also pressed for participation in the form of community feedback. This was an effort to legitimate district level decision making and also create community support upon which he could draw in motivating recalcitrant principals and staff to implement the ESP as he saw it. But this stance abated when the cabinet rejected the charrette. Through the remainder of the project, the superintendent ceased to be an active force in promoting community participation other than through his traditional role at the school board and the Education Council.

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[30] R. W. Saxe, School-Community Interaction, McCutchan Publishing Corporation, Berkeley California, 1975, p. 22.

The principals in turn resisted district level involvement as inappropriate in terms of the energy required to maintain it and its inadequacy in meeting the local needs of parents. Their acceptance of PAC's in most cases, illustrates their desire to control tightly who participated and insure that participation be limited to the informational exchange level. The prerogative of maintaining their own decisionary discretion predominated throughout ESP.

With few exceptions, the parents themselves provided little impetus for a change in their participation in district affairs. Such impetus that occurred was typified by extreme situations, such as the case of one school wherein discipline problems existed or those where some specific service or program was being reduced by the district. For example, there was the case of a reduction in the district's music program or a change in the special education program. These examples illustrate that some capacity for change did exist in the community, though it was frustrated. The extent and depth of this capacity was never tapped by the district, and the mode of enlisting community participation throughout ESP obviated its development. The district presented its definition of the problems, its agenda, and its program to attend to those problems in a fait accompli fashion. This definition rarely allowed that contribution which might possibly have been made by the community. Throughout the ESP, parents were confronted with plans already made and programs already implemented, and could express approval or disapproval only in general and ineffectual terms.

Finally, the amorphousness of the community was recognized by NIE and by the district as the principle barrier to parental participation in the ESP. However, equally important was the district's inability to cope meaningfully with that amorphousness.

The district, then, did not elicit broad and clearly defined participation. But to have done so may not only have infringed upon the discretionary powers of the principals, but might also have courted potential conflict with parents, risking open confrontation over the disparities between school practice and ESP goals. It also may have risked displaying the amorphous decision making processes of the district. But the district lacked the problem orientation and commitment to confront these issues internally, let alone to open them up for consideration by the community.

5. Instruction

As noted in Chapter VI of this report, six programs--but especially two, Project Promise and Project Skill--were forerunners of the ESP instructional programs in Jefferson. Many of the district's instructional emphases, such as individualized instruction, diagnostic teaching, and regrouping of students, were represented in these six programs. Additionally, many ongoing programs which were incorporated in the ESP, programs such as IGE, IPI, Occupational Versatility, and the Interim, were either planned or were already part of the district's ongoing instructional programs before the ESP grant was received. While the ESP allowed for the expansion of these programs into other schools, and while it provided for the introduction of some new "packaged" curricula (such as MACOS) and the development of a mathematics laboratory at the west-side junior high school, the ESP curricular programs were heavily dependent upon a continuation of past practices and projections. There were few instructional programs representing a radical departure from past instructional patterns.

a. Instructional Practices. The pattern of individual schools making decisions about what practices to adopt and implement is well documented in certain key elements of instruction. During the third year of the project, a comprehensive survey of a sample of instructional settings was conducted by NWREL staff. The results of that survey have been reported in a separate document,[31] but some highlights are as follows:

- o A variety of curricular materials were evident in the sample, ranging from individualized "pre-packaged" materials to standard basal textbooks.
- o Often, in any one class, a variety of curricular materials were used, thus making the designation of a pure "treatment" difficult if not impossible.
- o Training and supervision were minimal and largely idiosyncratic; what training was available tended to be geared to introductory sessions devoted to the "nuts and bolts" operation of a specific curricular package. Followup or ongoing training after the introductory sessions (run for the most part by company representatives of the curricular program) were largely absent.
- o Even though individualization was one of the prime goals of instruction within the district, the survey evidenced the following results:
  - o In mathematics, 27 percent of the classrooms observed could be classified as "individualized."
  - o In communications, a range of activities were evident with a mixture of standard basal textbooks together

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[31] See R. B. Everhart, B. J. Hawley, J. M. McGeever, R. M. Toepper, "Curriculum and Instruction in the Mathematics, Communications, and Social Studies Streams in the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project," NWREL, September 1974.

with pre-packaged individualized materials. In some instances these materials were combined in a single class setting, in other instances one approach was used to the exclusion of the other.

    - In social studies, new "discovery approach" materials were used, largely at the elementary level, often intermixed with a variety of more traditional basal text materials.

- Where individualization was the prime mode of instruction, it existed on a "variation by rate" basis. This meant that all students used the same materials at different times, but were to achieve the same goals. Differences then existed on how fast or slow the student completed the required materials.

- Over the three streams examined (mathematics, communications, and social studies) the dominant instructional patterns were

    - Whole class groupings.

    - Teacher talk and teacher dominated interaction patterns.

    - The domination of the "knowledge" dimension of cognitive level, meaning the student's demonstration of the learning of facts was the prime mode of required thinking.

A followup survey, conducted in 1975-76, showed that on the continuum of individualization, the four original elementary schools "peaked" on individualization of instruction during the third year of the project and then declined, by the fifth year, to a point similar to that existing during the first year of the project. The five elementary schools, new to the project in the third year, continued to implement increasing levels of individualization by rate during the third and fourth year, but had begun a slight decline by the fifth year.[32]

In general, instructional practices revealed whole class groupings, teacher controlled interactions patterns, and intermixture of new curricular programs with pre-existing more traditional programs. Some programs were used as designed; others were not.

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[32] R. M. Toepper, and J. M. McGeever, "The Status of Individualized Instructional Strategies on the Elementary Level (K-6) in the Jefferson School District During Its Five-Year Experimental Schools Project," NWREL, April 1976.

Some programs were intermixed with other programs or approaches, while others were used more purely. Individual schools opted for certain programs but, to a great extent, teachers with buildings had the prerogative to decide which of the school-adopted programs they would choose and how they would use them. As reported earlier, three primary factors contributed to choice and use of curricular programs.[33]

First, the ESP had been conceptualized by the superintendent with little substantive input from any other district employees. The principals were responsible for actual operationalization of the program, thus by-passing such middle management employees as the director of elementary and secondary education. They responded with idiosyncratic programs blended to their personal predilections and those of interested staff members.

Secondly, the program was never adequately defined. There were few guiding principles to help in the selection or implemention of programs; those that did exist but were not favored by various schools were merely disregarded. After one year of the project, the superintendent admitted that the original proposal was a "dead letter" and that he only hoped that the principals would come up with some things they wanted to do on their own.[34] As one administrator said:

> We give a lot of lip service to these ideas, but except for one, all the principals have a comparable value structure. They have been here a long time and they think alike. You cannot force anyone to do anything or it will be very short-lived. There has to be gentle persuasion and manipulation. And the principal is not the only one, the teachers themselves have to be committed.[35]

Finally, the ESP provided no mandate for the operation of the district to be altered radically. This was especially true for the two curriculum supervisors, individuals one would expect to have totally different roles considering the increase in coordination and communication required in a project which ostensibly was to create an appropriate learning environment for each student. With no programmatic directives to define their activities, these individuals, as well as many other individuals within the district, continued to carry out their activities in much the same way as in the past.

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[33] Toepper, "Study of Curricular Decision Making...."

[34] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 10/10/72.

[35] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with district administrator, 10/4/72, p. 5.

b. Student Outcomes. Project impact on students was mixed. On the one hand, districtwide studies showed that though cognitive achievement declined (when compared to the 1968 national norms) during the ESP, and that the disruptive influence of the innovation may have been related to that decline, there were few significant long term (four year) differences between initial entrants and later entrants to the project. On the other hand, certain instructional approaches emphasized during the ESP (e.g., IPI and other individualized instruction) contributed to improved cognitive and/or affective outcomes for select subgroups, particularly for low prior achieving students in mathematics. These students had higher mathematics achievement in individualized instruction and higher attitude toward mathematics in IPI. Students in IPI, in general, had greater gains in self-concept when compared to those in JMMSS and traditional math. High prior achieving students had better achievement and attitude toward math when they received traditional math instruction. Results were not so clear for reading instruction, where treatments were not as distinct as those in mathematics. Unfortunately, much of the ESP impetus was in areas such as career education, personal development, social studies, etc., for which definitive student impact information was not available. The effect of many project programs will therefore remain unknown. However, as measured by standardized achievement tests, ESP-instituted programs did not have any overall negative effects on student cognitive outcomes and, in some particular cases, a positive effect.

c. Saliency of ESP to District Personnel. The saliency of the ESP to district personnel, particularly teachers, is evidenced by teachers' comments on the project. While it may not be generalizable across all schools, some NWREL personnel found it characteristic for teachers to see themselves as "part of the project" if materials or programs in their schools were bought or supported by ESP funds, a point confirmed by a district evaluator.[36] For example, at the junior high level, teachers within the same department (English, for example) often responded to a query, "Tell me about the project in this school" in terms of the specific materials which they had: "We have the Craig readers, they were bought by ESP; I got this series of books through ESP," and so on. Many were unsure if, in fact, ESP had purchased new materials, and more important, many responded, "Why ask me, I'm not involved in ESP."

Through the spring of 1974, Level I conducted bi-annual staff attitude surveys on the reaction to various phases of the ESP. Though the attendant comments cannot be taken as scientifically valid (there were many non-respondents to a number of questions), they still prove some interesting illustrations on how the teaching staff envisioned the entire project and present ESP as an almost random happening, often not salient to many teachers. Staff responses to a series of questions were included as part of those surveys. One question asked was, "At this point in time, what is your reaction to the ESP in your school?" Some of the comments during the third year of the ESP were as follows:[37]

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[36] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with district Level I evaluator, 5/18/73.

- Most of what is being done could have been done anyway.
- I'm concerned mostly with my unit and I feel other units ought to do the project goal in their way.
- I only wish I could do more to change things.
- A waste of my time.
- I like the money that is available.
- Offers wider variety of courses for students and touches their needs better.
- ESP has only facilitated what was begun without it but now ESP makes it financially possible to proceed.
- It has worked very well for the first year and should be even greater next year.
- ONE OF THE BEAUTIFUL THINGS TO HAVE HAPPENED TO OUR CHILDREN.
- We are not involved.
- Where is it?

Another related question required respondents to complete the statement "The ESP effort in my school is ___________." Teachers provided the following comments.

- Progress is being made in all areas.
- There is poor leadership in directing the programs at our school.
- Depends on the teacher--if interested or not.

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[37] These comments taken from JSD, "Evaluation Reports #9, #16, and #23," 1973-74. The reader should be aware that these comments were selected to show the range of opinion regarding the ESP. No attempt was made to conduct a frequency count on whether comments tended to support a favorable, unfavorable or ambivalent attitude.

- I have very little with ESP except for Interim so I can't give a fair response to the above.
- Very well organized.
- Not clear.
- There is a lack of unity in administrative efforts.
- Not involved.
- It is quite clear where the effort is going.
- A waste of my time.

These comments point out that opinions on the ESP varied according to one's involvement in activities considered to be ESP. Involvement meant having a program funded (or thought to be funded) by ESP monies. Many teachers did not become involved, as indicated by comments that they knew little about what ESP really was.

To be accurate in an appraisal of the overall effects of ESP in terms of instruction, it would be necessary to go through each classroom in each school. Indeed, some of the schools, especially at the elementary level, implemented individualized and other programs that were highly effective in terms of variety of rate (such as IOI and Wisconsin Design) and even in variety of means (such as the Hawaii English Program). And there is no doubt that the Interim programs and fifth day programs where they were implemented, provided significant variety in the instructional program of the district. While there was variety in instructional programs, we feel that the evidence on curriculum and instruction demonstrates that the overall pattern of district curricular operations shows slight changes at the secondary level (mainly in the area of Interim courses) and some degree of change at the elementary level, but that change is shifting toward practices in evidence before the implementation of ESP programs.[38]

d. Discussion. Lacking a problem-orientation or any other impetus for change, the following factors tended to influence the change effort in Jefferson, especially in the area of curriculum and instruction:

1. The essential ideas and impetus for the ESP came from the superintendent with little input from other staff members.

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[38] The reports supporting the point of view include R. B. Everhart, et al., "Curriculum Instruction... in the Jefferson School District," R. M. Toepper, "...Curricular Decision Making in the Jefferson ESP," and R. M. Toepper and J. McGeever, "The Status of Individualized Instructional Strategies...."

Few people, with the possible exception of the director of training and elementary curriculum and two or three elementary principals, attempted to implement the ESP in a manner approaching the "spirit" of its intentions.

2. The district had a stable and homogeneous administrative and teaching population. Lacking a realistic understanding of what the ESP was meant to be and lacking avenues for exploiting its potential, district staff were comfortable in making slight variations in their usual mode of operation.

3. The J ESP lacked a comprehensive, rigorous, and specific training program adapted to the goals and needs of the ESP. Without such a training program, it seems idealistic to expect teachers and principals to focus their energies for a sustained period of time on the same or similar outcomes, especially considering the sanctioned growth of building autonomy (a gross operationalization of individualization from the institution's perspective) within the district, and the lack of a commitment by central office staff and/or "middle-management" composed of principals to operationalize the ESP as stated in the proposals mutually agreed upon by both the district and OE/NIE.

In terms of previous district practices as well as of curricular and instructional reality of the J ESP, individualization of instruction comes closest to becoming what Normann calls a reorientation,[39] a basic change which required new types of specialized knowledge (in this case, diagnosis of student capacities) and task systems (some form of team teaching or differentiated staffing), including new goals (adapting instruction to the individual's needs, abilities, or interests), new values (associated with the teachers' relationships to their students), new, as well as realigned, power structures (again, involving some form of team teaching or differentiated staffing), and shifts in cognitive structure (specific knowledge or students' capacities instead of personalized awareness of the "whole" child). Curriculum elements, space utilization, and grading practices are also subject to change when individualized instruction is installed. In terms of the J ESP rhetoric, the district proposed to implement several other innovations that would have been much more intensive reorientations. In the rhetoric, individualization was not planned to have a major role except in the instruction of high-risk or accelerated students. Because individualized instruction was not implemented pervasively across the elementary teachers of the district, we can only say that it came closest to becoming a reorientation during the J ESP. Individualized instruction was an actual reorientation only for those teachers who, for one reason or another, implemented such teaching strategies in their classrooms during the ESP.

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[39] R. Normann, "Organizational Innovativeness: Product Variation and Reorientation," Administration Science Quarterly, 16:2 (June 1971), pp. 203-215.

Continuing Normann's terminology, all of the other curricular and instructional endeavors associated with the J ESP then become variations, minor alterations which do not change the domain of the organization, but rather result from attempts to defend or further exploit the existing domain. According to Normann, existing cognitions, rules and heuristics are sufficient for dealing with such minor innovations. In general, in the area of curriculum and instruction, the ESP was defined by the pre-existing regularities of the Jefferson district more than the Jefferson educational system took on characteristics of the proposed intervention. In the case of individualized instruction, even this possible reorientation became a variation in the general district operation.

Based on our description and analysis of curricular and instructional endeavors associated with the Jefferson ESP, we can conjecture that one of the most lasting effects of the ESP will be the continued use of purchasables that the ESP grant has provided: capital improvements for instructional settings, curricular and instructional software, and certain hardware purchased for the facilitation of instruction. Though many teachers will not give up the goal of individualization, it will not be comprehensively implemented across district schools nor pervasively maintained among the teachers within any given school. What the idiosyncracies of building autonomy will allow to remain, the vagaries of tight financing will probably terminate. Individualization will continue to be espoused in the rhetoric of the district, but practiced unevenly among district teachers.

6. Evaluation

As noted in Chapter VII, the district's own evaluation team (Level I) was formed as an integral unit to provide timely and relevant information to the district regarding the ESP effort. By the end of the project, evaluation functions, like many within the governance, community, and instructional domains, had returned to a state very similar to that before the ESP.

Evaluation is very much intertwined with governance. Evaluation was at the mercy of the administrative staff for financial and psychological support. The inability of the evaluation component to gain the support of the cabinet was crucial. Without this support, evaluation was left without a useful or viable mission. It had no supportive clientele (who saw its services as useful) and lacked consistent support from administrators. It was a marginal unit, chasing an elusive program that never existed as envisioned. Brought into existence to fulfill a requirement, it was progressively abandoned as the requirement was perceived as less important. Even though, during the last year of the project, the evaluation division suddenly found itself more favorably received in the district as it published reports that placed the district's efforts in a more positive light, there was no evidence that evaluation ever fulfilled its role to provide information that would be used in the decision making process within the district. There is no strong evidence that such information was actually discussed by the district.

The reason for this being the fact that the evaluative mission of Level I was not well defined at the onset of the ESP. In part, this resulted from the rapidity with which OE funded the project; apparently, the amount of money appropriated to ESP evaluation was to compensate for the lack of clear definition. But it was also a reflection of the continuing ambiguity of the Jefferson ESP itself. Level I was committed to evaluating the ESP as defined in the district's proposal, apparently hoping that ultimately the schools would shape their programs accordingly and, in the process, incorporate evaluation into their operations. This did not occur. As the proposal was an overlay constructed by the superintendent with little input by principals or teachers, so the plans and efforts to evalute that proposal were made with even less input by the principals and teachers. Level I was faced with evaluating a non-event. Not only did Level I encounter the resistance normally expected from people who are evaluated, but also the credibility problems in pursuing phenomena with only a paper existence.

The dilemma was to become crucial for Level I. Both directors realized that evaluation had to achieve utility somehow at the building level, as well as at the district level, if it were to survive the ESP.

Resolving the project fragmentation required mounting a massive expansion of the Level I mission by proposing the creation of the management information system. Its development would allow Level I to create, on the one hand, the CER system for centralized decision making and, on the other, to respond to the need for program evaluation at the school level. But this effort would place Level I into an even more prolonged developmental phase, one which required a major expenditure of both project and district resources. Its development was to prove beyond the abilities of the existing staff under both directors.

Even had its development gone smoothly, it is questionable whether such a complex system would have found acceptance or utility in this setting. Its creation threatened existing units in the district. It was based on the premise that a comprehensive articulated ESP would evolve; it proposed to create an information base for centralized decision making in a system rapidly formalizing decentralized decision making; it sought to impose criteria for judgment on a system which had little sense of the validity of the criteria or motivation for judgment making.

B. What the ESP Was--The Dynamics of Local Control

The Jefferson ESP did not change the lives of many actors in the district. Certainly, there were some structural differences: the creation of a program cabinet; the formulation of charrettes and Parent Advisory Councils; and the inclusion of Interims, certain individualized programs and the purchase of other curricular materials. Some very high quality programs were either continued or initiated as the result of ESP funds. Yet the preponderance of evidence indicates that these new structures did not lead to significant behavioral changes on the part of students, teachers, administrators, or the larger community. The program cabinet, formed at NIE's urging as a forum to initiate a "comprehensive" district program, continued, and in some ways increased the practice of individual schools' prerogatives of making many decisions which, under the spirit of ESP, might have been made in concert. Concurrently, many governance issues were debated and resolved outside the cabinet by individuals or groups who had traditionally made such decisions. Community participation was largely ritualistic, and in the end reverted to infrequently held and sparsely attended forums wherein information was given to parents and legitimation was sought. Instructional activities, which consumed the largest proportion of ESP funds, were more visible, but again tended to be sporadic and largely idiosyncratic, depending more upon the vagaries of perceived desirability and effort at the school level rather than upon an orchestrated attempt across the district. And the district's own evaluation effort, attempting to follow these elusive instructional practices and lacking a committed constituency, was constantly plagued by problems of relevancy and timelines; in the end its role was marginal and many of its functions were either dropped or taken over by more firmly entrenched offices. The issue of "comprehensive change" was as unresolved at the end of the ESP as it was in the beginning.

These general findings are not unlike those of the RAND analysis of four federally supported change programs: Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title III; Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title VI; the Vocational Education Act; and the Right to Read Program.[40] The general conclusions from this study indicate that innovations will be altered to account for the vagaries of the institutional setting, a theme also suggested by Sarason in analyzing change efforts in general:

> ...a proposed new setting always arises in some relation to existing settings; that there are characteristics of the new setting (such as superiority of mission) and concerns of the existing ones (such as ideology, concern for resources) which ensure some conflict and competition; that regardless of whether the proposed setting arises from an existing structure or arises outside of one, it reflects in its purposes or functions or ideology some aspect of traditional conceptions...[41]

In this respect, the activities in Jefferson that have been recounted should not be viewed as unusual, but rather as typical of both federally sponsored change efforts across the nation and the whole process of the intorduction of "new settings," in Sarason's terms.

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[40] See P. Berman and M. McLaughlin, "Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change: Volume I," (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1974), p. vii. See also P. Berman and M. McLaughlin, "Implementation of Educational Innovation," Educational Forum, 40, March 1976, pp. 345-370. See also various articles on change in the February 1976 issue of Teachers College Record.

[41] S. B. Sarason, The Creation of Settings and the Future Societies, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972, p. 46.

However, the purpose of this section is not to belabor what the ESP was not, but to pinpoint what it was. Thus far, a convenient and appropriate metaphor, one which serves to summarize the reality of the ESP in Jefferson and to account for many of the activities recounted, is lacking.

1. The Concept of Revenue Sharing

The ESP in Jefferson can be thought of an analogous to effects of federal revenue sharing, wherein the federal government collects tax monies from local communities and returns those monies in various amounts with minimal restrictions or guidelines.[42] The amount of money envisioned in the revenue sharing approach is significant, for when the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 was passed, it was estimated that over 30 billion dollars of revenue sharing monies would be returned to local communities over the next five years.

The concept of revenue sharing was envisioned to speak to four problems. One was the fiscal crisis of local communities, many of which had outstripped their abilities to raise local monies (to wit: New York City). Under revenue sharing, monies were to be returned to local communities with few guidelines, as long as there was proper financial accounting for funds spent.

A second problem was program fragmentation. Throughout the federal system, grants and contracts had been pigeonholed in one agency or another to the degree that, in order to solve a specific problem, a local agency might have to apply to a dozen different requirements in order to bring monies to bear on that one problem. Revenue sharing was alleged to be more "comprehensive" in scope, as the number of federal agencies was to be reduced and agencies were to be reorganized by functional areas.

A third purpose was to provide for more effective allocation of resources. Issues of national concern had been set at the top and pushed through at the bottom, where they may not have been seen as problems at all. Equally important, grants and contract monies had been siphoned off at the top so that relatively little money reached the target group. Revenue sharing was to alleviate much of this by making problem identification; prioritization of problems, goals, settings; and program monitoring local rather than federal activities.

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[42] The metaphorical use of revenue sharing to discuss the ESP is, of course, in a post hoc fashion. We are not arguing that such was an original intent of the ESP in Jefferson.

Finally, revenue sharing was to stem the tide of power concentration in Washington, D.C. It was felt that Washington's problems often did not become local problems; thus, local communities had no vested interest in solving them. Local communities had used federal monies for their own purposes, because the federal bureaucracy was so large and unresponsive that local communities felt they could get nowhere dealing with them. By making local communities involved and accountable, power was supposed to swing back to the local community.

2. The ESP as Revenue Sharing

Although the ESP was not explicitly intended as revenue sharing, it met most of the basic criteria of revenue sharing programs; fiscal need (which may have been one reason for ESP's early requirements that school districts have large numbers of low income families); the philosophy of comprehensiveness; an allocation of resources based upon local as opposed to national need; and the general ideology which spoke to a return of power to the grass roots level.

It is important to note, however, that the ESP differed from revenue sharing in that NIE had at least titular control over Jefferson. Money was not sent automatically to Jefferson, as there were some broad (however vaguely defined or inconsistently enforced) standards. The issue was not that Jefferson could do anything it wanted with ESP funds; NIE made that clear. Rather, Jefferson was to decide on its own what it wanted to do and then propose that to NIE. As the national ESP director said, "We want to act as partners to help you put the pieces together and give you the freedom to do what you want...we want to test the idea of thinking comprehensively about change."[43] Jefferson was responsible for the model, its identification, goals, and its own evaluation of the model. NIE was seen only as a silent partner.

The ESP also may have differed from revenue sharing in that it was not intended to replace local revenues, but rather was to be used for new efforts which might not normally be funded from local revenues. We say "may have differed" because there are two philosophies about the use of revenue sharing funds. Conservatives tend to see it as a way of substituting federal funds for local property tax funds; liberals, on the other hand, see it as a way of increasing public expenditures, with revenue sharing funds being supplemental.[44] Clearly, the ESP (at the national level) was envisioned along the liberal lines.

Revenue sharing on a national basis, however, has not been eminently successful, at least according to the liberal vision of revenue sharing. Few local communities have used revenue sharing funds for new and creative programs; most have used the monies to support existing programs and prevent further increases in local taxes.[45] In this sense, most revenue sharing funds have been used for substitutional purposes.[46]

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[43] Ibid.

[44] See M. D. Regan, The New Federalism, (New York: Oxford, 1972), p. 92.

The process was little different in Jefferson, and the ESP came to be a new source of revenue wherein the district postponed an imminent financial crisis by substituting, in part, ESP monies for the local funds which they would have to raise had the ESP not been in operation. To document this fact and the general notion of the ESP as revenue sharing, it is necessary to review briefly the district's fiscal program during the project.

To understand the ESP as revenue sharing, the pattern of ESP expenditures will be reviewed.[47] Part of the ESP budget was designated "pro rata services" (administration, pupil services, plant operation, maintenance of plant and pupil transportation). The monies spent for these pro rata services were not a part of the budget expenditures tied to ESP objectives, but were rather the ESP's contribution for the operation of the district's total program--overhead, if you will, the logic being that the ESP had an indirect effect on all district operations and should thus help support those operations. Many of these indirect expenses were spread across the school district's general operation regardless of whether there was a specific ESP tied to those expenses. In this manner, ESP pro rata allocation augmented the district's income, thereby reducing the amount of local monies which had to be raised in order to meet these expenses, a point described in a district memorandum written early in the project:

> The one million dollar grant (for the one year) under the experimental schools grant should support the costs required to increase numbers of employees and pay costs for improving instruction and running the school during the summer. Because this fund will also pay its fair share of pro rata operational costs, *it should reduce by about 100,000 the amount needed in the non-ESP accounts.*[48] (Emphasis added)

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[45] See G. Byer, "Revenue Sharing and the New Federalism," *Society*, January 1974, pp. 58-61.

[46] See D. Caputo and R. L. Cole, "General Revenue Sharing Expenditures in Cities Over 50,000." *Public Administration Review*, 35, (March-April 1975), pp. 136-142. Figures presented by these authors indicate that monies to support existing programs lead expenditures for "new starts" by about a 2-1 margin.

[47] The bulk of the information is taken from T. L. Donicht, "Jefferson Experimental Schools Project: A Fiscal Orientation," NWREL, May 1976. The information on district finances in Chapter IV is also based on this report.

[48] JSD, Memorandum, "Determining of Levy Amount by Need," November 15, 1971.

A second major budgetary item of the original budget was earmarked "IGE", which, was not a building level program, but actually a district program meant to support certain costs attendant to the entrance of three elementary schools into the IGE framework. While originally proposed for remodeling expenses, this purpose was unacceptable to NIE and the $182,819 instead was used for salaries and expenses of the IGE schools over the first 30 months of the project. Use of this money for salaries and expenses freed the use of district funds for remodeling purposes which, coincidentally, amounted to $182,819. Yet remodeling costs (which were supported indirectly by ESP) could be tied not only to IGE. They were expenditures which would benefit all programs, whether ESP or not. Remodeling included new rugs and furniture, removal of walls between classrooms, modernized lighting facilities, and other attendant expenses. Together with pro rata expenses, IGE monies accounted for 46 percent of total district ESP expenditures for the first 30 months of the project.[49]

More important, however, as described in Chapter IV, the district's contribution (that is, the amount derived from non-project funds) to certain budgetary categories was either reduced during the first half of the project or increased at a rate slower than during the three years prior to the ESP. By partialling ESP monies from the basic budgetary categories, and accounting for inflation, the district's contribution to expenses in transportation, health services, textbooks, and administration of instruction, declined during the first three years of the ESP when compared to the year prior to ESP, and expenses for principals' salaries, teaching, and plant operation increased at a slower rate than in preceding years.

Not all of the ESP monies were used to increase the district's efforts in the areas outlined in the project. From 1967-71 (the four years immediately before the ESP) the increase in the local property tax levies requested by Jefferson averaged $108,647 (34.5 percent) over the 1967-68 base year. The first three years of the project, the requested incomes averaged $43,630 (9.1 percent) over the 1970-71 baseline.[50] Thus, the ESP funds, which the district received through the revenue sharing approach, precluded the need for even larger levies from local property owners. Had the ESP funds been used only to supplement local funds, such low increases indeed would have been impossible without a corresponding reduction in services. The ESP, with the materials and services it did buy, enabled the district not only to ask for smaller levy increases, but also to demonstrate to voters the effective use of monies that were voted, thereby creating a favorable climate for the increases necessary.

Such use of ESP funds fit into the ongoing practices of the district before the ESP and the general nature of revenue sharing as well. The superintendent once commented on his abilities as a "master at writing proposals that are vague on what you can actually make operational."[51] This allowed virtually anything to be defensible as meeting program objectives. More important, however, one could envision that similar ESP proposals would be written in the future. The district was constantly searching for external funds to take up the slack for expiring programs, a fact which the superintendent confirmed when he noted that, looking ahead to the expiration of the ESP, "by 1975-76, I hope we have many other sources to pick up the slack."[52] Attempts were made to have external monies "on line" to reduce the amount of local funds necessary to fund ongoing programs.[53]

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[49] Donicht, "...A Fiscal Orientation," p. 42.

[50] Ibid., p. 255. These figures are in "constant" dollars (1967) to account for inflation.

In conclusion, our metaphor of the ESP as revenue sharing seems to be valid, when looking at both the philosophy of revenue sharing and program outcomes. Revenue sharing spoke to the inability of local communities to raise monies; ESP focused upon communities with significant portions of low income families. Revenue sharing was envisioned as one solution to program "fragmentation"' ESP was equally opposed to educational fragmentation and offered the theme of "comprehensive change." Revenue sharing was based on local rather than federal needs; ESP placed responsibility on the local district to originate and implement the ESP plan. Revenue sharing was part of the "New Federalism" wherein local communities were to have more self-determination; ESP spoke to a "new relationship" between the federal government and local schools.

Similarly, in terms of outcome, revenue sharing and the ESP seem quite similar. Early returns indicate that the preponderance of revenue sharing funds have gone to support ongoing programs rather than to initiate new ones; many ESP monies were used to continue past practices rather than to begin new efforts. Similarly, at least in the case of counties, 57 percent of the funds were used for capital expenditures on the assumption that if revenue sharing ended, counties did not want to be saddled with having to support ongoing programs;[54] this was also an abiding concern within Jefferson. Finally, most revenue sharing funds have permitted smaller increases in local property taxes in that the monies have partly displaced local funds;[55] this seems to have been the case also in Jefferson.

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[51] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 7/10/72.

[52] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 12/13/72.

[53] Such practices are common in school districts and the "revenue sharing" approach seems typical in categorical funds as well as more open-ended programs such as the ESP. See for example J. Berke and M. Kirst, "Intergovernmental Relations: Conclusions and Recommendations," in Berke and Kirst, eds., Federal Aid to Education, Lexington, D. C. Heath, 1972, p. 391. See also House, E. R., The Politics of Innovation, Berkeley: McCutchan, 1974, and McLaughlin, M. W., "Implementation of ESEA Title I: A Problem of Compliance," Teachers College Record, 77 (February, 1976), pp. 397-415.

[54] J. C. Murphy, "General Revenue Sharing's Impact on County Governments," Public Administration Review, 35, March-April, 1975, pp. 131-135.

We are still left with the question of why this happened. Were there elements within Jefferson that led the ESP to follow the avenues of revenue sharing? Or did the actionsof NIE lead to this approach? The next two sections will analyze these questions and suggest some answers.

C. Why the ESP as Revenue Sharing-- The Jefferson Story

In looking at the events which led the ESP as a program that was to be influenced more by ongoing district regularities, than the ESP itself was to change the district, four important themes stand out: problemistic versus opportunistic search, the role of sub-unit autonomy, norms and practices of equality, and the dilemmas of comprehensiveness, will be discussed in this section.[56]

1. Problemistic vs. Opportunistic Search

The first thread running through the analysis of the J ESP is the emphasis placed on the project as more of an opportunity to be grasped than as a means of solving a specific problem--a distinction which might be termed as an opportunistic rather than a problemistic orientation.[57] The superintendent noted that obtaining the grant would help alleviate the district's present and impending fiscal crisis, and to this degree there may indeed have a been a problem orientation. Yet the fact that the NIE continued to ask the district what it was doing, and the varied district responses indicate that, insofar as curricular and instructional technology were concerned, the ESP was viewed more as an available opportunity. The fact was that the ESP provided the opportunity to test a host of curricular and instructional changes with only minimal consideration of what dependable problems each proposed program was to solve. This is illustrated by examining the development of various rationales for the presence of the ESP.

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[55] Ibid. See also H. Bryant, "Revenue Sharing: End May Be Near," Seaview Post-Intelligencer, March 1, 1976.

[56] Three of these four factors are present to various degrees in all school districts, but then interaction uniquely supports a revenue sharing model.

[57] A conclusion which, again, seems generalizable to educational innovation in general. See Berman and McLaughlin, "Federal Programs...," p. viii. and Berman and McLaughlin, "Implementation of Educational Innovation," The terms of "problemistic" and "opportunistic" are used as ideal types.

The presence of an opportunity orientation was evident many times. During refunding meetings with NIE, when principals were being urged to derive plans to fit their own needs, one principal said in exasperation: "This is all very confusing; someone will have to grab hold of this at the top; someone will have to tell me what needs I should be meeting or where I should go next."[58]

This confusion continued throughout the project. What had been bought, why, and where it was all going were unclear. The original objective of the Experimental Schools Project, and the one articulated in the district's application to USOE for the grant, was to "provide an appropriate environment for optimum learning for each student." Such an objective was seen to provide a "variety" of learning environments for each student as he progressed through various educational programs. But why such a goal? Ostensibly, it was to meet the needs of "transient" students who were thought to characterize the student population of the district to a great degree. Though there was little mention of the specific needs of these transient students, some later scenarios indicated that the district had a number of students who moved in and out of the district quite frequently and needed to be involved in learning programs which took account of the special needs and individual capacities. There was reference to the fact that "transient and low income students often lack the stability and emotional tools to relate well to their peer groups.[59]

If transient students were the "target" for the ESP, then what evidence existed about their peculiar needs?[60] What documentation supported the fact that the transient student in Jefferson needed one type of program as opposed to another? There is no information to provide answers to these questions. Indeed, a study conducted by NWREL staff, using achievment scores of transient and non-transient students, indicated no significant differences between the two groups. More important, there is some question as to whether transient students were even perceived as a viable focus for district operations, despite the rhetoric of the proposal. During the first year of the project, in preparation for the charrette, Level I administered a survey to all district principals as a means of prioritizing ESP objectives. Of the 12 objectives listed, "developing transient student programs" ranked twelfth.

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[58] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Planning meeting with NIE, 12/12/72.

[59] Superintendent and the Project Planning Team, "Project Promise: Programming Resources to Operate a Model Instruction System in Education," Jefferson County, JSD, an application to the Department of HEW for an operations grant under provisions of the Experimental Schools Program, planning project OEG-0-71-1214, project number 18040, [original draft of first 30 months proposal] submitted April 10, 1971.

[60] The district had conducted studies which revealed that elementary schools had a six-year entry and withdrawal rate of 31.2 percent, the junior high schools 19.1 percent, and the senior high 17.2 percent. Part of this is accounted for by the general pattern of growth in the district during this period of time (1962-68). It would seem, however, that these figures are not excessive when considering that the rate for withdrawals only was 17.1 percent at the elementary level. "Student Entry & Withdrawal Survey," 1968-9. Jefferson School District.

After the grant was awarded, the emphasis on "transiency" disappeared from the district's ESP rhetoric. In the refunding proposal for the last half of the project, the theme of transient students as a target population was replaced by the more general theme of "providing an optimum learning environment for each student." Transiency never did become internalized by many teachers as an emphasis of the ESP; in fact most were unclear as to just why the ESP was in the district. After four years of the project, a teacher who was explaining to a substitute that the district had recieved "a lot of money" for some "federal project," turned to a NWREL representative and asked: "Just why is it that the district got all of this money? Is it because they don't have much money themselves?"[61] That question may have approached reality more closely than thought.

Another factor pointing to the project as an opportunity was the type of programs which the district thought would help meet students' needs and provide "optimum learning environments." In the early stages, a number of components intended to meet the needs of individual students were mentioned: e.g., student developed curricula, environmental education, extended school day or year, drug education, and the sharing of media facilities with the local university. Described as "optimum learning devices" in 1971, most of these strategies were noticeably absent or deemphasized by the time of the refunding proposal in 1973. Reference to student developed curricula was limited to mention of students' "involvement" in Interim and "fifth day" activities. Environmental, drug and international education were dropped as separate program emphases and "incorporated" into the ongoing curriculum of each school. The district admitted further it was not successful in extending the school day but would initiate a "year around program featuring Interim months" (in reality, a summer school). Closer relations with the local university had never developed, and little attempt was made to encourage them.[62] Other strategies, such as differentiated staffing, suffered a similar fate.

As the project continued into its third and fourth years, the district withdrew more and more into the notion of individual schools, rather than a unified project with common problems being attacked in a "comprehensive manner," as the heart of the ESP. About half way into the project district literature noted that the real emphasis in ESP was not on building an integrated learning network, but rather that "the heart of the ESP (was) the individual school. Each principal and his staff (built their) own approach, (their) own way of reaching each child."[63] It should be noted that this was not a new approach, but merely a public statement of what had been occurring since the beginning of the project, and, in fact, even before the project began. The fact that a major part of the refunding proposal was written (on NIE's insistence) by each principal for his own school perhaps heightened the reality of each school's "building its own program." Although each school's description of its program was tied to "district objectives," the appearance of unity was somewhat diminished because the programs were not related to objectives by the principals, but by the district disseminator, who methodically matched each school activity with a relevant sounding objective from the district's master list of ESP objectives.

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[61] R. B. Everhart, Fieldnotes, Teachers' lounge, 4/10/75.

[62] F. Mulhauser, "School-University Relations in the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project," NWREL, March 1974.

The objectives and purposes of the ESP in Jefferson continued to change as much in the later stages of the project as they had in the beginning. One notable change was initiated by the national ESP project director's visit to Jefferson in the fall of 1974. For a week (probably the longest anyone from NIE had been in the district since the project began), the project director was given the usual tour of the schools. He seemed perplexed and unable to define for himself what the J ESP was trying to do. He told the cabinet, "When I go to [ESP site], I know what they are trying to do, its alternatives. If I go to [another ESP site], I know their concern is articulation between the schools and the Spanish speaking clientele; when I come to Jefferson, I have a hard time knowing exactly what it is you are doing here."[64] After a few days, the superintendent produced a document (written during the week of the project director's visit) indicating what the ESP was and what it was attempting to do. On the day before the project director departed, a document entitled "Purpose of ESP, Jefferson School District" was disseminated by the superintendent. It listed three main objectives of the ESP:

> To serve as a regional demonstration site for promising curriculum efforts in education which have been developed and validated elsewhere; to develop and install curriculum and manage these programs for students in such a way that they can be financed and maintained within or below the prevailing cost of traditional or alternative programs.[65]

This, then, was where the district stood at the beginning of the fourth year. It was a "lighthouse" district, a district which would serve as a regional showplace for educational hardware and software developed elsewhere, but which had been bought and installed by Jefferson.

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[63] JSD, "Experimental Schools Project," 1972-73, p. 3.

[64] R. B. Everhart, Fieldnotes, Meeting of district officials and NIE, 11/8/74.

[65] Handout, Cabinet meeting, November 8, 1974.

In the fall of 1974, another district tract was published. This time emphasis was placed upon the retention of "educational programs which can be specified in terms of intended student behavior patterns." Those programs which showed no real progress in this area were to be discarded. It was also stated that "while the emphasis of each school may vary somewhat," the general district emphasis would now fall into these areas:[66]

1. Basic skills
2. New students to district
3. Work experience
4. Interim-Fifth Day
5. Small group instruction
6. Effective use of buildings

This section attempts to show the shifting nature of goals and objectives of the ESP over the first four years of existence. This shifting emphasis (illustrated most remarkably by the fact that the director of the national project continually had to ask the superintendent what the ESP was) indicates that the existence of ESP in Jefferson was minimally based upon well defined problems to be solved, but rather upon the opportunities provided by the money the grant brought. The periodic lists or project accomplishments reflect a variety of responses to the question "How are you continuing to use the opportunity presented to you?", a question vastly different in scope and intent from "How are you solving the problems which you wanted to solve through the presence of this grant?" Goals and objectives came and went, were invented, died, and were reinvented to suit the exigencies of the time. They represented words and phrases which served a ceremonial function; to gather parties together for a common purpose. As in most ceremonies, participants came to view the occasion symbolically rather than as a means to an end. The chants and the incantations became fixed in the minds of intended audiences as wholesome and desirable in and of themselves, with little reference to meaning. As the project entered its fifth year, the investment of time and commitment dictated a defense of what had been done, thus resulting in an institutional form of cognitive dissonance. Justifying what had been done took precedence over initiating new efforts, and people soon lost sight of why the ESP was in Jefferson in the first place. ESP was an opportunity which came along at a time when budget cuts were being considered. As one administrator noted: "ESP is such a large grant that it has helped us keep things we were going to cut back."[67]

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[66] JSD, "Your Jefferson Schools," December 1974, pp. 3-4.

[67] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with district administrator, 12/12/72.

2. The Role of Building Autonomy

In the second year of the project, a program cabinet was created to provide direction and a sense of integration across the district. Formed largely at NIE's insistence (but again, according to district specifications) the cabinet was seen by NIE as a forum in which various actors could participate in decision making to initiate "comprehensive change." But comprehensiveness was understood by neither NIE nor the district. Furthermore, the original commitments to the project and its objectives (however loosely stated) were made by the superintendent with minimal involvement by others. Thus, the cabinet provided the structure of unity and integration but not the substance.

Prior to the ESP, and especially since the superintendent had come to the district in 1966, there had been a trend to give principals more discretion in operating their schools. While secondary schools had enjoyed such autonomy in the past, such was not as true for the elementary schools, where the director of elementary education controlled considerable funds for curriculum. But with the ESP, even the elementary schools were provided some degree of fiscal autonomy via lump sum budgets for certain discretionary expenditures, allocated to each school on a per pupil basis. This pattern, combined with each principal running his own school with minimal outside interference, (from the community, the federal officials, or the central office), set the stage for the evolution of the cabinet into a body wherein collective agreements appeared to respect the independence of each school. This is illustrated by the manner in which the cabinet negated the idea of a districtwide charrette; its problems with the special education department (discussed in Chapter IV), evidenced by the principals' resistance to special education making decisions about pupil placement and the use of special education facilities; the manner by which the evaluation division was relegated to an "on call" role and bypassed in the administration of a questionnaire for the phase-in committee (as well as a subsequent survey on special levies taken during the fifth year of the project); and the very operation of the phase-in committee itself, which essentially decided by default to allow each school to make its own determination of which programs to drop or continue.

The evolution of community involvement from the districtwide charrettes to local school "Parent Advisory Councils" with little, if any, coordination between those councils has been discussed. Community involvement never had been a salient aspect of the district's program, and the administrators, like most school people in the country, did not relish the though of community people becoming too involved in the affairs of the school. One principal probably spoke for many when he said, "Who knows, you let some of them in to do a few things and pretty soon they want to run your whole school."[68] Parents were to be informed, not actively involved, and when the charrette turned out to be a self-admitted failure it only proved to most district personnel that involving parents effectively was an impossible situation.

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[68] R. B. Everhart, Fieldnotes, Interview with principal, 3/6/75.

Over time, the structure and process of community involvement slowly gravitated to control by the local school.

Instructional development reached its zenith the third year of the project for west-side schools when the first NWREL districtwide instructional survey was conducted. After that year, the west-side IGE schools began to retrench to the accustomed self-contained structure, and individualized treatments became increasingly confounded with more basic "whole class" treatments.[69] As one district administrator said of one IGE school after the first year, "They have better morale this year, because they have returned to a situation they understand better. They are doing what they feel most comfortable doing."[70] While activities had just begun on the east-side schools (at least technically; money had been shared with west-side schools the first year on the "sister school" concept) the NWREL staff predicted that the same cycle of regression would occur in those schools in about the same period of time. A NWREL fifth-year survey did indicate that these schools reached their zenith of individualization the fourth year of the ESP and began their retrenchment the final year of the project.[71] Given the minimal attention to concentrated training programs and the lack of district articulation of what the ESP was to accomplish, it was only natural that even slight departures from what occurred before the project would eventually revert to past patterns. After all, Jefferson had a stable and experienced teaching staff and an even more stable administrative contingent; the introduction of a few new programmed learning packages without radically restructuring the organizational environment surrounding those programs was bound to be regularized into the pervasive patterns of the past. To many teachers, the ESP had been a "non-event" in the first place; the passage of time only served to make it so for more.

The common thread of building or unit autonomy seemed to pervade the ongoing structure of the Jefferson School District, a point noted by the district and outside reviewers as well.[72] Whenever any decision was to be made, individual schools would generally be given maximum autonomy. This was seen in the operation of the program cabinet over the four years of its existence, in the evolution of the community component of the project, and in the choice and operation of curricular programs within the schools.

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[69] R. M. Toepper, "...Curricular Decision Making in the JSD ESP"; also R. M. Toepper and J. M. McGeever, "The Status of Individualized Instructional Strategies..."

[70] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with administrotor, 10/4/72.

[71] R. M. Toepper and J. M. McGeever, "The Status Of Individualized..."

[72] See JSD, Progress Report #3, April 1, 1974, and A. M. Gallegos, "Critique of Jefferson ESP," April 30, 1973, p. 11.

A brief discussion of curriculum substantiates even more the role of unit autonomy. During the first half of the project, a number of innovations were proposed: differentiated staffing, extended school day/year, a districtwide environmental and drug education program, an articulated K-12 program, and, of course, a variety of individualized instructional programs. We have already discussed the fate of the extended school day/year and the differentiated staffing program, neither of which was supported by the teachers' association. Not knowing what an articulated K-12 program really meant, district personnel did not actually support the concept, and discussion of it between NIE and Jefferson ended with the refunding of the project in mid-1973. Both drug education and environmental education were dropped before the refunding proposal because of serious coordination difficulties. This was less of a problem for drug education, since it never got beyond the introduction of a few units in health classes. In the 1972-73 school year, an attempt was made to mount a districtwide environmental education program. First, a group of consultants was brough in to organize the early stages. Releasing teachers to attend districtwide meetings evidenced the dominant forces of building autonomy; some principals were reluctant to provide released time for teachers in their buildings, claiming that ongoing instruction would suffer.[73] More important, getting principals to surrender funds allocated to the schools in order to support a districtwide environmental education program proved to be an insurmountable task. Each school attempted to justify not giving monies to the environmental education component (thus precluding the surrender of money for the creation of a larger unit which could, in fact, establish a program which any individual school might not support), by showing how many courses in science and social studies were related to environmental education. The environmental education program consisted only of a director who served as a resource person to interested schools wishing to use his services. NIE later refused to refund the program (and dropped drug education and international education as well) because of obvious inactivity.

The rhetoric on these programs just mentioned--differentiated staffing, extended school day/year, environmental education, K-12 articulation--was discontinued at some time between the inception of the project and midpoint refunding. It is interesting to note that all the programs dropped required extensive coordination between or within school units and interfered, to some degree, with the capability of small sub-units to make decisions independent of external forces. Differentiated staffing required coordination and interdependence between teachers within a building; extended school day/year, as it was envisioned, would require complex scheduling between and among teachers and administrators within a building as well as between schools. An articulated K-12 program required some assessment of what was being done at each grade level and coordination between levels on what materials were to be taught, when, and by whom. The environmental education program, as planned, required establishing districtwide policies and programs for environmental education and having schools surrender their claim that learning about the natural resources of a given counrty, for example, was indeed a legitimate aspect of environmental education. Of four instructional programs chosen for districtwide adoption (Man: A Course of Study--MACOS, People and Technology--PAT, Concepts and Values, and Elementary Science Study--ESS), only MACOS was consistently implemented across all nine elementary schools. Individually Prescribed Instruction, Criterion Reading, Wisconsin Design, and others, were adopted by individual schools and continued with modifications.

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[73] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 12/12/72.

It may be no accident that those instructional programs which survived, violated the norms and practices of autonomy the least. The district's later claims that it was serving as a "regional demonostration center" for promising curriculum efforts (many of which were individualized programs)[74] gave notice that those programs which survived (and which were now the essence of the ESP,) were those which allowed schools and teachers to decide what they wanted to do without the constraint of such issues as "comprehensiveness" or having to reach consensus on priorities, objectives, and alternatives. The district's emphasis on individualized educational programs and the manner of curricular adoptions seemed consistent with the fact that these pgorams fit best with the historical patterns of unit autonomy, since virtually any individualized program (as practiced in Jefferson) would be conducted by the teacher in his own room with minimal constraint from other teachers or school.

The stress on autonomy in the Jefferson school system must be placed in context. The subject of autonomy in schools has been widely discussed.[75] Yet, Lortie is perhaps most accurate in his assessment of the reasons behind teachers' and principals' obsession with autonomy. Noting the tendency for teachers to find rewards in the intrinsic tasks performed (interaction with students in the classroom) rather than extrinsic rewards such as recogniton and participation in decision making, and given that the criteria for these intrinsic rewards are indeterminate and difficult to formulate, he says,

> A reward system which emphasizes psychic rewards based on somewhat indeterminate criteria for achievement reinforces individualistic orientations. The teacher who is burdened with ambiguous criteria must select his own criteria of effectiveness; this gives him the chance to align his goals with his own capacities and interests. Having worked out a satisfactory balance, a

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[74] JSD, Handout to NIE officials upon their visit to Jefferson, November 11, 1974.

[75] F. E. Katz, "The School as a Complex Social Organization," Harvard Educational Review, 34 (summer 1964), pp. 428-455; Katz, Autonomy and Organization, (New York: Random House, 1968); R. J. Pellegrin, "Schools as Work Organizations," unpublished paper.

> teacher is likely to resist conditions that would force the change--he has a stake in autonomy. The ideology of individualism serves the teacher's purpose; it undergrids psychic rewards; the circle is closed.[76]

The teacher's stake in autonomy is therefore crucial because it is a stake in the reward system which is the key element in his daily life.[77] In Jefferson each teacher and principal worked out his or her own logic system for handling day to day problems. Any incursion into a classroom or school from external sources (advocated in many district instructional programs) served to disrupt and challenge that logic system--an incursion with which many simply were not prepared to deal. We are not trying to say that Jefferson evidenced excessive autonomy; experience leads us to believe that it was very typical. Nor are we trying to use the term "autonomy" in a pejorative sense, for it is an endemic quality of American education, given its structure. We are saying, however, that the patterns of autonomy had certain consequences when applied to the J ESP, and we have attempted to document some of those consequences in the district's reaction to a program calling for more integrated approaches.

It should be noted how the design of the project exacerbated the very autonomous patterns which were intended to be broken down. First, the requirement that districts had to integrate "promising past practices" into the ESP seemed to guarantee the use of many instructional programs which, in Jefferson, reinforced autonomy rather than encouraged a K-12 articulated program. All the district had to do was to show an attempt to bring these proven practices within the rubric of a "comprehensive educational program." There was apparently little regard as to whether, in fact, those practices would or could jeopardize the very integration desired.

Second, NIE reinforced the continuation of a school-by-school approach to comprehensive change by requiring that principals write their own sections of the refunding document. Rather than providing the sense of direction and unification which they felt such a requirement would have, it only served to guarantee that the ESP would continue as a combination of school activities which were only artificially related to broaden district objectives. Just as the OE stated that adding a central theme where one did not exist might provide an "artificial sense of unity" to the project, so did the discrete writing of a significant part of the proposal by individual principals serve only artificially to unify the project; in fact, it reinforced the very discreteness and fragmentation which the ESP was to overcome.

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[76] D. C. Lortie, Schoolteacher, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 210.

[77] See P. Jackson, Life in Classrooms, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968, Chapter 4, for additional illustrative material.

3. The Role of Equality

A third thread running through the dynamics of the ESP is the pervasiveness of a norm of equality (closely aligned to the pervasiveness of unit autonomy). Though not as patently obvious as unit autonomy, it undergirded much that transpired through the ESP. In fact, it established the parameters for many important decisions.

Perhaps the notion of equality is best typified in the establishment of the ESP budget for the first half of the project. The budget submitted to NIE with the project proposal was organized by school (the designated program unit) and not by component (environmental education, career education, etc.); thus, it is difficult to reconstruct how the budget was prepared. It is known, however, that there was considerable objection among principals that some schools had received more money than others (one school had been given an extra $25,000 for implementing a Computer Assisted Instruction Program which never was implemented). Early in the first year of the project, the superintendent, noting that the principals had "just bought programs, aides, and remodeling" without tying them to expected gains,[78] admitted that the allocation was "not fair," and decided to propose to the superintendent's cabinet that monies be allocated on a per pupil basis for the duration of the project. This was approved, and from that point on, funds were allocated to schools by taking the number of dollars available, dividing that by the total number of students, and apportioning the amount to each school according to its student enrollment.

The same basic patterns were operable during the second half of the project. When the "east-side schools" entered the ESP, the amount of money they would receive had to be determined. At a cabinet meeting early in 1973, there was discussion of certain "overhead" expenses which a school incurred regardless of enrollment, and it was pointed out that smaller schools should not be penalized for their smaller enrollments and thus be made to absorb these overhead costs. After considerable debate, the decision was to give the new ESP schools approximately $45,000 and to allocate the remainder of the money to schools on the basis of $75 per pupil.

Of course, east-side schools had received money from ESP funds previously. During the first year of the project, west-side schools shared money with east-side schools under the "sister schools" concept. Because the district decided that "the expertise of non-project school personnel was needed to make the programs in the project schools a success,"[79] over $72,000 of ESP funds were used for personnel costs and the export of occupational versatility to the east-side junior high school. The cost sharing plan was instituted with the full knowledge of NIE until they ordered it stopped late the first year for for fear of funds being spread too thinly. Other examples of equality of funding included the existence of the Consolap Cabinet where all non-ESP externally derived funds were channeled to east-side schools during the first half of the project, and the use of district remodeling only funds for non-ESP schools during the same period.

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[78] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 2/28/72.

[79] J Superintendent letter to M. Duby, Office of Contracts and Grants, National Institute of Education, July 5, 1973, p. 4.

Despite NIE's pleas for the district to derive financial requirements from the plan,[80] the presence of problems was not used to determine needs for the second half of the project. In the absence of clear standards, and in the void left by the lack of articulation, a formula based upon equal distribution was the only defensible approach. Early in the refunding negotiations, principals attempted to get NIE to tell them how much money they would receive, but NIE insisted the amount would be determined by the proposal submitted. In order to speed the proposal writing process, the superintendent, in December 1972, simply used the anticipated revenue from ESP as a beginning figure (2.3 million dollars), subtracted one million dollars for non-teaching direct costs and prorated indirect costs, then allocated the remainder to individual schools on a per pupil basis, with 50 percent to be spent in 1973-74, 35 percent in 1974-75, and 15 percent in 1975-76.[81] This occurred months before the actual proposal was written and gives evidence that program requests were based on estimated dollars available, rather than program needs. This process was followed in most of the district's externally funded programs.[82]

Equality norms were obvious in other instances. The cabinets' deliberations over the allocation of undesignated funds was one such example; decisions were usually made with little consideration for the relative merits of requests, but on the basis of each program or school's receiving its "fair share" of the resources.[83] Even the designation of the chairman of the cabinet was done so that the outnumbered secondary principals were rotated into the chairmanship at strategic times, assuring that the elementary principals didn't chair the cabinet for too many years in succession.

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[80] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Meeting between district and NIE officials, 3/16/73.

[81] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 12/12/72.

[82] Memorandum, District administrator to CONSOLAP cabinet on allocation of 1972-73 Title II funds, February 15, 1973. In this memorandum approximately $10,000 in Title II funds was allocated to three schools on a per pupil basis.

[83] See Chapter IV; also D. R. Pierce, "Project Governance: A Fourth Year Review," Section VI, NWREL, September 1975.

4. The Contradictions of Comprehensive Change and District Operations

a. Comprehensive Change and Autonomy. It seems clear that comprehensive change, as it operated within Jefferson, was a study in contradictions. One of the clearest and most pervasive contradictions (and one which was to plague NIE and the district for much of the project's duration) was the dynamics of autonomy and unit choice versus the vague notion of comprehensiveness.

In Jefferson, local autonomy had, under the superintendent, emerged as a highly valued practice. This new project, from all visible appearances, was meant to erode that autonomy in favor of districtwide decisions which, ostensibly, would bind may district operations to decisions of the whole rather than of the parts. As pointed out, this effort seemed doomed from the start. The presence of a small administrative component (a factor in which the district prided itself) virtually forced much of the district's operation to the local level, and the allocation of lump sum budgets on a per student basis (a practices in effect on a smaller scale before the ESP) gave power to the local principal, especially in the area of curricular endeavors. While such a decentralized approach had merits, it could be effective only if all units understood what the overarching problem was which they were to address. This was not the case in Jefferson.

Program implementation and design were forced down to the school level, since few personnel at the administrative level had the resources or time (even if they had the inclination) to oversee any district attempt towards "comprehensiveness". Though principals often commented on their small residue of power, the fact remains that they had the power either to negate or to alter according to their wishes and those of their staff. Indeed, the superintendent was caught in a bind, for with the funds dispersed to the schools, he had little power to implement the ESP as he originally designed it, other than to suggest and cajole. His thoughts were accurate, as he reflected: "Without that (changing one principal at one school early in the project) nothing would have happened in that school. But what about the others, what could I do? Send them back to the classroom?"[84] Yet, attempting to institute a comprehensive model for change (however, ambiguously conceived) would have been difficult in any event within an atmosphere in which many building principals had never participated in the original proposal, only vaguely understood it when included, and generally used the monies to shore up existing programs.

Ironically, some tasks instituted at the urging of NIE only contributed to this piecemeal approach to comprehensive change and reinforced autonomy. For example, NIE's insistence that the principals write major chapters of the refunding proposal supported the assumption that there was universal understanding of what the proposal in Jefferson had been and should be. This common understanding was absent, and having building principals write the main body of the refunding document with little understanding of the objectives they were attempting to meet only perpetuated the discreteness and fragmentation of the project. NIE's attempt to unify the fragmentation under a more rigid and sophisticated budgeting system and to make the district more accountable for its expenditures (an issue which had led to considerable interaction between NIE and Jefferson during the first 30 months) only increased the fragmentation. Though the accounting scheme itself was not significantly altered, limits and restrictions were placed on it, forcing the money into even tighter and more discrete boxes. For example, no program category could be changed by more than 10 percent of the original estimate without NIE approval. Additionally, any purchase for more than $200 not specified in the original proposal had to be approved first by NIE. Finally, there could be no shifting of monies between categories without NIE approval. Though these changes were not severe, they convinced many administrators that NIE was now concerned with fiscal accountability, a perception which only reinforced the notion of the ESP as a program with unarticulated budgetary categories.

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[84] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 5/30/73.

b. Comprehensive Change as a Threat. The idea of comprehensiveness was alien to the district. There was minimal support for such coordinated activities as differentiated staffing, environmental education, or the extended school day/ year. These ideas were either effectively dampened or strategically altered in the early stages of the project, never to be seen again except, of course, in the form of the Jefferson rhetoric.

Comprehensive change, in the broadest sense, threatened what had been part of the ongoing traditions and practices of the district for years. Administrators within the district had an average in-district tenure of about 30 years, and issues in the original ESP proposal were largely issues raised by the superintendent (a relative newcomer), not the principals. Thus, there was only the glimmer of an agenda of educational problems meant to be solved by the ESP, and certainly no articulated consciousness of what could or should be accomplished as the result of its presence. Yet, it was patently clear that the proposal contained important themes which threatened the autonomy of individual schools.

The presence of these themes represented a symbolic admission that many practices of the past had been in error (or at least, were not as favorable as they may have been though to be). This may have been true, yet significant numbers of school people apparently disagreed. Given the absence of community pressures for any significant change in the operation of the school system, and given the relatively passive quality of the stable teaching population, the majority of whom were "locals" people who had attended nearby teacher training institutions, principals were not convinced that many aspects of the proposal were indeed necessary or desirable. Yet the superintendent was pervasive, and the lure of the money, which in the superintendent's terms, was "more than we had ever imagined" convinced most that the project should be approved, given certain reservations and the understanding that schools would continue to be the dominant locus of decision making.

c. The Criteria for Comprehensive Change. In its originally proposed form, the project had many components which were not directly tied to any central comprehensive theme. The notion of "creating an optimum learning environment for each child" was, at best, a symbolic slogan which implanted some notion of flexibility and diversity. The absence of greater specificity made decentralized implementation of comprehensiveness more erratic.

Comprehensive change was never clearly defined by either Jefferson or the NIE. The resulting variety of definitions led to diverse activities at every grade level, school, and stream. All were, at one time or another, posited as "evidence" of comprehensive change. Most were passively rejected by NIE as unacceptable criteria, yet acceptable criteria were not defined. In this void, ESP schools shared money with the "control" schools for the first year of the project, school beautification programs were posited as indices of environmental education, student activities in fifth day programs and Interims (for less than 10 percent of their time in school) were advanced as evidence of students' involvement in learning activities of their own choice--the list is endless. Yet, the fact that instructional programs in schools were coded in an *ex post facto* manner to district objectives demonstrated that pre-existing programs were justified after the fact as meeting district goals, and not the other way around. The difficulty in matching programs to goals resulted from the fact that objectives were so broad that it must have been difficult to decide which objectives *not* to include for any one program. The person responsible for coding objectives to programs later spoke of the arbitrary manner by which he made the match, indicating that he paired programs with goals which looked "reasonable."[85]

The absence of any uniform criteria as to what constituted comprehensive change makes an attribution of the "success" of the ESP on that criteria difficult if not impossible. What results are any number of judgments on the projects success, most of which are relative to the viewpoint of the individuals making those judgments. From the superintendent's (and some of the principals') point of view, the project was a success because it did introduce a number of instructional changes into the district that were not present before the ESP. It also involved the interaction of district principals in matters of district concern, a factor less prevalent before the ESP. In the superintendent's words, "Innovation does not mean better, but usually does mean different than what was done before."[86]

We cannot say with any assurance whether NIE considered the ESP in Jefferson to be a success in that their own definitions of comprehensive change were unclear and transitory. We do know that, by the mid-point of the project, NIE seemed less concerned with comprehensiveness and more concerned with a proper accounting of the use of ESP monies. One NIE official allegedly said, "We've given up on trying to get a real comprehensive change in Jefferson; but if we can't get that, at least we can get them to tell us what they're spending their money on."[87]

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[85] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with district administrator, 2/19/73.

[86] Comments by the superintendent to NWREL staff, May 13, 1976.

Another criteria on which to judge the district's efforts was on the latent purposes of the ESP--as a vehicle to help the district out of its financial situation by infusing new monies into the district and thus preventing a rise in property taxes for education. In a district of primarily working class people, which for years had suffered from high unemployment, shaky economy, the ESP returned more federal dollars than had been collected, thus permitting a decreased levy request the first year of the project and smaller than normal increases for subsequent years. Thus, the ESP was successful in preventing a rise in taxes and a cut in services. Using these latent criteria, and in the absence of definitive criteria from the funding agency--the ESP can be labeled A SUCCESS.[88]

D. The ESP in Jefferson--The NIE Story

The notion of the ESP as revenue sharing matches quite well with the patterns of unit autonomy, equality, and opportunistic orientation. Because buildings were designated as the programs, each could use funds for its own purposes with relatively little external constraint. This facilitated the use of monies to augment general revenues, since there were minimal restrictions. Similarly, the absence of standards of worth, as well as the absence of any real incentives to arrive at those standards, created a void in which the ongoing standards of equality were allowed to operate. Thus, the ESP funds were distributed throughout the district on a per pupil basis. In addition, the ESP was operationalized more as an opportunistic search rather than as a program meant to solve definitive problems, thus permitting the expenditure of monies for virtually any purpose.

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[87] R. B. Everhart, Fieldnotes, Interview with NIE official, 6/13/73.

[88] This claim can be made seriously. While we have pointed to many of the problems inherent in the ESP, the reader must be aware that this school district was placed under a microscope for five years and its every move was recorded. Such careful scrutiny of any organization would probably reveal an equally telling story. More important, however, the use of ESP monies must be viewed in relative terms. Jefferson received five million dollars over a five year period of time, certainly a pittance when one considers that one of the proposed Trident submarines will cost 1.3 billion dollars, over 250 times that which Jefferson received through the ESP. The entire Trident program will cost over eighteen billion dollars. Such massive outlays for defense would be much better spent if they were subjected to the same scrutiny as was Jefferson's ESP.

The role of the funding agency facilitated the operation of the ESP in this relatively freewheeling manner. The superintendent once said of them, "You expect some greater sophistication in the grantor. They control an awful lot of money and we're probably doing some things that are pretty far off, but they've never stopped anything."[89] Repeatedly NIE gave the district total responsibility for figuring what it was to do and how to do it, all under the premise that the ESP had evolved a program where government allowed the local recipient to make those decisions. Though this philosophy was evident throughout the project in most interactions between NIE and Jefferson, it was especially obvious, and, for district people, perplexing, during refunding. Amid the NIE rhetoric "you define what's good," (this is) "a new concept in federal education," "you do the plan, we'll give you the money," "You're free to spend your money as you wish--it's not our money"[90]--the district was trying to determine what NIE wanted. At one meeting when refunding issues were being discussed, a principal asked an NIE official if there was a written document available to serve as a pattern. The response was predictable: If there were a model why would we be wasting our time here? What we have is a trust in the talent in this room. We've given you a son of a bitch of a problem and we can't solve it quickly."[91] It was clear at that meeting that the proposal was fragmented and NIE was merely insisting on a way of codifying the fragmentation via streaming, tying objectives to programs, and a tighter budgetary accounting system.[92] After trying in vain to get guidelines from NIE, the superintendent finally said of the whole refunding proposal: "Paper and pencil don't make a district ...nor my addendums...but if they send us 2.5 million dollars, I'll say what they want."[93] The refunding document may not have been what NIE wanted, but NIE seemed to take the position that they had neither the time nor resources to get anything else. In that respect, the nature of the ESP was effectively sealed when the refunding document was accepted in the late spring of 1973. All else that followed was merely a variation on a theme.

It is clear, then, that whatever shape the ESP took in Jefferson, it had at least the tacit approval of the NIE/ESP officials. The experiment was funded by the agency, monitored, cajoled, and refunded. If, as NIE said, the intention was "to give school districts money for comprehensive change and then sit back and watch,"[94] then that watching must involve more than the recipient. Since the grantor was also part of this "new relationship in education," its role must also be examined. Four important themes stand out.

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[89] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with superintendent, 3/6/73.

[90] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Meeting with district and NIE officials, 5/8/73.

[91] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Meeting between district and NIE officials, 3/16/73.

[92] The fieldnotes of March 16, 1973 reflect this process vividly.

[93] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Cabinet meeting, 5/8/73. See also F. Mulhauser, Conversation with evaluation director, 5/18/73.

1. Grandiose Expectations

In the beginning, it appeared that NIE (or USOE), through the ESP, had grandiose expectations as to what "comprehensive change" could do, without defining clearly what the model of comprehensiveness was. The conceptualization of comprehensiveness as "change activities throughout all aspects of the educational system, including not only curriculum, staffing, and governance, but also consideration and involvement of the community" did not go far in defining the indices to be used to determine whether or not comprehensiveness occurred. In fact, given this loose definition, the superintendent was certainly correct when he pointed out to this staff that no operationalization of comprehensive change existed--by anyone.

To expect then that such weak conceptual underpinnings could produce a "synergistic" change model appears overly optimistic. There seemed to be no realization that school systems given their structural looseness, will more often transform the innovation to their own standards than will the innovation transform the school. If a soft object (in this case, comprehensive change) comes in contact with a hard object (in this case Jefferson and its patterns of tradition and regularity), it is the soft object which will be bent and shaped to conform to the more durable object. Given these conditions, it is not unexpected that the ESP in Jefferson turned out in the manner it did; we would be surprised if anyone should expect a more clearly delineated approach to emerge.

2. The Myth of Participation

The ESP evolved into an experiment intended, in part, to counter the federal government's domination of innovation. In order to combat this domination--seen as one reason for the failure of so many educational innovations NIE encouraged maximum feasible participation by various parts of the local constituency in shaping the program.[95] Thus, the inclusion of the community component in the original

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[94] D. Doyle, "Final Report of the ESP Review Committee," April 2, 1975, p. 16.

[95] "Participation" is an integral part of most social action programs. See P. Morris and M. Rein, The Dilemmas of Social Reform, New York: Atherton, 1967; D. P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, New York: Free Press, 1969; and T. Wolfe, Radical Chic and Mau-mauing the Flak Catchers, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1970; among others.

USOE request for letters of interest and the evolution of the program cabinet in Jefferson to encourage decision making by those who were to implement the decisions was a natural part of the revenue sharing approach.

That the community should be involved was a constant maxim of federal projects in general in the late 60's and early 70's; the ESP was no exception. Yet the questions "Who is the community?" "How should (can) it be involved?" and "In what can it be involved?" were rarely asked. The ramifications of the fact that Jefferson was not a community but rather a combination of census tracts called the Jefferson School District, overlapped by water districts, fire districts, police district, sewer districts, and a county, all asking for citizen "involvement", was not adequately considered by NIE.

In encouraging citizen participation, NIE officials seemed to have envisioned a restless sea of citizenry, demanding their constitutional right to be involved in decision making—a situation they apparently thought could be alleviated merely by opening the door and inviting people in. NIE officials could not understand the superintendent when he told them that racial, ethnic, or class conflict occurring in eastern urban centers wasn't characteristic of Jefferson, and that, in fact, people had to be dragged from their homes, bowling alleys, or taverns to attend public meetings. There was no massive outcry from the citizenry to be involved and, in fact, most people were quite willing to let the professionals do what they were being paid to do, within the implicity understood cultural norms of the community. Many of the principals prided themselves that they "knew their community," and that deference to those being paid to make the decisions was one of the things they "knew."

Different but parallel issues were raised with the cabinet. NIE officials hoped that, in forming the cabinet, building principals would grasp the comprehensive nature of the project and begin to work as a team rather than as separate fiefdoms. Again, NIE misread the context of life in Jefferson. Organizational tradition and practice in Jefferson was one of unit autonomy, not one of coordination and compromise. The world view of many educational planners is that coordination, comprehensiveness, and integration are values to which all school people ascribed, and that given the opportunity, school people would grasp these realities and begin to move in those directions. However, these were not values to which most Jefferson administrators ascribed, and they were not willing to use their potential power to move in those directions. Additionally, there were insufficient external pressures forcing them in those directions.

The "myth of participation" raised by both the level of community involvement and the operation of the cabinet, speaks to the fundamental question of the resources available for participation and the trade off between the opportunity for participation and the worth of participation. Neither the average citizen, the principals qua cabinet, nor most teachers had the resources available to make meaningful inputs; the information they had on which to base decisions was either incomplete or provided by someone else (and from various points of view). Citizens held full-time jobs, and there was a limit to the number of issues or organizations on which they could be sufficiently informed to make meaningful decisions. Likewise, cabinet members were responsible for operating their schools, as well as allegedly running the project. They too had limited information on which to base decisions.

The ideology of both community and administrative involvement illustrates that merely calling for involvement is a far step from guaranteeing it. The premise in the revenue sharing approach (and the ideology of grass roots participation in general) is that it would, as Nixon said, "Put the power to spend it (money) where the people are." But what is the guarantee that "the people" in Jefferson would have the knowledge (rather than just the power) to use the money in some programmatic manner? What was to say they would have the training and expertise to manage these new found responsibilities? What was to say they would have the time to deal with such new issues while carrying out their normal responsibilities? One of the fallacious lines of reasoning in the revenue sharing approach is that local constituencies have the resources and capabilities to become involved. As Robert Dahl has pointed out, democracy is dependent upon small groups of individuals who have direct control over decision making, who have available to them necessary information for making decisions, who have the time to become involved in the decision making process, and who have the capabilities and resources to understand the ramifications of decisions made and implemented.[96] In this sense,

> Until and unless we reach much greater parity in the distribution of political resources, other steps toward democratization are like treating tuberculosis with aspirin, or dropping marshmallows to famine victims.[97]

3. The Realities of Minimal Intervention

While the general orientation of the ESP was discussed as early as 1967, it lay dormant until 1970 when it became the cornerstone of the President's educational program. There is probably no doubt that the ideology behind the ESP grew, in part, as a result of the dissatisfaction with the failures of Great Society programs, wherein changes had been made in one part of the learning environment without corresponding changes in other sectors.[98]

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[96] R. Dahl, After the Revolution, Chapter 3, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

[97] Ibid., p. 163.

[98] This is reflected in the rationale of the ESP, stated in Chapter 2 of this report. For other statements on the push away from incrementalism, see Peter Morris and Martin Rein, The Dilemmas of Social Reform, New York: Autherton, 1967, and Ronald Corwin, Reform and Organizational Survival, New York: John Wiley, 1971.

As the ESP developed in 1970-71, the perspective developed that federal funding to the local level with minimal control from Washington and that of attacking problems comprehensively rather than incrementally, stood a better chance of working. While the scope of comprehensiveness grew from dissatisfaction with incrementalism of Great Society programs, important aspects of ESP's operationalization--specifically those of local agencies defining their own needs and implementing their own designs as well as that of minimal intervention by the federal agency--were consonants with the emerging ideology of revenue sharing. If we can make the distinction between adoption and implementation, then the ESP, like revenue sharing, was adopted in part, as a result of the dissatisfaction with Great Society programs, and implemented in a manner consonant with the values of the "new federalism."

The notion of minimal intervention is of special interest because of the dramatic and pervasive shift from earlier practices. The ESP was only one small part of this growing federal ideology; other examples abounded. For example, the entire stance which the administration took on the Bicentennial celebration was one where the government refused to take an active part in planning. While this stance may have resulted from the fact than in an era of Vietnam and dirty tricks, there was really little to celebrate, the alleged reason given was that the American independence movement had begun at the local level without a national impetus, and should be celebrated as such. John D. Rockefeller's statement--"The federal government can play a supportive role at best, not a leadership role; just as 200 years ago, it is the people who will determine the outcome," illustrates the approach the administration took toward the Bicentennial.[99]

Another example of placing localism into practice was the stance which the Nixon administration took towards public television networks and their funding. Whereas once the PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) had distributed centrally produced documentaries on national issues (many of which were embarrassing to the party in office), the government took a stance, under the guise of grass roots localism, that many of these centrally produced programs were not "representative of community needs" and that, in order to receive future government appropriated monies, PBS would have to distribute significant funds to member stations for production of locally oriented programs for local audiences. This would, of course, reduce the amount of money available for the production of national programs, as well as reduce the amount of money available to local stations to purchase such programs.[100]

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[99] J. D. Rockefeller, "Taking the Bicentennial Seriously," Newsweek, April 1, 1974, p. 11.

[100] See Les Brown, "No Hopes for Fourth Network," Seaview Post-Intelligencer, March 17, 1974.

In these examples, as well as others, the government's role was one of a kindly benefactor passing out the means to solve local problems, but not influencing how they should be solved. A second precept, then, under which the ESP operated was that of minimal intervention referring to the posture of local agencies knowing best their own problems and thus having to come up with their own solutions. This posture was, no doubt, a reaction against governmental bureaucracy and the increased power of Washington.

But this stance was more than just a reaction against something; it was also an affirmation for the symbolic ability of local governmental agencies (indeed the local citizenry) to be masters of their own fate and for the values of self-sufficiency and grass root politics. In a sense, it represented a reincarnation of the Horatio Alger myth.

The NIE came to Jefferson carrying the banner of the school district doing its own thing with little harassment from "the feds." Yet NIE's stance of minimal intervention in Jefferson was inappropriate, for it allowed the district to promise far more than it could possibly deliver. What's more, NIE knew about this inflated rhetoric, refused or was unable to offer any useful assistance or tell them how to get assistance, then proclaimed that they had "given up" on comprehensive change. It would thus seem that here as well as elsewhere, the pendulum had swung too far. In retrospect, it seems an error to believe that local agencies necessarily have the capabilities to solve all their problems if they are given money and just left alone by the government. There is a difference between the role of NIE (and the federal government in general) as a consultant or mediator and its role as a dictator. There is also a difference between total involvement, minimal involvement and a progressive involvement based upon the stage of the implementation process.[101] Horatio Alger was not the story of the self-made man, but rather of one person who knew the right people and the right angles; so the realities of minimal intervention exposes a similar myth. It is idyllic to believe that our society as it exists today--rootless, wrought with fragmentation, and lacking cababilities to control the forces which affect it, can solve all its problems if only market forces are allowed to operate.

4. The Myth of Federal Programs as Tests of Educational Policy

The ESP was conceived as an experiment to test the model of comprehensive change--its development, implementation, operationalization, and evaluation. The fact that it was avowedly a test of what district would do with money given to them to create their own models of comprehensive change and their own solutions to problems, unencumbered by unnecessary external sources, also made it a test of a specific educational policy. In the words of an NIE panel commissioned to examine ESP across the nation in its fourth year,

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[101] Berman and McLaughlin, "Implementation of Educational Innovations."

> The point is not that ESP is a programmatic failure; rather, the original rhetoric of ESP--inflated, grandiose perhaps--has come back to haunt the program. It was never rigorously designed as an experiment in comprehensive change--it was clearly to be a grand happening, a series of demonstrations of what local school districts would do with free money without laboring under the heavy hand of the government or foundation bureaucrat. The promise of ESP was precisely that it was generous, egalitarian, and anti-elitist.[102]

Yet we must ask to what degree the ESP as a form of educational revenue sharing actually represented a viable educational policy. Considering the definition of policy--"a definite course of method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions"[103]--there seemed to be, in the ESP, a paucity of courses, guidelines, and standards. On the other hand, there seemed to be an abundance of confusion, indecision, and purposelessness. Though the ESP was inconsistent about the decisions it did make, it was certainly consistent in the decisions it did not make. NIE accepted a plan under the rubric of "comprehensive change," discussed for three years with Jefferson the meaning of comprehensive change, but was no closer at the end than at the beginning; provided minimal direction and assistance to Jefferson in the course of its program; provided maximal amounts of rhetoric which was rarely specific; refunded the program, primarily as a way of tightening financial control; and then gave up on comprehensive change halfway through the project.

ESP, meant to test a new relationship between the government and local schools, was really the test of an "un-policy." The entire effort was so elusive and fragmented that the only definable goal was exactly what was stated by NIE--"to give schools money for comprehensive change and then sit back and watch." But watch what? It was hard to say, "watch comprehensive change," for the criteria for comprehensive change never was resolved. The only answer was to watch what happened, and much of what happened was due, in part, to the enforced pattern on minimal intervention and quidance. This posture, we submit, was little more than an "un-policy," a morass wherein there was no compass, no chart, and no rudder, but one wherein the predictable patterns of the prevailing winds determined the course of direction. Thus, it was a policy wherein the significance was "not (in) who makes such decisions as are made, but rather (in) how matters of the greatest social importance are not the objects of anyone's decision at all."[104]

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[102] Doyle, "Final Report of the ESP Review Committee," p. 23.

[103] Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, Mass.: G &C Meriam Co., 1973), p. 890. This definition seems to encompass the myriad of definitions as noted by Martin Rein in Social Policy, New York: Random House, 1970.

Pincus has argued that the federal government traditionally has had little control over funds parceled out to local school districts, and that withdrawal of support is more a symbolic than a real threat.[105] Furthermore, he states that local schools see federal guidelines for innovation as inconsistent and unclear, perceive federal funds as transitory, and generally tend to follow the path of least resistance with regard to federal pressures; such was certainly the case in Jefferson. More important, however, the Jefferson-NIE relationship was such that a lack of federal pressures seems to have been both a purposeful strategy and a result of simply not knowing what to do. The policy of local initiative for comprehensive change was in reality an un-policy because the directions taken resulted as much from the absence of decisions as from conscious action taken. Though the federal government may not provide local schools incentives for the implementation of federally sponsored programs, it also lacks any well conceived and clearly articulated policy which takes into consideration the forces affecting educational change.

This discussion leads to the ongoing dynamics within NIE during the project, information which is sketchy and mostly secondhand. Un-policy within NIE/ESP was, perhaps, somewhat understandable when one considers the following chronology of events: the project was formed in 1970; a director was named in late 1970; a program had to be operational by September 1971; decisions on funding were accelerated; there was little lead time for planning; there was a small staff for monitoring; Jefferson had two project officers the first year; ESP was absorbed by NIE during the second year; the staff turnover at NIE increased; NIE appointed review panels to find out what they inherited; NIE came under increasing pressure from Congress for inactivity during first year; NIE appointed review panel to look at project for refunding; NIE continued to be scrutinized by Congress and its efforts turned inward; funding became a problem within NIE, and internal politics became paramount as vulnerable programs were sought to achieve cost efficiency; ESP was looked at as a possible program to be shifted to other agencies within the institute; a review panel of outside "experts" was appointed and visited Jefferson, as well as other ESP sites; the Government Accounting Office (GAO) appointed a review panel and it spent considerable time in Jefferson and other ESP sites; the director of the ESP was ousted from office and his belongings were removed the next day in an internal purge; an acting director was assigned; a freeze on hiring was imposed on NIE; staff turnover and accretion continued; morale reached a new low; the project officer only rarely visited Jefferson the last two years of the project; another internal review panel was appointed consider shifting ESP to other agencies; the acting director (since appointed director) was forced to handle both project and evaluation concerns; the new director was rumored on his way out; ESP lost its divisional status within NIE and was transferred to another division; the project director took a one-year paid "sabbatical" during the fifth year of the ESP; the question of the survival of NIE continued throughout.[106]

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[104] R. P. Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism, Boston: Beacon Press, 1968, p. 118.

[105] J. Pincus, "Incentives for Innovation in the Public Schools," Review of Educational Research, 44, winter 1974, pp. 113-44. See also J. T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Educational Reform," Harvard Educational Review, 41, February 1971.

How can federal educational policy survive in a climate such as this? Clearly it cannot. Whatever the stance of the ESP with regard to educational policy, the position was the result of the interaction of actors, events, and external forces operable at any given point. Educational policy, as embodied in the ESP, was not some consistent line of reasoning, but rather was the accretion of decisions and non-decisions which resulted in a program based primarily on the intermixture of rhetoric and romanticism, shaped and forced by the political context within which it operated. As Merrow has said, and as the ESP illustrated "There is no federal educational policy, only numbers of programs which themselves embody (in their original form anyway) different political positions."[107]

E. Beyond the ESP--The Conservative Nature of Educational Innovation

The NWREL evaluation team spent five years studying the attempts at change in one school district. In some respects, we could be accused of "overkill," for the time, effort, and expense of examining the ESP in Jefferson seems hardly justifiable in relation to the scope of effort. However, we have learned a great deal about the realities of daily life in school districts and how educational innovations must conform to that reality. It is useful to see the ESP as part of the educational innovation process and the effects of change efforts in general. In this final section, we want to advance the idea that the ESP in Jefferson was typical of educational change in school districts across the country and, as such, was an indication of the conservative nature which such change efforts usually engender.

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[106] This seems a common scenario in federal agencies. See J. I. Gallagher, "Unfinished Educational Tasks (Thoughts on Leaving Government Service)," Exceptional Children, 36, January 1970, pp. 709-716; E. R. House, The Politics of Educational Innovation, Berkeley: McCutchan, 1974, Chapter 8; J. Merrow, "The Politics of Federal Educational Policy: The Case of Educational Renewal," Teachers College Record, 76 (September 1974), pp. 19-38.

[107] J. Merrow, "The Politics of Federal Educational Policy: The Case of Educational Renewal." See also the spring 1976 issue of the Social Policy Journal.

We have suggested viewing the ESP a local success because, lacking any other firm criteria on which to judge it, the fact that it prevented an even greater rise in local property taxes and/or a corresponding cut in services is of sufficient value to term the ESP successful. While this refers more to the latent rather than the manifest purposes of the ESP project, some might term it more successful based upon its manifest purposes of the ESP project, some might term it more successful based upon its manifest purposes.[108] Based upon his comments at a meeting with Level II staff on May 13-14, 1976, we suspect that this stand would be supported by the superintendent. Among his points were the following:

1. Innovation does not necessarily mean better, but it does mean that some things are done differently than they were before. In this respect, (a) the principals do meet as a body to consider and deliberate various aspects of district operations; (b) some community members are more involved in reviewing the programs in the respective schools, whereas this involvement was almost nonexistent before the ESP; (c) while it is true that some schools have scarcely changed their instructional operations, it is also true that other schools have added new curricula that were not present before the ESP. In this respect, the district has changed as a result of the ESP and thus the ESP is successful.

2. There is no utility dwelling on comprehensive change, because nobody (including our Level II staff) knows what it is or was supposed to be. Comprehensive change means changes in every school, not necessarily in every program within a school. In that respect, the ESP in Jefferson was comprehensive.

3. The goal of the ESP all along was to allow buildings to define and implement their own programs, with the understanding that they all were to meet the same objectives.

4. While there were objectives in the first proposal, Jefferson was not funded to follow those objectives. Rather, they were funded to try out changes as described in the hypothetical case studies found in the first proposal.

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[108] We are using the terms "manifest" and "latent" in the sense originally used by Merton. Thus, manifest functions are intended, purposeful, and recognized by participants, while latent functions are unintended, not purposeful, and unrecognizable. See Robert K. Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," Social Theory and Social Structure (1968 enlarged edition), New York: The Free Press, 1968, pp. 73-138.

5. In the second thirty months, each school was not to meet all the objectives outlined, but rather was to pick which objectives it was supposed to meet and then meet those.

6. The ESP provided funds that allowed the district to decrease its general fund expenditures without decreasing the quality of its educational delivery systems. Even despite these augmented funds, the district was unable to accumulate enough resources to reach average per-pupil expenditures of districts across the state.

Given these and other considerations, the superintendent felt the ESP was sucessful in Jefferson because change had occurred in all schools. While we cannot support the superintendent's position that the ESP was successful on its intended criteria, we recognize the difficulty in fulfilling the intentions of change efforts. It is difficult to portray, in a report such as this, the emotional energy that flowed into the project in Jefferson and how certain points of view on it came to be formed. The superintendent, for one, devoted enormous energies to this project and had to overcome a number of obstacles, both internal and external, if the directions stated in the original proposal were to be followed. Change efforts are difficult to lead, and this document has pointed to some of these difficulties. Our argument is that most of these obstacles were not overcome, a point on which we know some district people disagree with us.

It is easy to make indictments. Some might say that NIE was ill-staffed and the whole notion of comprehensive change was ill conceived; the Jefferson superintendent promised much more than he could possibly deliver and was satisfied with the fact that the project did bring in large amounts of money; he did not invoke any sanctions upon those who violated the spirit of ESP; the principals were unwilling to surrender their power for the good of the cause; the teachers' association should have been more expansive in their thinking and less concerned with job security. Perhaps our own evaluation team should have been less concerned with the canons of science and more willing to help and offer suggestions rather than to sit idly by and watch the whole effort muddle along.[109]

Yet such personal indictments, while containing a ring of truth, are concerned with superficialities, not the main problem of change. The people involved in the project, from NIE down to the classroom teacher were, for the most part, honest people who tried their best under very difficult circumstances. The whole political context within which the ESP was founded and operated was, at best, an impossible situation. Even given the motivation to do more, what could have occurred within NIE, suffering as it was under the external and internal pressures present within the federal system? Certainly improvements could have been made, but the degree to which they would really have changed anything is doubtful. As Murphy states,

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[109] Some other problems of evaluation in the ESP are noted in Cynthia Parsons, "'Experimental Schools' Failed over Evaluations," The Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 1976, p. 29.

> The Federal system--with its dispersion of power and control--not only permits but encourages the evasion and dilution of federal reform... those not diluted by Congressional intervention can be ignored during the state and local implementation.[110]

The superintendent, despite his penchant for mixed messages and for preparing rationales for decisions already made, was a dedicated and hard working individual. He searched for new ideas and new visions, and spent many hours attempting to keep district programs operable in an inhospitable financial environment. While other districts were suffering cutbacks and laying off teachers, Jefferson was able to keep afloat and run a sound general educational program despite having one of the lowest tax bases in the state.

The principals and staff were not much different from staffs of most school districts. The district had its share of poor personnel, but it also had many energetic and dedicated people who, though possibly unable to handle the ESP project, still gave a lot to the ongoing day-to-day business of running a school system. What could be done internally was questionable. Most teachers and principals only vaguely understood the project, and many resisted it. Aspects of it were foreign to their way of thinking, as evidenced by one district administrators's comment on liberalized attendance policies:

> We have to instill in kids good attitudes and work habits. Face it, school is business, not play. Less than half the kids in this district go to college, and those kids have to learn that you just can't take off the job (to go) hunting or turn in any old excuse. We have a responsibility to teach them about being on time and carrying through their responsibilities.[111]

As reported elsewhere in this document, and when compared to the literature on change, the Jefferson ESP was rather typical of what happens in most change efforts. As both Havelock and Pincus point out, schools tend to adopt innovations which project an image of being "up to date, efficient, professional, and responsive."[112] Likewise, schools tend to adopt innovations which

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[110] J. T. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Educational Reform," Harvard Educational Review, 41, February 1971, p. 60.

[111] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Principals meeting, 6/6/72.

> do not require complex changes in management structure or organizational relations. Such innovations help to satisfy staff and client demands for more change, without requiring from the organization the difficult task of self-renewal, which many of the organization's clients, as well as the organization itself, might resist. Such innovations are also safe, in that it is nearly impossible, given the state of educational information systems, to document whether a new curriculum, or new physical plant, or an audiovisual system helps or hinders children's learning or attitudes. Therefore, the innovating district, if it uses reasonable sense, is unlikely to get in trouble as a consequence of adopting or abandoning such innovations.[113]

Schools do not respond to market forces but, instead, are protected from them by virtue of an assured supply of funds and clientele. As Pincus points out, schools are less likely than competitive organizations to adopt innovations which will seriously challenge their organizational or institutional structure, authority roles, or the established ways of doing business. Lacking external motivation, and having to satisfy the broad spectrum of clientele, they tend to maximize efficiency, minimize diversity, and appease pressures only to the degree necessary. In this sense, school based innovations attempt to be as many things as possible to as many people as possible; in the end, however, the excessive appeasement necessary for stability results in either a refusal to attempt major changes or considerable dilution of the change effort.

Ironically, most educational innovations are conservative rather than the liberating forces they claim to be. Given the current institutional setting into which innovations are introduced, they an hardly be anything different. Any innovation, in order to be implemented in sufficient form for rhetoric to approximate reality, must be conservative; schools therefore reject attempts which seriously challenge the ongoing educational structure.[114] Those individuals who would seriously question the educational system and its ability to change are probably working outside of, not within that system. Those who foster innovation from within must be prepared to live with disparities between their expectations and the daily realities they face. As the ESP so aptly illustrates, most innovations within school systems, are not forces for change but for the rhetoric of change.[115] Survival mandates the substitution of ideology for practice; other actions are a realization of disparity or eventual exit, both leading to possible (more often, probable) disassociation of people from the events proclaimed.[116]

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[112] J. Pincus, "Incentives for Innovation in the Public Schools," p. 122; R. Havelock, Educational Innovation in the United States, Center for Research on the Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, Ann Arbor, 1973.

[113] Pincus, Incentives for Innovation in the Public Schools," p. 118. See also Berman and McLauglin, "Federal Programs...."

[114] A point discussed at length in P. Morris, Loss and Change, New York: Pantheon, 1974, Chapter 6. See also R. Normann, "Organizational Innovativeness: Product Variation and Re-Orientation," Administrative Science Quarterly, 16, June 1971, pp. 203-215.

We might also address the purpose of conservative innovations such as ESP as it existed in Jefferson. That is, why should innovations such as the ESP exist in Jefferson, and why might we suspect these change efforts to continue?

It seems that our experiences and the experiences of those in the district place most educational innovations in a role of little more than foreign aid. As Pressman and Wildavsky point out, foreign aid is initiated by a crisis and a corresponding need to spend money within a given period of time.[117] The mentality of foreign aid is the premise that panaceas exist, and the effort is to get them operable in short order. Perhaps one great project, with many resources, will help turn the tide; donors are caught up in the "great leap forward psychology," accompanied by undue pessimism about the past and wild optimism about the future. As Pressman and Wildavsky state

> One side has limited resources to allocate; the other, limited ability to spend. They could take account of each other's limitations by designing programs geared to implementation. They then might manage to make good on their promises. Instead, they both succumb to the temptation to juxtapose grand schemes for which their resources, both in terms of money and administrative capacity, are inadequate.[118]

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[115] A distinction made by Andrew Halpin, "The Mythology of Change," unpublished paper, p. 6.

[116] Recent studies on the reaction of organizational members to organizational conditions include: O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970 and E. Weisband and T. Ranck, Resignation and Protest, New York: Grossman, 1975.

[117] J. Pressman and A. Wildavsky, Implementation, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 136-142.

[118] Ibid., p. 136.

Spending money is not the manifest goal, but the manifest goals are difficult to realize and the results may not be in for a number of years. Thus, the one immediately available criterion for success is the ability to spend the allotted amount.

The crisis of ESP was the "Crisis in the Classroom" of American education--especially in low income areas such as Jefferson. Jefferson had the need, NIE/ESP had the money. In lieu of definitive results, the ability to move money was indicative of progress; and the movement of money was symbolic of the progress being made. Despite the problems outlined in this report, most of which NIE knew beforehand, the district (as well as our own evaluation team) was refunded in the spring of 1973 rather than the summer as originally planned. The reason? Quite simply, ESP had not spent their allotted money for the fiscal year and not to spend it by July 1 would be to admit a lack of progress. The solution? Advance the refunding process and spend money before the monies were lost, thus showing Congress that the program was "on schedule."

Like most innovations, however, the ESP had minimal effect other than to infuse large amounts of money into a locally depressed educational community. (One local even referred to Jefferson as a "disaster area needing federal help.")[119] But the ESP as revenue sharing, much like foreign aid, was not continued so much on the basis of manifest intents, but more on the symbolic visibility that somewhere, somebody was doing something. In Jefferson, the fact that the federal government was trying to do something, was making an effort, and was allowing the school district to run its own show, was of value not so much for what was accomplished but for the symbolic meaning--federal involvement in local problems in a style compatible with the local community.

Innovations having symbolic rather than substantive value are important, for they offer hope and create expectations, but more importantly, they establish the image that critical problems are being attacked. Yet this psychological sense of well being stifles overt dissatisfaction by giving participants the sense that they really are dealing with issues which can significantly influence the educational system. Dedication to small scale changes over a narrow range prevents participants from examining more fundamental issues such as a change in organizational relations or the outside forces impinging on the system's ability to change. In this sense, most educational innovations are counterproductive to an awareness of educational change.[120]

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[119] F. Mulhauser, Fieldnotes, Interview with community resident, 7/17/72.

[120] For a similar point of view, see Martin Rein and S. M. Miller, "Social Action on the Installment Plan," in Marc and Phylis Pilisuk, eds., How We Lost the War on Povery, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1973, pp. 204-223.

The analogy between educational innovation and revenue sharing and foreign aid is comparable to Piven and Cloward's analysis of social welfare programs. They point out that income is substituted for the more difficult and risky act of changing the social structure through an alteration of power relationships, the creation of employment possibilities, and the design of new opportunities.[121] Welfare becomes important not as a system to make changes, but rather as a system which avoids [illegible] need to consider other changes. There is a "welfare cycle" wherein expenditures increase during times of discontent; welfare serves to reduce this discontent by making people dependent on welfare payments. When economic conditions improve, welfare is used punitively to force people into low paying and menial jobs which must be filled during times of economic prosperity. Thus, welfare funds are beneficial to the existing order because they are consumed, and this consumptions staves off threats to the economic order and reduces the possibility of massive dissatisfaction erupting into political action.

We can look at educational innovations in a similar manner. Often they are seen as investments that offer the potential for an investment return in the form of increased test scores, teacher satisfaction, or greater economies. Yet the return on investment is usually negligible, except as a symbolic representation of an expedient manner to handle a problem--a politically viable option to the difficulties of altering the basic structures of the educational system. Educational innovations serve the same purpose as income does in the welfare system, for innovations are often little more than short-term expedients to long term problems--expedients that mask the more critical problems and establish dependency of the recipients on money. Yet they represent symbolic efforts at change, and, by obscuring the fact that they are typically conservative rather than liberating forces, they serve to minimize more drastic attempts at change. Innovations should not be seen in terms of potential return on investments, but rather in terms of consumption--money to be used. To spend the money, however, obscures the existence of innovation as a conservative force. Innovations continue to be consumed because, like welfare or foreign aid, revenue sharing serves a consumptive function for short run gains that helps ensure survival.

In the case of Experimental Schools (as well as most large innovative programs in education), educators and funding agencies were unwilling or unable to examine the basic patterns that needed to be addressed if changes were truly sought. They were unable to see that the real issues were not minor variations in curriculum or IGE versus traditional modes of classroom organization. Rather than consider structural power to determine the type of program they desired or the substitution of proficiency as an index of competency rather than mere attendance (all avenues which would seriously upset existing power valences) minor variations are funded, thereby subverting discontent and demonstrating symbolically that the existing economic and social order can be all things to all people. Like foreign aid or welfare, educational innovation argues that if the necessary changes are impractical because they would upset too many traditions, then at least school districts can be provided with revenue to reassure them that they are grappling with important issues.[122]

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[121] F. Piven and R. A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor, Pantheon, New York, 1971.

We don't know how far the metaphor of ESP as revenue sharing can or should be taken. Given the literature on educational innovation, we suspect is is a useful analogy and that an analysis of many innovations would reveal a similar pattern. Nor do we want to argue that a legitimate function of education may be stability rather than change, for that argument is beyond the scope of this report. It seems clear, however, that given the current relationship between grantors and grantees, and given the institutional parameters within which schooling operates, and given the institutional parameters within which schooling operates, revenue sharing may be all that we can expect from many educational innovations. If so, we should reduce the rhetoric about change and innovation and acknowledge instead the more obvious role of federal government attempts at funding change as simply another means of allowing the system to operate in variations of the way it has operated all along. By acknowledging this role we might, at least, reduce the tendency for the local school district to be the major focus in searches for reasons things don't work--and that would be an accomplishment.

While we have spoken to the "what" and the "why" of the ESP, we have yet to detail what the Jefferson case can tell us about change efforts--their conceptualization and implementation. In the next chapter, we cover some implications of the Jefferson ESP for future attempts at planned change.

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[122] The notion of social policy as symbolically reassuring is discussed at length in M. Edelmann, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, University of Illinios Press, Urbana, 1964. See also Martha Derthick, New Towns in Town, The Urban Institute, Washington, 1972.

CHAPTER IX

IMPLICATIONS

IX. IMPLICATIONS

The Experimental Schools Program represented a new approach by a federal agency in funding programs of planned change in a local school district. Previously the federal government's approach to funding reform programs had been to earmark monies for change in one or two elements within the larger system (e.g., a reading program, a math curriculum, or new staffing arrangement). The impetus or specific change most often emanated from the funding agency, and the contract usually extended over a short period. The ESP differed from previous approaches in several respects. First, the program spanned a five year period--a sizeable slice of time in the annals of government funding. Second, an average of one million dollars per year for five years represented a substantial increase in financial assistance by a government agency for a program of educational reform. Third, systemic change was to occur; that is, most of the elements within the school system were to undergo change simultaneously. Fourth, decisions about the specific changes that were to occur in the several elements were to originate with the local district. Fifth, the federal government, through its funding agency, was to assume a stance of minimal intervention in the design of the program and also in its implementation.[1]

Although change did occur in the Jefferson School District during project years, as has been explicated in this report, it should be quite clear that no systematic plan emerged to carry out the grandiose program of reform as conceived by the writers of the proposal and approved by the funding agency. There are a myriad of more or less legitimate reasons or explanations why massive, systemic reform did not occur, and this chapter deals with those which appear to be most salient. Some factors for not adopting and/or implementing the ESP on a districtwide basis can be explained by a failure of either the local district or the funding agency to take them into consideration. Other explanations fall into the categories of inability to exercise control or disinclination to exercise control. These potential categories are mentioned not because data exist that permit them to be used as analytical constructs operationalized in this chapter, but instead to elevate them to a level of consciousness for us and interested readers.

Conceptualizing systemic, comprehensive change, communicating the sense of it to others, deciding when a potential client had a purchase on it sufficient to merit funding, deciding that a reasonable climate for change existed at the client level, deciding that the capacity existed at the local level in sufficient abundance to implement the agreed upon plan, and monitoring the implementation of such plan are tasks of considerable magnitude. These tasks and more faced the planners of Experimental Schools at the national level. To say they were merely difficult is to understate the case, but to designate them as impossible may be overstating the case. However, when constraints at the federal level are considered, both externally and self-imposed constraints, substantial success appears unlikely. When combined with constraints that existed in the Jefferson School District, successful implementation of the planned project appears highly improbable. Conditions at the federal level that impeded reform in establishing a new approach to promoting local change are considered next, followed by a discussion of problems and issues that militated against systemic, comprehensive change in the Jefferson School District. Please note that it is often the interaction of the constraints which prevents or hinders successful solutions.

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[1] It was not different from previous approaches in the sense that the local plan was to be approved by the funding agency and that some monitoring was to occur during the life of the program.

A. Constraints at the Federal Level

Several constraints were operating at the federal level which militated against the likelihood that a comprehensive, systemic program of planned reform could be mounted and sustained. Some of the factors that had long hindered local change also seemed to inhibit federal officials in working out a new plan for funding a change program. Federal officials needed to conceptualize what was meant by comprehensive, systemic change and to communicate this to potential clients and significant others. They needed to conceptualize the social conditions conducive to change and to determine when these conditions existed at the local level. They needed to establish clear and consistent policies as to how the federal and local agencies were to relate, which also included the establishment of mechanisms and procedures for resolving conflict with local agencies. Operationally, federal planners and supervisors faced such constraining factors as minimal time to plan and mount the program, insufficient resources to build and maintain a staff capable of supervising a program of such magnitude as well as severely limited resources for staff travel to the various ESP sites, almost constant turnover in the staff, and a lack of continuity in priorities by major policy makers.

Although it was the task of local educational agencies to plan the specific changes they were to adopt and implement, federal officials were charged with laying out the parameters of comprehensive change, making related decisions, and allocating funds to the Local Education Agency (LEA) as well as monitoring local expenditures. There were no successful models for change (that is, cooperative ventures between a funding agency and a local school district) to serve as a point of departure. Previous ventures in school reform did not meet with much success and the picture has not changed appreciably in more recent years. The existence of a successful model would probably have precluded a need for the federal government to underwrite a new model. Models for comprehensive, systemic reform were nonexistent. Insofar as we are aware, there had been only one previous attempt at promoting comprehensive change in schools by an outside agency. The Ford Foundation had funded some comprehensive change programs in the early mid-sixties. Some problems had been identified but were of minimal or no assistance to the planners of ESP since the results had not been written up and published.

The notion of providing funds to school districts to bring about extensive reform as alluded to in the proposal rhetoric and then watching carefully to see what happens seems to be rather fundamentally at odds with what is known about how and why change occurs. Providing funds for a proposed plan of reform and then assuming a stance of minimal intervention might very well be effective under a set of social conditions where the incentive for change is strong and widely shared by the significant actors in the system targeted for change. Even then an inclination to change is insufficient if the capability to carry out the program of reform is not present. It is risky to assume that the rhetoric of change contained in a proposal is reliable evidence of things present or things future. The alternative to making the assumption that a climate conducive to change exists is to study existing social conditions carefully and systematically. This calls for resources in time and money that usually do not accompany external funding of planned change and which certainly was not the case with Experimental Schools. We strongly recommend that this be made an integral part of any future intervention model. The evaluation effort might also be enhanced considerably.

One of the important lessons to be learned from J ESP is that adequate funds are insufficient to induce planned reform if other conditions are not conducive to change. It can be said that revenue to underwrite programs of change is a necessary but not sufficient condition. It promotes the means by which planned change can take place but in no way assures that the rhetoric will become reality if other necessary conditions are not present. The amount of the funds does not change that nor does the length of the funding period. At the same time we do not wish to minimize the importance of these aspects of the intervention model because they do provide significant contributions. They relieve the pressure of constantly being in a planning mode and diminish search behavior for outside funds. The energy consumed by these behaviors can be channeled into implementing and revising plans so as to reduce negative and unanticipated consequences. We see these elements as highly desirable in most intervention models.

An issue that plagued the district, as well as federal officials in Washington, for at least the first two years of ESP was that of ambiguity about comprehensive change. At least some of the confusion can be traced to the vagueness of the charge from USOE and NIE. It was not something peculiar to the ESP model; the problem is at least as old as planned change itself. However, in this instance the vagueness of the charge was somewhat intentional because specific change in the school district was to emanate from the grass roots. Nevertheless, it was the subject of many conversations and the issue was never really resolved. Apparently few problems surfaced during the initial and negotiation stages that were not quickly resolved. The broad aimed guidelines probably created more problems during the implementational stage and in the discussions prior to refunding. Since the program design at the local level was also not very precise, few parameters existed for informed decision making and conflict resolution. Consequently, we are recommending that another important step be added. Specific strategies for implementing the grand program design at the LEA level should be spelled out in as much detail as possible before funds are granted--but only after the problems to be solved have been conceptualized and ends agreed upon by both district and federal actors. It seems logical to be concerned with means (solutions) following the previous step but before actual implementational events begin. After all, most of the disagreement within the local district and between the local district and the funding agency occurs over means and not ends. It is the means by which new programs are operationalized that create new relationships and change the roles and statuses of individuals. The major source of resistance to change is the risk that implementers must take in assuming new roles. This is the true innovation and not the new materials that are introduced. They are merely the tools of innovation. Some change theorists and practitioners argue that the change rhetoric in proposals should serve only to gain social, psychological, and financial support and once that is achieved, it has served its purpose. They hold that a great amount of "wiggle room" must remain for the potential reformers and implementers to work out the details. We, too, are firm believers in the notion that action informs thinking and therefore plans must be subject to change. At the same time, we are advocates of the notion that plans which deal primarily with ends is insufficient because they have not grappled with those issues which are the main source of conflict. All too often solutions (strategies for implementation) are laid on implementers even without agreement that they remotely relate to the problem that is to be solved, and without any understanding of what is implied in changed relationships. In essence, we are advocating steps which suggest that more resources in terms of time and expertise be devoted to the initial and negotiation stages. At the same time, only those potential clients would be involved in the solution steps who had communicated a sense of the problem, had agreed internally upon ends, had been judged by the funding agency to have a conceptual plan which merits further consideration and had been judged, on the basis of systematically generated information, by the funding agency to possess a favorable climate for change as well as the inclination and capability to implement such a program. The adoption of such a model should decrease the number of projects which meet an early demise or which undergo massive and undesirable transformation. Presently the only means of dealing with such developments is to withdraw funds, and this is not a viable alternative because of its political infeasibility. We would like to speculate further by suggesting that adding the step in the model that deals with gathering systematic information on capability and inclination to change, as well as the step on strategies for implementing the program (solution step) would have revealed that comprehensive and systemic change was not possible, or for that matter desirable, in the Jefferson district. Elaboration of this point is reserved for the discussion on local constraints.

Another issue which was never resolved during the J ESP was the role of the federal agency. The data that have been presented in this report make it quite clear that the local clients were unsure what was expected of them in carrying out a comprehensive, systemic mandate for change. The signals from Washington did appear to be mixed. The stance of minimal intervention on the part of federal officials came through clearly on the level of general intent. Although federal officials did not tell the district what specific changes to make, it was made abundantly clear from time to time that what the district proposed to do could not be done. What outwardly appeared to be freedom to implement as district personnel elected was oftentimes erroneous and more than a little frustrating. The absence of previously agreed upon clear and precise parameters that informed decisions precluded both sets of actors from pursuing more productive behaviors and which would probably have been more palatable to them. Conflict between Washington and the LEA was much less pronounced during the last half of the project since monitoring was almost non-existent due to scarce resources.

Sufficient time to plan and mount a program of considerable magnitude at the national level was not available to federal officials. Consequently, they could not give to others what was denied to them. Traditionally, time is not usually considered as a valuable resource like money and materials, but as a given. The truth of the matter is that time is as important as any resource--maybe more so. It is not sufficient to insure success, but the chances for success should be enhanced considerably if it were treated as a finite resource. An ironic development in all of this is that in one respect time was thought to be an important factor to consider as a part of the change model. The contract covered several years--not one or two years as was the case traditionally. Consequently, time and energy could be devoted to more productive endeavors than writing proposals for contract renewal or for new contracts. It would serve no purpose in trying to show culpability for failing to view time as a resource (or any other shortcoming for that matter), but what we are saying is that time is an important and scarce source and should receive due consideration.

Experimental Schools was a program which seemingly called for a large and expanding staff at the federal level. It involved millions of dollars and eventually 25 sites. Such was not the case; the staff was small even when the program realized its full size. There was insufficient time to monitor existing programs because staff time was taken up with expansion problems. A related problem was inadequate funds for staff travel. A small staff plus minimal funds for staff travel proved to be a major constraint on the capability of the federal agency to monitor the ESP and to provide needed assistance to people in the field. This doesn't appear to be a complicated problem, but it has plagued federally funded educational programs for a long time.

Another constraining factor was the almost constant turnover of the central staff in Washington. It was certainly a problem for the staff there to deal with, but it was even more of a problem at the local level. Stable relationships with people in the field are a must if good rapport is to be developed and maintained. It was stated earlier that the aspect of change which encounters the most resistance is the establishment of new roles and relationships, and it is no less true at this level. Stability not change is in order; a certain amount of stability in human relationships must exist if people are to take risks, and changing certainly involves taking risks. Staff turnover is probably related to all of the factors we are discussing here, but it is closely related to inadequate staffing and constantly changing priorities, the final factor discussed under constraints at the federal level.

Few, if any, federal educational programs enjoy high status throughout the life of the program and consequently, priorities may change at any moment with a sudden shift in personnel. The shift usually creates a new set of priorities which are imposed in LEA's. Confusion, sometimes bordering on chaos, is the result. It was difficult to keep abreast on what the priorities were in Experimental Schools. Changes at USOE and NIE policy levels, changes at the agency level and differing expectations of the numerous panels of experts that descended on both the local project and the external evaluation team created undue anxiety and interfered with continuity. Presently there is a nagging realization among this evaluation staff that there may not be anyone left at NIE interested in the results of J ESP. Ostensibly the purpose of ESP was to test the viability of a change model. We are not advocating the adoption of the ESP model as applied in J ESP for future programs, but we have attempted to highlight its strengths and weaknesses. We have shown what happened in one case. There are both positive and negative aspects to J ESP; theoretically something can be learned from both. A cross-site comparison of results might very well reveal that what has been pictured as a negative feature of the model here was a positive feature in another site. For example, we suggested that under certain social conditions and with an addition of two steps in the initiating and negotiating stages, entirely different results might have emerged. It is possible, even probable, that the case was different in another setting. We strongly recommend that the results reported here and in other ESP sites be studied for possible insights into the development of new collaborative change models. We further suggest that long range planning might partially circumvent the demise of programs before their scheduled culmination. Some things must possess enough stability to induce continuity or else there is no meaningful point of departure. We believe that an organization which purports to promote planned change in LEA's must develop long range plans which encourage both continuity in some organizational elements and change in others. Both are possible and desirable.

As previously indicated, factors that inhibited the likelihood of a successful program of comprehensive, systemic change as envisioned in the rhetoric were not confined to the federal level. We turn to a discussion of some of the more salient constraints at the local level.

B. Constraints at the Local Level

Major factors which militated against successful planned change at the local level included the infeasibility and undesirability of comprehensive, systemic change in Jefferson, the vagueness and incompleteness of the proposal rhetoric, the lack of a sensed substantive problem and consequently, a broad impetus to change, a lack of incentive to change, and severely limited time in which to involve potential implementers.

Comprehensive, systemic change in school districts is a debatable concept. Organizations seek a state of equilibrium in order to sustain themselves, indeed a legitimate goal, and broad, sweeping change in the system militates against the achievement of a steady state. Schools can tolerate only so much change and still attend to the business of "keeping" school, and planned change programs must be sensitive to this need. Even when specific but broad changes are determined at the local level, there are limits to what can be changed and how quickly change can occur. If dissatisfaction does exist with an ongoing system it is highly unlikely that dissatisfaction pervades institutional level management, middle level management, involvement of community people in the schools, staffing arrangements, power and authority arrangements, instructional procedures, curricula, the outcomes of schooling, the manner in which assessment occurs and the flow of information to inform decisions. People are reluctant to change those things with which they are satisfied even if new roles, relationships and statuses are not threatening to them. Where there is little impetus to change, there is little incentive to change. Minimal impetus to change exists when the significant local actors are satisfied with what is. We believe this to be generally true and we are further persuaded of the truth of it in the Jefferson School District. There was little sense of a felt substantive problem in Jefferson. A problem of adequate financial resources to sustain existing educational programs was evident but not a problem with the various programs, including the manner in which decisions were made. Of course, there were a few people in Jefferson who were not pleased with the status quo but no widespread dissatisfaction--not from the central office staff, not from the principals, not from the teachers, not from the students and not from the community population. In the main, existing policies, practices and procedures were broadly accepted. A climate conducive to sweeping change was not present. A careful and systematic study of social conditions existing in Jefferson prior to a final funding (a step we advocated adding to future change models) would have revealed that a climate which facilitates massive change did not exist. Much of what we have reported about social conditions in Jefferson could have been uncovered at an early point. This statement is not intended to be a condemnation of either federal planners or the Jefferson district but is raised here to show the utility of such a step. Information resulting from such a survey can be useful in determining what change is feasible and desirable to attempt. The gist of the charge to district personnel was that they must invoke change in certain elements but could specify what that change was to be within those elements. We strongly endorse the idea that change should be specified by those doing the implementing, but further believe that the change should include an identification of what aspect(s) of schooling are to be targeted for change as well as what that specific change will be.

The proposal language was also vague and ends oriented and consequently, served mostly a ceremonial function gaining social, psychological and financial support for the project. A grand strategy for implementing the program design was not a part of the proposal nor did it develop later. Minimal time existed to solicit involvement of those destined to implement the project design. Little change emerged that could be labeled either comprehensive or systemic. Conditions at both the federal and local levels had combined to render such a development unlikely.

Yet change did occur in the Jefferson School District during ESP as we have reported in this and related documents. Although ESP has not succeeded in reforming Jefferson as visualized--comprehensively and systemically, it did change much more than it would have normally changed without ESP. Just because numerous groups had resisted wholesale change does not mean that there were not some people who wanted to try some new ways of doing things. ESP monies made it possible to try new materials and techniques that otherwise would not have been possible. Although the model for change proved only minimally successful in accomplishing projected change, ESP was good for Jefferson. It served as a lubricant for social and bureaucratic forces. There is an intrinsic quality about attempts to change. As has been previously explicated, change occurred school by school and teacher by teacher. When district people were ready for change and capable of changing, they tried new programs. There was no systemwide strategy designed or adopted; minimal coordination occurred between schools and even within schools in many instances. It might be said that what occurred was analogous to shopping in a supermarket. School personnel took what they wanted and did what they wanted with what they took. It tended to be a nightmare for evaluators (both internal and external evaluators). It was much less difficult to document what occurred than it was to evaluate the impact of various innovations. It is ironic that J ESP succeeded in promoting piecemeal change--the very thing that previous collaborative arrangements between federal agencies and LEA's had accomplished and which had been cited in early ESP rhetoric as a major cause for limited impact.

Is there an alternative to the ESP model for change? We believe we have explicated an alternative that can serve as a starting point for a new model. ESP cross-site information can also be used to supplement what has been learned here as well as other collaborative ventures that involve federal and private funding agencies and local school districts.

Several years ago Smith and Keith suggested that gradualism was a viable alternative to grand and sweeping change and we concur with their thinking. Incremental change is possible in most school districts while grandiose change is not. If change is successful in smaller settings, it will touch people both inside and outside the district. It is unlikely that sufficient impetus can be mustered to change an entire system--whereas a sub-setting may be changed, even several elements within that sub-setting, provided a felt problem exists. It is less complex to get agreement on the functional problem, desired ends, and the means by which a solution can be reached if fewer people are involved and their frames of reference are not too dissimilar. If the solution calls for greater interdependence, coordination comes easier with a few people than with a lot of people. Just because planned change occurs in a small setting or on a small scale doesn't mean that it has to be "piecemeal." We also agree with the designers of ESP that "piecemeal" change is not desirable when planned change occurs that has not been thought through and planned carefully and systematically. Also many changes have been judged unsuccessful that did not really occur but were assumed to have occurred. The emphasis on comprehensiveness could be changed from extensiveness to intensiveness. For example, comprehensive change could occur in a reading program for first grade youngsters in a single classroom if multiple aspects of the program to teach reading were altered simultaneously.

We would also emphasize the point that if meaningful and effective reform is to occur in promoting educational reform at the local level, a broader social and political context than the LEA's and funding agencies must be considered. Constraints to reform outside these two settings is not within the purview of this report; however, to attempt the development of a new collaborative change model without including such variables is to invite major problems and hindrances.

C. Summary

Numerous constraints existed at both the federal and local levels that inhibited an effective implementation of the planned program of reform in Jefferson. Still it has been suggested that J ESP has been functional for the Jefferson School District. It helped the district through a severe financial crunch and permitted individual schools and individual teachers to try some programs which were being tried elsewhere--as well as develop new curricula. The ESP did not have a deleterious effect upon student outcomes in general, nor did it have an overall positive effect, at least as measured by both internal and external evaluators. The ESP did have intrinsic value for Jefferson in that it served as a lubricant for social and bureaucratic forces. By and large, it can be said that Jefferson gained from the experience.

Did J ESP serve its stated function as expressed in the grand design? We have concluded that generally it did not. Broad and sweeping change did not occur as envisioned in the rhetoric. We have argued that it was neither feasible or desirable in this setting.

Was the overall ESP model for inducing planned reform successful in Jefferson? We submit that generally it was not successful and have tried to provide empirical support for our case by documenting what did and did not happen. We have also advanced some possible explanations as to why. It was held that the ESP model as conceived and articulated was not really tested in Jefferson. We have argued that some aspects of the model were not congruent with the reality of change and suggested a gradual and incremental approach but with a different interpretation of comprehensiveness. Finally, we advocated that new collaborative change models should be concerned with conditions which might be manipulated that lie outside the LEA's and federal funding agencies.

Was the J ESP of any value other than to the district itself? Is what has been learned from this experience of any help in developing subsequent collaborative change models? Has anything new been learned about planned change? We would respond to those questions in the affirmative. But, of course, we may be somewhat biased. The readers of this document are in a position to provide an informed response to these and other questions.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Methodological Issues

Appendix A is an extension of what was introduced as a Methodological Note in the introduction section. In this extension we discuss a multi-level approach to evaluation as envisioned by the architects of the Experimental Schools Program; some salient functional issues of immediate concern in the evaluation of J ESP; our response to the substantive evaluation issues confronting Level II in launching the evaluation effort; the employment of a qualitative evaluation strategy to address certain types of questions; the use of a quantitative evaluation strategy to address certain types of questions; a combination of these strategies; and finally, a few comments on the illuminative evaluation design.

The Multi-level Approach to Evaluation

The architects of ESP felt that evaluation should be no less comprehensive than the proposed program change and should serve as an analytical counterpart to that program. This view of evaluation suggested that it needed to serve a broader function than to simply assess program impact on targeted clientele with the assumption that events were occurring as planned. Evaluation was to provide constant process and product feedback about the program that had the potential of contributing to informed decision making at the local level. An internal evaluation unit was to be developed (if the capacity did not already exist) to provide these data to local decision makers. The unit was to be an integral part of the local change program and responsible to the school district. The role and function which the Level I evaluation unit performed in the J ESP is presented in Chapter VII of this report.

Evaluation was to provide information related to the problems encountered in implementing innovations. Information was to be generated on many aspects of the change effort, thereby yielding some insight into problems associated with planned change. Impact data on targeted clientele were to be gathered, analyzed and interpreted. These general charges were to be carried out by an on-site, external evaluation team (Level II). The contract for the external evaluation of the J ESP was awarded to the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory. In the summer of 1971 an evaluation team was placed in the district. An independent unit, the team reported directly to the funding agency through NWREL--not to the district. Since the external evaluation unit was not to influence the project, most Level II reports have not been shared with the district heretofore.*

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*There were a few exceptions since it was deemed necessary to legitimize our presence and establish credibility with the local school people. The few reports that were shared with the district were judged jointly with the federal client not to be in violation of the non-interference posture of Level II. Most of them will now be shared since the project is ended.

The funding agency wanted to gain an unbiased view of J ESP, hence the second level of evaluation. Evaluation information critical to district decision makers was to be fed back through Level I while information critical to the intervening agency was to be gathered independently and fed directly to them.

A third source of information for the intervening agency was to emanate from cross-site comparisons of common programs, problems and issues. These data were to be gathered by a Level III evaluation unit which was to be housed in the offices of the federal agency. This evaluation unit never materialized although several efforts were made to launch such. It seems to us that the ESP program could have been well served with such a capacity. The reasons that position is held have already been discussed in Chapter IX.

Immediate Functional Concerns

Level I and Level II teams were on site in the summer of 1971, but after a year no agreement had been reached as to how the separate evaluation units would function cooperatively in a single setting. A plan for Level I had been approved in the first thirty months district proposal, but the details of how the two teams would gather and share common data were to be worked out jointly and approved by USOE. The one thing that did appear to be clear was that although the two evaluation teams were to be independent of each other in determining the questions to be addressed, they were not to barrage the district with data demands when common data could be utilized.

No agreement had been reached between USOE and Level II evaluation as to what it should be about, although the team had been on site for approximately a year. All of the blame for the absence of such a plan did not rest solely with Level II. The charge for Level II evaluation was vague and consequently much latitude for varying interpretations existed as to what was expected. A new director assumed responsibility for the Level II evaluation program in July of 1972 and two new team members were added by the end of October. Although no approved evaluation plan existed, it was obvious that student achievement and attitude data would be needed. An arrangement on gathering and sharing these data was worked out with the Level I director. A previous agreement existed that data from field notes would not be shared. Their initial budget had been predicated on the idea that Level II would underwrite their share of data gathering and preliminary analysis. With the reaching of an agreement, it was now feasible for Level I to proceed with their approved plan, and Level II could concentrate on developing an evaluation plan.

We perceived our task to be two-fold. Our first priority was to come up with a conceptualization of the evaluation problem that confronted us before providing a detailed operational plan. Following a conceptualization of the task would be the development of an operational plan including a work statement. We also believed that the plan must be developmental. The two staff members who had been in the district the first year of the project were quite knowledgeable about the state of the ESP. Their insights, coupled with what all of us knew about reform efforts in general, led us to believe that whatever plan we developed must be subject to change depending on the information the team came up with on events that were actually occurring in the Jefferson District. We had the concurrence of our Project Officer, but while in the throes of writing a developmental plan, it was learned that NIE was sending a panel to Jefferson to evaluate the evaluation. The saga of that experience will not be detailed here, and is mentioned only because it was a major functional issue with which we had to grapple. It presented a particularly difficult situation for us because we now had eight different agenda with which to deal; our agenda, NIE's agenda, and the agenda of the six different panel members. It was impossible to determine who wanted us to do what. Anyway we survived the experience and lived to see an overall evaluation design eventually approved by NIE. Although evaluation project officers changed many times in the next three and one-half years, the approach to evaluation in the J ESP did not change radically. Only the quality of our studies improved with the addition of Level II staff and the flexibility and excellent technical assistance offered by project staff in Washington.

These were certainly not all of the functional problems that were encountered during those first few months, but the treatment of a few of the more salient ones should provide a flavor of the climate we faced during those first several months. The next section deals with the substance of developing an evaluation methodology consonant with the program we were charged with documenting and evaluating.

Substantive Evaluation Issues

Through studying the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Level II evaluation and also through conversations with the federal director of evaluation for ESP, it was learned that there were three major considerations. First, the impact of the ESP intervention on district clients was to be assessed. Second, Level II evaluation was to document what happened as the Jefferson Schools implemented the project. Third, the planners of ESP wanted a broad evaluation design that encompassed more than existing evaluation models. It was the responsibility of Level II evaluators to provide the specifics. We interpreted the general charge to mean that answers should be sought to two basic questions: How did the J ESP work? How will the J ESP work? Added to the general charge from Washington were two other basic questions: Why does the J ESP take certain forms? How do a government agency and a local education agency work together to bring about planned change?

We did not believe that very many resources should be expended in pursuing the impact question without first illuminating the events that were actually occurring in the Jefferson District. This posture elevated the importance of implementation variables by suggesting that they should be subject to empirical investigation. At the same time, the importance of studying outcome variables was not minimized. Adding the why question had the potential of helping to explain why planned change occurs or fails to occur. We also believed that the role of the intervening agency added another important dimension in understanding what happened and why it happened. The genesis, contact, planning, negotiating and monitoring stages at all levels are integral parts of the project and must be understood before a complete portrayal can be projected. In essence, what we proposed to do, and actually did, was to provide an indepth case study of an entire school district utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods of gathering and analyzing data.

Since the project was to affect several elements of the school system such as governance, community, curriculum and instruction, staffing, training, and assessment, it seemed to make sense to develop specific studies that were focussed on these elements of the system--studies that captured both process and product. Additionally, we attempted to record, analyze and interpret interactions between the Jefferson LEA and the intervening agency. Some forty studies were conducted during the four years this particular team was on site. The final report also includes some data that were not included in individual interim reports. To effectively address the several questions, it was necessary to conduct both qualitative and quantitative studies. Consequently, the research and evaluation team was staffed with interdisciplinary scholars with diverse backgrounds and training. Specific designs were developed for each study and are included in each interim report. However, an attempt is made here to provide some general comments on how certain questions were addressed.

Qualitative Strategies

Documentation was interpreted to mean that events, interactions and activities should be recorded and analyzed. For the most part, the what happened question as well as the why question was pursued qualitatively. Those data are mostly in the form of field notes taken while visiting classrooms, attending meetings, conducting interviews and looking through documents. Some of the data from field notes yielded quite well to quantitative analyses as in the case of studies in curriculum and instruction, community and governance. It was felt that outcome studies would not be particularly meaningful unless treatments were identified and described, although it was necessary to conduct some quantitative studies without benefit of empirical analyses of process or implementation variables. Much qualitative data were gathered, analyzed, interpreted and reported in the governance component of the study, the community component, the curriculum and instruction component, and the assessment component. In some cases, these data could not be tied to quantitative outcome data and in other cases they could be. This does not mean, however, that impact was not reported in all cases because it is possible to use qualitative data to assess impact. In some instances these evaluators were trained educational ethnographers and in all cases they had some training in field methodology.

As an example of what is being referred to here, a study from the curriculum and instructional component is cited. The team wanted to get some purchase on the variety and extent of use of curricular programs and instructional practices. The purpose of the study was two-fold: (1) to get some notion of what the district was implementing and (2) to later be able to study outcome variables of students in relation to treatments. Classrooms on all levels were sampled by actually sitting in those classrooms and recording information on the use of curricular programs and materials, instructional practices, teacher and student interactions and activities and a host of other variables. This study also served as a valuable information source in later tying students to program treatments.

Our evaluation team found, in the main, that observation was most effective in gathering information on what was actually occurring in the project, and it didn't seem to matter whether it was curriculum, instruction, community, governance or evaluation. The why question was most effectively addressed through follow-up interviews with significant actors or through formally structured interviews. The impact or how well question was most effectively addressed with quantitative data, but only after we were able to identify the event, activity or interaction that would cause or in some way be related to the outcome. The largest single drawback to the use of the qualitative method, especially observation, is that it is expensive to implement. At the same time, it is cost effective when the richness of the acquired data is considered.

Quantitative Strategies

Quantitative data were used primarily in six ways: (1) to assess the impact of the overall ESP intervention on student achievement without illuminating implementational variables, (2) to assess the impact of specific ESP programs or student achievement but illuminating implementational variables with qualitative data (sometimes transformed to quantitative data), (3) to assess the impact of specific ESP programs on student achievement while illuminating implementational and other independent and control variables with quantitative data, but informed by qualitative data that had been gathered earlier in the project, (4) to assess attitudes, opinions and sentiments of parents with students in Jefferson schools regarding ESP thrusts and programs, (5) to assess the institutional character of the Jefferson staff before and during the project using perception data, and (6) to trace the expenditure of ESP funds during the project and non-ESP funds before and during the project.

For the most part, we found that quantitative data were more amenable to answering questions of impact than qualitative data; it was certainly more efficient. However, in considering the question of impact, it should be reiterated that the results were often difficult to interpret when not associated with process variables on which some form of empirical analysis had been done. Interpretation often took the form of speculation with the advancement of alternative explanations--not uncommon when using traditional models of evaluation.

Combining Strategies

The strength of our evaluation design resides in the fact that several data-gathering and analysis techniques were utilized. We did not pick up on the polemic between the advocates of field methods and the proponents of survey techniques. We made the assumption that data-gathering techniques cannot be divorced from the nature of the problem. The problem under investigation must dictate the method or methods of investigation; no one best method exists that can be effectively utilized in all situations. Fieldwork contributes to survey analyses and vice-versa. We found that a combination of these strategies often enhances interpretation of results. We also found that the utilization of one method often facilitates the use of anotner. But just as important, we also found that combining techniques is sometimes the best solution. This was done in community studies, curriculum and instructional studies and student impact studies. The specific designs of these studies can be found in interim reports mentioned in this report and listed in the ERIC system.

The Illuminative Evaluation Model

This was a case study of a single educational system, the Jefferson School District, utilizing both field and survey methods. Much has been made of the usefulness of illuminating both process and product variables; of elevating implementational variables and subjecting them to empirical analysis; of the utility in appraising events rather than non-events; of the richness of observation and other field-generated data; and of the usefulness of combining evaluation methodologies. To our knowledge, this is the first time that all of these have been successfully accomplished in the same investigation. The utility of this model in studying planned innovation is readily apparent. Events cannot be assumed nor is it sufficient to speculate about alternative explanations of what the data might be suggesting if innovations are to be understood and decisions are to be made on the basis of evaluation information. It is wasteful of resources to judge reform programs as successes or failures on the basis of severely limited information. This is not the first time that scholars have called for greater illumination; however, it may very well represent the first attempt to actually illuminate a program of planned reform. We recognize that this evaluation effort was replete with problems and that we also made mistakes which we would not make again. It does, however, represent a good beginning in utilizing a more inclusive evaluation model.

One final point should be made. Most evaluation projects are not funded at a level approaching this one. But on the other hand, that could be at least a partial explanation of why evaluation historically has enjoyed minimal success in helping us to understand and find solutions to the myriad problems associated with planned change.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF LEVEL II INTERIM REPORTS

List of Level II Interim Reports

Community Component

Mulhauser, F., "Charrette Report," September 8, 1972.

*Eixenberger, D. F., "Community Profile of the Jefferson School District," July 13, 1973.

Eixenberger, D. F., Hawley, B., and B. Fite, "Survey of the Parents of the Jefferson School District," November 1973.

*Eixenberger, D. F., Hawley, B., and B. Fite, "Impact of the Experimental Schools Project on Parents of the Jefferson School District," April 1974.

*Eixenberger, D. F., "Formal Community Involvement in Policy Formation at the Board of Education and the Education Council Since the Development of the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project," July 1974.

*Eixenberger, D. F. and J. Crist-Whitzel, "Parents and the Schools: An Examination of Consensus, Perceptions of Quality, and Involvement," January 1976.

*Eixenberger, D. F., "Report on Formal Relationships Between School and Community at the Building Level," March 1976.

*Eixenberger, D. F., "Community Participation in the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project," April 1976.

Governance Component

*Mulhauser, F., "Report to Mr. J. Schiller," May 9, 1973.

Pierce, D., "Jefferson Education Association-Jefferson School District Relationships," March 1974.

Pierce, D., "The Fiscal Environment of the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project School Finance Structure," March 1974.

*Mulhauser, F., (with editorial revision by D. Pierce and W. Doyle), "School-University Relations in the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project: A Two-Year Review," working paper, March 1974.

*Pierce, D., "Project Governance: A Three-Year Review," August 1974.

*Pierce, D., "Perceptions of Institutional Character," December 31, 1974.

*Pierce, D., "Jefferson Educational Association-Jefferson School District Relationships: Impacts of the Teachers' Association Upon Governance," June 1975.

*Pierce, D., "Project Governance: A Fourth Year Review," September 1975.

*Pierce, D., "Project Governance: A Five-Year Review," April 1976.

*Donicht, T., "Jefferson Experimental Schools Project: A Fiscal Orientation," May 1976.

Instructional Environment Component

Everhart, R. B., "Schooling and the Socialization of Knowledge," working paper, August 1973.

Everhart, R. B., Hawley, B., McGeever, J. M., and R. M. Toepper, "A Survey of Selected Educational Practices in Seven Schools Before their Official Involvement in the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project,"May 1974.

*Everhart, R. B., Hawley, B., McGeever, J. M. and R. M. Toepper, "Curriculum and Instruction in the Mathematics, Communications, and Social Studies Streams in the Jefferson Experimental Schools Project," September 1974.

*Toepper, R. M., "A Study of Curricular Decision Making in the Jefferson School District Experimental Schools Project," December 1975.

*Everhart, R. B, and J. M. McGeever, "Career and Personal Development Streams in the Jefferson School District," January 1976.

McGeever, J. M., "The Instructional Experience of Selected Students in Traditional and Innovative Instructional Settings," January 1976.

*Toepper, R. M. and J. M. McGeever, "The Status of Individualized Instructional Strategies on the Elementary Level (K-6) in the Jefferson School District During Its Five-Year Experimental Schools Project," April 1976.

Everhart, R. B., "The Worlds of the School: Everyday Life in a Junior High School," July 1976.

Student Impact Component

Reynolds, L., "Report on Student Transiency in Lincoln High School," May 30, 1973.

Reynolds, L., "Descriptive Survey of Twelfth Graders in the Lincoln and Jefferson High Schools," June 30, 1973.

*Reynolds, L. and T. Donicht, "Monitoring Report I: Changes in Student Achievement in Jefferson During the First Two Years of the Experimental Schools Project," October 1973.

Donicht, T. L., "A Review of Literature Concerning the Educational Effects of Student Residential Mobility," January 9, 1974.

Donicht, T. L., "Monitoring Report II: Analysis of Elementary Student Achievement Patterns in Jefferson, 1967-1973," March 1974.

Donicht, T. L. and L. Reynolds, "Monitoring Report III: Changes in Elementary Student Achievement," April 1974.

Donicht, T. L. and L. Reynolds, "The Effect of Transiency and Social Integration Upon the Academic Achievement," May 1974.

Donicht, T. L., "Monitoring Report IV: Changes in Junior High Student Achievement in Jefferson," January 15, 1975.

Donicht, T. L., "Monitoring Report V: Changes in Senior High Student Achievement in Jefferson," March 1975.

*Crist-Whitzel, J. and B. Hawley-Winne, "A Study of Student Characteristics, Instructional Outcomes and Classroom Environment in Different Instructional Approaches in Sixth Grade Mathematics and Reading," December 1975.

*Donicht, T. L., "Summary Report: Changes in Jefferson Student Achievement, 1971-1975," May 1976.

*Crist-Whitzel, J., Toepper, R. M., Donicht, T. L. and J. M. McGeever, "A Longitudinal Study of Achievement in Franklin Pierce Mathematics and Communications Instructional Treatments," October 1976.

Other

*Eixenberger, D. F., "Internal Evaluation: A Sea of Heterogeniety," May 1976.

*Referred to in this report.

APPENDIX C

OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRST 30 MONTHS OF THE JEFFERSON ESP

The final draft of the original ESP proposal: "Experimental Schools, Jefferson: Providing Optimum Learning Environments for 4000 Students," an application to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for an operations grant under provisions of the Experimental Schools Program, planning project OEG-0-71-1214, project number 18040, submitted by the superintendent, May 15, 1971, pp. 5, 8 and 10.

RELATIONSHIP OF IDENTIFIED EDUCATIONAL NEEDS TO PROPOSED PROJECT OBJECTIVES

NEEDS	OBJECTIVES
ALL students need to experience SUCCESS	1. Decrease by 75% the number of students behind grade level. 2. Maintain rate of progress for students at grade level. 3. Decrease by 25% time required by gifted students to complete academic assignments. 4. Offer each student some course in which he can be successful.
Students need to be active participants in the learning process	1. All students in one or more classes of less than 15 students daily. 2. High priority to individualized and independent study programs.
Students need to develop REAL RESPONSIBILITY	1. Vocational work experience provided for all students K-12. 2. Graduation requirements include at least one-semester of work experience and certify that the student could accept responsibility from sources external to the school.
Students need to develop a POSITIVE SELF IMAGE	1. Programs designed for competition with SELF rather than with PEERS. 2. Opportunities, when needed, for one-to-one pupil-teacher groupings.
Students need relevant curriculums with content built around student interests.	1. New FIFTH day interim and summer month curriculums built on student interests. 2. Technical-Interdisciplinary curriculums relating INTEREST to academic subjects.
Students need to be prepared for the FUTURE	1. Students will participate in experiences preparing them for shorter HIGH PERFORMANCE work weeks and be able to constructively use leisure time. Learn relevant THINKING SKILLS.

NEEDS	OBJECTIVES
Today's students need IDEALISM	1. School allows activities WITHIN school rather than WITHOUT. 2. Students will demonstrate a realistic approach to non-materialistic values.
Teachers and all instructional personnel NEED training to work at a higher performance level	1. All teachers in ungraded programs will be trained to work adequately with pupils grouped in flexible, continuous progress curriculums. 2. Teachers will demonstrate improved educator-learning relationships. 3. Teachers will be able to accept the concept of differentiated assignment based on variable performance of students.
School buildings NEED to be utilized during the entire year	To increase the availability of schools to students by at least 33% by keeping them open in the evenings and programming their use during the summer months
Schools NEED to utilize staff members more efficiently	Using a formula acceptable to the teachers association and parents, increase the adult-pupil ratio to 1:12 without significantly increasing the costs. Develop adequate job descriptions and conduct training for these added personnel.
The COMMUNITY NEEDS to be involved in school operations	Establish the CHARRETTE as a regular procedure for converting community desires into real programs. Utilize and train selected members of the community for volunteer service in the schools.
Individualized and group oriented curriculum NEEDS to be efficiently managed	The amount of time a student spends in school will be determined by his performance level. The school will move from an emphasis of providing 180 days of "custody" to emphasizing a change in the level of "performance."

NEEDS	OBJECTIVES
The INSTITUTION NEEDS schools which the patrons can afford	A cost-effectiveness formula will be applied to PRESENT as well as new curriculums utilizing the following formula: $\frac{\text{TOTAL COST X QUALITY RATIO}}{\text{INSTRUCTIONAL COST}} = \text{C. E.}$ (Coefficient) Those programs which can be justified either from increased QUALITY or decreased instructor's cost will be retained. Others will be modified or discontinued.
There NEEDS to be a training program for each of the project components so that successful practices can be exported	Two local universities will establish training in three diminensions: 1. Incorporate information about project components in their regular training programs. 2. Develop training for INSTALLERS including workshops, visitation, and material development so that project components can be successfully exported. 3. Conduct mini-courses and clinics on project components.
The Project NEEDS to be accounted in the PPBES format	To cost account all programs in terms of performance objectives: 1. For the federal budget for the 1971-72 school year. 2. For the TOTAL school budget of the project of the project schools for the 1972-73 school year.
A system NEEDS to be developed to determine which project components should be exported and which promising programs should be imported	To develop a quality and efficiency import, export model and apply this instrument to all components to be imported for the 1971-72 school year and develop the criteria for all components ready to by exported by 1973-74.

NEEDS	OBJECTIVES
The project NEEDS to be able to handle visitors to the project schools without these visitors becoming part of the educational process.	A television dissemination center will be established at a local university to bring live signals from eight locations in the three proximity schools. These would be distributed through the existing T. V. networks. Visitors would have an orientation at the university, view selected classes in action, and visit one or two sites instead of all six.
Evaluation results NEED to be used to continue, discontinue or modify project components.	After the first year, projects showing negative evaluation values will be modified. After the second year, the negative value projects will be dicontinued.